


FRANKLIN
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J. B. Beman,

L I F E
OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

PRESENTING


**HIS EARLY HISTORY, POLITICAL CAREER, AND SPEECHES IN
AND OUT OF CONGRESS;**

L. B. Benson,

BY
JOSEPH H. BARRETT,

NEW YORK :
WORTHINGTON CO.,
747 BROADWAY,

—
1890.



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PART I.

CHAPTER I.

MR. LINCOLN'S EARLY BOYHOOD IN KENTUCKY.

Ancestry of Abraham Lincoln.—Their residence in Pennsylvania and Virginia.—His Grandfather Crosses the Alleghanies to join Boone and his Associates.—“The Dark and Bloody Ground.”—His Violent Death.—His Widow Settles in Washington County.—Thomas Lincoln, his Son, Marries and Locates near Hodgenville.—Birth of Abraham Lincoln.—La Rue County.—His Early Life and Training in Kentucky.

THE ancestors of ABRAHAM LINCOLN were of English descent. We find the earliest definite traces of them in Berks county, Pennsylvania, though this was almost certainly not the first place of their residence in this country. Their location, and their adherence to the Quaker faith, make it probable that the original emigration occurred under the auspices of William Penn. It was doubtless a branch of the same family that, leaving England under different religious impulses, but with the same adventurous and independent spirit, settled, at an earlier date, in Old Plymouth Colony. The separation may possibly have taken place this side of the Atlantic, and not beyond. Some of the same traits appear conspicuously in both these family groups. One tradition indeed affirms that the Pennsylvania branch was transplanted from Hingham, Massachusetts, and was derived from a common stock with General Benjamin Lincoln, of Revolutionary fame. There is a noticeable coincidence in the general prevalence, in each American branch, of Scriptural names in christening—the Benjamin, Levi, and Ezra, of Massachusetts, having their counterpart in the Abraham, Thomas, and Josiah, of Virginia and Kentucky. The peculiarity is one to have been equally expected among sober Friends, and among zealous Puritans.

Berks county was not very long the home of Mr. Lincoln's immediate progenitors. There can hardly have been more than a slender pioneer settlement there, when one or more of the number made another remove, not far from the year 1750, to what is now Rockingham county, Virginia. Old Berks was first settled about 1734—then, too, as a German colony—and was not organized as a county until 1752; before which date, according to family traditions, this removal to Virginia took place.

This, it will be observed, was pre-eminently a pioneer stock, evidently much in love with backwoods adventure, and constantly courting the dangers and hardships of forest life.

Rockingham county, Virginia, though situated in the beautiful valley of the Shenandoah, and inviting, by its natural resources, the advances of civilization, must nevertheless have been, at the time just mentioned, in the very heart of the wilderness. Now, it is one of the most productive counties of Virginia, having exceeded every other county in the State, according to the census of 1850, in its crops of wheat and hay. A branch of the family, it is understood, still remains there, to enjoy the benefits of so judicious a selection, and of the labors and imperfectly requited endurances of these first settlers.

From this locality, about the year 1782, Abraham Lincoln, grandfather of him who was to make the name illustrious, started Westward across the Alleghanies, attracted by the accounts which had reached him of the wonderfully fertile and lovely country explored by Daniel Boone, on and near the Kentucky river. During all his lifetime, hitherto, he could have known little of any other kind of existence than that to which he had been educated as an adventurous frontiersman. The severe labor of preparing the heavily-timbered lands of Shenandoah for cultivation, the wild delights of hunting the then abundant game of the woods, and the exciting hazards of an uncertain warfare with savage enemies, had been almost the sole occupation of his rough and healthful life. Perhaps the settlements around him had already begun to be too far advanced for the highest enjoyment of his characteristic mode of living; or possibly, with others, he aspired to the possession

of more fertile fields, and to an easier subsistence. Whatever the reason, he set out at the time just stated, with his wife and several young children, on his long journey across the mountains, and over the broad valleys intervening between the Shenandoah and the Kentucky.

At this date, and for ten or twelve years later, the present State of Kentucky formed part of the old Commonwealth of Virginia. "The dark and bloody ground," as afterward named for better reasons than the fiction which assigns this meaning to its Indian appellation, had then been but recently entered upon by the white man. Its first explorer, Daniel Boone, whose very name suggests a whole world of romance and adventure, had removed, when a mere boy, among the earlier emigrants from Eastern Pennsylvania, to Berks county. Here he must have been a contemporary resident, and was perhaps an acquaintance, of some of the younger members of the Lincoln family. At all events, as substantially one of their own neighbors, they must have watched his later course with eager interest and sympathy, and caught inspiration from his exploits. At eighteen, Boone had again emigrated with his father, as before, to the banks of the Yadkin, a mountain river in the north-west of North Carolina, at just about the same date as the removal of the Lincolns to Virginia. Some years later, Boone, in his hunting excursions, had passed over and admired large tracts of the wilderness north of his home, and especially along a branch of the Cumberland river, within the limits of what is now Kentucky. It was not until 1769, however, that, with five associates, he made the thorough exploration of the Kentucky valley, which resulted in the subsequent settlements there. The glowing descriptions, which ultimately got abroad, of the incredible richness and beauty of these new and remote forest-climes of Trans-Alleghanian Virginia, and of their alluring hunting-grounds, must have early reached the ears of the boyhood-companions of Daniel Boone, and spread through the neighboring country. The stirring adventures of the pioneer hero, during the next five or six years, and the beginnings of substantial settlements in that far-west country, must have suggested new attractions thitherward, to the more

active and daring spirits, whose ideal of manhood Boone so nearly approached.

From the borders, in various directions, hundreds of miles away, emigration had now begun. These recruits were from that class of hardy frontiersmen most inured to the kind of toils they were to encounter anew in the Kentucky forests. They went forward, fearless of the dangers to be encountered from the numerous bands of Indians already re-commencing hostilities, after a temporary pacification. Here was a common territory and place of meeting for the tribes, both of the North and the South, and here, before and after this date, there were many exciting adventures and deadly conflicts with these savages, whose favorite haunts had been thus uncere- moniously invaded.

It was not far from the date of the disastrous battle of the Lower Blue Licks, in 1782, that the grandfather of Mr. Lincoln, with his young family, reached the region which had, perhaps, long been the promised land of his dreams. The exact place at which he settled is not known. According to the family tradition, it was somewhere on Floyd's creek, supposed to be near its mouth, in what is now Bullitt county. On the other hand, in the field-book of Daniel Boone, who was a deputy-surveyor under Col. Thomas Marshall, father of Chief Justice Marshall, is the following memorandum: "Abraham Lincoln enters 500 acres of land, on a Treasury Warrant—No. 5,994—beginning opposite Charles Yancey's upper line, on the south side of the river, running south 200 poles, then up the river for quantity, 11th December, 1782."* Yancey's land, as appears from the same book, was on the north side of the "main" Licking Creek, as then designated.

The emigrant had made but a mere beginning in his new pioneer labors, when, while at work one day, at a distance from his cabin, unsuspecting of danger, he was killed by an Indian, who had stolen upon him unawares. His widow, thus suddenly bereaved

* Boone's field-book is now in the hands of L. C. Draper, Esq., of Madison, Wisconsin, to whom I am indebted for the copy given in the text. The "treasury warrant" was issued by the State of Virginia.

in a new and strange land, had now their three sons and two daughters left to her sole protection and care, with probably little means for their support. She soon after removed to what became Washington county, in the same State, and there reared her children, all of whom reached mature age. One of the daughters was married to a Mr. Crume, and the other to a man named Bromfield. The three sons, named Thomas, Mordecai and Josiah, all remained in Kentucky until after their majority.

Thomas Lincoln, one of these sons, was born in 1778. He was a mere child when his father removed to Kentucky, and was but six years old at the time of the latter's death. The date of this event was consequently about 1784. Of the early life of the orphan boy, we have no knowledge, except what can be learned of the general lot of his class, and of the habits and modes of living then prevalent among the hardy pioneers of Kentucky. These backwoodsmen had an unceasing round of hard toils, with no immediate reward but a bare subsistence from year to year, and the cheering promise of better days in the future. But even their lands, as in the case of Boone, they were not always so fortunate as to retain in fee.

More comfortable days, and a much improved state of things had come, before Thomas arrived at maturity; but in his boyhood and youth, he must have known whatever was worst in the trials and penury of the first generation of Kentucky frontiersmen, with few other enjoyments than an occasional practice with his rifle. His training was suited to develop a strong, muscular frame, and a rugged constitution, with a characteristic quickness of perception and promptness of action. The Kentuckian of that, and the succeeding generation had generally a tall, stalwart frame, a frank and courteous heart, and a humorous and slightly quaint turn of speech; a fondness for adventure and for the sports of hunting; a manly self-respect, and a fearless independence of spirit.

"Pride in their port, defiance in their eye,

* * * * *

Intent on high designs, a thoughtful band,

By forms unfashioned, fresh from nature's hand,

Fierce in their native hardness of soul,

True to imagined right, above control."

This generation began its life with the independent existence of the nation, and partook largely of the spirit of exultant self-confidence then abroad through the land.

These were the circumstances and associations under which, in those primeval days in Kentucky, Thomas Lincoln passed through the period of boyhood and youth. At the date of the political separation from Virginia, in 1792, and the formation of a new State, this orphan boy, struggling to aid his mother in the support of the ill-fortuned family, had reached the age of fourteen. The currents of emigration had become enlarged and accelerated, meantime, until the population was swelled, as early as 1790, to more than 73,000; and during the next ten years it was more than trebled, reaching 220,000. The wilderness that once was around Boonesborough, Harrodsburg, and Lexington, was now blossoming as the rose. Still, however, there was ample space unoccupied, within the limits of the new State, for those who craved the excitements and the loneliness of a home in the wilderness.

In 1806, Thomas Lincoln, being then twenty-eight years of age, was married to Nancy Hanks, a native of Virginia, and settled in what was then Hardin county, Kentucky. It does not appear that the parents of Miss Hanks ever removed to Kentucky, though others of the family did so. Of the history of her ancestry, we have no definite particulars. Her position in life appears to have been not dissimilar to that of her husband. That she possessed some rare qualities of mind and heart, there is reason to believe; although, dying at an early age, and having, from the time of her marriage, passed her days on obscure frontiers, few recollections of her remain.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN was born of these parents on the 12th day of February, 1809. The place where they at this time resided, is in what is now LaRue county, about a mile and a half from Hodgenville, the county-seat, and seven miles from Elizabethtown, laid off several years previously, and the county-seat of Hardin county. He had one sister, two years his senior, who grew up to womanhood, married, and died while young. He had a brother, two years younger than himself, who died in early childhood. Mr. Lincoln remembers to

have visited the now unmarked grave of this little one, along with his mother, before leaving Kentucky. These were the only children of Thomas Lincoln, either by the present or by a subsequent marriage, hereafter to be noticed. ABRAHAM has thus, for a long time, been the sole immediate representative of this hardy and energetic race.

LaRue county, named from an early settler, John LaRue, was set off and separately organized in 1843, the portion containing Mr. Lincoln's birthplace having been, up to that date, included in Hardin county. It is a rich grazing country in its more rolling and hilly parts, and the level surface produces good crops of corn and tobacco. In the northern borders of the county, on the Rolling Fork of Salt river, is Muldrough's Hill, a noted eminence. Hodgenville, near which Mr. Lincoln was born, is a pleasantly situated town on Nolin creek, and a place of considerable business. About a mile above this town, on the creek, is a mound, or knoll, thirty feet above the banks of the stream, containing two acres of level ground, at the top of which there is now a house. Some of the early pioneers encamped on this knoll; and but a short distance from it a fort was erected by Philip Phillips, an emigrant from Pennsylvania, about 1780 or 1781, near the time Mr. Lincoln's ancestor arrived from Virginia. John LaRue came from the latter State, with a company of emigrants, and settled, not far from the same date, at Phillips' Fort. Robert Hodgen, LaRue's brother-in-law, purchased and occupied the land on which Hodgenville is built. Both these pioneers were men of sterling integrity, and high moral worth. They were consistent and zealous members of the Baptist church, and one of their associates, Benjamin Lynn, was a minister of the same denomination. Such were the influences under which, more than twenty years before Thomas Lincoln settled there, this little colony had been founded, and which went far to give the community its permanent character.

It is needless to rehearse the kind of life in which Abraham Lincoln was here trained. The picture is similar in all such settlements. In his case, there was indeed the advantage of a generation or two of progress, since his grandfather had

hazarded and lost his life in the then slightly broken wilderness. The State now numbered some 400,000 inhabitants, and had all the benefits of an efficient local administration, the want of which had greatly increased the dangers and difficulties of the first settlers. Henry Clay had already, though little more than thirty years of age, begun his brilliant political career, having then served for a year or two in the United States Senate.

Yet, with all these changes, the humble laborers, settled near "Hodgen's Mills," on Nolin Creek, had no other lot but incessant toil, and a constant struggle with nature in the still imperfectly reclaimed wilds, for a plain subsistence. Here the boy spent the first years of his childhood. With apparently the same frowning fortune which darkened the early days of Robert Burns, it was not destined that young Lincoln's father should succeed in these first endeavors to secure a competency. Even before the date of his earliest distinct recollections, he removed with his father to a place six miles distant from Hodgenville, which was also ere long to be surrendered, as we shall presently see, for a home in the far-off wilderness, and for frontier life, in its fullest and most significant meaning.

The period of ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S Kentucky life extends through a little more than seven years, terminating with the autumn of 1816. If it be true as a rule (as Horace Mann was wont to maintain), that the experiences and instructions of the first seven years of every person's existence, do more to mold and determine his general character, than all subsequent training, then must we regard Mr. Lincoln as a Kentuckian (of the generation next following that of Clay), by his early impressions and discipline, no less than by birth.

In those days there were no common schools in that country. The principal reliance for acquiring the rudiments of learning was the same as that to which the peasant-poet of Ayrshire was indebted. Education was by no means disregarded, nor did young Lincoln, poor as were his opportunities, grow up an illiterate boy, as some have supposed. Competent teachers were accustomed to offer themselves then, as in later years, who opened private schools for a neighborhood, being sup-

ported by tuition fees or subscription. During his boyhood days in Kentucky, Abraham Lincoln attended, at different times, at least two schools of this description, of which he has clear recollections. One of these was kept by Zachariah Riney, a Roman Catholic, whose peculiarities have not been wholly effaced from the memory of his since so distinguished pupil. But although this teacher was himself an ardent Catholic, he made no proselyting efforts in his school, and when any little religious ceremonies, or perhaps mere catechising and the like, were to be gone through with, all Protestant children, of whom, it is needless to say that young Abraham was one, were accustomed to retire, by permission or command. Riney was probably in some way connected with the movement of the "Trappists," who came to Kentucky in the autumn of 1805, and founded an establishment (abandoned some years later) under Urban Guillet, as superior, on Pottinger's Creek. They were active in promoting education especially among the poorer classes, and had a school for boys under their immediate supervision. This, however, had been abandoned before the date of Lincoln's first school-days, and it is not improbable that the private schools under Roman Catholic teachers were an offshoot of the original system adopted by these Trappists, who subsequently removed to Illinois.

Another teacher, on whose instructions the boy afterward attended, while living in Kentucky, was named Caleb Hazel. His was also a neighborhood school, sustained by private patronage.

With the aid of these two schools, and with such further assistance as he received at home, there is no doubt that he had become able to read well, though without having made any great literary progress, at the age of seven. That he was not a dull or inapt scholar, is manifest from his subsequent attainments. With the allurements of the rifle and the wild game which then abounded in the country, however, and with the meager advantages he had, in regard to books, it is certain that his perceptive faculties, and his muscular powers, were much more fully developed by exercise than his *scholastic* talents.

While he lived in Kentucky, he never saw even the exterior of what was properly a church edifice. The religious services he attended were held either at a private dwelling, or in some log school-house, or in the open grove:

“Fit shrine for humble worshiper to hold
Communion with his Master. These dim vaults,
These winding aisles, of human pomp or pride
Report not. No fantastic carvings show
The boast of our vain race, to change the form
Of Thy fair works. But Thou art here, Thou fill'st
The solitude.”*

Unsatisfactory results of these many years' toil on the lands of Nolin Creek, or a restless spirit of adventure and fondness for more genuine pioneer excitements than this region continued to afford, led Thomas Lincoln, now verging upon the age of forty, and his son beginning to be of essential service in manual labor, to seek a new place of abode, far to the west, beyond the Ohio river.

*Bryant.

CHAPTER II.

MR. LINCOLN'S EARLY LIFE IN INDIANA.

The Removal from Kentucky.—An Emigrant Journey.—The Forests of Southern Indiana.—New Home of the Lincoln Family.—Indiana in 1816.—Slavery and Free Labor.—Young Lincoln at His Work.—His Schools and Schoolmasters.—Self-Education.—A Characteristic Incident.—Acquaintance with River Life.—His First Trip to New Orleans as a Flatboatman.—Death of His Mother.—His Father's Second Marriage.—Recollections of an Early Settler.—Close of an Eventful Period in Young Lincoln's History.

EARLY in the autumn of 1816, an immediate departure for the new wilds of Indiana, was determined on by Thomas Lincoln. It was no very imposing sight, certainly, as the little family, bidding the old Kentucky home adieu, moved forward upon their long and winding pioneer march. Many sad thoughts there undoubtedly were in that small group, and perhaps some forebodings, also, as their former place, gradually receding, at length disappeared from their reverted eyes. But these emotions must soon have been lost in the excitements of their journey.

It was no novel picture which they presented, for that period, as they advanced on their lonely way, for the days required to bring them to the place whence they were to cross the "Beautiful River." The plain wagon, with its simple covering as a shelter for its lading of household utensils, articles of food, and "varieties," was drawn by a not too-spirited or over-fed horse, in a harness probably compounded of leather and hempen cords of an uncertain age. In the forward part of this conveyance, sat the emigrant wife and her daughter, nine years old, while the father and his son, now past seven, walking in the rear, took care that the indispensable cow kept pace to the

music of the jolting wheels. Underneath the wagon, or scouting at pleasure through the surrounding woods, was of course a large dog, constant to the fortunes of his master's family, and ready for any fate to which their migrations might lead him. Arrived at the appointed landing on the banks of the Ohio, it only remained to embark the little caravan upon a flatboat, and to cross the stream, now swelled to fair proportions by the autumn rains. Finally, after reaching the Indiana side, the adventurers landed at or near the mouth of Anderson's Creek, now the boundary between the counties of Perry and Spencer, about one hundred and forty miles below Louisville, by the river, and sixty above Evansville. In a direct line across the country from their former residence, the distance is, perhaps, hardly one hundred miles.

The place at which Mr. Lincoln settled, at the end of this journey, is some distance back from the Ohio river, near the present town of Gentryville. Under the earliest organization, this was in Perry county, of which Troy was the county-seat. Two years later, Spencer county was formed, embracing all that part of Perry west of Anderson's Creek, and including the place at which Mr. Lincoln had located himself.

Here his emigrant wagon paused, and aided by the busy hands of his son, a log cabin was speedily built, which was to be their home through many coming years. The particular site of his dwelling was doubtless determined, as usual, by the discovery of a living spring of water, after fixing on his selection for a farm. This completed, and a shelter provided for their stock, the next business was to clear up a space in the forest which should produce a crop of grain for their sustenance the next season. Hard work had begun in good earnest for the young Kentuckian. He was to learn the realities of genuine pioneer life, such as he had before but imperfectly understood, unless by tradition and the evening tales of his father.

Indiana, at this date, was still a Territory, having been originally united under the same government with Illinois, after the admission of Ohio as a State, "the first-born of the great North-west," in 1802. A separate territorial organization was made for each in 1809. A few months before the arrival

of Thomas Lincoln, namely, in June, 1816, pursuant to a Congressional "enabling act," a Convention had been held which adopted a State Constitution, preparatory to admission into the Union. Under this Constitution, a little later, in December, 1816, Indiana became, by act of Congress, one of the United States.

The population of Indiana was now about 65,000, distributed chiefly south of a straight line drawn from Vincennes, on the Wabash, to Lawrenceburg, on the Ohio. Vincennes was long the territorial capital, and with the surrounding country, had been occupied by French emigrants, many years before the Revolution. In 1800, the whole number of residents in these colonies was less than 5,000. These, like other French settlements, made little progress of themselves. From 1800 to 1810, there had been a large increase, mostly by emigrations to Southern Indiana from Kentucky, swelling the population to 24,520, at the latter date. In 1811 had occurred serious difficulties with the Indians, terminating in the decisive victory over them at Tippecanoe. So general had become the settlements, eastward from Vincennes and up the Ohio river, that the capital was removed far eastward to Corydon, in 1813, as a central location. This place, the capital of Harrison county, is about twenty-five miles west from Louisville, and more than a hundred south of the present metropolis of the State. But one county intervened between Harrison and Perry, and Gentryville is hardly forty miles, in a direct line, from Corydon. This place continued to be the seat of government for the State until 1824, as it had been for the Territory during the three years next preceding 1816. It was but natural, therefore, that emigration should be prominently directed to this part of the State, at the period under consideration. In 1820, the population had increased to over 147,000, or more than six-fold during ten years, and nearly thirty-fold since 1800.

There is little doubt that, in emigrating, Thomas Lincoln had fallen in with a prevalent contagion in his own State, and that he took up his residence in the part of Indiana then deemed most desirable of all that was unoccupied. It is common to attribute these extensive migrations from the border slave-

holding States into the non-slaveholding North-west, to a preference for institutions based upon free labor to the exclusion of slavery. This was, beyond question, a powerful inducement with many, yet, by no means the only one; and, with some, it did not exist at all. In the earlier days of Kentucky, the proportion of slaves to the free white population was small, and in many places slavery can hardly have been an appreciable element. But in 1816, the number of slaves must have exceeded 100,000, and their ratio of increase was becoming very high. Upon a man in the circumstances of Mr. Lincoln, with a young family to rear, this consideration undoubtedly had its weight, among the others we have suggested as the cause of his removal to Indiana. We have at least the fact, that, though painfully, and with an exile's sadness, he yet turned his back forever on a State that tolerated slavery, to seek a new home where free labor had been sacredly assured exclusive rights and honors.

The next thirteen years Abraham Lincoln spent here, in Southern Indiana, near the Ohio, nearly midway between Louisville and Evansville. He was now old enough to begin to take an active part in the farm labors of his father, and he manfully performed his share of hard work. He learned to use the ax and to hold the plough. He became inured to all the duties of seed-time and harvest. On many a day, during every one of those thirteen years, this Kentucky boy might have been seen with a long "gad" in his hand, driving his father's team in the field, or from the woods with a heavy draught, or on the rough path to the mill, the store, or the river landing. He was specially an adept at felling trees, and acquired a muscular strength in which he was equaled by few or none of those about him. In the sports of hunting and fishing, he was less skilled.

A vigorous constitution, and a cheerful, unrepining disposition, made all his labors comparatively light. To such a one, this sort of life has in it much of pleasant excitement to compensate for its hardships. He learned to derive enjoyment from the severest lot. The "dignity of labor," which is with

demagogues mere hollow cant, became to him a true and appreciable reality.

Here, as in Kentucky, he attended private schools, and in other ways increased his little stock of learning, aided by what he had already acquired. The same want of systematic public instruction, and the same mode of remedying this lack, prevailed in Indiana, as in his former home. One of his teachers was named Andrew Crawford, to whom he used to be occasionally indebted for the loan of books, to read at such leisure hours as he could command. His last teacher was Azel W. Dorsey, who had the satisfaction, in later years, of taking his former scholar by the hand, rejoicing to recognize the once obscure boy as one of the foremost leaders of the people. Dorsey was lately residing in Schuyler County, Illinois, where he also had sons living.

That we may estimate Mr. Lincoln in his true character, as chiefly a self-educated man, it should be stated that, summing up all the days of his actual attendance upon school instruction, the amount would hardly exceed one year. The rest he has accomplished for himself in his own way. As a youth he read with avidity such instructive works as he could obtain, and in winter evenings, by the mere light of the blazing fireplace, when no better resource was at hand.

An incident having its appropriate connection here, and illustrating several traits of the man, as already developed in early boyhood, is vouched for by a citizen of Evansville, who knew him in the days referred to. In his eagerness to acquire knowledge, young Lincoln had borrowed of Mr. Crawford a copy of Weems' *Life of Washington*—the only one known to be in existence in the neighborhood. Before he had finished reading the book, it had been left, by a not unnatural oversight, in a window. Meantime, a rain storm came on, and the book was so thoroughly wet as to make it nearly worthless. This mishap caused him much pain; but he went, in all honesty, to Crawford with the ruined book, explained the calamity that had happened through his neglect, and offered, not having sufficient money, to "work out" the value of the book.

"Well, Abe," said Crawford, "as it's you I wont be hard on

you. Come over and pull fodder for me for two days, and we will call our accounts even."

The offer was accepted and the engagement literally fulfilled. As a boy, no less than since, Abraham Lincoln had an honorable conscientiousness, integrity, industry, and an ardent love of knowledge.

The town on the Ohio river, nearest his home, was Troy, the capital of Perry county down to the date of its division. This place, at the mouth of Anderson's Creek, had been settled as early as 1811, and was a place of some consequence, both for its river trade and as the county-seat. After this latter advantage was lost, by the formation of a new county in 1818, Troy dwindled away, and is now a place of only about five hundred inhabitants. Rockport, nearly twenty miles south-west of Gentryville, became the capital of Spencer county, and thenceforward a point of interest to the new settlers. It is situated on a high bluff of the Ohio river, and receives its name from "Lady Washington's Rock," a picturesque hanging-rock at that place. At these two points young Lincoln gained some knowledge of the new world of river life and business, in addition to his farm experience, and to his forest sports with rod and rifle. For several months he is said to have been ferryman at Anderson's Creek Ferry.

It was during one of the later of these thirteen years, that Abraham, at nineteen, was permitted to gratify his eager longing to see more of the world, and to try the charms of an excursion on the Beautiful River. He had inherited much of the adventurous and stirring disposition of his Virginian grandfather, and was delighted with the prospect of a visit to New Orleans, then the splendid city of Western dreams. He performed this journey on a common flatboat, doing service as one of the hands on that long yet most exhilarating trip. We have no particulars of this his sole excursion as a flatboatman during his Indiana days, yet to his own mind it probably long afforded many not unpleasing recollections. He was undoubtedly the life of the little company, delighting them with his humorous sallies no less than with his muscular superiority, and with his hilarious activity and intuitive tact in all that immediately concerned their voyage.

If there had been any forebodings at the time of departure from their first home on Nolin Creek, these were to be ere long realized by the Indiana emigrants. Scarcely two years had passed, in this changed climate, and in these rougher forest experiences, before the mother of young Abraham—perhaps too gentle to encounter the new trials added to those she had before partially surmounted, and to endure the malarious influences in which this wild country abounded—was called to a last separation from those she had so tenderly loved. She died in 1818, leaving as her sole surviving children, a daughter less than twelve years old, and a son two years younger, of whose future distinction, even with a mother's fondness, she probably had but an indefinite hope. A grave was made for her—

“Where the wind of the West breathes its softest sigh;
Where the silvery stream is flowing nigh—
Where the sun's warm smile may never dispel
Night's tears o'er the form that was loved so well—
Where no column proud in the sun may glow
To mock the heart that is resting below.” *

A year or two later, Thomas Lincoln contracted a second marriage with Mrs. Johnston, a widow with three children, that were brought up with those of Mr. Lincoln. Besides these step-children, there were no additions to the family as before enumerated.

In concluding this brief account of the thirteen important years which were spent by Abraham Lincoln as an Indianian, the personal recollections of a distinguished lawyer and statesman of an older generation, who emigrated to Indiana at nearly the same date, will aid in conveying a correct impression of those times, and of the circumstances with which the youth was surrounded.

Indiana, says the late Hon. O. H. Smith,† “was born in the year 1816, with some sixty-five thousand inhabitants—only about forty years ago. A few counties only were then organ-

* J. B. Dillon.

† Early Indiana Trials and Sketches. Reminiscences by Hon. O. H. Smith, page 285.

ized. The whole middle, north, and north-west portions of the State were an unbroken wilderness, in the possession of the Indians. Well do I remember when there were but two families settled west of the Whitewater Valley—one at Flat Rock, above where Rushville now stands, and the other on Brandywine, near where Greenfield was afterward located. When I first visited the ground on which Indianapolis now stands, the whole country, east to Whitewater and west to the Wabash, was a dense, unbroken forest. There were no public roads, no bridges over any of the streams. The traveler had literally to swim his way. No cultivated farms, no houses to shelter or feed the weary traveler, or his jaded horse. The courts, years afterward, were held in log huts, and the juries sat under the shade of the forest trees. I was Circuit Prosecuting Attorney at the time of the trials at the falls of Fall Creek, where Pendleton now stands. Four of the prisoners were convicted of murder, and three of them hung, for killing Indians. The court was held in a double log cabin, the grand jury sat upon a log in the woods, and the foreman signed the bill of indictment which I had prepared, upon his knee; there was not a petit juror that had shoes on—all wore moccasins, and were belted around the waist, and carried side-knives used by the hunter. The products of the country consisted of peltries, the wild game killed in the forest by the Indian hunters, the fish caught in the interior lakes, rivers and creeks, the pawpaw, wild plum, haws, small berries gathered by the squaws in the woods. The travel was confined to the single horse and his rider, the commerce to the pack-saddle, and the navigation to the Indian canoe. Many a time and oft have I crossed our swollen streams, by day and by night, sometimes swimming my horse, and at others paddling the rude bark canoe of the Indian. Such is a mere sketch of our State when I traversed its wilds, and I am not one of its first settlers.”

Thus it was that young Lincoln grew up to the verge of manhood; he led no idle or enervating existence. Brought up to the habits of sobriety, and accustomed to steady labor, no one of all the working-men with whom he came in contact

was a better sample of his class than he. He had now become a Saul among his associates, having reached the hight of nearly six feet and four inches, and with a comparatively slender yet uncommonly strong, muscular frame. He was even then, in his mental and moral characteristics, no less than in his physical proportions, one not to be forgotten or unappreciated by those who knew him. Many reminiscences of those days of his hardy endeavor and rough experience linger in the minds of the plain, earnest people among whom his lot for a long period was thus cast, and will some time be repeated, with such exaggerations or fabulous glosses as are wont gradually to gather, like the sacred halo of the painters, around the memorials of a recognized hero. And a hero, ever hereafter, in the traditions of Southern Indiana, will be the youthful Abraham Lincoln, gigantic and stalwart in his outward form, no less than in the glowing and noble spirit already beginning to foresee and prepare for a high destiny. Wherever he has dwelt becomes classic and consecrated ground, and to have known him, even in his obscurest days, will be deemed a circumstance to be recounted with pride. To gather up such recollections and to perpetuate them with the pen, will be the work of future times and other hands.

This period of young Lincoln's life was terminated by another removal of his father, as will appear in the next chapter

CHAPTER III.

FIRST YEARS IN ILLINOIS.—1830-32

The French Settlements.—The North-west.—The Advance of Emigration.—Four Great States Founded in the Lifetime of Mr. Lincoln's Father.—North and South Meeting in Ohio, Indiana and Illinois.—Sentiments of Southern Emigrants.—The First Emigrations.—A Coincidence of Dates.—Mordecai and Josiah Lincoln.—Removal to Illinois.—Settlement on the Sangamon, in Macon County.—The Locality Described.—Abraham Lincoln Engaged in Splitting Rails.—Another Removal of his Father.—He Settles in Coles County.—Abraham Lincoln makes Another Trip as a Flatboatman.—Becomes Clerk in a Store on his Return.—Postmaster at New Salem.

THE early French settlements of Illinois, at Kaskaskia and Cahokia, had proved as little successful or permanent as those of Indiana around Vincennes. The territory had come into the possession of the British Government just before the Revolution, and emigration from Virginia had commenced almost simultaneously to that quarter and to Kentucky. In 1787, as is well known, the settlements here, in common with those scattered throughout the great expanse of United States territory, north-west of the Ohio river, were brought under a territorial government, as wide in its local scope as it was apparently insignificant in the extent of its population and power. Time speedily demonstrated the error of such an estimate of the remarkable region between the Ohio, the Mississippi, and the Lakes. yet, even to this day, the people of the East accept the idea of this greatness and coming power rather as an abstract proposition than as a living reality, deeply affecting their own relative interests and the common resources and grandeur of the country.

The rapid growth of Kentucky on the one side, and of Ohio and Indiana on the other, we have incidentally seen in these pages. The birth of Mr. Lincoln's father, Thomas Lincoln, was anterior to, or nearly coeval with, the very first settlements in all those States, excepting only the lifeless French colonies of Indiana. The State of Illinois may be added to those of which it may be said, in like manner, his own life was the measure of their age, dating from the first substantial and growing existence of their colonial settlements. In Illinois, as in Indiana, the earliest waves of a healthful emigration had come from Kentucky and Virginia, and in both cases alike, the Southern portion was the earliest to be occupied. Between these early outflowings of free labor from the land of slavery, and those later ones from the free States of the East, on more northern parallels, there is a marked difference, still traceable—creating, in a certain sense, in all the States of the North-west which touch the imaginary line of Mason and Dixon, a division of North and South. Experience and increased commingling between these localities are fast abating the distinctness of this somewhat indefinite separating line, but for years to come it can not be wholly obliterated. These two elements, combined and consolidated, growing into unity instead of being arrayed against each other in widening separation, will go to constitute the strongest of States. The Southern emigration gave character to the earlier legislation of Indiana and Illinois especially. With evidences of a lurking attachment to the peculiar institution of the States on the other side of the Ohio river, the general tenor of public sentiment and action was as positive and distinct, as were the opinions of the more Northern multitudes who came in to fill up these new commonwealths. And yet, the views of slavery prevalent in southern Indiana and Illinois, were at that time not much diverse from those which were entertained in the communities from which these settlers had come. They regarded slavery as an evil to be rid of; and to make sure of this, those who were not already too much entangled with it, left in large numbers for a region which, by request of Virginia herself, was “forever” protected from the inroads of this moral and social mischief.

As we have seen, Indiana had more than 100,000 people concentrated in the south, before any real advance had been made in the central and northern parts. Nearly the same thing was true of Illinois. The territory had been separately organized in the same year with the birth of Abraham Lincoln—1809. The next year's census showed its entire white population to be only 11,501. These were almost exclusively located south of the National Road, which crosses the Kaskaskia river at Vandalia, extending nearly due west to Alton. Notwithstanding the severe labors of opening the forests on the rich western soil, and the long period that must necessarily elapse between the first clearing therein and the perfect subjugation of the selected lands into cultivated farms, there seems to have been a general avoidance, even down to comparatively a late period, of the open prairie, which is now thought to offer such pre-eminent facilities for cultivation, with almost immediate re-payment for the toil bestowed. The settlers who had gone into Illinois, evidently placed a low estimate upon the prairie lands, and always settled on the banks of some stream, on which there was plenty of timber, seeking the forest by preference for their homes. The open character of the country undoubtedly repelled emigration, and caused it to be concentrated on the chief streams, for a long time, when at last it commenced in earnest.

In 1820, two years after admission into the Union, the entire population, still almost entirely confined to the same region, and to similar localities as ten years before, amounted to only 55,211. From that time to 1830, there was some extension of the settlements northward, toward the center of the State, and up the Mississippi to Galena, where the mines were already worked. The rivers along which the principal settlements had been made, aside from the great boundary rivers—the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Wabash—were the Kaskaskia, the Embarras, the Sangamon, and their branches. There were a few settlements, also, in the Rock-river country, and on the range of Peoria. The population, thus chiefly distributed, had now (1830) reached 157,445.

The brothers of Thomas Lincoln had previously removed

to a more northern location in Indiana, than that which he had occupied. Both settled in the Blue river country—Mordecai in Hancock county, where he not long after died, and Josiah in Harrison county. Their example, perhaps, had its influence upon Thomas, who, however, took a course of his own. Whatever the immediate or remote occasion, he left Indiana in the spring of 1830, to seek another place of abode, in the State of Illinois. He had seen the growth of Kentucky from almost the very start, to a population of nearly 700,000 and he had lived in Indiana from the time its inhabitants numbered only 65,000, until they had reached nearly 350,000. As he first set his foot within the limits of Illinois, its vast territory had, comparatively, but just begun to be occupied, scarcely at all, as we have seen, except in the extreme southern portion, and here almost exclusively along the principal streams. In a country so poorly supplied with wood and water, as Illinois, such sites would naturally be the first to be taken up, and, with a prairie addition, they suited the tastes even of those to whom the level, open country was forbidding in appearance.

Mr. Lincoln's father pushed forward to the central part of the State, where such locations were abundant. A more beautiful country than that of the Sangamon valley, could not easily have been anywhere discovered by an explorer. It was not strange that the report of such lands, if he heard it in his Southern Indiana home, should have attracted even so far one who was bred to pioneer life, and inherited a migratory disposition. He first settled on the Sangamon "bottom," in Macon county.

Passing over the Illinois Central Railroad, as you approach Decatur, the county-seat of Macon, from the south, a slightly broken country is reached two or three miles from that place, and presently the North Fork of the Sangamon, over which you pass, a mile from the town. This stream flows westwardly, uniting with the South Fork, near Jamestown, ten miles from Springfield. Following down this North Fork for a distance of about ten miles from Decatur, you come to the immediate vicinity of the first residence of Abraham Lincoln (with his father's family), in Illinois.

Here, for the first season of his abode in the new State he continued to assist the father in his farm-work. One of the first duties was to fence in a field on the rich bottom-lands, which had been selected for cultivation. For this purpose, with the help of one laborer, Abraham Lincoln, it is said split three thousand rails*—the crowning work of a long laborious period of his life. The hand who aided him in this exploit, named John Hanks, a distant relative of his mother, bears earnest testimony to the strength and skill with which the maul and the wedge were employed on this occasion.

For some unexplained reason, the family did not remain on this place but a single year. Abraham was now of age, and when, in the spring of 1831, his father set out for Coles county, sixty or seventy miles to the eastward, on the upper waters of the Kaskaskia and Embarras, a separation took place, the son for the first time, assuming his independence, and commencing life on his own account. The scene of these labors he never again visited. His father was soon after comfortably settled in the place to which he had turned his course, and spent the remainder of his adventurous days there, arriving at a good old age. He died in Coles county, on the 17th day of January, 1851, being in his seventy-third year. The farm on the Sangamon subsequently came into the possession of a Mr. Whitley, who erected a mill in the vicinity.

While there was snow on the ground, at the close of the year 1830, or early in 1831, a man came to that part of Macon county where young Lincoln was living, in pursuit of hands to aid him in a flatboat voyage down the Mississippi. The fact was known that the youth had once made such a trip, and his services were sought for the occasion. As one who had his own subsistence to earn, with no capital but his hands, and with no immediate opportunities for commencing professional study, if his thoughts had as yet been turned in that direction, he accepted the proposition made him. Perhaps there was something of his inherited and acquired fondness for exciting adventure, impelling him to this decision. With him, were

*The number is uncertain, but the main fact rests on the best authority.

also employed, his former fellow-laborer, John Hanks, and a son of his step-mother, named John Johnston. In the spring of 1831 Lincoln set out to fulfill his engagement. The floods had so swollen the streams that the Sangamon country was a vast sea before him. His first entrance into that county was over these wide-spread waters, in a canoe. The time had come to join his employer on his journey to New Orleans, but the latter had been disappointed by another person on whom he relied to furnish him a boat, on the Illinois river. Accordingly, all hands set to work, and themselves built a boat, on that river, for their purposes. This done, they set out on their long trip, making a successful voyage to New Orleans and back. It is reported by his friends, that Mr. Lincoln refers with much pleasant humor to this early experience, so relating some of its incidents as to afford abundant amusement to his auditors. In truth, he was a youth who could adapt himself to this or any other honest work which his circumstances required of him, and with a cheerfulness and alacrity—a certain practical humor—rarely equaled. He could turn off the hardest labor as a mere pastime; and his manly presence, to other laborers, was as a constant inspiration and a charm to lighten their burdens.

It was midsummer when the flatboatman returned from this his second and last trip, in that capacity. The man who had commanded this little expedition now undertook to establish himself in business at New Salem, twenty miles below Springfield, in Menard county—a place of more relative consequence then than now—two miles from Petersburg, the county-seat. He had found young Lincoln a person of such sort that he was anxious to secure his services in the new enterprise he was about to embark in. He opened a store at New Salem, and also had a mill for flouring grain. For want of other immediate employment, and in the same spirit which had heretofore actuated him, Abraham Lincoln now entered upon the duties of a clerk, having an eye to both branches of the business carried on by his employer. This connection continued for nearly a year, all the duties of his position being faithfully performed.

It was to this year's humble but honorable service—one that would have been ennobled by his alacrity in discharging it, as a necessity of his lot, were the employment far less dignified than it really was—that Mr. Douglas tauntingly alluded, in one of his speeches during the canvass of 1858, as “keeping a grocery.” In his reply, Mr. Lincoln declared his adversary to be “woefully at fault” as to the fact, in alleging him to have been a grocery-keeper, though it might be no great sin had the statement been well founded. He added that, in truth, he had “never kept a grocery anywhere in the world.”

The business of this country merchant at New Salem did not prove remarkably successful. In any event, the employment was not such as could have permanently suited an active, muscular person, like young Lincoln, with a lurking passion for adventure, and for more exciting scenes. His clerkship days, however, were brought to an abrupt close, probably much sooner than they otherwise would have been, by the breaking out of the Black-Hawk war, in which he was eager to bear an honorable part.

It was during this year that he was appointed Postmaster at New Salem—not from political affinity with the administration of Jackson, to which he was, in fact, opposed, but because he was thought better fitted for the place than any of his neighbors. He discharged his duties well; and instead of even temporarily using any of the public money to supply his then pressing wants, he carefully laid up whatever belonged to the Government, from day to day, and at the final settlement he had a bag of coin, containing the proper amount, ready to be paid over.

CHAPTER IV.

SERVICE IN THE BLACK-HAWK WAR—1832.

Breaking out of the Black-Hawk War.—The Invasion of 1831.—The Rock-river Country Threatened.—Prompt Action of Gov. Reynolds.—Retreat of Black-Hawk.—Treaty of 1804 Re-affirmed.—Bad Faith of the Indians.—Invasion of 1832.—Volunteers Called For.—Abraham Lincoln one of a Company from Menard County.—He is chosen Captain.—Rendezvous at Beardstown.—Hard Marches across the Country to Oquawka, Prophetstown and Dixon.—Expected Battle Avoided by the Enemy.—Discontent among Volunteers.—They are Disbanded.—Captain Lincoln Remains, Volunteering for Another Term of Service.—Skirmishing Fights.—Arrival of New Levies.—Encounter at Kellogg's Grove.—Black-Hawk at the Four Lakes.—He Retreats.—Battle on the Wisconsin.—Hastens Forward to the Mississippi.—Battle of the Bad-ax.—End of Lincoln's First Campaign.—Autobiographic Note.

WHILE Abraham Lincoln was quietly performing his duties in the pioneer "store," in Menard county, reports were received of an alarming Indian invasion, on the western border of the State. In the spring of 1831, the noted Black-Hawk, an old chief of the Sac tribe of Indians, repudiating the treaty by the terms of which they had been removed beyond the Father of Waters, re-crossed the river with his women and children, and three hundred warriors of the Sacs, together with allies from the Kickapoo and Pottawatomie nations. His object was again to take possession of his old hunting-grounds, and to establish himself where the principal village of his nation before had been, in the Rock-river country. The Indians began committing depredations upon the property of the white settlers, destroying their crops, pulling down their fences, driving off and slaughtering their cattle, and ordering the settlers themselves to leave under penalty of being massacred.

In response to the representations of Gov. Reynolds, to whom the settlers applied for protection, Gen. Gaines, commander of the United States forces in that quarter, took prompt and decisive measures to expel these invaders from the State. With a few companies of regular soldiers, Gen. Gaines at once took up his position at Rock Island, and at his call, several hundred volunteers, assembled from the northern and central parts of the State, upon the proclamation of Gov. Reynolds, joined him a month later. His little army distributed into two regiments, an additional battalion, and a spy battalion, was the most formidable military force yet seen in the new State. The expected battle did not take place, the Indians having suddenly and stealthily retired again, in their canoes, across the river. The troops had been advanced to Vandruff's Island, opposite the Indian town, where the engagement was anticipated, and there was much dissatisfaction among the volunteers, and some complaints against the generals, Gaines and Duncan, for permitting the enemy to escape.

Whether or not either of these commanders was chargeable with blame, this retreat of Black-Hawk only prolonged the difficulties impending, and prepared the way for a more formidable and eventful campaign the next season. Gen. Gaines, however had taken measures to preclude any such possibility, so far as the deliberate engagements of the uneasy chief could avail for that purpose. Intimidated by the threats of Gaines to cross the river, and to prosecute the war on that ground, Black-Hawk sued for peace. A treaty was entered into, by which he agreed that he and his tribe should ever after remain on the west side of the river, unless by permission of the State Governor, or of the President. Thus was the treaty of 1804 re-affirmed, by which the lands they were claiming had been distinctly conveyed to the United States Government, which, in turn, had sold them to the present settlers.

In express violation, however, of this second deliberate engagement, Black-Hawk and his followers began, early in the spring of 1832, as we have seen, to make preparations for another invasion. Many and grievous wrongs have undoubtedly been inflicted upon the savage tribes by the superior race,

that has gradually, but steadily driven the former from their ancient homes. But the bad faith shown in this case, and the repeated violation of deliberate and voluntary agreements, was wholly without justification or excuse. No provocation or plausible pretext had arisen after the treaty of the previous June; yet Black-Hawk, under the misguided influence and false representations of the "Prophet," who persuaded him to believe that even the British (to whom Black-Hawk had always been a fast friend), as well as the Ottawas, Chippewas, Winnebagoes and Pottawatomies, would aid them in regaining their village and the adjoining lands. Under this delusion, to which the wiser Keokuk refused to become a dupe, though earnestly invited to join them, Black-Hawk proceeded to gather as strong a force as possible. He first established his headquarters at the old site of Fort Madison, west of the Mississippi. After his preparations, of which the people of Illinois were advised, had been completed, he proceeded up the river with his women and children, his property and camp equipage, in canoes, while his warriors, armed and mounted, advanced by land. In spite of the warning he had received, that there was a strong force of white soldiers at Fort Armstrong, on Rock Island, he continued on to the mouth of Rock river, where, in utter recklessness and bad faith—paying not the slightest regard to his solemn agreement of the last year—the whole party crossed to the east side of the Mississippi, with a declared purpose of ascending Rock river to the territory of the Winnebagoes. This was in the early part of April, 1832. Black-Hawk, after he had gone some distance up this latter river, was overtaken by a messenger from Gen. Atkinson, who had command of the troops on Rock Island, and ordered to return beyond the Mississippi. This was defiantly refused.

Gov. Reynolds again issued a call for volunteers to protect the settlers from this invasion. A company was promptly raised in Menard county, in the formation of which Abraham Lincoln was one of the most active. From New Salem, Clary's Grove, and elsewhere in the vicinity, an efficient force was gathered, and in making their organization, Lincoln was elected Captain. This was the first official honor he had ever

received by the suffrages of his fellows, and one that afforded particular satisfaction to his not unaspiring, though modest spirit, as he, long afterward, frankly admitted.

Their first march was to the rendezvous appointed by Gov. Reynolds, at Beardstown, one of the earlier settlements on the Illinois river, forty miles west of New Salem. Here eighteen hundred men were speedily assembled, under the direction of the Governor. The forces were organized into four regiments, with an additional spy battalion. Gen. Samuel Whiteside, of the State militia, who had commanded the spy battalion in the campaign of the previous year, was now intrusted with the command of the whole brigade. Gen. James D. Henry was placed at the head of the spy battalion.

This little army, a more imposing force than that of the preceding year, set out from Beardstown on the 27th of April, for the scene of action. Three or four days' hard marching across the country brought the volunteers to Oquawka, on the Mississippi, from whence they proceeded, without delay, northward to the mouth of Rock river. Here it was arranged with Gen. Atkinson, commander of the regulars, that the volunteer force should march up the latter stream a distance of about fifty miles, to Prophetstown, where they were to encamp, awaiting the arrival of the regulars, with provisions, by the river. Gen. Whiteside, however, instead of following out this plan, set fire to the Prophet's village, on arriving, and pushed forward toward Dixon's Ferry, forty miles further up the river.

These incessant marches must have severely taxed the endurance of many of the inexperienced soldiers, but to Capt. Lincoln, reared as he had been, they rather heightened the exhilaration which attended these adventures from the start. The prospect of speedily overtaking and encountering the enemy in battle, and the hope of winning, in the fight, some special honors for the little contingent under his command, relieved the sense of fatigue. A short distance below Dixon's Ferry, it was ordered that the baggage-wagons should be left behind, and that a forced march should be made upon that place. Arrived there, Gen. Whiteside halted, and sent

out scouting parties to ascertain the position and condition of the enemy. Here two battalions of mounted volunteers, numbering two hundred and seventy-five men, joined them from McLean, Peoria, and other counties, eager to distinguish themselves by participating in the war. Some of these fiery spirits, advancing without orders, and having no other duty assigned them than that of scouts, had a little skirmish on the 12th of May, a mile distant from their encampment, in Ogle county, with a number of mounted Indians, in which three of the latter were killed. Black-Hawk and his principal forces were not far off, and rallying seven hundred men, he promptly repelled the assaults of these scouts, pursuing them in a disorderly condition, to their camp. These rash adventurers now showed greater eagerness in flight, than they had before to gain distinction in battle, and ran helter-skelter over the prairie, producing such confusion and dismay as to render it difficult to prevent the most serious effects from their insubordinate conduct. As it was, eleven of the men were killed, the confidence of the Indians was greatly raised, and the survivors, who came straggling into the camp of General Whiteside, were full of panic, anticipating an immediate and general attack from their pursuers. Such was "Stillman's defeat."

The consequence of this affair was a council of war at the tent of the commander-in-chief, and a decision to march, early next morning, to the scene of that evening's misadventure. The great battle which Capt. Lincoln and his fellow-volunteers had come so far to participate in, seemed now on the point of becoming a reality. Notwithstanding the premature advance of Whiteside from Prophetstown had left them without the necessary supplies, and subjected them to the privations so well known to experienced soldiers, yet seldom encountered so early in a campaign, they made up for the absence of their regular provisions as best they might, and were ready, with the dawn, for the day's undertaking. But their enemy did not await their coming. Arrived at the scene of yesterday's skirmish and flight, they found not a straggler of all the savage forces. They had partly gone further up the river, and partly dispersed, to commit depredations in the

surrounding country. One party of them came suddenly upon a settlement near Ottawa, and massacred fifteen persons, carrying two young women into captivity. This circumstance alone is sufficient to show how utterly unfounded was the pretense of some that Black-Hawk had no hostile purpose, in this repudiation of his treaty engagements, and to remove any ground for the mistaken sympathy which many have expended upon him.

After this energetic but vain attempt to fall in with the enemy and give him battle, Gen. Whiteside, having buried the dead of the day before, returned to camp, where he was joined, next day, by Gen. Atkinson, with his troops and supplies. The numbers of the army were thus increased to twenty-four hundred, and a few weeks more would have enabled this force to bring the war to a successful close. But many of the volunteers, whose time had nearly expired, were eager to be discharged. They had seen quite enough of the hardships of a campaign, which, without bringing as yet any glory, had turned out in reality quite different from what their imaginations had foretold. With the prevailing discontents, but one course was possible. The volunteers were marched to Ottawa, where they were discharged by Gov. Reynolds, on the 27th and 28th of May.

This sudden disbanding, without a battle, and with no results accomplished, was a disappointment to the young captain from Menard county. Gov. Reynolds had previously issued a call for two thousand new volunteers, to assemble at Beardstown and Hennepin. In accordance with the wishes of Lincoln, and others, who were still ready to bear their share of the campaign, to its close, the Governor also asked for the formation of a volunteer regiment from those just discharged. Lincoln promptly enrolled himself as a private, as did also General Whiteside.

Before the arrival of the other levies, a skirmishing fight with the Indians was had at Burr Oak Grove, on the 18th of June, in which the enemy was defeated, with considerable loss, and on the side of the volunteers, two killed and one wounded.

The Winnebagoes and Pottawatomies now showed a decidedly hostile disposition toward the whites, and an inclination to join the movement of Black-Hawk. Accordingly, with the appearance of the new levies, which had been divided into three regiments, and their junction with the regular and volunteer forces already in the field—the whole number of volunteers alone being thirty-two hundred—the army was placed in a formidable and effective attitude for offensive warfare. Meantime the Indian atrocities continued, their acts of signal treachery and cruelty rendering an efficient prosecution of the war, to its termination, indispensable. Galena, then a village of about four hundred inhabitants, was surrounded by the desperate enemy, and in imminent danger of attack. Apple River Fort, twelve miles from Galena, had already been made the object of a fierce and persevering attack, by Black-Hawk himself and a hundred and fifty of his warriors, and obstinately defended by twenty-five men, during fifteen hours of constant fighting, ending with the retreat of the Indians, with no slight loss. Within the fort, one man was killed and another wounded. Straggling parties of Indians, at various points, made attacks upon the whites, producing constant alarm and excitement through that part of the country.

The new forces, under command of Gen. Atkinson, of the regular army, were at length put in motion, detachments being sent out in different directions. A severe fight was had at Kellogg's Grove, in the midst of the Indian country, on the 25th of June, resulting in the retreat of the Indians, with much loss. Five whites were killed, and three wounded. A detachment under Gen. Alexander was stationed in a position to intercept the Indians, should they attempt to re-cross the Mississippi.

Meanwhile, it was understood that Black-Hawk had concentrated his forces, in a fortified position, at the Four Lakes, awaiting the issue of a general battle. Gen. Atkinson moved in that direction, with all possible celerity, and encamped a mile above Turtle Village, on the open prairie, not far from Rock river, on the 30th of June. The appearance of hostile Indians, prowling around his encampment, showed that their

progress was watched, but they were not attacked. Next day, with numerous re-enforcements, Gen. Atkinson's troops reached Burnt Village, a Winnebago town on the Whitewater river. They were now in a strange country, in which, for want of correct information, they were obliged to advance slowly and cautiously. There were traces of hostile Indians in the vicinity, and next day two soldiers, at a little distance from the camp, were fired upon by them, and one seriously wounded. But from this point it was difficult to discover the trail of the enemy.

Nearly two months had now passed since the opening of the campaign, and its purpose seemed as remote from accomplishment as ever. The new volunteers had many of them become discontented, like the former ones. Their number had in fact become reduced one-half. The wearisome marches, the delays, the privations and exposures, had proved to them that this service was no pastime, and that its romance was not what it seemed in the distance. They sickened of such service, and were glad to escape from its restraints. Not so, however, with Lincoln, who had found in reality the kind of exciting adventure which his spirit craved. While others murmured, and took their departure, he remained true and persistent, no less eager for the fray, or ambitious to play a genuine soldier's part, than at the beginning. Hardship was not new to him, and he had a physical energy and endurance that would not be wearied into untimely discouragement.

It was not destined, however, that he should be actively engaged in any battle more serious than those encounters already mentioned. The forces were divided and dispersed in different directions, on the 10th of July, with a view to obtaining supplies. Two days later, news was received that Black-Hawk was thirty-five miles above Gen. Atkinson, on Rock river. A plan of Generals Alexander, Henry, and others, to take him by surprise, without awaiting orders, was frustrated by their troops refusing to follow them. Gen. Henry finally set out in pursuit of the Indians, on the 15th of July, but was misled by treachery. He continued on for several days,

acquiring better information, passing the beautiful country around the Four Lakes, the present site of Madison, Wisconsin, and after another day's hard march came close upon the retreating Indians, and finally overtook them on the 21st. They were immediately charged upon, and driven along the high bluffs of the Wisconsin, and down upon the river bottom. The Indians lost sixty-eight killed, and of the large number wounded, twenty-five were afterward found dead on their trail leading to the Mississippi. The regulars, in this engagement on the Wisconsin, were commanded by Gen. (then Colonel) ZACHARY TAYLOR, afterward President of the United States. Gen. Henry, of Illinois, and Col. Dodge (afterward United States Senator), were chief commanders of the volunteers.

Waiting two days at the Blue Mounds, the forces still in the field were all united, and a hard pursuit resumed through the forest, down the Wisconsin. On the fourth day, they reached the Mississippi, which some of the Indians had already crossed, while the others were preparing to do so. The battle of the Bad-Axe here brought the war to a close, with the capture of Black-Hawk and his surviving warriors.

Mr. Lincoln, as yet a youth of but twenty-three, faithfully discharged his duty to his country, as a soldier, persevering amid peculiar hardships, and against the influences of older men around him, during the three months' service of this his first and last military campaign.

Sarcastically commenting on the efforts of Gen. Cass' biographers to render him conspicuous as a military hero, Mr. Lincoln, in a Congressional speech, delivered during the canvass of 1848, made a humorous and characteristic reference to his own experience as a soldier. We give his language on this occasion, as a suitable pendant to our sketch of this period of Mr. Lincoln's youth :

" By the way, Mr. Speaker, did you know I am a military hero ? Yes, sir, in the days of the Black-Hawk war, I fought, bled, and came away. Speaking of Gen. Cass' career, reminds me of my own. I was not at Stillman's defeat, but I was about as near it as Cass to Hull's surrender ; and like him, I saw the place very soon afterward. It is quite certain I did

not break my word, for I had none to break ; but I bent a musket pretty badly on one occasion. If Cass broke his sword, the idea is, he broke it in desperation ; I bent the musket by accident. If Gen. Cass went in advance of me in picking whortleberries, I guess I surpassed him in charges upon the wild onions. If he saw any live, fighting Indians, it was more than I did, but I had a good many bloody struggles with the mosquitoes ; and although I never fainted from loss of blood, I can truly say I was often very hungry.

“Mr. Speaker, if I should ever conclude to doff whatever our Democratic friends may suppose there is of black-cockade Federalism about me, and, thereupon, they should take me up as their candidate for the Presidency, I protest they shall not make fun of me as they have of Gen. Cass, by attempting to write me into a military hero.”

CHAPTER V.

EIGHT YEARS IN THE LEGISLATURE OF ILLINOIS—1834—41

A New Period in Mr. Lincoln's Life.—His Political Opinions.—Clay and Jackson.—Mr. Lincoln a Candidate for Representative.—His Election in 1834.—Illinois Strongly Democratic.—Mr. Lincoln as a Surveyor.—Land Speculation Mania.—Mr. Lincoln's First Appearance in the Legislature.—Banks and Internal Improvements.—Whig Measures Democratically Botched.—First Meeting of Lincoln with Douglas.—The Latter Seeks an Office of the Legislature and Gets it.—Mr. Lincoln Re-elected in 1836.—Mr. Douglas also a Member of the House.—Distinguished Associates.—Internal Improvements Again.—Mr Lincoln's Views on Slavery.—The Capital Removed to Springfield.—The New Metropolis.—The Revulsion of 1837.—Mr Lincoln Chosen for a Third Term.—John Calhoun of Lecompton Memory.—Lincoln the Whig Leader, and Candidate for Speaker.—Close Vote.—First Session at Springfield.—Lincoln Re-elected in 1840.—Partisan Remodeling of the Supreme Court.—Lincoln Declines Further Service in the Legislature.—His Position as a Statesman at the Close of this Period.—A Tribune of the People.

WE now approach the period of Mr. Lincoln's transition to the more natural position in which, as a professional man and a statesman, he was to attain that success and eminence for which his rare endowments fitted him. Hitherto, he had been unconsciously undergoing a varied training, the whole tendency of which, if rightly subjected afterward to a high purpose in life, could not fail to be advantageous. He had learned much of the world, and of men, and gained some true knowledge of himself. The discipline of those hard years of toil and penury, so manfully and cheerfully gone through with, was of more value to him, as time was to prove, than any heritage of wealth or of ancestral eminence could have been. Still the conflict with an adverse fortune was to continue; but from this time

onward, a more genial future began to shape itself in the hopes and aspirations of the self-reliant youth. His later experiences had shown him more clearly that he was not to be a mere private in the great battle of life, but that he had certain qualities which could place him at the head of a brigade or of a column, if he were so minded. Nor was he indifferent to the good opinion of his fellow-men. The confessed satisfaction which the captaincy of a company of volunteers had given him, as the expressed preference of a hundred or two of associates for him above all others, as a leader, showed that, however distrustful as yet of his own powers, he was not without ambition, or unable to appreciate popular honors.

This campaign likewise, besides the excitements of varied adventure which it afforded, so much to his natural inclination, had brought him in contact with inspiring influences and associations, and had demonstrated, and doubtless improved, his powers of fixing the esteem and admiration of those around him. He had been, as is told of him, a wild sort of a boy, and in his peculiar way he had attached his associates to him to a remarkable degree. This will be seen from a circumstance to be presently related. His horizon had been enlarged and his dreams ennobled. Meantime, it is to be remembered, that he had come home from the Black-Hawk war with no definite business to resort to, and still under a necessity of devoting his chief and immediate energies to self-support.

He has, then, reached a new epoch of his youth, at this date, and entered on another distinct period of his history. Proof of this we shall find in the fact that he became, on returning home, a candidate for representative in the State Legislature, the election of which was close at hand. A youth of twenty-three, and not at all generally known through the county, or able, in the brief time allowed, to make himself so, it may have an appearance of presumption for him to have allowed the use of his name as a candidate. He was not elected, certainly, and could hardly have thought such an event possible; yet the noticeable fact remains that he received so wonderful a vote in his own precinct, where he was best if not almost exclusively known, as may almost be said to

have made his fortune. His precinct (he had now settled in Sangamon county) was strongly for Jackson, while Lincoln had, from the start, warmly espoused the cause of Henry Clay. The State election occurred in August, and the Presidential election two or three months later, the same season. Political feeling ran high, at this the second election (as it proved) of Jackson. Notwithstanding this, such was the popularity which young Lincoln had brought home with him from the war, that out of the two hundred and eighty-four votes cast in his precinct, two hundred and seventy-seven—the entire vote wanting seven—were cast for him. Yet, a little later in the same canvass, Gen. Jackson received a majority of one hundred and fifty-five for the Presidency, from the very same men, over Mr. Clay, whose cause Lincoln was known to favor. So marked an indication as this of his personal power to draw votes, made him a political celebrity at once. In future elections it became a point with aspirants to seek to combine his strength in their favor, by placing Lincoln's name on their ticket, to secure his battalion of voters. When he was elected to the Legislature for the first time, two years later, his majority ranged about two hundred votes higher than the rest of the ticket on which he ran.

Such was the beginning of Mr. Lincoln's political life, almost in his boyhood. This is the proper place to pause and review, in a brief way, the state of political affairs in Illinois, at the time of his first appearance upon this public arena. We shall find the revolution which has been wrought—Mr. Lincoln, though for long years in an apparently hopeless minority in the State, having been always a foremost leader on the side opposed to the Democracy—to be scarcely less remarkable than his youthful successes at the polls.

At the date of Mr. Lincoln's arrival—when just of age—in the State of Illinois, Gen. Jackson was in the midst of his first Presidential term. Since 1826 every general election in that State had resulted decisively in favor of his friends. In August, 1830, the first election after Lincoln became a resident of the State, and before he was a qualified voter, the only rival candidates for Governor, were both of the same

strongly predominant party. The Legislature then elected had a large majority on that side. In 1832, Gen. Jackson received the electoral vote of Illinois, for the second time, by a decisive majority. The Legislature of 1834 was so strongly Democratic, that the Whig members did not have any candidates of their own, in organizing the House, but chose rather to exercise the little power they had in favor of such Democratic candidate as they preferred. Against such odds, as we shall see, the opponents of that party struggled long and in vain. Even the great political tornado which swept over so large a portion of the Union in 1840, made no decisive impression upon Illinois. In spite of all these difficulties and discouragements, Mr. Lincoln adhered steadily to his faith, never once dreaming of seeking profit in compliance, or in a compromise of his honest principles. Henry Clay was his model as a statesman, and always continued such, while any issues were left to contend for, of the celebrated American system of the great Kentuckian.

During the time Mr. Lincoln was pursuing his law studies, and making his first practical appearance with political life, he turned his attention to the business of a surveyor as a means of support. The mania for speculation in Western lands and lots was beginning to spread over the country at this time; and while our young student of law had neither means nor inclination to embark in any such enterprise for himself, it was the means of bringing him some profitable employment with the chain and compass. From the earliest grand center of these operations in lands and town lots, Chicago, which had also itself furnished, even then, most remarkable examples of fortunes easily made, the contagion spread everywhere through the State. Towns and cities without number were laid out in all directions, and innumerable fortunes were made, in anticipation, by the purchase of lots in all sorts of imaginary cities, during the four or five years preceding the memorable crisis and crash of 1837. It was during the year previous to that consummation, that this business had reached its height in Illinois. With the revulsion, came also a brief period of adversity to the successful surveyor, whose occupation was now

gone. It is said that even his surveying instruments were sold under the hammer. But this change only served to establish him more exclusively and permanently in his profession of the law.

Mr. Lincoln's first election to the Illinois Legislature, as has been stated, was in 1834. His associates on the ticket were Major John T. Stuart (two or three years later elected to Congress), John Dawson and William Carpenter. All were decided Clay men, or, as the party in that State was first styled, Democratic Republicans. About this time, the name of Whigs had begun to be their current designation. Lincoln was the youngest member of this Legislature, with the single exception of Hon. Jesse K. Dubois, of Lawrence county, afterward State Auditor of Illinois, who served with him during his entire legislative career. He had not yet acquired position as a lawyer, or even been admitted to the bar, and had his reputation to make, no less, as a politician and orator. At this time he was very plain in his costume, as well as rather uncourtly in his address and general appearance. His clothing was of homely Kentucky jean, and the first impression made by his tall, lank figure, upon those who saw him, was not specially prepossessing. He had not outgrown his hard backwoods experience, and showed no inclination to disguise or to cast behind him the honest and manly, though unpolished characteristics of his earlier days. Never was a man further removed from all snobbish affectation. As little was there, also, of the demagogue art of assuming an uncouthness or rusticity of manner and outward habit, with the mistaken notion of thus securing particular favor as "one of the masses." He chose to appear then, as in all his later life, precisely what he was. His deportment was unassuming, though without any awkwardness of reserve.

During this, his first session in the Legislature, he was taking lessons, as became his youth and inexperience, and preparing himself for the future, by close observation and attention to business, rather than by a prominent participation in debate. He seldom or never took the floor to speak, **although** before the close of this and the succeeding special session of the same Legislature, he had shown, as previously

in every other capacity in which he was engaged, qualities that clearly pointed to him as fitted to act a leading part. One of his associates from Sangamon county, Major Stuart, was now the most prominent member on the Whig side of the House.

The organization of this Legislature, was, of course, in the hands of the Democrats. The Speaker was Hon. James Semple, afterward United States Senator. In the selection of his committees, he assigned Lincoln the second place on the Committee on Public Accounts and Expenditures, as if with an intuition, in advance of acquaintance, of the propriety of setting "Honest Abe" to look after the public treasury.

Hon. Joseph Duncan, then a member of Congress, had been elected Governor at the same time this Legislature was chosen, over Mr. Kinney, also a Democrat, and of what was then termed the "whole hog" Jackson school. Notwithstanding the strong preponderance of the Democrats in both branches of the Legislature, and in the State, it is noticeable that in the distinguishing measures of Whig policy, in this as in subsequent years, the minority found their principles repeatedly in the ascendant, though unable to control the details of their practical application. This was true more particularly in regard to banks and internal improvements. Though inferior in numbers, the Whigs had superiority in ability, and in the real popularity and genuine democracy of their doctrines.

General attention had now come to be strongly fixed upon the remarkable natural advantages and resources of the new State of Illinois. Land speculation, as we have seen, had already begun to bring in Eastern money, and the population was rapidly increasing. According to the Whig policy, it now became desirable that every proper and reasonable legislative aid should be afforded to further the development of the latent power of this young commonwealth, and its progress toward the high rank among the States of the Mississippi valley, which had been indicated and provided for by nature. Despite the strong Democratic predominancy in this Legislature, therefore, a new State bank, with a capital of one million and five hundred thousand dollars, was incorporated, and the Illinois bank at Shawneetown, which had suspended for twelve years, was

re-chartered, with a capital of three hundred thousand dollars. It is to be noticed, however, that this bank legislation, just like that of many other States, similarly circumstanced, while it fully indorsed the Whig policy, in its fundamental principle, was by no means so skillfully done or so safely guarded as it should have been, and habitually was done in those States where the Whigs were in the ascendant. Whatever troubles have accrued in Illinois, under this head, have been chiefly due to the fact that Whig measures were not rightly shaped and executed by Democratic hands. Whig measures, framed and carried out by Democrats, have too often ended in a mere botch. At the same time, it is observable that these imperfect, yet plausible concessions to the public welfare, have often saved the Democratic party, at the expense of the real interest involved. The State bank charter passed the House of Representatives by one majority.

This Legislature also gave some attention to what are technically called internal improvements within the State. In behalf of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, the company for constructing which had been incorporated in 1825, a loan was agitated at the first session. Congress had granted for this work, in 1826, about 300,000 acres of land on the proposed route of the canal. But for a special message of Gov. Duncan, maintaining that the desired loan could be effected on a pledge of these canal lands alone, it is probable that the loan bill, reported by a Senator from Sangamon county, named George Forquer, would have passed. At the next session, in 1835, this measure was carried, a bill pledging the credit of the State in behalf of the Canal Company, to the amount originally proposed, having become a law. The loan was negotiated by Gov. Duncan the next year, and the work on this important canal was commenced in June, 1836. At the same special session, a large number of railroads, without State aid, were chartered, including the Illinois Central and the Galena and Chicago routes.

It is hardly necessary to state more distinctly that these measures, securing, with all the defects of their origin, immense benefits to the people of Illinois, and in their spirit accordant with the great principles of the "American system," were sup-

ported by Mr. Lincoln and his Whig associates. Not all they desired, these measures were yet the nearest approach to their wishes that could be obtained of the majority.

It was during the regular session of this Legislature, that Stephen A. Douglas, not himself a member, became first known to Mr. Lincoln. Late in the year 1833, Mr. Douglas, then in his twenty-first year, had migrated to Illinois (Vermont being his native State), and commenced teaching a district school in Winchester, Scott county. During the succeeding year, he gave a portion of his time to the study of law, taking part also in the political affairs of his locality. The Legislature, at this session, had taken from the Governor the power of appointing State's attorneys for the several judicial districts, and provided that these officers should be elected by the Legislature, in joint convention. Though he had been but a little more than a year in the State, and was scarcely to be regarded as an expert in the profession of the law, Mr. Douglas presented himself before the Legislature as a candidate for State's attorney for the first judicial district, against Mr. Hardin, a distinguished lawyer, then in office. The movement was so adroit, that the youthful advocate distanced his unsuspecting competitor, receiving thirty-eight votes to thirty-six cast against him. Mr. Lincoln had not only preceded Mr. Douglas as a resident of Illinois, but, also, as thus seen, in gaining a political standing in the State.

In 1836, Mr. Lincoln was elected for a second term, as one of the seven representatives from Sangamon county. Among his associates were Mr. Dawson, re-elected, and Ninian W. Edwards. Mr. Douglas was one of the representatives from Morgan county (to which he had recently removed), and along with him Mr. Hardin, whom he had managed to supersede as State's attorney in 1835. The latter (who was subsequently in Congress, and who fell at Buena Vista) was the only Whig elected from that county, the other five representatives being Democrats. This canvass in Morgan county is memorable for introducing in Illinois, through the aid of Douglas, the convention system, the benefit of which he was subsequently

to reap in the local contests of that State. He had been put on the representative ticket to fill a vacancy occasioned by the declinature of one of the candidates, having failed himself in this instance to secure a nomination from the convention. He was never again elected to the Legislature, having in fact vacated his seat after the first session, and accepted the federal appointment of Register in the land office at Springfield.

In this House, as in that which immediately preceded, the Democrats had a decided majority. Gen. Semple was re-elected Speaker. Mr. Lincoln was assigned a place on the Committee on Finance. In addition to those we have already named, the House included many men of ability, who have been distinguished in the politics of the State or of the nation, among whom were James Shields, Augustus C. French, Robert Smith, John Dougherty, W. A. Richardson, and John A. McClernand. At the two sessions of this Legislature, in 1836 and '37, Mr. Lincoln came forward more prominently in debate gradually, becoming recognized as the leading man on the Whig side.

The subject of internal improvements became one of the most prominent ones before this Legislature, as had happened with the last. Of this policy, in a judiciously guarded form, Mr. Lincoln had been from the first a stanch and efficient advocate. He held it to be the duty of Government to extend its fostering aid, in every Constitutional way, and to a reasonable extent, to whatever enterprise of public utility required such assistance, in order to the fullest development of the natural resources, and to the most rapid healthful growth of the State. The Democratic party, while professing the let-alone (*laissez faire*) principle in general, was compelled to follow pretty closely in the wake of its adversary, in some of its most distinctive features of public policy. The question of internal improvements was one of these. And while the Democrats had a decided majority of the members of each House, it was understood that, by the aid of pledges made contrary to Democratic teaching in general, a majority for liberal legislation in regard to internal improvements had likewise been secured. The business, in fact, under the grand excitement of

the flush times of 1836, was somewhat overdone, and through subsequent mismanagement and the revulsion of the next year, matters were eventually made still worse. The voice of the people was overwhelmingly in favor of the legislation which was granted. Even Whigs like Mr. Lincoln, were outstripped by some ardent Democrats—Mr. Douglas among them—in zeal for these improvements; they having unfortunately, as noticed in the case of bank-legislation, in appropriating the principle, failed to understand its most skillful and safe application in practice.

At the first session of 1836–7, about 1,300 miles of railroad were provided for, in various quarters, the completion of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, from Chicago to Peru, and the improvement of the navigation of the Kaskaskia, Illinois, Rock, and Great and Little Wabash rivers; requiring in all a loan of \$8,000,000. This included the novel appropriation of \$2,000,000 to be distributed among those counties through which none of the proposed improvements were to be made. The system voted by the Legislature was on a most magnificent scale, such as New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio or Indiana had not surpassed. This system of internal improvement, with Democratic variations, having scarcely been inaugurated when the crash of 1837 came, did not entirely correspond in practice with what it had promised in theory.

There was also a considerable addition made to the banking capital of the State at this session.

During the winter, resolutions of an extreme Southern character on the slavery question, were introduced, and, after discussion, adopted by the Democratic majority. The attempt was, of course, made to affix a character of abolitionism to all those who refused assent to these extreme views. At that time, the public sentiment of the North was not aroused on the subject, as it became a few years later, in consequence of pro-slavery aggressions. Yet Mr. Lincoln refused to vote for these resolutions, and exercised his Constitutional privilege, along with one of his colleagues from Sangamon county, of entering upon the Journal of the House his reasons for thus acting. As showing his sentiments twenty-three years ago

on this now so prominent national question, the protest referred to, as it appears on the journal, is here appended in full:

MARCH 3, 1837.

The following protest was presented to the House, which was read and ordered to be spread on the journals, to wit:

"Resolutions upon the subject of domestic slavery having passed both branches of the General Assembly, at its present session, the undersigned hereby protest against the passage of the same.

"They believe that the institution of slavery is founded on both injustice and bad policy; but that the promulgation of abolition doctrines tend rather to increase than abate its evils.

"They believe that the Congress of the United States has no power, under the Constitution, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the different States.

"They believe that the Congress of the United States has the power, under the Constitution, to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia; but that the power ought not to be exercised, unless at the request of the people of said District.

"The difference between these opinions and those contained in the said resolutions, is their reason for entering this protest.

"(Signed)

"DAN STONE,

"A. LINCOLN,

"Representatives from the County of Sangamon."

On the formation of the separate territory of Illinois, in 1809, Kaskaskia, perhaps the oldest town in all the Western country, had been designated as the capital. Such it continued to be until Illinois was admitted into the Union as a State, in 1818, when Vandalia, far up the Kaskaskia river, was laid out as the new capital. For some time it continued to be relatively a central location. But during several years immediately preceding 1837, the middle and northern portions of the State had filled so rapidly that the removal of the capital to a point nearer the geographical center had become manifestly expedient. At this session, accordingly, an act was passed changing the seat of government to Springfield, the principal town in the interior of the State, from and after the 4th day of July, 1839. To the people of Sangamon county, whom Mr. Lincoln represented, this was of course a

most satisfactory measure, and by the State at large it was received with general approbation. Vandalia, which had reached a population of about two thousand, dwindled away for a time, until it had but about one-fourth that number of inhabitants, though of late years it has revived. Springfield has steadily advanced, since this period, and is one of the most beautiful interior towns of the West. The prairie country for scores of miles around is as charming in appearance and as fertile in its productions as any tract of like extent on the face of the earth. It is greatly to the credit of Mr. Lincoln's good taste and sagacity that, when he came to his majority, he fixed upon such a locality for his home, foreseeing for this spot a successful future, to which (altogether beyond his anticipations) his influence, in 1836, added a material advantage, and his presence, in 1860, gave a national luster of renown.

The financial disasters of the spring of 1837 were the occasion of an extra session of the Legislature of Illinois, in July of that year. The Governor asked for the legalization of the suspension of specie payments by the banks of the State, which a majority of both Houses granted. He also asked a repeal or modification of the internal improvement system, which was refused. The condition of affairs was deemed critical, and particularly so to the prospects of the Democratic party, which had just been congratulating itself on the election and inauguration of the successor of Gen. Jackson, Martin Van Buren, as President. In Illinois, that party had held unbroken and decisive sway, from the days of the younger Adams down. Whatever looseness of legislation had contributed to these evils at home, they were responsible for. And in the nation, the political dangers were felt to be imminent—so much so that the President had called an extra session of Congress. There was a want of Democratic harmony, however, at Washington and at Vandalia. The doctors of the party sat in council at the latter place, during the special session, but in the Legislature they only accomplished what has been stated. It now required the most desperate exertions to save the Democracy from defeat, and the

Whigs actively followed up their advantages. So overwhelming had been the strength of their opponents, however, from the time that Mr. Lincoln first appeared on the political stage, and long before, that while a great change was visible in the results of the next election, the revolution was not yet to be completed.

In 1838, Mr. Lincoln was for the third time elected a representative in the Legislature, for the two years ensuing. Among the other six representatives of Sangamon county was John Calhoun, since notorious for his connection with the Lecompton Constitution. Availing himself of some local issue or other, and being a man of conceded ability, of highly respectable Whig antecedents and connections, he had slipped in by a small majority, crowding out the lowest candidate on the Whig ticket. The remaining five were Whigs, including E. D. Baker, Ninian W. Edwards, and A. McCormick. The strength of the two parties in the House was nearly evenly balanced, the Democrats having only three or four majority, rendering this unexpected gain particularly acceptable.

So well recognized was now the position of Mr. Lincoln in his party that, by general consent, he received the Whig vote for the Speakership. There was a close contest, his Democratic competitors being Col. William Lee D. Ewing, who had served with Lincoln in the Black-Hawk war. On the fourth ballot, Ewing had a majority of one over all others, two Whigs (including Mr. Lincoln) and two Democrats having scattered their votes.

At the State election, in August, 1838, the Whig candidate for Governor made an excellent run, but was defeated by Thomas Carlin, Democrat. State affairs were hardly brought in issue in the general canvass. A majority of the Legislature, at the first session, was opposed to the repeal or modification of the public works system, but voted additional expenditures thereon, to the amount of \$800,000. At a special session, however, this body repealed the system, and made provisions for its gradual winding up. Mr. Lincoln, as the Whig leader, had his position on the Committee on Finance, and exerted his influence in favor of wise counsel,

and such a determination of affairs as would best remedy the evils resulting from this loose Democratic tampering with measures of Whig policy.

Aside from these financial questions, there were few matters of any general interest before this Legislature. This session of 1838-9 was the last held at Vandalia. A special session in 1839, inaugurated the new state-house at Springfield. The great contest of 1840 was already casting its shadow before, and began chiefly to engross the attention of persons in political life. Whig candidates for electors were nominated in November of this year, and discussions commenced in earnest. Mr. Lincoln, who was deemed one of the strongest champions of the cause before the people, was repeatedly called on to encounter the foremost advocates of the Democratic party—what no man in Illinois, it was now manifest, could do more successfully.

For the fourth time in succession, Mr. Lincoln was elected to the Legislature in 1840—the last election to that position which he would consent to accept from his strongly attached constituents of Sangamon county. In this Legislature, like all previous ones in which he had served, the Democrats had a majority in both branches, and the responsibility of all legislation was with them. It was at this session that, to overrule a decision unacceptable to Democrats, and for political and personal reasons of common notoriety in Illinois, the judicial system of the State was changed, as desired by Mr. Douglas, against the judgment of many leading Democrats, and five new judges, of whom Mr. Douglas was one, were added to the Supreme Court of the State. This is now generally felt to be a measure conferring little credit upon those concerned in concocting the scheme, and was never heartily approved by the people.

There was but one session during the two years for which this Legislature was chosen. Mr. Lincoln, as in the last, was the acknowledged Whig leader, and the candidate of his party for Speaker. First elected at twenty-five, he had continued in office without interruption so long as his inclination allowed, and until, by his uniform courtesy and kindness of manners,

his marked ability, and his straight-forward integrity, he had won an enviable repute throughout the State, and was virtually, when but a little past thirty, placed at the head of his party in Illinois.

Begun in comparative obscurity, and without any adventitious aids in its progress, this period of his life, at its termination, had brought him to a position where he was secure in the confidence of the people, and prepared, in due time, to enter upon a more enlarged and brilliant career, as a national statesman. His fame as a close and convincing debater was established. His native talent as an orator had at once been demonstrated and disciplined. His zeal and earnestness in behalf of a party whose principles he believed to be right, had rallied strong troops of political friends about him, while his unfeigned modesty and his unpretending and simple bearing, in marked contrast with that of so many imperious leaders, had won him general and lasting esteem. He preferred no claim as a partisan, and showed no overweening anxiety to advance himself, but was always a disinterested and generous co-worker with his associates, only ready to accept the post of honor and of responsibility, when it was clearly their will, and satisfactory to the people whose interests were involved. At the close of this period, with scarcely any consciousness of the fact himself, and with no noisy demonstrations or flashy ostentation in his behalf from his friends, he was really one of the foremost political men in the State. A keen observer might even then have predicted a great future for the "Sangamon Chief," as he was sometimes called in Illinois; and only such an observer, perhaps, would then have adequately estimated his real power as a natural orator, a sagacious statesman, and a gallant **TRIBUNE OF THE PEOPLE.**

CHAPTER VI.

HIS SETTLEMENT AT SPRINGFIELD AND HIS MARRIAGE.--
1837-42.

Mr. Lincoln's Law Studies.—His Perseverance under Adverse Circumstances.—Licensed to Practice in 1836.—His Progress in his Profession.—His Qualities as an Advocate.—A Romantic and Exciting Incident in his Practice.—A Reminiscence of his Early Life.—He Renders a Material Service to the Family of an Old Friend.—An Affecting Scene.—Mr. Lincoln Removes to Springfield in 1837.—Devotes Himself to his Profession, Giving up Political Life.—His Marriage.—The Family of Mrs. Lincoln.—Fortunate Domestic Relations.—His Children and their Education.—Denominational Tendencies.—Four Years' Retirement.

DURING the time of his service in the Legislature, Mr. Lincoln was busily engaged in mastering the profession of law. This he was, indeed, compelled to do somewhat at intervals, and with many disadvantages, from the necessity he was under to support himself meanwhile by his own labor, to say nothing of the attention he was compelled to give to politics, by the position he had accepted. Nothing, however, could prevent his consummating his purpose. He completed his preliminary studies, and was licensed to practice in 1836. His reputation was now such that he found a good amount of business, and began to rise to the front rank in his profession. He was a most effective jury advocate, and manifested a ready perception and a sound judgment of the turning legal points of a case. His clear, practical sense, and his skill in homely or humorous illustration, were noticeable traits in his arguments. The graces and the cold artificialities of a polished rhetoric, he certainly had not, nor did he aim to acquire them. His style of expression and the cast of his thought were his own, having all the native force of a genuine originality.

The following incident, of which the narration is believed to be substantially accurate, is from the pen of one who professes to write from personal knowledge. It is given in this connection, as at once illustrating the earlier struggles of Mr. Lincoln in acquiring his profession, the character of his forensic efforts and the generous gratitude and disinterestedness of his nature.

Having chosen the law as his future calling, he devoted himself assiduously to its mastery, contending at every step with adverse fortune. During this period of study, he for some time found a home under the hospitable roof of one Armstrong, a farmer, who lived in a log house some eight miles from the village of Petersburg, in Menard county. Here, young Lincoln would master his lessons by the firelight of the cabin, and then walk to town for the purpose of recitation. This man Armstrong was himself poor, but he saw the genius struggling in the young student, and opened to him his rude home, and bid him welcome to his coarse fare. How Lincoln graduated with promise—how he has more than fulfilled that promise—how honorably he acquitted himself, alike on the battle-field, in defending our border settlements against the ravages of savage foes, and in the halls of our national legislature, are matters of history, and need no repetition here. But one little incident, of a more private nature, standing as it does as a sort of sequel to some things already alluded to, I deem worthy of record. Some few years since, the oldest son of Mr. Lincoln's old friend Armstrong, the chief support of his widowed mother—the good old man having some time previously passed from earth—was arrested on the charge of murder. A young man had been killed during a riotous melee, in the night-time, at a camp-meeting, and one of his associates stated that the death-wound was inflicted by young Armstrong. A preliminary examination was gone into, at which the accuser testified so positively, that there seemed no doubt of the guilt of the prisoner, and therefore he was held for trial. As is too often the case, the bloody act caused an undue degree of excitement in the public mind. Every improper incident in the life of the prisoner—each act which bore the least semblance of rowdyism—each school-boy quarrel—was suddenly remembered and magnified, until they pictured him as a fiend of the most horrid hue. As these rumors spread abroad, they were received as gospel truth, and a feverish desire for vengeance seized upon the infatuated populace, while only prison-bars prevented a horrible death at the

hands of a mob. The events were heralded in the news papers, painted in highest colors, accompanied by rejoicing over the certainty of punishment being meted out to the guilty party. The prisoner, overwhelmed by the circumstances in which he found himself placed, fell into a melancholy condition, bordering upon despair; and the widowed mother, looking through her tears, saw no cause for hope from earthly aid.

At this juncture, the widow received a letter from Mr. Lincoln, volunteering his services in an effort to save the youth from the impending stroke. Gladly was his aid accepted, although it seemed impossible for even his sagacity to prevail in such a desperate case; but the heart of the attorney was in his work, and he set about it with a will that knew no such word as fail. Feeling that the poisoned condition of the public mind was such as to preclude the possibility of impanneling an impartial jury in the court having jurisdiction, he procured a change of venue, and a postponement of the trial. He then went studiously to work unraveling the history of the case, and satisfied himself that his client was the victim of malice, and that the statements of the accuser were a tissue of falsehoods. When the trial was called on, the prisoner, pale and emaciated, with hopelessness written on every feature and accompanied by his half-hoping, half-despairing mother—whose only hope was in a mother's belief of her son's innocence, in the justice of the God she worshipped, and in the noble counsel, who, without hope of fee or reward upon earth, had undertaken the cause—took his seat in the prisoner's box, and with a "stony firmness" listened to the reading of the indictment.

Lincoln sat quietly by, while the large auditory looked on him as though wondering what he could say in defense of one whose guilt they regarded as certain. The examination of the witnesses for the State was begun, and a well-arranged mass of evidence, circumstantial and positive, was introduced, which seemed to impale the prisoner beyond the possibility of extrication. The counsel for the defense propounded but few questions, and those of a character which excited no uneasiness on the part of the prosecutor—merely, in most cases, requiring the main witness to be definite as to time and place. When the evidence of the prosecution was ended, Lincoln introduced a few witnesses to remove some erroneous impressions in regard to the previous character of his client, who, though somewhat rowdyish, had never been known to commit a vicious act; and to show that a greater degree of ill-feeling existed between the accuser and the accused, than the

accused and the deceased. The prosecutor felt that the case was a clear one, and his opening speech was brief and formal. Lincoln arose, while a deathly silence pervaded the vast audience, and in a clear but moderate tone began his argument. Slowly and carefully he reviewed the testimony, pointing out the hitherto unobserved discrepancies in the statements of the principal witness. That which had seemed plain and plausible, he made to appear crooked as a serpent's path. The witness had stated that the affair took place at a certain hour in the evening, and that, by the aid of the brightly-shining moon, he saw the prisoner inflict the death-blow with a slung-shot. Mr. Lincoln showed, that at the hour referred to, the moon had not yet appeared above the horizon, and consequently the whole tale was a fabrication. An almost instantaneous change seemed to have been wrought in the minds of his auditors, and the verdict of "not guilty" was at the end of every tongue. But the advocate was not content with this intellectual achievement. His whole being had for months been bound up in this work of gratitude and mercy, and as the lava of the overcharged crater bursts from its imprisonment, so great thoughts and burning words leaped forth from the soul of the eloquent Lincoln. He drew a picture of the perjurer, so horrid and ghastly that the accuser could sit under it no longer, but reeled and staggered from the court-room, while the audience fancied they could see the brand upon his brow. Then in words of thrilling pathos, Lincoln appealed to the jurors, as fathers of sons who might become fatherless, and as husbands of wives who might be widowed, to yield to no previous impressions, no ill-founded prejudice, but to do his client justice; and as he alluded to the debt of gratitude which he owed the boy's sire, tears were seen to fall from many eyes unused to weep. It was near night when he concluded by saying, that if justice was done—as he believed it would be—before the sun should set it would shine upon his client, a freeman. The jury retired, and the court adjourned for the day. Half an hour had not elapsed, when, as the officers of the court and the volunteer attorney sat at the tea-table of their hotel, a messenger announced that the jury had returned to their seats. All repaired immediately to the court-house, and while the prisoner was being brought from the jail, the court-room was filled to overflowing with citizens of the town. When the prisoner and his mother entered, silence reigned as completely as though the house were empty. The foreman of the jury, in answer to the usual inquiry from the court, delivered the verdict of "Not Guilty!" The widow dropped into the arms of her son, who lifted her up, and told her to look upon him as before, free

and innocent. Then, with the words, "Where is Mr. Lincoln?" he rushed across the room and grasped the hand of his deliverer, while his heart was too full for utterance. Lincoln turned his eyes toward the West, where the sun still lingered in view, and then, turning to the youth, said, "It is not yet sundown, and you are free." I confess that my cheeks were not wholly unwet by tears, and I turned from the affecting scene. As I cast a glance behind, I saw Abraham Lincoln obeying the divine injunction, by comforting the widowed and the fatherless.

On becoming well established in his profession, Mr. Lincoln took up his permanent residence at Springfield, the county-seat of Sangamon county. This occurred in the spring immediately following the passage of the act removing the State capital to that place, but more than two years before it was to go into effect. The date at which he became settled in Springfield, which has ever since been the place of his residence, was April 15, 1837.

For several years after his removal, Mr. Lincoln remained a bachelor, and was an inmate of the family of the Hon. William Butler, in later years the Treasurer of the State. For three or four years he continued to represent his county in the Legislature, but after 1840, he refused further public service, with a view to the exclusive pursuit of his profession, the highest success in which he could not hope to obtain while giving so much of his time, as had been hitherto required of him, to political affairs.

On the 4th of November, 1842, Mr. Lincoln was married to Miss MARY TODD, daughter of the Hon. Robert S. Todd, of Lexington, Kentucky. This lady is one of four sisters, the eldest of whom had previously married the Hon. Ninian W. Edwards, and settled at Springfield. Her two other sisters, subsequently married, became residents of the same town. Mr. Lincoln's domestic relations were happy, and his devoted attachment to his home and family was always one of the marked traits of his personal character. Of the four sons born to him, Robert T., the oldest, was at school at Exeter Academy, in New Hampshire, when Mr. Lincoln was first nominated for the Presidency, and soon after entered Harvard

University, where he completed his course in 1864, when in his twenty-first year. The second son died when four years old. The third, Willie, died at the White House in 1863, at the age of twelve years. Thomas, familiarly called "Tad," was two years younger.

It is proper to mention that Mrs. Lincoln is a Presbyterian by education and profession (two of her sisters are Episcopalians), and that her husband, though not a member, was a liberal supporter of the church to which she belongs. It should further be stated that the Sunday-School, and other benevolent enterprises associated with these church relations, found in him a constant friend.

In this quiet domestic happiness, and in the active practice of his profession, with its round of ordinary duties, and with its exceptional cases of a more general public interest, Mr. Lincoln disappears for the time from political life. Its peculiar excitements, indeed, were not foreign to the stirring and adventurous nature which, as we have seen, was his by inheritance. Nor could the people, and the party of which he was so commanding a leader, long consent to his retirement. Yet such was his prudent purpose—now especially, with a family to care for—and to this he adhered, with only occasional exceptions, until, four years after his marriage, he was elected to Congress.

CHAPTER VII.

CANVASSES OF 1844 AND 1846.

Mr. Lincoln's Devotion to Henry Clay.—The Presidential Nominations of 1844.—The Campaign in Illinois.—Mr. Lincoln Makes an Active Canvass for Clay.—John Calhoun the Leading Polk Elector.—The Tariff Issue Thoroughly Discussed.—Method of Conducting the Canvass.—The Whigs of Illinois in a Hopeless Minority.—Mr. Lincoln's Reputation as a Whig Champion.—Renders Efficient Service in Indiana.—Mr. Clay's Defeat and the Consequences.—Mr. Lincoln a Candidate for Congressman in 1846.—President Polk's Administration.—Condition of the Country.—Texas Annexation, the Mexican War and the Tariff.—Political Character of the Springfield District.—Mr. Lincoln Elected by an Unprecedented Majority.—His Personal Popularity Demonstrated.

MR. LINCOLN had, from his first entrance into political life, recognized Henry Clay as his great leader and instructor in statesmanship. His reverence and attachment for the great Kentuckian had been unlimited and enthusiastic. When, therefore, Mr. Clay had been nominated by acclamation for the Presidency by the National Whig Convention, held at Baltimore on the 1st of May, 1844, and when a Democrat of the most offensive school was put in nomination against him, Mr. Lincoln yielded to the demands of the Whigs of Illinois, and, for the first time breaking over the restrictions he had placed upon himself in regard to the exclusive pursuit of his profession, he consented to take a leading position in canvassing the State as an elector. In a State that had stood unshaken in its Democratic position, while so many others had been revolutionized during the great political tempest of 1840, there was, of course, no hope of immediate success. It was deemed an opportunity not to be lost, however, for maintaining and strengthening the Whig organization, and a spirited canvass was consequently made.

On the Democratic side, John Calhoun, then one of the strongest and most popular speakers of that party, and in many respects quite another man than he subsequently became, held the laboring oar for Mr. Polk. Mr. Lincoln traversed various parts of the State, attracting large audiences and keeping their fixed attention for hours, as he held up to admiration the character and doctrines of Henry Clay, and contrasted them with those of his Presidential opponent. On the tariff question, which was the chief issue in Illinois that year, he was particularly elaborate, strongly enforcing the great principles on which the protective system, as maintained by Clay, was based. He had always a fund of anecdote and illustration, with which to relieve his close logical disquisitions, and to elucidate and enforce his views in a manner perfectly intelligible, as well as pleasing to all classes of hearers. This campaign, so barren in immediate results, as it was expected to be in Illinois, was not without its excellent fruits, ultimately, to the party. It had also the effect of establishing Mr. Lincoln's reputation as a political orator, on a still broader and more permanent foundation. From this time forward he was widely known as one of the soundest and most effective of Whig champions in the West.

After doing in Illinois all that could have been required of one man, had this arena been of the most promising description, Mr. Lincoln crossed the Wabash, at the desire of the people of his former State, and contributed largely toward turning the tide of battle for Clay in that really hopeful field. Here he worked most efficiently, losing no opportunity up to the very eve of the election. In Indiana, those efforts were not forgotten, but were freshly called to mind, at a later juncture, by great numbers of Old Whigs in Southern Indiana.

If any event, more heartily than another, could have discouraged Mr. Lincoln from again participating in political affairs, it was the disastrous result, in the nation at large, of this canvass of 1844. He felt it more keenly than he could have done if it were a mere personal reverse. Mr. Clay was defeated, contrary to the ardent hopes, and even expectations

of his friends, down to the last moment. Of the causes and the consequences which followed that event, the impartial historian, at some future day, can more candidly and philosophically speak than any of those who shared in this disappointment. That the election of Mr. Polk over Mr. Clay, made the subsequent political history of our country far different from what it would have been with the opposite result, all will concede.

Two years later, in 1846, Mr. Lincoln was induced to accept the Whig nomination for Congress in the Sangamon District. The annexation of Texas had, in the meantime, been consummated. The Mexican war had been begun, and was still in progress. The Whig tariff of 1842 had just been repealed. This latter event had been accomplished in the Senate by the casting vote of Mr. DALLAS, the Vice-President, and with the official approval of Mr. POLK, the President, both of whom had been elected by the aid of Pennsylvania, and had carried the vote of that State solely by being represented to the people as favoring the maintenance of the tariff which they thus destroyed.

The Springfield district had given Mr. Clay a majority of 914 in 1844, on the most thorough canvass. It gave Mr. Lincoln a majority of 1,511, which was entirely unprecedented, and has been unequalled by that given there for any opposition candidate, for any office since. The nearest approach was in 1848, when Gen. Taylor, on a much fuller vote than that of 1846, and receiving the votes of numerous returned Mexican volunteers, of Democratic faith, and who had served under him in Mexico, obtained a majority of 1,501. In the same year (1848) Mr. Logan, the popular Whig candidate, was beaten by Col. Thomas L. Harris, Democrat, by 106 majority. There was no good reason to doubt, in advance, that Mr. Lincoln would have been elected by a handsome majority, had he consented to run for another term, nor has it been questionable, since the result became known, that the strong personal popularity of Mr. Lincoln would have saved the district. It was redeemed by Richard Yates in 1850, who carried his election by less than half the majority (754) which Mr. Lincoln had received in 1845. The district, after its reconstruc-

tion, following the census of 1850, was for ten years Democratic. Under all the circumstances, therefore, the vote for Mr. Lincoln was a remarkable one, showing that he possessed a rare degree of strength with the people. His earnest sincerity of manner always strongly impressed those whom he addressed. They knew him to be a man of strong moral convictions. An opponent seemed to intend a sneer at this trait, when he called Mr. Lincoln "conscientious," but it was a quality to which the people were never indifferent.

There was a universal confidence in his honest integrity, such as has been rarely extended to men so prominent in political life. The longer he was tried as a public servant, the more his constituents became attached to him. A popularity thus thoroughly grounded is not to be destroyed by the breezes of momentary passion or prejudice, or materially affected by any idle fickleness of the populace.

CHAPTER VIII.

MR. LINCOLN IN CONGRESS.—1847-49.

The Thirtieth Congress—Its Political Character—The Democracy in a Minority in the House.—Robert C. Winthrop Elected Speaker.—Distinguished Members in both Houses.—Mr. Lincoln takes his Seat as a Member of the House, and Mr. Douglas, for the first time, as a Member of the Senate, at the same Session.—Mr. Lincoln's Congressional Record, that of a Clay and Webster Whig.—The Mexican War.—Mr. Lincoln's Views on the Subject.—Misrepresentations.—Not an Available Issue for Mr. Lincoln's Opponents.—His Resolutions of Inquiry in Regard to the Origin of the War.—Mr. Richardson's Resolutions Indorsing the Administration.—Mr. Hudson's Resolutions for an Immediate Discontinuance of the War.—Voted Against by Mr. Lincoln.—Resolutions of Thanks to Gen. Taylor.—Mr. Henley's Amendment, and Mr. Ashman's Addition thereto.—Resolutions Adopted without Amendment.—Mr. Lincoln's First Speech in Congress, on the Mexican War.—Mr. Lincoln on Internal Improvements.—A Characteristic Campaign Speech.—Mr. Lincoln on the Nomination of Gen. Taylor; the Veto Power; National Issues; President and People; the Wilmot Proviso; Platforms; Democratic Sympathy for Clay; Military Heroes and Exploits; Cass a Progressive; Extra Pay; the Whigs and the Mexican War; Democratic Divisions.—Close of the Session.—Mr. Lincoln on the Stump.—Gen. Taylor's Election.—Second Session of the Thirtieth Congress.—Slavery in the District of Columbia.—The Public Lands.—Mr. Lincoln as a Congressman.—He Retires to Private Life.

MR. LINCOLN took his seat in the National House of Representatives on the 6th day of December, 1847, the date of the opening of the Thirtieth Congress. In many respects this Congress was a memorable one. That which preceded, elected at the same time Mr. Polk was chosen to the Presidency, had been strongly Democratic in both branches. The policy of the Administration, however, had been such, during the first two years of its existence, that a great popular re-action had followed

The present House contained but one hundred and ten Democrats, while the remaining one hundred and eighteen, with the exception of a single Native American from Philadelphia, were nearly all Whigs, the balance being "Free-Soil men," who mostly co-operated with them. Of these, only Messrs. Giddings, Tuck and Palfrey refused to vote for the Hon. Robert C. Winthrop for Speaker, who was elected on the third ballot.

Among the members of the House, on the Whig side, were John Quincy Adams (who died during the first session and was succeeded by Horace Mann), and George Ashman, of Massachusetts; Washington Hunt, of New York; Jacob Collamer and George P. Marsh, of Vermont; Truman Smith, of Connecticut; Joseph R. Ingersoll and James Pollock, of Pennsylvania; John M. Botts and William L. Goggin, of Virginia; Alexander H. Stephens, Robert Toombs and Thomas Butler King, of Georgia; Henry W. Hilliard, of Alabama; Samuel F. Vinton and Robert C. Schenck, of Ohio; John B. Thompson and Charles S. Morehead, of Kentucky; Caleb B. Smith and Richard W. Thompson, of Indiana, and Meredith P. Gentry, of Tennessee. On the Democratic side, there were David Wilmot, of Pennsylvania; Robert M. McLane, of Maryland; James McDowell and Richard K. Meade, of Virginia; R. Barnwell Rhett, of South Carolina; Howell Cobb, of Georgia; Albert G. Brown and Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi; Linn Boyd, of Kentucky; Andrew Johnson, George W. Jones and Frederick P. Stanton, of Tennessee; James S. Greene and John S. Phelps, of Missouri; and Kinsley S. Bingham, of Michigan. Illinois had seven representatives, of whom Mr. Lincoln was the only Whig. His Democratic colleagues were John A. McClernand, Orlando B. Ficklin, William A. Richardson, Robert Smith, Thomas J. Turner and John Wentworth.

At this session, Stephen A. Douglas took his seat in the Senate, for the first time, having been elected the previous winter. In that body there were but twenty-two Opposition Senators, against thirty-six Democrats. Among the former were Daniel Webster, Wm. L. Dayton, S. S. Phelps, John M. Clayton, Reverdy Johnson, Thomas Corwin, John M. Berrien, and John Bell. On the Democratic side were John C. Cal-

houn, Thomas H. Benton, Daniel S. Dickinson, Simon Cameron, Hannibal Hamlin, Sam Houston, R. M. T. Hunter, and William R. King.

Mr. Lincoln was comparatively quite a young man when he entered the House, yet he was early recognized as one of the foremost of the Western men on the floor. His Congressional record, throughout, is that of a Whig of those days, his votes on all leading national subjects, being invariably what those of Clay, Webster or Corwin would have been, had they occupied his place. One of the most prominent subjects of consideration before the Thirtieth Congress, very naturally, was the then existing war with Mexico. Mr. Lincoln was one of those who believed the Administration had not properly managed its affairs with Mexico at the outset, and who, while voting supplies and for suitably rewarding our gallant soldiers in that war, were unwilling to be forced, by any trick of the supporters of the Administration, into an unqualified indorsement of its course in this affair, from beginning to end. In this attitude, Mr. Lincoln did not stand alone. Such was the position of Whig members in both Houses, without exception. Yet his course was unscrupulously misrepresented, during the campaign of 1858, as it has been more or less, on other occasions since. That many men who supported Mr. Lincoln, approved President Polk's course in regard to the Mexican War, as well in its inception as in its management from first to last, is not improbable. But all those who, at that time, were induced by their party relations, to sustain the Administration, at heart approved the method in which hostilities were precipitated, or felt satisfied that the most commendable motives actuated the Government in its course toward Mexico, is certainly not true. This is not an issue that any existing party need be anxious to resuscitate. Still less would the friends of Mr. Lincoln be reluctant to have his record on this question scrutinized to the fullest extent.

Early in the session, after listening to a long homily on the subject from the President, in his annual message, in which the gauntlet was defiantly thrown down before the Opposition members, and after his colleague, Mr. Richardson, had pro-

posed an unqualified indorsement of the President's views, Mr. Lincoln (December 22, 1847) introduced a series of resolutions of inquiry in regard to the origin of the war. They affirmed nothing, but called for definite official information, such as, if conclusively furnished in detail, and found to accord with the general assertions of Mr. Polk's messages would have set him and his administration entirely right before the country. Either such information was accessible or the repeated statements of the President on this subject were groundless, and his allegations mere pretenses. If the Democratic party was in the right, it had not the least occasion to complain of this procedure, if pressed to a vote. Mr Lincoln's preamble and resolutions (copied from the *Congressional Globe*, first session, thirtieth Congress, page 64) were in the following words :

WHEREAS, The President of the United States, in his message of May 11, 1846, has declared that "the Mexican Government not only refused to receive him (the envoy of the United States), or listen to his propositions, but, after a long-continued series of menaces, has at last invaded *our territory*, and shed the blood of our fellow-citizens on *our own soil* :"

And again, in his message of December 8, 1846, that "We had ample cause of war against Mexico long before the breaking out of hostilities ; but even then we forbore to take redress into our own hands until Mexico herself became the aggressor, by invading *our soil* in hostile array, and shedding the blood of our citizens :"

And yet again, in his message of December 7, 1847, that "The Mexican Government refused even to hear the terms of adjustment which he (our minister of peace) was authorized to propose, and finally, under wholly unjustifiable pretexts, involved the two countries in war, by invading the territory of the State of Texas, striking the first blow, and shedding the blood of our citizens on *our own soil* :"

and,

WHEREAS, This House is desirous to obtain a full knowledge of all the facts which go to establish whether the particular spot on which the blood of our citizens was so shed was or was not at that time "*our own soil* :"

therefore,

Resolved, by the House of Representatives, That the President of the United States be respectfully requested to inform this House—

1st. Whether the spot on which the blood of our citizens

was shed, as in his message declared, was or was not within the territory of Spain, at least after the treaty of 1819, until the Mexican revolution.

2d. Whether that spot is or is not within the territory which was wrested from Spain by the revolutionary Government of Mexico.

3d. Whether that spot is or is not within a settlement of people, which settlement has existed ever since long before the Texas revolution, and until its inhabitants fled before the approach of the United States army.

4th. Whether that settlement is or is not isolated from any and all other settlements by the Gulf and the Rio Grande on the south and west, and by wide uninhabited regions on the north and east.

5th. Whether the people of that settlement, or a majority of them, or any of them, have ever submitted themselves to the government or laws of Texas or of the United States, by consent or by compulsion, either by accepting office, or voting at elections, or paying tax, or serving on juries, or having process served upon them, or in any other way.

6th. Whether the people of that settlement did or did not flee from the approach of the United States army, leaving unprotected their homes and their growing crops, *before* the blood was shed, as in the messages stated; and whether the first blood, so shed, was or was not shed within the inclosure of one of the people who had thus fled from it.

7th. Whether our *citizens*, whose blood was shed, as in his messages declared, were or were not, at that time, armed officers and soldiers, sent into that settlement by the military order of the President, through the Secretary of War.

8th. Whether the military force of the United States was or was not so sent into that settlement after General Taylor had more than once intimated to the War Department that, in his opinion, no such movement was necessary to the defense or protection of Texas.

These resolutions were laid over, under the rule. Many other propositions, embracing the substance of this question were also brought before the House, besides Mr. Richardson's, which ultimately failed. Mr. Lincoln did not call up his resolutions, nor were they acted upon; but he commented on them in a speech subsequently made.

On the third day of January, 1849, Mr. Hudson, of Massachusetts, offered a resolution, directing the Committee on Mil-

itary Affairs · to inquire into the expediency of requesting the President of the United States to withdraw to the east bank of the Rio Grande our armies now in Mexico, and to propose to the Mexican Government forthwith a treaty of peace on the following basis, namely: That we relinquish all claim to indemnity for the expenses of the war, and that the boundary between the United States and Mexico shall be established at or near the desert between the Nueces and the Rio Grande; that Mexico shall be held to pay all just claims due to our citizens at the commencement of the war, and that a convention shall be entered into by the two nations to provide for the liquidation of those claims and the mode of payment."

This was a test question on abandoning the war, without any material result accomplished. Mr. Lincoln voted with the minority, in favor of laying this resolution on the table. On the question of adopting the resolution, which was defeated, yet voted for by John Quincy Adams, Ashmun, Vinton, and many others on the Whig side, Mr. Lincoln voted in the negative. (*See Congressional Globe, first session, 30th Congress, page 94.*)

On the same day, almost immediately following the above action, joint resolutions of thanks to General Zachary Taylor and our troops in Mexico, having been offered, an amendment was proposed by Mr. Henley, a Democratic member from Indiana, as an adroit political maneuver, by which it was designed to secure an indorsement of the war from the Whigs, or a refusal of the vote of thanks. He moved the addition of this clause to the resolutions: "engaged, as they were, in defending the rights and honor of the nation." As an amendment to the amendment, in order to defeat its underhand purpose, Mr. Ashmun promptly moved to add the words: "In a war unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States," Mr. Lincoln voted for Ashmun's amendment to Henley's amendment. So also did Messrs. Clingman and Barringer, of North Carolina; A. H. Stephens, Robert Toombs and Thomas Butler King, of Georgia; Goggin, of Virginia; Genery of Tennessee; and a majority of

all those voting. [See page 95, as above.] The object intended, of defeating the brilliant movement of Mr. Henley, was accomplished. The amendment, as amended, was not carried. The resolutions in their original shape, were subsequently re-introduced by Mr. Stephens, and adopted without opposition. (*Congressional Globe*, page 304.)

On the 12th day of January, 1848, Mr. Lincoln expressed his views, frankly and fully, in regard to the war with Mexico. It was the first speech made by Mr. Lincoln in Congress, and is subjoined entire, as reported in the Appendix to the *Congressional Globe* [1st session, 30th Congress, page 93]:

MR. LINCOLN'S SPEECH ON THE MEXICAN WAR.

(*In Committee of the Whole House*, January 12, 1848.)

Mr. Lincoln addressed the Committee as follows:

MR. CHAIRMAN: Some, if not all, of the gentlemen on the other side of the House, who have addressed the Committee within the last two days, have spoken rather complainingly, if I have rightly understood them, of the vote given a week or ten days ago, declaring that the war with Mexico was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the President. I admit that such a vote should not be given in mere party wantonness, and that the one given is justly censurable, if it have no other or better foundation. I am one of those who joined in that vote; and did so under my best impression of the *truth* of the case. How I got this impression, and how it may possibly be removed I will now try to show. When the war begun, it was my opinion that all those who, because of knowing too *little*, or because of knowing too *much*, could not conscientiously approve the conduct of the President (in the beginning of it), should, nevertheless, as good citizens and patriots, remain silent on that point, at least till the war should be ended. Some leading Democrats, including ex-President Van Buren, have taken this same view, as I understand them; and I adhered to it, and acted upon it, until since I took my seat here; and I think I should still adhere to it, were it not that the President and his friends will not allow it to be so. Besides, the continual effort of the President to argue every silent vote given for supplies into an indorsement of the justice and wisdom of his conduct; besides that singularly candid paragraph in his late message, in which he tells us that Congress with great unanimity (only two in the Senate and fourteen in the House dissenting) had declared that "by the

act of the Republic of Mexico a state of war exists between that Government and the United States ;' when the same journals that informed him of this, also informed him that, when that declaration stood disconnected from the question of supplies, sixty-seven in the House, and not fourteen merely, voted against it; besides this open attempt to prove by telling the *truth*, what he could not prove by telling the *whole truth*, demanding of all who will not submit to be misrepresented, in justice to themselves, to speak out; besides all this, one of my colleagues (Mr. Richardson), at a very early day in the session, brought in a set of resolutions, expressly indorsing the original justice of the war on the part of the President. Upon these resolutions, when they shall be put on their passage, I shall be *compelled* to vote; so that I can not be silent if I would. Seeing this, I went about preparing myself to give the vote understandingly, when it should come. I carefully examined the President's messages, to ascertain what he himself had said and proved upon the point. The result of this examination was to make the impression, that, taking for true all the President states as facts, he falls far short of proving his justification; and that the President would have gone further with his proof, if it had not been for the small matter that the *truth* would not permit him. Under the impression thus made I gave the vote before mentioned. I propose now to give, concisely, the process of the examination I made, and how I reached the conclusion I did.

The President, in his first message of May, 1846, declares that the soil was *ours* on which hostilities were commenced by Mexico; and he repeats that declaration, almost in the same language, in each successive annual message—thus showing that he esteems that point a highly essential one. In the importance of that point I entirely agree with the President. To my judgment, it is the *very point* upon which he should be justified or condemned. In his message of December, 1846, it seems to have occurred to him, as is certainly true, that title, ownership to soil, or anything else, is not a simple fact, but is a conclusion following one or more simple facts; and that it was incumbent upon him to present the facts from which he concluded the soil was ours on which the first blood of the war was shed.

Accordingly, a little below the middle of page twelve in the message last referred to, he enters upon that task; forming an issue and introducing testimony, extending the whole to a little below the middle of page fourteen. Now, I propose to try to show that the whole of this—issue and evidence—is, from beginning to end, the sheerest deception. The issue, as

he presents it, is in these words: "but there are those *who*, conceding all this to be true, assume the ground that the true western boundary of Texas is the Nueces, instead of the Rio Grande; and that, therefore, in marching our army to the east bank of the latter river, we passed the Texan line, and invaded the territory of Mexico." Now, this issue is made up of two affirmatives and no negatives. The main deception of it is, that it assumes as true that *one* river or the *other* is necessarily the boundary, and cheats the superficial thinker entirely out of the idea that *possibly* the boundary is somewhere *between* the two, and not actually at either. A further deception is, that it will let in *evidence* which a true issue would exclude. A true issue made by the President would be about as follows: "I say the soil *was ours* on which the first blood was shed; there are those who say it was not."

I now proceed to examine the President's evidence, as applicable to such an issue. When that evidence is analyzed, it is all included in the following propositions:

1. That the Rio Grande was the western boundary of Louisiana, as we purchased it of France in 1803.

2. That the Republic of Texas always *claimed* the Rio Grande as her western boundary.

3. That, by various acts, she had claimed it *on paper*.

4. That Santa Anna, in his treaty with Texas, recognized the Rio Grande as her boundary.

5. That Texas *before*, and the United States *after* annexation, had *exercised* jurisdiction *beyond* the Nueces, *between* the two rivers.

6. That our Congress *understood* the boundary of Texas to extend beyond the Nueces.

Now for each of these in its turn:

His first item is, that the Rio Grande was the western boundary of Louisiana, as we purchased it of France in 1803; and, seeming to expect this to be disputed, he argues over the amount of nearly a page to prove it true; at the end of which, he lets us know that, by the treaty of 1819, we sold to Spain the whole country, from the Rio Grande eastward to the Sabine. Now, admitting for the present, that the Rio Grande was the boundary of Louisiana, what, under heaven, had that to do with the *present* boundary between us and Mexico? How, Mr. Chairman, the line that once divided your land from mine can *still* be the boundary between us *after* I have sold my land to you, is, to me, beyond all comprehension. And how any man, with an honest purpose only of proving the truth, could ever have *thought* of introducing such a fact to prove such an issue, is equally incomprehensible. The out

rage upon common *right*, of seizing as our own what we have once sold, merely because it *was* ours *before* we sold it, is only equaled by the outrage on common *sense* of any attempt to justify it.

The President's next piece of evidence is, that "The Republic of Texas always *claimed* this river (Rio Grande) as her western boundary." That is not true, in fact. Texas *has* claimed it, but she has not *always* claimed it. There is, at least, one distinguished exception. Her State Constitution—the public's most solemn and well-considered act; that which may, without impropriety, be called her last will and testament, revoking all others—make no such claim. But suppose she had always claimed it. Has not Mexico always claimed the contrary? So that there is but *claim* against *claim*, leaving nothing proved until we get back of the claims, and find which has the better *foundation*.

Though not in the order in which the President presents his evidence, I now consider that class of his statements, which are, in substance, nothing more than that Texas has, by various acts of her Convention and Congress, claimed the Rio Grande as her boundary—*on paper*. I mean here what he says about the fixing of the Rio Grande as her boundary, in her old Constitution (not her State Constitution), about forming congressional districts, counties, etc. Now, all this is but naked *claim*; and what I have already said about claims is strictly applicable to this. If I should claim your land by word of mouth, that certainly would not make it mine, and if I were to claim it by a deed which I had made myself, and with which you had nothing to do, the claim would be quite the same in substance, or rather in utter nothingness.

I next consider the President's statement that Santa Anna, in his *treaty* with Texas, recognized the Rio Grande as the western boundary of Texas. Besides the position so often taken, that Santa Anna, while a prisoner of war—a captive—*could* not bind Mexico by a treaty, which I deem conclusive; besides this, I wish to say something in relation to this treaty, so called by the President, with Santa Anna. If any man would like to be amused by a sight at that *little* thing, which the President calls by that *big* name, he can have it by turning to Niles' Register, volume 50, page 336. And if any one should suppose that Niles' Register is a curious repository of so mighty a document as a solemn treaty between nations, I can only say that I learned, to a tolerable degree of certainty, by inquiry at the State Department, that the President himself never saw it anywhere else. By the way, I believe I should not err if I were to declare, that during the first ten

years of the existence of that document, it was never by anybody *called* a treaty; that it was never so called till the President, in his extremity, attempted, by so calling it, to wring something from it in justification of himself in connection with the Mexican war. It has none of the distinguishing features of a treaty. It does not call itself a treaty. Santa Anna does not therein assume to bind Mexico; he assumes only to act as President, Commander-in-Chief of the Mexican army and navy; stipulates that the then present hostilities should cease, and that he would not *himself* take up arms, nor *influence* the Mexican people to take up arms, against Texas, during the existence of the war of Independence. He did not recognize the independence of Texas; he did not assume to put an end to the war, but clearly indicated his expectation of its continuance; he did not say one word about boundary, and most probably never thought of it. It is stipulated therein that the Mexican forces should evacuate the territory of Texas, *passing to the other side of the Rio Grande*; and in another article it is stipulated, that to prevent collisions between the armies, the Texan army should not approach nearer than within five leagues—of *what* is not said—but clearly, from the object stated, it is of the Rio Grande. Now, if this is a treaty recognizing the Rio Grande as the boundary of Texas, it contains the singular feature of stipulating that Texas shall not go within five leagues of *her own* boundary.

Next comes the evidence of Texas before annexation, and the United States afterward, exercising jurisdiction beyond the Nueces, and *between* the two rivers. This actual *exercise* of jurisdiction is the very class or quality of evidence we want. It is excellent so far as it goes; but does it go far enough? He tells us it went *beyond* the Nueces, but he does not tell us it went *to* the Rio Grande. He tells us jurisdiction was exercised *between* the two rivers, but he does not tell us it was exercised over *all* the territory between them. Some simple-minded people think it possible to cross one river and go beyond it, without going all the way to the next; that jurisdiction may be exercised *between* two rivers without covering *all* the country between them. I know a man, not very unlike myself, who exercises jurisdiction over a piece of land between the Wabash and the Mississippi; and yet so far is this from being *all* there is between those rivers, that it is just one hundred and fifty-two feet long by fifty wide, and no part of it much within a hundred miles of either. He has a neighbor between him and the Mississippi—that is, just across the street, in that direction—whom, I am sure, he could neither *persuade* nor *force* to give up his habitation; but which, never.

theless, he could certainly annex, if it were to be done, by merely standing on his own side of the street and claiming it, or even sitting down and writing a deed for it.

But next, the President tells us the Congress of the United States *understood* the State of Texas they admitted into the Union to extend *beyond* the Nueces. Well, I suppose they did—I certainly so understand it—but how *far* beyond? That Congress did *not* understand it to extend clear to the Rio Grande, is quite certain by the fact of their joint resolutions for admission, expressly leaving all questions of boundary to future adjustment. And, it may be added, that Texas herself is proved to have had the same understanding of it that our Congress had, by the fact of the exact conformity of her new Constitution to those resolutions.

I am now through the whole of the President's evidence; and it is a singular fact, that if any one should declare the President sent the army into the midst of a settlement of Mexican people, who had never submitted, by consent or by force to the authority of Texas or of the United States, and that *there*, and *thereby*, the first blood of the war was shed, there is not one word in all the President has said which would either admit or deny the declaration. In this strange omission chiefly consists the deception of the President's evidence—an omission which, it does seem to me, could scarcely have occurred but by design. My way of living leads me to be about the courts of justice; and there I have some times seen a good lawyer struggling for his client's neck, in a desperate case, employing every artifice to work round, befog, and cover up with many words some position pressed upon him by the prosecution, which he *dared* not admit, and yet *could* not deny. Party bias may help to make it appear so; but with all the allowance I can make for such bias, it still does appear to me that just such, and from just such necessity, are the President's struggles in this case.

Some time after my colleague (Mr. Richardson) introduced the resolutions I have mentioned, I introduced a preamble, resolution, and interrogatories, intended to draw the President out, if possible, on this hitherto untrodden ground. To show their relevancy, I proposed to state my understanding of the true rule for ascertaining the boundary between Texas and Mexico. It is, that *wherever* Texas was *exercising* jurisdiction was hers; and wherever Mexico was *exercising* jurisdiction was hers; and that whatever separated the actual exercise of jurisdiction of the one from that of the other, was the true boundary between them. If, as is probably true, Texas was exercising jurisdiction along the western

bank of the Nueces, and Mexico was exercising it along the eastern bank of the Rio Grande, then *neither* river was the boundary, but the uninhabited country between the two was. The extent of our territory in that region depended not on any *treaty-fixed* boundary (for no treaty had attempted it), but on revolution. Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the *right* to rise up and shake off the existing government, and form a new one that suits them better. This is a most valuable, a most sacred right—a right which, we hope and believe, is to liberate the world. Nor is this right confined to cases in which the whole people of an existing government may choose to exercise it. Any portion of such people that *can* may revolutionize, and make their *own* of so much of the territory as they inhabit. More than this, a *majority* of any portion of such people may revolutionize, putting down a *minority*, intermingled with, or near about them, who may oppose their movements. Such minority was precisely the case of the Tories of our own Revolution. It is a quality of revolutions not to go by old lines, or old laws; but to break up both, and make new ones. As to the country now in question, we bought it of France in 1803, and sold it to Spain in 1819, according to the President's statement. After this, all Mexico, including Texas, revolutionized against Spain; and still later, Texas revolutionized against Mexico. In my view, just so far as she carried her revolution, by obtaining the *actual*, willing or unwilling submission of the people, *so far* the country was hers, and no further.

Now, sir, for the purpose of obtaining the very best evidence as to whether Texas had actually carried her revolution to the place where the hostilities of the present war commenced, let the President answer the interrogatories I proposed, as before mentioned, or some other similar ones. Let him answer fully, fairly and candidly. Let him answer with *facts*, and not with arguments. Let him remember he sits where Washington sat; and so remembering, let him answer as Washington would answer. As a nation *should* not, and the Almighty *will* not, be evaded, so let him attempt no evasion, no equivocation. And if, so answering, he can show that the soil was ours where the first blood of the war was shed—that it was not within an inhabited country, or, if within such, that the inhabitants had submitted themselves to the civil authority of Texas, or of the United States, and that the same is true of the site of Fort Brown—then I am with him for his justification. In that case, I shall be most happy to reverse the vote I gave the other day. I have a selfish motive for desiring that

the President may do this; I expect to give some votes, in connection with the war, which, without his so doing, will be of doubtful propriety, in my own judgment, but which will be free from the doubt, if he does so. But if he *can not* or *will not* do this—if, on any pretence, or no pretence, he shall refuse or omit it—then I shall be fully convinced, of what I more than suspect already, that he is deeply conscious of being in the wrong; that he feels the blood of this war, like the blood of Abel, is crying to heaven against him; that he ordered General Taylor into the midst of a peaceful Mexican settlement, purposely to bring on a war; that originally having some strong motive—what I will not stop now to give my opinion concerning—to involve the two countries in a war, and trusting to escape scrutiny by fixing the public gaze upon the exceeding brightness of military glory—that attractive rainbow that rises in showers of blood—that serpent's eye that charms to destroy—he plunged into it, and has swept *on* and *on*, till, disappointed in his calculation of the ease with which Mexico might be subdued, he now finds himself he knows not where. How like the half insane mumbling of a fever dream is the whole war part of the late message! At one time telling us that Mexico has nothing whatever that we can get but territory; at another, showing us how we can support the war by levying contributions on Mexico. At one time urging the national honor, the security of the future, the prevention of foreign interference, and even the good of Mexico herself, as among the objects of the war; at another, telling us that, “to reject indemnity by refusing to accept a cession of territory, would be to abandon all our just demands, and to wage the war, bearing all its expenses, *without a purpose or definite object*.” So, then, the national honor, security of the future, and everything but territorial indemnity, may be considered the *no purposes* and *indefinite* objects of the war! But having it now settled that territorial indemnity is the only object, we are urged to seize by legislation here, all that he was content to take a few months ago, and the whole province of Lower California to boot, and to still carry on the war—to take *all* we are fighting for, and *still* fight on. Again, the President is resolved, under all circumstances, to have full territorial indemnity for the expenses of the war; but he forgets to tell us how we are to get the *excess* after those expenses shall have surpassed the value of the *whole* of the Mexican territory. So, again, he insists that the separate national existence of Mexico shall be maintained; but he does not tell us *how this can be done* after we shall have taken *all* her territory. Lest

the question I here suggest be considered speculative merely, let me be indulged a moment in trying to show they are not.

The war has gone on some twenty months; for the expenses of which, together with an inconsiderable old score, the President now claims about one-half of the Mexican territory, and that by far the better half, so far as concerns our ability to make anything out of it. It is comparatively uninhabited; so that we could establish land offices in it, and raise some money in that way. But the other half is already inhabited, as I understand it, tolerably densely for the nature of the country; and all its lands, or all that are valuable, already appropriated as private property. How, then, are we to make any thing out of these lands with this incumbrance on them, or how remove the incumbrance? I suppose no one will say we should kill the people, or drive them out, or make slaves of them, or even confiscate their property! How, then, can we make much out of this part of the territory? If the prosecution of the war has, in expenses, already equaled the *better* half of the country, how long its future prosecution will be in equaling the less valuable half is not a *speculative* but a *practical* question, pressing closely upon us; and yet it is a question which the President seems never to have thought of.

As to the mode of terminating the war and securing peace, the President is equally wandering and indefinite. First, it is to be done by a more vigorous prosecution of the war in the vital parts of the enemy's country; and, after apparently talking himself tired on this point, the President drops down into a half despairing tone, and tells us that, "with a people distracted and divided by contending factions, and a government subject to constant changes, by successive revolutions, *the continued success of our arms may fail to obtain a satisfactory peace.*" Then he suggests the propriety of wheedling the Mexican people to desert the counsels of their own leaders, and, trusting in our protection, to set up a government from which we can secure a satisfactory peace, telling us that "*this may become the only mode of obtaining such a peace.*" But soon he falls into doubt of this, too, and then drops back on to the already half-abandoned ground of "more vigorous prosecution." All this shows that the President is in no wise satisfied with his own positions. First, he takes up one, and, in attempting to argue us into it, he argues himself out of it; then seizes another, and goes through the same process; and then, confused at being able to think of nothing new, he snatches up the old one again, which he has some time before cast off. His mind, tasked beyond its power, is running

hither and thither, like some tortured creature on a burning surface, finding no position on which it can settle down and be at ease.

Again, it is a singular omission in this message that it nowhere intimates *when* the President expects the war to terminate. At its beginning, General Scott was, by this same President, driven into disfavor, if not disgrace, for intimating that peace could not be conquered in less than three or four months. But now at the end of about twenty months, during which time our arms have given us the most splendid successes—every department, and every part, land and water, officers and privates, regulars and volunteers, doing all that men could do, and hundreds of things which it had ever before been thought that men could *not* do; after all this, this same President gives us a long message without showing us that, *as to the end*, he has himself even an imaginary conception. As I have before said, he knows not where he is. He is a bewildered, confounded, and miserably-perplexed man. God grant he may be able to show that there is not something about his conscience more painful than all his mental perplexity.

Mr. Lincoln was an industrious member of the Committee on Post-offices, and Post-roads, and thoroughly acquainted himself with the details of that prominent branch of the public service. On the 5th of January, 1848, he made a clear and pertinent speech in regard to a question of temporary interest which then excited considerable attention, the "Great Southern Mail" contract. Some of the Virginia Whig members had taken issue with the Postmaster-General, in regard to his action on this question, and there were indications of an attempt to give a partisan turn to the affair. Mr. Lincoln sustained the action of that Democratic official, insisting that his construction of the law in this instance, which was the more economical, was also the more correct one. It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the case here. We subjoin two or three paragraphs from the speech, which was purely a practical one, for the purpose of showing the general spirit and tenor of Mr. Lincoln's mode of dealing with business matters :

I think that abundant reasons have been given to show that the construction put upon the law by the Postmaster-General is the right construction, and that subsequent acts of Congress have confirmed it. I have already said that the

grievance complained of ought to be remedied. But it is said that the sum of money about which all this difficulty has arisen is exceedingly small—not more than \$2,700. I admit it is very small; and if nothing else were involved, it would not be worth the dispute. But there is a principle involved; and if we once yield to a wrong principle, that concession will be the prolific source of endless mischief. It is for this reason, and not for the sake of saving \$2,700, that I am unwilling to yield what is demanded. If I had no apprehensions that the ghost of this yielding would rise and appear in various distant places, I would say, pay the money, and let us have no more fuss about it. But I have such apprehensions. I do believe, that if we yield this, our act will be the source of other claims equally unjust, and therefore I can not vote to make the allowance.

Mr. L. insisted that the true and great point to which the attention of this House or the committee should be directed was, what is a just compensation? Inasmuch as this railroad and steamboat company could afford greater facilities than any other line, the service ought to be done upon this route; but it ought to be done on just and fair principles. If it could not be done at what had been offered, let it be shown that a greater amount was just. But, until it was shown, he was opposed to increasing it. He had seen many things in the report of the Postmaster-General and elsewhere that stood out against the river route. Now, the daily steamboat transportation between Troy and New York was performed for less than one hundred dollars per mile. This company was dissatisfied with two hundred and twelve or two hundred and thirteen dollars per mile. It had not been shown, and he thought it could not be shown to them why this company was entitled to more, or so much more, than the other received. It was true, they had to encounter the ice, but was there not more ice further north? There might possibly be shown some reason why the Virginia line should have more; but was there any reason why they should have so much more? Again, the price paid between Cincinnati and Louisville for daily transportation was not two hundred and thirteen dollars per mile, or one hundred dollars, or fifty; it was less than twenty-eight dollars per mile. Now, he did not insist that there might not be some peculiar reasons connected with this route between this city and Richmond that entitled it to more than was paid on the routes between Cincinnati and Louisville, and Troy and New York. But, if there were reasons, they ought to be shown. And was it supposed that there could be any, or so peculiar reasons as to justify so great a difference in compen-

sation as was claimed by this company? It did seem that there could be none.

These reasons actuated him in taking the position he had taken, painfully refusing to oblige his friend from Virginia, which he assured the gentleman he had the greatest inclination to do.

In relation to the report of the committee, let him state one thing: It proposed that the Postmaster-General should again offer this company what he had already offered and they had refused. It was for the reason that the Postmaster-General, as he understood, had informed them that he was not himself going to renew the proposition. The committee supposed, at any rate he (Mr. L.) supposed—that as soon as the company should know that they could get what he had offered them, and no more—as soon as all hope of greater compensation was cut off—that instant they would not take ten thousand dollars a year for the privilege of doing it. Whether this was actually the case he did not profess positively to know; it was a matter of opinion, but he firmly believed it. In proposing to offer them the contract again, as he had already said, the committee yielded something, viz.: the damage that the Government would have to pay for the breaking up of the present arrangement. He was willing to incur that damage; some other gentlemen were not; they were further away from the position which his friend from Virginia took. He was willing to yield something, but could not consent to go the whole length with the gentleman.

The subject of internal improvements, as before indicated, had long been one in which Mr. Lincoln had taken a special interest. In the Illinois Legislature, he had favored the policy of developing the resources of the State by the fostering aid of the local government, in so far as he might, under the constant restraints of a Democratic majority. The great River and Harbor Improvement Convention, held at Chicago, not long before the commencement of his Congressional life—and to which he refers in his subjoined speech on this policy—he had participated in, as one of its most active and earnest members. A brief, fifteen-minute speech of his on that occasion, of which there appears to be no report extant, is still remembered by many of those who heard it, as one of the most eloquent and impressive efforts of that memorable convention, which was presided over by the Hon. Edward Bates,

of St. Louis. Aside from the celebrated speech of the latter, a theme of constant praise from that day to the present, no more electrifying address was made before the convention than that of Mr. Lincoln.

On the 20th day of June, 1848, after the Presidential nomination of Mr. Cass, whom "circumstances," it will be remembered, prevented from being present at that convention, Mr. Lincoln took occasion to address the House on this subject. Below is his speech entire, as reported in the Appendix to the *Congressional Globe* for that session (p. 709):

MR. LINCOLN'S SPEECH ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS.

(*In Committee of the Whole House, June 20, 1848.*)

Mr. Lincoln said:

MR. CHAIRMAN—I wish at all times in no way to practice any fraud upon the House or the Committee, and I also desire to do nothing which may be very disagreeable to any of the members. I therefore state, in advance, that my object in taking the floor is to make a speech on the general subject of internal improvements; and if I am out of order in doing so, I give the Chair an opportunity of so deciding, and I will take my seat.

The Chair.—I will not undertake to anticipate what the gentleman may say on the subject of internal improvements. He will, therefore, proceed in his remarks, and if any question of order shall be made, the Chair will then decide it.

Mr. Lincoln.—At an early day of this session the President sent to us what may properly be termed an internal improvement veto message. The late Democratic Convention which sat at Baltimore, and which nominated General Cass for the Presidency, adopted a set of resolutions, now called the Democratic platform, among which is one in these words:

"That the Constitution does not confer upon the General Government the power to commence and carry on a general system of internal improvements."

General Cass, in his letter accepting the nomination, holds this language:

"I have carefully read the resolutions of the Democratic National Convention, laying down the platform of our political faith, and I adhere to them as firmly as I approve them cordially."

These things, taken together, show that the question of

internal improvements is now more distinctly made—has become more intense, than at any former period. It can no longer be avoided. The veto message and the Baltimore resolution I understand to be, in substance, the same thing; the latter being the more general statement, of which the former is the amplification—the bill of particulars. While I know there are many Democrats, on the floor and elsewhere, who disapprove that message, I understand that all who shall vote for General Cass will thereafter be considered as having approved it, as having indorsed all its doctrines. I suppose all, or nearly all, the Democrats will vote for him. Many of them will do so, not because they like his position on this question, but because they prefer him, being wrong in this, to another, whom they consider further wrong on other questions. In this way the internal improvement Democrats are to be, by a sort of forced consent, carried over, and arrayed against themselves on this measure of policy. General Cass, once elected, will not trouble himself to make a constitutional argument, or, perhaps, any argument at all, when he shall veto a river or harbor bill. He will consider it a sufficient answer to all Democratic murmurs, to point to Mr. Polk's message, and to the "Democratic platform." This being the case, the question of improvements is verging to a final crisis; and the friends of the policy must now battle, and battle manfully, or surrender all. In this view, humble as I am, I wish to review, and contrast as well as I may, the general positions of this veto message. When I say *general* positions, I mean to exclude from consideration so much as relates to the present embarrassed state of the Treasury, in consequence of the Mexican war.

Those general positions are: That internal improvements ought not to be made by the General Government:

1. Because they would overwhelm the treasury;
2. Because, while their *burdens* would be general, their *benefits* would be *local* and *partial*, involving an obnoxious inequality;
3. Because they would be unconstitutional;
4. Because the States may do enough by the levy and collection of *tonnage* duties; or, if not,
5. That the Constitution may be amended.

"Do nothing at all, lest you do something wrong," is the sum of these positions—is the sum of this message; and this, with the exception of what is said about Constitutionality, applying as forcibly to making improvements by State authority as by the national authority. So that we must abandon the improvements of the country altogether, by any and every

authority, or we may resist and repudiate the doctrines of this message. Let us attempt the latter.

The first position is, that a system of internal improvement would overwhelm the treasury.

That, in such a system, there is a *tendency* to undue expansion, is not to be denied. Such tendency is founded in the nature of the subject. A member of Congress will prefer voting for a bill which contains an appropriation for his district, to voting for one which does not; and when a bill shall be expanded till every district shall be provided for, that it will be too greatly expanded is obvious. But is this any more true in Congress than in a State Legislature? If a member of Congress must have an appropriation for his district, so a member of a Legislature must have for his county; and if one will overwhelm the national treasury, so the other will overwhelm the State treasury. Go where we will, the difficulty is the same. Allow it to drive us from the halls of Congress, and it will just as easily drive us from the State Legislatures. Let us, then, grapple with it, and test its strength. Let us, judging of the future by the past, ascertain whether there may not be, in the discretion of Congress, a sufficient power to limit and restrain this expansive tendency within reasonable and proper bounds. The President himself values the evidence of the past. He tells us that at a certain point of our history, more than two hundred millions of dollars has been *applied for*, to make improvements, and this he does to prove that the treasury would be overwhelmed by such a system. Why did he not tell us how much was *granted*? Would not that have been better evidence? Let us turn to it, and see what it proves. In the message, the President tells us that "during the four succeeding years, embraced by the administration of President Adams, the power not only to appropriate money, but to apply it, under the direction and authority of the General Government, as well to the construction of roads as to the improvement of harbors and rivers, was fully asserted and exercised."

This, then, was the period of greatest enormity. These, if any, must have been the days of the 200,000,000. And how much do you suppose was really expended for improvements during those four years? Two hundred millions? One hundred? Fifty? Ten? Five? No, sir, less than two millions. As shown by authentic documents, the expenditures on improvements during 1825, 1826, 1827 and 1828, amounted to \$1,879,627 01. These four years were the period of Mr Adams' administration, nearly, and substantially. This fact shows that when the power to make improvements was "fully asserted and exercised," the Congresses *did* keep within rea-

sonable limits ; and what has been done it seems to me *can* be done again.

Now for the second position of the message, namely, that the burdens of improvements would be *general*, while their *benefits* would be *local* and *partial*, involving an obnoxious inequality. That there is some degree of truth in this position I shall not deny. No commercial object of Government patronage can be so exclusively *general*, as not to be of some peculiar *local* advantage ; but, on the other hand, nothing is so *local* as not to be of some general advantage. The navy, as I understand it, was established, and is maintained, at a great annual expense, partly to be ready for war, when war shall come, but partly also, and perhaps chiefly, for the protection of our commerce on the high seas. This latter object is, for all I can see, in principle, the same as internal improvements. The driving a pirate from the track of commerce on the broad ocean, and the removing a snag from its more narrow path in the Mississippi river, can not, I think, be distinguished in principle. Each is done to save life and property, and for nothing else. The navy, then, is the most general in its benefits of all this class of objects ; and yet even the navy is of some peculiar advantage to Charleston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, beyond what it is to the interior towns of Illinois. The next most general object I can think of, would be improvements on the Mississippi river and its tributaries. They touch thirteen of our States—Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Iowa. Now, I suppose it will not be denied, that these thirteen States are a little more interested in improvements on that great river than are the remaining seventeen. These instances of the navy, and the Mississippi river, show clearly that there is something of local advantage in the most general objects. But the converse is also true. Nothing is so *local* as not to be of some *general* benefit. Take, for instance, the Illinois and Michigan canal. Considered apart from its effects, it is perfectly local. Every inch of it is within the State of Illinois. That canal was first opened for business last April. In a very few days we were all gratified to learn, among other things, that sugar had been carried from New Orleans, through the canal, to Buffalo, in New York. This sugar took this route, doubtless, because it was cheaper than the old route. Supposing the benefit in the reduction of the cost of carriage to be shared between seller and buyer, the result is, that the New Orleans merchant sold his sugar a little *dearer*, and the people of Buffalo sweetened their coffee a little

cheaper than before ; a benefit resulting *from* the canal, not to Illinois, where the canal is, but to Louisiana and New York where it is *not*. In other transactions Illinois will, of course, have her share, and perhaps the larger share too, in the benefits of the canal ; but the instance of the sugar clearly shows that the *benefits* of an improvement are by no means confined to the particular locality of the improvement itself.

The just conclusion from all this is, that if the nation refuse to make improvements of the more general kind, because their benefits may be somewhat local, a State may, for the same reason, refuse to make an improvement of a local kind, because its benefits may be somewhat general. A State may well say to the nation: "If you will do nothing for me, I will do nothing for you." Thus it is seen, that if this argument of "inequality" is sufficient anywhere, it is sufficient everywhere, and puts an end to improvements altogether. I hope and believe, that if both the nation and the States would, in good faith, in their respective spheres, do what they could in the way of improvements, what of inequality might be produced in one place might be compensated in another, and that the sum of the whole might not be very unequal. But suppose, after all, there should be some degree of inequality : inequality is certainly never to be embraced for its own sake ; but is every good thing to be discarded which may be inseparably connected with some degree of it ? If so, we must discard all government. This Capitol is built at the public expense, for the public benefit ; but does any one doubt that it is of some peculiar local advantage to the property holders and business people of Washington ? Shall we remove it for this reason ? And if so, where shall we set it down, and be free from the difficulty ? To make sure of our object, shall we locate it nowhere, and leave Congress hereafter to hold its sessions as the loafer lodged, "in spots about ?" I make no special allusion to the present President when I say, there are few stronger cases in this world of "burden to the many, and benefit to the few"—of "inequality"—than the Presidency itself is by some thought to be. An honest laborer digs coal at about seventy cents a day, while the President digs abstractions at about seventy dollars a day. The *coal* is clearly worth more than the *abstractions*, and yet what a monstrous inequality in the prices ? Does the President, for this reason, propose to abolish the Presidency ? He *does* not, and he *ought* not. The true rule, in determining to embrace or reject anything, is not whether it have *any* evil in it, but whether it have more of evil than of good. There are few things *wholly* evil or *wholly* good

Almost every thing, especially of government policy, is an inseparable compound of the two ; so that our best judgment of the preponderance between them is continually demanded. On this principle, the President, his friends, and the world generally, act on most subjects. Why not apply it, then, upon this question? Why, as to improvements, magnify the *evil*, and stoutly refuse to see any good in them?

M.: Chairman, on the third position of the message (the Constitutional question) I have not much to say. Being the man I am, and speaking when I do, I feel that in any attempt at an original, Constitutional argument, I should not be, and ought not to be, listened to patiently. The ablest and the best of men have gone over the whole ground long ago. I shall attempt but little more than a brief notice of what some of them have said. In relation to Mr. Jefferson's views, I read from Mr. Polk's veto message :

"President Jefferson, in his message to Congress in 1806, recommended an amendment of the Constitution, with a view to apply an anticipated surplus in the treasury 'to the great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such other objects of public improvements as it may be thought proper to add to the Constitutional enumeration of the Federal powers.' And he adds : 'I suppose an amendment to the Constitution, by consent of the States, necessary, because the objects now recommended are not among those enumerated in the Constitution, and to which it permits the public moneys to be applied.'" In 1825, he repeated, in his published letters, the opinion that no such power has been conferred upon Congress."

I introduce this, not to controvert, just now, the Constitutional opinion, but to show, that on the question of *expediency*, Mr. Jefferson's opinion was against the present President—that this opinion of Mr. Jefferson, in one branch at least, is, in the hands of Mr. Polk, like McFingal's gun :

"Bears wide and kicks the owner over."

But, to the Constitutional question. In 1826, Chancellor Kent first published his *Commentaries on American Law*. He devoted a portion of one of the lectures to the question of the authority of Congress to appropriate public moneys for internal improvements. He mentions that the question had never been brought under judicial consideration, and proceeds to give a brief summary of the discussions it had undergone between the legislative and executive branches of the Government. He shows that the legislative branch had usually been *for*, and the executive *against*, the power, till the period

of Mr. J. Q. Adams' administration ; at which point he considers the executive influence as withdrawn from opposition and added to the support of the power. In 1844, the Chancellor published a new edition of his Commentaries, in which he adds some notes of what had transpired on the question since 1826. I have not time to read the original text, or the notes, but the whole may be found on page 267, and the two or three following pages of the first volume of the edition of 1844. As what Chancellor Kent seems to consider the sum of the whole, I read from one of the notes :

“ Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, vol. 2, page 429-440, and again, page 519-538, has stated at large the arguments for and against the proposition that Congress have a Constitutional authority to lay taxes, and to apply the power to regulate commerce, as a means directly to encourage and protect domestic manufactures ; and, without giving any opinion of his own on the contested doctrine, he has left the reader to draw his own conclusion. I should think, however, from the arguments as stated, that every mind which has taken no part in the discussions, and felt no prejudice or territorial bias on either side of the question, would deem the arguments in favor of the Congressional power vastly superior.”

It will be seen, that in this extract, the power to make improvements is not directly mentioned ; but by examining the context both of Kent and of Story, it will appear that the power mentioned in the extract and the power to make improvements, are regarded as identical. It is not to be denied that many great and good men have been *against* the power ; but it is insisted that quite as many, as great, and as good, have been *for* it ; and it is shown that, on a full survey of the whole, Chancellor Kent was of opinion that the arguments of the latter were *vastly* superior. This is but the opinion of a man ; but who was that man ? He was one of the ablest and most learned lawyers of his age, or of any other age. It is no disparagement to Mr. Polk, nor, indeed, to any one who devotes much time to politics, to be placed far behind Chancellor Kent as a lawyer. His attitude was most favorable to correct conclusions. He wrote coolly and in retirement. He was struggling to rear a durable monument of fame ; and he well knew that *truth* and thoroughly sound reasoning were the only sure foundations. Can the party opinion of a party President, on a law question, as this purely is, be at all compared or set in opposition to that of such a man, in such an attitude, as Chancellor Kent ?

This Constitutional question will probably never be better

settled than it is, until it shall pass under judicial consideration; but I do think that no man who is clear on this question of expediency need feel his conscience much pricked upon this.

Mr. Chairman, ~~the~~ President seems to think that enough may be done in the way of improvements, by means of tunnage duties, under State authority, with the consent of the General Government. Now, I suppose this matter of tunnage duties is well enough in its own sphere. I suppose it may be efficient, and perhaps *sufficient*, to make slight improvements and repairs in harbors already in use, and not much out of repair. But if I have any correct general idea of it, it must be wholly inefficient for any general beneficent purposes of improvement. I know very little, or rather nothing at all, of the practical matter of levying and collecting tunnage duties; but I suppose one of its principles must be, to lay a duty, for the improvement of any particular harbor, *upon the tunnage coming into that harbor*. To do otherwise—to collect money in *one* harbor to be expended on improvements in *another*—would be an extremely aggravated form of that inequality which the President so much deprecates. If I be right in this, how could we make any entirely new improvements by means of tunnage duties? How make a road, a canal, or clear a greatly obstructed river? The idea that we could, involves the same absurdity of the Irish bull about the new boots: "I shal niver git 'em on," says Patrick, "till I wear 'em a day or two, and stretch 'em a little." We shall never make a canal by tunnage duties, until it shall already have been made awhile, so the tunnage can get into it.

After all, the President concludes that possibly there may be some great objects of improvements which can not be effected by tunnage duties, and which, therefore, may be expedient for the General Government to take in hand. Accordingly, he suggests, in case any such be discovered, the propriety of amending the Constitution. Amend it for what? If, like Mr. Jefferson, the President thought improvements *expedient*, but not constitutional, it would be natural enough for him to recommend such an amendment; but hear what he says in this very message:

"In view of these portentous consequences, I can not but think that this course of legislation should be arrested, even were there nothing to forbid it in the fundamental laws of our Union."

For what, then, would *he* have the Constitution amended? With *him* it is a proposition to remove *one* impediment, merely to be met by *others*, which, in his opinion, can not be

removed—to enable Congress to do what, in his opinion, *they* ought not to do if they could.

[Here Mr. Meade, of Virginia, inquired if Mr. L. understood the President to be opposed, on grounds of expediency, to any and every improvement?]

To which Mr. Lincoln answered: In the very part of his message of which I am now speaking, I understand him as giving some vague expressions in favor of some possible objects of improvements; but, in doing so, I understand him to be directly in the teeth of his own arguments in other parts of it. Neither the President, nor any one, can possibly specify an improvement, which shall not be clearly liable to one or another of the objections he has urged on the score of expediency. I have shown, and might show again, that no work—no object—can be so general, as to dispense its benefits with precise equality; and this inequality is chief among the “portentous consequences” for which he declares that improvements should be arrested. No, sir; when the President intimates that something in the way of improvements may properly be done by the General Government, he is shrinking from the conclusions to which his own arguments would force him. He feels that the improvements of this broad and goodly land are a mighty interest; and he is unwilling to confess to the people, or perhaps to himself, that he has built an argument which, when pressed to its conclusion, entirely annihilates this interest.

I have already said that no one who is satisfied of the expediency of making improvements need be much uneasy in his conscience about its constitutionality. I wish now to submit a few remarks on the general proposition of amending the Constitution. As a general rule, I think we would do much better to let it alone. No slight occasion should tempt us to touch it. Better not take the first step, which may lead to a habit of altering it. Better rather habituate ourselves to think of it as unalterable. It can scarcely be made better than it is. New provisions would introduce new difficulties, and thus create and increase appetite for further change. No, sir; let it stand as it is. New hands have never touched it. The men who made it have done their work, and have passed away. Who shall improve on what *they* did?

Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of reviewing this message in the least possible time, as well as for the sake of distinctness, I have analyzed its arguments as well as I could, and reduced them to the propositions I have stated. I have now examined them in detail. I wish to detain the committee only a little while longer, with some general remarks on the subject of

improvements. That the subject is a difficult one, can not be denied. Still, it is no more difficult in Congress than in the State Legislatures, in the counties, or in the smallest municipal districts which everywhere exist. All can recur to instances of this difficulty in the case of county roads, bridges, and the like. One man is offended because a road passes over his land; and another is offended because it does *not* pass over his; one is dissatisfied because the bridge, for which he is taxed, crosses the river on a different road from that which leads from his house to town; another can not bear that the county should get in debt for these same roads and bridges; while not a few struggle hard to have roads located over their lands, and then stoutly refuse to let them be opened, until they are first paid the damages. Even between the different wards and streets of towns and cities, we find this same wrangling and difficulty. Now, these are no other than the very difficulties against which, and out of which, the President constructs his objections of "inequality," "speculation," and "crushing the Treasury." There is but a single alternative about them—they are *sufficient*, or they are *not*. If sufficient, they are sufficient *out* of Congress as well as *in* it, and there is the end. We must reject them as insufficient, or lie down and do nothing by any authority. Then, difficulty though there be, let us meet and overcome it.

"Attempt the end, and never stand to doubt;
Nothing so hard, but search will find it out."

Determine that the thing can and shall be done, and then we shall find the way. The tendency to undue expansion is unquestionably the chief difficulty. How to do *something*, and still not to do *too much*, is the desideratum. Let each contribute his mite in the way of suggestion. The late Silas Wright, in a letter to the Chicago Convention, contributed his, which was worth something; and I now contribute mine, which may be worth nothing. At all events, it will mislead nobody, and therefore will do no harm. I would not borrow money. I am against an overwhelming, crushing system. Suppose that at each session, Congress shall first determine *how much* money can, for that year, be spared for improvements; then apportion that sum to the most *important* objects. So far, all is easy; but how shall we determine which *are* the most important? On this question comes the collision of interests. I shall be slow to acknowledge that *your* harbor or *your* river is more important than *mine*, and *vice versa*. To clear this difficulty, let us have that same statistical information which the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Vinton] suggested

at the beginning of this session. In that information we shall have a stern, unbending basis of *facts*—a basis in nowise subject to whim, caprice, or local interest. The pre-limited amount of means will save us from doing *too much*, and the statistics will save us from doing what we do, in *wrong places*. Adopt and adhere to this course, and, it seems to me, the difficulty is cleared.

One of the gentlemen from South Carolina (Mr. Rhett) very much deprecates these statistics. He particularly objects, as I understand him, to counting all the pigs and chickens in the land. I do not perceive much force in the objection. It is true, that if everything be enumerated, a portion of such statistics may not be very useful to this object. Such products of the country as are to be *consumed* where they are *produced*, need no roads and rivers, no means of transportation, and have no very proper connection with this subject. The *surplus*, that which is produced in *one* place to be consumed in *another*; the capacity of each locality for producing a *greater* surplus; the natural means of transportation, and their susceptibility of improvement; the hindrances, delays, and losses of life and property during transportation, and the causes of each would be among the most valuable statistics in this connection. From these it would readily appear where a given amount of expenditure would do the most good. These statistics might be equally accessible, as they would be equally useful, to both the nation and the States. In this way, and by these means, let the nation take hold of the larger works, and the States the smaller ones; and thus, working in a meeting direction, discreetly, but steadily and firmly, what is made unequal in one place, may be equalized in another, extravagance avoided, and the whole country put on that career of prosperity which shall correspond with its extent of territory, its natural resources, and the intelligence and enterprise of its people.

The first session of the Thirtieth Congress was prolonged far beyond the date of the Presidential nominations of 1848, and the canvass was actively carried on by members on the floor of the House. Mr. Lincoln warmly sustained the nomination of Gen. Taylor, and before the adjournment of Congress, he made, in accordance with precedent and general practice, one of his characteristic campaign speeches. He showed himself a man of decided partisan feelings, and entered into this contest with zeal, not only repelling the violent attacks upon the Whig candidate, but showing that there were blows

to be given as well as taken. He said some things in a vein of sarcastic humor, which could only have been mistaken for actual bitterness, by those who did not know the really genial character of the man. Argument, ridicule and illustrative anecdotes were brought into requisition, with great ability and unsparing boldness, in setting the real issues of the canvass, political and personal, in what he deemed a proper light before the people.

Although containing so many things of mere temporary interest, this speech will be read with avidity at the present time, and particularly on account of several passages which have especial significance from the position Mr. Lincoln himself afterward occupied—what had then probably never seriously entered his thoughts as among the events of the future. This effort will perhaps give occasional offense to the purist in style, but its manly earnestness and force, and its adaptedness to popular effect as a campaign document, will not be called in question. It is obvious that there was some change in Mr. Lincoln's manner of speaking subsequently to those days, yet his first appearance in the national arena of politics exhibited that rugged strength and that earnest directness of expression which have given him permanent power with popular auditories.

MR. LINCOLN'S SPEECH ON THE PRESIDENCY AND GENERAL POLITICS.

(Delivered in the House, July 27, 1848)

GENERAL TAYLOR AND THE VETO POWER.

Mr. Lincoln said—

MR. SPEAKER :—Our Democratic friends seem to be in great distress because they think our candidate for the Presidency don't suit *us*. Most of them can not find out that Gen. Taylor has any principles at all ; some, however, have discovered that he has *one*, but that that one is entirely wrong. This one principle is his position on the veto power. The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Stanton) who has just taken his seat, indeed, has said there is very little if any difference on this question between Gen. Taylor and all the Presidents ; and he seems to think it sufficient detraction from Gen. Taylor's position on it, that it has nothing new in it. But all others, whom I have heard speak, assail it furiously. A new member from Ken-

tucky (Mr. Clarke*) of very considerable ability, was in particular concern about it. He thought it altogether novel and unprecedented for a President, or a Presidential candidate, to think of approving bills whose Constitutionality may not be entirely clear to his own mind. He thinks the ark of our safety is gone, unless Presidents shall always veto such bills as, in their judgment, may be of *doubtful* Constitutionality. However clear Congress may be of their authority to pass any particular act, the gentleman from Kentucky thinks the President must veto if *he* has *doubts* about it. Now I have neither time nor inclination to argue with the gentlemen on the veto power as an original question; but I wish to show that Gen. Taylor and not he, agrees with the earliest statesmen on this question. When the bill chartering the first Bank of the United States passed Congress, its constitutionality was questioned, Mr. Madison, then in the House of Representatives, as well as others, had opposed it on that ground. Gen. Washington, as President, was called on to approve or reject it. He sought and obtained, on the constitutional question, the separate written opinions of Jefferson, Hamilton and Edmund Randolph, they then being respectively Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and Attorney General. Hamilton's opinion was for the power; while Randolph's and Jefferson's were both against it. Mr. Jefferson, after giving his opinion decidedly against the constitutionality of that bill, closed his letter with the paragraph which I now read:

"It must be admitted, however, that unless the President's mind, on a view of everything which is urged for and against this bill, is tolerably clear that it is unauthorized by the Constitution; if the pro and the con hang so even as to balance his judgment, a just respect for the wisdom of the Legislature would naturally decide the balance in favor of their opinion; it is chiefly for cases where they are clearly misled by error, ambition or interest, that the Constitution has placed a check in the negative of the President. THOMAS JEFFERSON.

"*February 15, 1791.*"

Gen. Taylor's opinion, as expressed in his Allison letter, is as I now read:

"The power given by the veto is a high conservative power; but, in my opinion, should never be exercised, except in cases of clear violation of the Constitution, or manifest haste and want of consideration by Congress."

It is here seen that, in Mr. Jefferson's opinion, if on the constitutionality of any given bill, the President *doubts*, he is

*The late Hon. Beverly L. Clarke.

not to veto it, as the gentleman from Kentucky would have him to do, but is to defer to Congress and approve it. And if we compare the opinions of Jefferson and Taylor, as expressed in these paragraphs, we shall find them more exactly alike than we can often find any two expressions having any literal difference. None but interested fault-finders, can discover any substantial variation.

THE NATIONAL ISSUES.

But gentlemen on the other side are unanimously agreed that Gen. Taylor has no other principle. They are in utter darkness as to his opinions on any of the questions of policy which occupy the public attention. But is there any doubt as to what he will *do* on the prominent questions, if elected? Not the least. It is not possible to know what he will or would do in every imaginable case; because many questions have passed away, and others doubtless will arise which none of us have yet thought of; but on the prominent questions of currency, tariff, internal improvements, and Wilmot proviso, General Taylor's course is at least as well defined as is General Cass'. Why, in their eagerness to get at General Taylor, several Democratic members here have desired to know whether, in case of his election, a bankrupt law is to be established. Can they tell us General Cass' opinion on this question? (Some member answered, "He is against it.") Aye, how do you know he is? There is nothing about it in the platform, nor elsewhere, that I have seen. If the gentleman knows anything which I do not, he can show it. But to return: General Taylor, in his Allison letter, says:

"Upon the subject of the tariff, the currency, the improvement of our great highways, rivers, lakes, and harbors, the will of the people, as expressed through their Representatives in Congress, ought to be respected and carried out by the Executive."

A PRESIDENCY FOR THE PEOPLE.

Now, this is the whole matter—in substance, it is this: The people say to General Taylor, "If you are elected, shall we have a national bank?" He answers, "*Your* will, gentlemen, not *mine*?" "What about the tariff?" "Say yourselves." "Shall our rivers and harbors be improved?" "Just as you please." "If you desire a bank, an alteration of the tariff, internal improvements, any or all, I will not hinder you; if you do not desire them, I will not attempt to force them on you." "Send up your members of Congress from the various districts, with opinions according to your own, and if they are for these measures, or any of them, I shall have nothing to

oppose; if they are not for them, I shall not, by any appliances whatever, attempt to dragoon them into their adoption." Now, can there be any difficulty in understanding this? To you, Democrats, it may not seem like principle; but surely you can not fail to perceive the position plainly enough. The distinction between it and the position of your candidate is broad and obvious, and I admit you have a clear right to show it is wrong, if you can; but you have no right to pretend you can not see it at all. We see it, and to us it appears like principle, and the best sort of principle at that—the principle of allowing the people to do as they please with their own business. My friend from Indiana (Mr. C. B. Smith) has aptly asked, "Are you willing to trust the people?" Some of you answered, substantially, "We are willing to trust the people; but the President is as much the representative of the people as Congress." In a certain sense, and to a certain extent, he is the representative of the people. He is elected by them, as well as Congress is. But can he, in the nature of things, know the wants of the people as well as three hundred other men coming from all the various localities of the nation? If so, where is the propriety of having a Congress? That the Constitution gives the President a negative on legislation, all know; but that this negative should be so combined with platforms and other appliances as to enable him, and, in fact, almost compel him, to take the whole of legislation into his own hands, is what we object to—is what General Taylor objects to—and is what constitutes the broad distinction between you and us. To thus transfer legislation is clearly to take it from those who understand with minuteness the interest of the people, and give it to one who does not and can not so well understand it. I understand your idea, that if a Presidential candidate avow his opinion upon a given question, or rather upon all questions, and the people, with full knowledge of this, elect him, they thereby distinctly approve all those opinions. This, though plausible, is a most pernicious deception. By means of it measures are adopted or rejected, contrary to the wishes of the whole of one party, and often nearly half of the other. The process is this: Three, four, or half a dozen questions are prominent at a given time; the party selects its candidate, and he takes his position on each of these questions. On all but one his positions have already been indorsed at former elections, and his party fully committed to them: but that one is new, and a large portion of them are against it. But what are they to do? The whole are strung together, and they must take all or reject all. They can not take what they like and leave the the rest. What they

are already committed to, being the majority, they shut their eyes and gulp the whole. Next election, still another is introduced in the same way. If we run our eyes along the line of the past, we shall see that almost, if not quite, all the articles of the present Democratic creed, have been at first forced upon the party in this very way. And just now, and just so, opposition to internal improvements is to be established, if Gen. Cass shall be elected. Almost half the Democrats here are for improvements, but they will vote for Cass; and if he succeeds. their votes will have aided in closing the doors against improvements. Now, this is a process which we think is wrong. We prefer a candidate who, like Gen. Taylor, will allow the people to have their own way, regardless of his private opinion; and I should think the internal-improvement Democrats, at least, ought to prefer such a candidate. He would force nothing on them which they don't want, and he would allow them to have improvements, which their own candidate, if elected, will not.

GEN. TAYLOR AND THE WILMOT PROVISIO.

Mr. Speaker, I have said Gen. Taylor's position is as well defined as is that of Gen. Cass. In saying this, I admit I do not certainly know what he would do on the Wilmot Proviso. I am a Northern man, or, rather, a Western free-state man, with a constituency I believe to be, and with personal feelings I know to be, against the extension of slavery. As such, and with what information I have, I hope, and *believe*, Gen. Taylor, if elected, would not veto the proviso; but I do not *know* it. Yet, if I knew he would, I still would vote for him. I should do so, because, in my judgment, his election alone can defeat Gen. Cass; and because, *should* slavery thereby go into the territory we now have, just so much will certainly happen by the election of Cass; and, in addition, a course of policy leading to new wars, new acquisitions of territory, and still further extensions of slavery. One of the two is to be President; which is preferable?

CASS ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS.

But there is as much doubt of Cass on improvements, as there is of Taylor on the proviso. I have no doubt myself of Gen. Cass on this question, but I know the Democrats differ among themselves as to his position. My internal-improvement colleague (Mr. Wentworth) stated on this floor the other day, that he was satisfied Cass was for improvements, because he had voted for all the bills that he (Mr. W.) had. So far so good. But Mr. Polk vetoed some of

these very bills; the Baltimore Convention passed a set of resolutions, among other things, approving these vetoes, and Cass declares, in his letter accepting the nomination, that he has carefully read these resolutions, and that he adheres to them as firmly as he approves them cordially. In other words, Gen. Cass voted for the bills, and thinks the President did right to veto them; and his friends here are amiable enough to consider him as being on one side or the other, just as one or the other may correspond with their own respective inclinations. My colleague admits that the platform declares against the constitutionality of a general system of improvements, and that Gen. Cass indorses the platform; but he still thinks Gen. Cass is in favor of some sort of improvements. Well, what are they? As he is against *general* objects, those he is *for*, must be *particular* and *local*. Now, this is taking the subject precisely by the wrong end. *Particularity*—expending the money of the *whole* people for an object which will benefit only a *portion* of them, is the greatest real objection to improvements, and has been so held by Gen. Jackson, Mr. Polk, and all others, I believe, till now. But now, behold, the objects most general, nearest free from this objection, are to be rejected, while those most liable to it are to be embraced. To return: I can not help believing that Gen. Cass, when he wrote his letter of acceptance, well understood he was to be claimed by the advocates of both sides of this question, and that he then closed the door against all further expressions of opinion, purposely to retain the benefits of that double position. His subsequent equivocation at Cleveland, to my mind, proves such to have been the case.

PLATFORMS.

One word more, and I shall have done with this branch of the subject. You Democrats, and your candidate, in the main are in favor of laying down, in advance, a platform—a set of party positions, as a unit; and then of enforcing the people by every sort of appliance, to ratify them, however unpalatable some of them may be. We, and our candidate, are in favor of making Presidential elections and the legislation of the country distinct matters; so that the people can elect whom they please, and afterward legislate just as they please, without any hindrance, save only so much as may guard against infractions of the Constitution, undue haste, and want of consideration. The difference between us is clear as noon-day. That we are right, we can not doubt. We hold the true Republican position. In leaving the people's business in

their hands, we can not be wrong. We are willing, and even anxious, to go to the people on this issue.

MR. CLAY'S DEFEAT AND DEMOCRATIC SYMPATHIES.

But I suppose I can not reasonably hope to convince you that we have any principles. The most I can expect is, to assure you that we think we have, and are quite contented with them. The other day one of the gentlemen from Georgia (Mr. Iverson), an eloquent man, and a man of learning, so far as I can judge, not being learned myself, came down upon us astonishingly. He spoke in what the *Baltimore American* calls the "scathing and withering style." At the end of his second severe flash I was struck blind, and found myself feeling with my fingers for an assurance of my continued physical existence. A little of the bone was left and I gradually revived. He eulogized Mr. Clay in high and beautiful terms, and then declared that we had deserted all our principles, and had turned Henry Clay out, like an old horse, to root. This is terribly severe. It can not be answered by argument; at least, I can not so answer it. I merely wish to ask the gentlemen if the Whigs are the only party he can think of, who sometimes turn old horses out to root? Is not a certain Martin Van Buren an old horse, which your own party have turned out to root? and is he not rooting a little to your discomfort about now? But in not nominating Mr. Clay, we deserted our principles, you say. Ah! in what? Tell us, ye men of principles, what principle we violated? We say you did violate principle in discarding Van Buren, and we can tell you how. You violated the primary, the cardinal, the one great living principle of all Democratic representative government—the principle that the representative is bound to carry out the known will of his constituents. A large majority of the Baltimore Convention of 1844 were, by their constituents, instructed to procure Van Buren's nomination if they could. In violation, in utter, glaring contempt of this, you rejected him—rejected him, as the gentleman from New York (Mr. Birdsall), the other day expressly admitted, for *availability*—that same "general availability" which you charge upon us, and daily chew over here, as something exceedingly odious and unprincipled. But the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Iverson), gave us a second speech yesterday, all well considered and put down in writing, in which Van Buren was scathed and withered a "few" for his present position and movements. I can not remember the gentleman's precise language, but I do

remember he put Van Buren down, down, till he got him where he was finally to "stink" and "rot."

Mr. Speaker, it is no business or inclination of mine to defend Martin Van Buren. In the war of extermination now waging between him and his old admirers, I say, devil take the hindmost—and the foremost. But there is no mistaking the origin of the breach; and if the curse of "stinking" and "rotting" is to fall on the first and greatest violators of principle in the matter, I disinterestedly suggest, that the gentleman from Georgia and his present co-workers are bound to take it upon themselves.

[Mr. Lincoln then proceeded to speak of the objections against Gen. Taylor as a mere military hero; retorting with effect, by citing the attempt to make out a military record for Gen. Cass; and referring, in a bantering way, to his own services in the Black-Hawk war, as already quoted. He then said:]

CASS ON THE WILMOT PROVISIO.

While I have Gen. Cass in hand, I wish to say a word about his political principles. As a specimen, I take the record of his progress on the Wilmot Proviso. In the Washington Union, of March 2, 1847, there is a report of the speech of Gen. Cass, made the day before in the Senate, on the Wilmot Proviso, during the delivery of which Mr. Miller, of New Jersey, is reported to have interrupted him as follows, to wit:

"Mr. Miller expressed his great surprise at the change in the sentiments of the Senator from Michigan, who had been regarded as the great champion of freedom in the North-west, of which he was a distinguished ornament. Last year the Senator from Michigan was understood to be decidedly in favor of the Wilmot Proviso; and, as no reason had been stated for the change, he (Mr. Miller) could not refrain from the expression of his extreme surprise."

To this Gen. Cass is reported to have replied as follows, to wit:

"Mr. Cass said, that the course of the Senator from New Jersey was most extraordinary. Last year he (Mr. Cass) should have voted for the proposition had it come up. But circumstances had altogether changed. The honorable Senator then read several passages from the remarks as given above, which he had committed to writing, in order to refute such a charge as that of the Senator from New Jersey."

In the "remarks above committed to writing," is one numbered 4, as follows, to-wit:

"4th. Legislation would now be wholly imperative, because no territory hereafter to be acquired can be governed without an act of Congress providing for its government. And such an act, on its passage, would open the whole subject, and leave the Congress, called on to pass it, free to exercise its own discretion, entirely uncontrolled by any declaration found in the statute book."

In Niles' Register, vol. 73, page 293, there is a letter of Gen. Cass to A. O. P. Nicholson, of Nashville, Tennessee, dated December 24, 1847, from which the following are correct extracts:

"The Wilmot Proviso has been before the country some time. It has been repeatedly discussed in Congress, and by the public press. I am strongly impressed with the opinion that a great change has been going on in the public mind upon this subject—in my own as well as others; and that doubts are resolving themselves into convictions, that the principle it involves should be kept out of the National Legislature, and left to the people of the Confederacy in their respective local Governments. * * * * *

"Briefly, then, I am opposed to the exercise of any jurisdiction by Congress over this matter; and I am in favor of leaving the people of any territory which may be hereafter acquired, the right to regulate it themselves, under the general principles of the Constitution. Because,

"1. I do not see in the Constitution any grant of the requisite power to Congress; and I am not disposed to extend a doubtful precedent beyond its necessity—the establishment of territorial governments when needed—leaving to the inhabitants all the rights compatible with the relations they bear to the Confederation."

AN OBEDIENT DEMOCRAT.

These extracts show that, in 1846, Gen. Cass was for the Proviso *at once*; that, in March, 1847, he was still for it, *but not just then*; and that in December, 1847, he was *against* it altogether. This is a true index to the whole man. When the question was raised in 1846, he was in a blustering hurry to take ground for it. He sought to be in advance, and to avoid the uninteresting position of a mere follower; but soon he began to see glimpses of the great Democratic ox-gad waving in his face, and to hear indistinctly, a voice saying, "back," "back, sir," "back a little." He shakes his head and bats his eyes, and blunders back to his position of March, 1847; but

still the gad waves, and the voice grows more distinct, and sharper still—"back, sir!" "back, I say!" "further back!" and back he goes to the position of December, 1847; at which the gad is still, and the voice soothingly says—"So!" "Stand still at that."

Have no fears, gentlemen, of your candidate; he exactly suits you, and we congratulate you upon it. However much you may be distressed about *our* candidate, you have all cause to be contented and happy with your own. If elected, he may not maintain all, or even any of his positions previously taken; but he will be sure to do whatever the party exigency, for the time being, may require; and that is precisely what you want. He and Van Buren are the same "manner of men;" and like Van Buren, he will never desert *you* till you first desert *him*.

[After referring at some length to extra "charges" of Gen Cass upon the Treasury, Mr. Lincoln continued :]

WONDERFUL PHYSICAL CAPACITIES.

But I have introduced Gen. Cass' accounts here, chiefly to show the wonderful physical capacities of the man. They show that he not only did the labor of several men at the same *time*, but that he often did it, at several *places* many hundred miles apart, *at the same time*. And at eating, too, his capacities are shown to be quite as wonderful. From October, 1821 to May, 1822, he ate ten rations a day in Michigan, ten rations a day here, in Washington, and near five dollar's worth a day besides, partly on the road between the two places. And then there is an important discovery in his example—the art of being paid for what one eats, instead of having to pay for it. Hereafter, if any nice young man shall owe a bill which he can not pay in any other way, he can just board it out. Mr. Speaker, we have all heard of the animal standing in doubt between two stacks of hay, and starving to death; the like of that would never happen to Gen. Cass. Place the stacks a thousand miles apart, he would stand stock-still, midway between them, and eat them both at once; and the green grass along the line would be apt to suffer some too, at the *same* time. By all means, make him President, gentlemen. He will feed you bounteously—if—if—there is any left after he shall have helped himself.

THE WHIGS AND THE MEXICAN WAR.

But as Gen. Taylor is, par excellence, the hero of the Mexican war; and, as you Democrats say we Whigs have always

opposed the war, you think it must be very awkward and embarrassing for us to go for Gen. Taylor. The declaration that we have always opposed the war, is true or false accordingly as one may understand the term "opposing the war." If to say "the war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the President," be opposing the war, then the Whigs have very generally opposed it. Whenever they have spoken at all, they have said this; and they have said it on what has appeared good reason to them:—The marching an army into the midst of a peaceful Mexican settlement, frightening the inhabitants away, leaving their growing crops and other property to destruction, to *you* may appear a perfectly amiable, peaceful, unprovoking procedure; but it does not appear so to *us*. So to call such an act, to us appears no other than a naked, impudent absurdity, and we speak of it accordingly. But if, when the war had begun, and had become the cause of the country, the giving of our money and our blood, in common with yours, was support of the war, then it is not true that we have always opposed the war. With few individual exceptions, you have constantly had our votes here for all the necessary supplies. And, more than this, you have had the services, the blood, and the lives of our political brethren in every trial, and on every field. The beardless boy and the mature man—the humble and the distinguished—you have had them. Through suffering and death, by disease and in battle, they have endured, and fought, and fallen with you. Clay and Webster each gave a son, never to be returned. From the State of my own residence, besides other worthy but less known Whig names, we sent Marshall, Morrison, Baker, and Hardin; they all fought, and one fell, and in the fall of that one, we lost our best Whig man. Nor were the Whigs few in number, or laggard in the day of danger. In that fearful, bloody, breathless struggle at Buena Vista, where each man's hard task was to beat back five foes, or die himself, of the five high officers who perished, four were Whigs.

In speaking of this, I mean no odious comparison between the lion-hearted Whigs and Democrats who fought there. On other occasions, and among the lower officers and privates on *that* occasion, I doubt not the proportion was different. I wish to do justice to all. I think of all those brave men as Americans, in whose proud fame, as an American, I, too, have a share. Many of them, Whigs and Democrats, are my constituents and personal friends; and I thank them—more than thank *them*—one and all, for the high, imperishable honor they have conferred on our common State.

AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION.

But the distinction between the cause of the *President* in beginning the war, and the cause of the *country* after it was begun, is a distinction which you can not perceive. To *you*, the President and the country seem to be all one. You are interested to see no distinction between them; and I venture to suggest that *possibly* your interest blinds you a little. We see the distinction, as we think, clearly enough; and our friends, who have fought in the war, have no difficulty in seeing it also. What those who have fallen would say, were they alive and here, of course we can never know; but with those who have returned there is no difficulty. Col. Haskell and Maj. Gaines, members here, both fought in the war; and one of them underwent extraordinary perils and hardships; still they, like all other Whigs here, vote on the record that the war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the President. And even Gen. Taylor himself, the noblest Roman of them all, has declared that, as a citizen, and particularly as a soldier, it is sufficient for him to know that his country is at war with a foreign nation, to do all in his power to bring it to a speedy and honorable termination, by the most vigorous and energetic operations, without inquiring about its justice, or anything else connected with it.

Mr. Speaker, let our Democratic friends be comforted with the assurance that we are content with our position, content with our company, and content with our candidate; and that although they, in their generous sympathy, think we ought to be miserable, we really are not, and that they may dismiss the great anxiety they have on *our* account.

Mr. Lincoln concluded with some allusions to the then divided condition of the New York Democracy.

This session of Congress came to a close on the 14th day of August. The chief points of Mr. Lincoln's Congressional record, thus far, have been noticed, and his principal speeches given at length. He stood firmly by the side of John Quincy Adams, in favor of the unrestricted right of petition, as will be seen by his vote, among others, against laying on the table a petition presented by Caleb B. Smith (December 27, 1847) praying for the abolition of slavery and the slave-trade in the District of Columbia. He favored a liberal policy toward the people in disposing of the public lands, as indicated by

his imperfectly reported remarks (May 11, 1848), at the time of the passing of the bill admitting Wisconsin into the Union as a State. He was careful to scrutinize particular claims, to satisfy which he was asked to vote for an appropriation, as in the case of the proposition to pay the Texas volunteers for lost horses (May 4, 1848). All his acts show a purpose to do his duty to the country, no less than to his immediate constituents, without fear or favor.

After the session closed, Mr. Lincoln made a visit to New England, where he delivered some effective campaign speeches, which were enthusiastically received by his large audiences, as appears from the reports in the journals of those days, and as will be remembered by many. His time, however, was chiefly given, during the Congressional recess, to the canvass in the West, where, through the personal strength of Mr. Cass as a North-western man, the contest was more severe and exciting than in any other part of the country. The final triumph of Gen. Taylor, over all the odds against him, did much to counterbalance, in Mr. Lincoln's mind, the disheartening defeat of four years previous. As before stated, he had declined to be a candidate for re-election to Congress, yet he had the satisfaction of aiding to secure, in his own district, a majority of 1,500 for the Whig Presidential candidates.

Mr. Lincoln again took his seat in the House in December, on the re-assembling of the thirtieth Congress for its second session. Coming between the Presidential election, which had effected a political revolution, and the inauguration of the new Government, this session was generally a quiet one, passing away without any very important measure of general legislation being acted upon. A calm had followed the recent storms. There were, indeed, certain movements in regard to slavery and the slave-trade in the District of Columbia, which produced some temporary excitement, but resulted in no serious commotion. On the 21st of December, Mr. Gott, a representative from New York, introduced a resolution, accompanied by a strong preamble, instructing the Committee on the District of Columbia to report a bill prohibiting the slave-trade in the District. The language used was as follows :

WHEREAS, The traffic now prosecuted in this metropolis of the Republic in human beings, as chattels, is contrary to natural justice and the fundamental principles of our political system, and is notoriously a reproach to our country throughout Christendom, and a serious hinderance to the progress of republican liberty among the nations of the earth; therefore,

Resolved, That the Committee for the District of Columbia be instructed to report a bill, as soon as practicable, prohibiting the slave-trade in said District.

Mr. Haralson, of Georgia, moved to lay the same on the table, and the yeas and nays were taken on his motion. Mr. Lincoln, Joseph R. Ingersoll, Richard W. Thompson, and George G. Dunn, were nearly or quite the only Northern Whigs who voted in the affirmative. The motion was lost, and the resolution, under pressure of the previous question, was adopted, ninety-eight to eighty-eight, Mr. Lincoln voting in the negative. A motion to re-consider this vote came up for action on the 27th of the same month. A motion to lay on the table the motion to re-consider having been lost (yeas 58 nays 107, Mr. Lincoln voting in the negative), the subject was postponed until the 10th of January. At that date, Mr. Lincoln read a substitute which he proposed to offer for the resolution, in case of a re-consideration. This substitute contained the form of a bill enacting that no person not already within the District should be held in slavery therein, and providing for the gradual emancipation of the slaves already within the District, with compensation to the owners, if a majority of the legal voters of the District should assent to the act, at an election to be holden for the purpose. It made an exception of the right of citizens of the slaveholding States, coming to the District on public business, "be attended into and out of said District, and while there, by the necessary servants of themselves and their families." These were the chief provisions of the measure contemplated by Mr. Lincoln, which compared favorably with the act prohibiting the slave-trade in the District, included among the Compromise measures of 1850. After rehearsing the details of the bill, according to the report in the *Congressional Globe*—

Mr. Lincoln then said, that he was authorized to say, that

of about fifteen of the leading citizens of the District of Columbia to whom this proposition had been submitted, there was no one but who approved of the adoption of such a proposition. He did not wish to be misunderstood. He did not know whether or not they would vote for this bill on the first Monday of April; but he repeated, that out of fifteen persons to whom it had been submitted, he had authority to say that every one of them desired that some proposition like this should pass.

A motion to lay on the table the proposition to re-consider was again lost, and by a much larger majority than before, and the resolution was re-considered, 119 to 81. Mr. Smith, of Indiana, then moved the following substitute :

Resolved, That the Committee on the District of Columbia be instructed to report, as soon as practicable, a bill so amending the present law in this District, as effectually to prevent the bringing of slaves into the District, either for sale here, or to be sold and carried to any place beyond the District.

Mr. Meade, of Virginia, offered the following as an amendment to Mr. Smith's amendment :

And that the said committee is hereby instructed to report a bill more effectually to enable owners to recover their slaves escaping from one State into another.

Here, it is observable, are two of the propositions which were ultimately embraced in the great Compromise "settlement" of 1850, and these several amendments, proposed by Mr. Lincoln and others, may be termed the springs in Congress from which flowed a portion of that celebrated series of measures.

The Speaker (Mr. Winthrop) ruled Mr. Meade's amendment out of order, and without any decisive action thereon, the House adjourned, leaving the resolution and amendments to disappear among the files of unfinished business on the Speaker's table.

An unsuccessful attempt had previously been made by Mr. Palfrey, of Massachusetts, a Free-Soil member who refused to vote for Mr. Winthrop for Speaker, to introduce a bill "to repeal all acts, or parts of acts, of Congress establishing or maintaining slavery or the slave-trade in the District of Colum

bia." Mr. Holmes, of South Carolina, having objected, the yeas and nays were taken on granting the leave asked, and the negative prevailed by thirteen majority. The Northern Whigs in general, excepting Messrs. Vinton and Dunn, and many Northern Democrats, including John Wentworth, David Wilmot, and J. J. Faran, of Ohio, voted in the affirmative. Mr. Lincoln's name is recorded among the nays. So sweeping and unqualified a measure he had ever been opposed to, as he avowed himself to be in 1858, and he never hesitated, from a fear of popular misapprehension, to vote in strict accordance with his own convictions.

On the 31st of January, Mr. Edwards, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, reported a bill, suitably guarded in its terms, prohibiting the slave-trade in the District. On a motion to lay this on the table, Mr. Lincoln voted in the negative, with the friends of that measure, who were a majority. This bill, however, passed over among the unfinished business of the session.

In regard to the grant of public lands to the new States, to aid in the construction of railroads and canals, Mr. Lincoln favored the interests of his own constituents, under such reasonable restrictions as the proper carrying out of the purpose of these grants required. This policy had been strongly opposed by Mr. Vinton, while one of the bills of this sort was pending. In the brief remarks which Mr. Lincoln offered in reply, there are some points (*Congressional Globe*, page 533) worth quoting here: -

In relation to the fact assumed, that, after awhile, the new States, having got hold of the public lands to a certain extent, would turn round and compel Congress to relinquish all claim to them, he had a word to say, by way of recurring to the history of the past. When was the time to come (he asked) when the States in which the public lands were situated would compose a majority of the representation in Congress, or any thing like it. A majority of Representatives would very soon reside West of the mountains, he admitted; but would they all come from States in which the public lands were situated? They certainly would not; for, as these Western States grew strong in Congress, the public lands passed away from them, and they got on the other side

of the question, and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Vinton) was an example attesting that fact.

Mr. Vinton interrupted here to say, that he had stood upon this question just where he was now, for five-and-twenty years.

Mr. Lincoln was not making an argument for the purpose of convicting the gentleman of any impropriety at all. He was speaking of a fact in history, of which his State was an example. He was referring to a plain principle in the nature of things. The State of Ohio had now grown to be a giant. She had a large delegation on that floor; but was she now in favor of granting lands to the new States, as she used to be? The New England States, New York, and the Old Thirteen, were all rather quiet upon the subject; and it was seen just now that a member from one of the new States was the first man to rise up in opposition. And so it would be with the history of this question for the future. There never would come a time when the people residing in the States embracing the public lands would have the entire control of this subject; and so it was a matter of certainty that Congress would never do more in this respect than what would be dictated by a just liberality. The apprehension, therefore, that the public lands were in danger of being wrested from the General Government by the strength of the delegation in Congress from the new States, was utterly futile. There never could be such a thing. If we take these lands (said he) it will not be without your consent. We can never outnumber you. The result is, that all fear of the new States turning against the right of Congress to the public domain must be effectually quelled, as those who are opposed to that interest must always hold a vast majority here, and they will never surrender the whole or any part of the public lands, unless they themselves choose so to do. This was all he desired to say.

With the termination of the Thirtieth Congress, by Constitutional limitation, on the 4th of March, 1849, Mr. Lincoln's career as a Congressman came to a close. He had refused to be a candidate for re-election in a district that had given him over 1,500 majority in 1846, and nearly the same to General Taylor, as the Whig candidate for the Presidency in 1848. His name was prominently presented for the position of Commissioner of the General Land Office, under President Taylor, but, though he zealously labored to bring in the new Administration, he made no complaint, and certainly did not afterward seriously regret that his valued services were not thus recog-

nized. He retired once more to private life, renewing the professional practice which had been temporarily interrupted by his public employment. The duties of his responsible position had been discharged with assiduity and with fearless adherence to his convictions of right, under whatever circumstances. Scarcely a list of yeas and nays can be found, for either session, which does not contain his name. He was never conveniently absent on any critical vote. He never shrank from any responsibility which his sense of justice impelled him to take. His record, comparatively brief as it is, is no doubtful one, and will bear the closest scrutiny. And though one of the youngest and most inexperienced members of an uncommonly able and brilliant Congress, he might well have been ranked, without the more recent events which have naturally followed upon his previous career, among the distinguished statesmen of the Thirtieth Congress.

CHAPTER IX.

**PROFESSIONAL LIFE.—THE ANTI-NEBRASKA CANVASS.—
1849—1854.**

Mr. Lincoln in Retirement for Five Years.—Gen. Taylor's Administration.—The Slavery Agitation of 1850.—The Compromise of Clay and Fillmore.—The "Final Settlement" of 1852.—How, and by Whom it was Disturbed.—Violation of the most Positive Pledges.—The Kansas-Nebraska Bill.—Douglas, the Agitator.—Popular Indignation and Excitement.—Mr. Lincoln takes part in the Canvass of 1854.—Great Political Changes.—The Anti-Nebraska Organization.—Springfield Resolutions of 1854.—Results of the Election.—A Majority of Congressmen and of the Legislature Anti-Nebraska.—Election of United States Senator to Succeed Gen. Shields.—Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Trumbull.—A Magnanimous Sacrifice.—Mr. Trumbull Elected.

DURING the five years immediately following the close of his Congressional life, Mr. Lincoln attentively pursued his profession of the law. He took no active part in politics through the period of Gen. Taylor's Administration, or in any of the exciting scenes of 1850. His great political leader, Henry Clay, had resumed his place in the Senate, and was earnestly striving—one of the last great labors of his life—to avert the dangers to the country, which he believed to be threatened by the fierce contests over the question of Slavery. It was, with the slave States, a desperate struggle to retain the balance of power in the Senate, by rejecting the application of another free State for admission, the granting of which would destroy the exact equilibrium then existing. The policy of admitting a slave State along with every new free one, had substantially prevailed for years; but, at this time, despite the extensive additions of Mexican territory, there was no counterbalancing slave State ready for admission. The exclusion of slavery

from California had, in fact, been rather a surprise, and this application was evidently still more an irritating circumstance for that reason. And yet this movement was in strict accordance with the policy of a Southern President. As a final result, the admission of California was only carried by means of great counterbalancing concessions on the part of the free States. For months after, there was much discontent in both sections, in regard to the compromise measures of 1850, which were defeated in Congress, when first acted upon as a whole, but were ultimately carried in detail. It was not until 1852, when both the great parties of the country agreed to accept those measures as a "final settlement" of the slavery controversy, that public sentiment, North and South, appeared to have become fully reconciled to this adjustment. The Administration, brought into power by the election of that year, was most thoroughly and sacredly committed to the maintenance of this settlement, and against the revival of the slavery agitation in any form. To introduce that subject under any pretence, into the halls of Congress, was an act of wanton incendiarism, in utter disregard of most solemn pledges, by the aid of which the Democratic party had secured whatever real hold it had upon popular confidence. Such was the state of affairs in 1852, and at the time of Mr. Pierce's inauguration in 1853.

Mr. Lincoln, as a private citizen, engrossed with his professional duties, had borne no part in the original controversy, and had taken no share in its settlement. Whether preferring the non-intervention policy of President Taylor, or the compromise course of Clay and Fillmore, he had undoubtedly regarded the peace established, by means of the latter, as one that ought by all means to be preserved, and the pledges of both sections of the country, through the action of both the national parties, as religiously binding upon every public man who had openly or tacitly assented thereto. That he approved all the details of this compromise is not probable. But that, if faithfully adhered to, the practical results would have been satisfactory, he was undoubtedly convinced.

The introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, in 1854, in the midst of this profound peace on the slavery question, was

"the alarm of the fire-bell at night" which startled Mr. Lincoln in the repose of his private life, and showed that the incendiary had but too successfully been at his work. The solemn pledge of peace had been violated by the very men who were most forward in making it, and most noisy in their professions of a desire that the slavery conflict should cease. This new agitating movement, not only unsettling all the more recent stipulations made for the sake of peace, but even going back to destroy the only condition yet assailable, of the Compromise of 1820, and that the very portion which was agreed on as a consideration to the free States, was led by the ambitious politician of Illinois, Stephen A. Douglas. Not only had Senator Douglas committed himself as fully as any man could do to the maintenance of peace on this question, after the compromise of 1850, but he had, a year previous, called down vengeance upon the hand that would dare disturb the time-honored Missouri compact—that settlement which secured freedom "forever" to the soil embraced within the limits of Kansas and Nebraska. Yet the first hand raised for the commission of this incalculable wrong was his own! Douglas himself reported the act which violated that compact, and which opened the new territories to slavery (professedly, not really, at the option of the people), contrary to the spirit of all the early legislation, and to the hitherto uniform course of the Government. Even he himself had recently voted for the Wilmot Proviso as applied to the territory acquired from Mexico, and Mr. Polk had approved the Oregon bill, containing the same restriction. Never was there more universal indignation among the people of the North, and many of the more sagacious statesmen of the South clearly foresaw the mischiefs that were to follow from this sacrilege. Yet strange to say, this measure sundered and broke up the Whig party forever, through the action of a large portion of the Southern Whig Congressmen, in joining the Democracy in this act of bad faith, for the sake of supposed sectional advantage. The most intense excitement prevailed throughout the country, and the destruction of the old party lines was effectually accomplished.

These events called forth Mr. Lincoln once more to do battle for the right. He entered into the canvass of 1854, as one of the most active leaders of the "Anti-Nebraska" movement. He addressed the people repeatedly from the stump, with all his characteristic earnestness and energy. He met and cowed the author of the "Nebraska iniquity," in the presence of the masses, and powerfully aided in effecting the remarkable political changes of that year in Illinois.

The incendiary act had come to the final vote, in the Senate, on the 26th day of May. About the first of August, Congress adjourned. Douglas lingered by the way on his return to his constituents, and reached Chicago near the close of that month. Here he met a storm of indignation from the people whom, for manifesting their disapprobation of his conduct, he complacently termed a "mob." He had proposed to speak in self-vindication, on the evening of the first day of September. He was received with the most decisive demonstrations of popular indignation, which he attempted to face down with an uncompromising insolence of manner, that only tended to increase the excitement against him. After long perseverance in an attempt to *compel* a hearing, he was forced to succumb. All over the State he early discovered the same state of feeling existing among a large portion of his constituents, although there was no refusal to hear him, except in this first unlucky effort to defy and silence a crowd by bullying deportment. The popular rage gradually subsided, but the deliberate sentiment of the people of Illinois on this subject was rather confirmed and strengthened in succeeding years. From commanding a large majority of the popular vote, as he had done previously, his strength dwindled away, until from that time on, he and the party that sustained him, were in a positive minority in the State. The reader can judge how much this, to him, painful truth, had to do with the change of policy adopted by him, in opposing the Lecompton Constitution, the legitimate fruit of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and substantially approved by him in advance, in a speech made in Springfield, in 1857.

Mr. Douglas visited several parts of the State, vainly attempt

ing, by ingenious but sophistical addresses to the people to avert the impending revolution. Mr. Lincoln met him in debate at Springfield, during the time of the State Fair, early in October, 1854, and the encounter was a memorable one in the great campaign then in progress. They met a few days later at Peoria, where Mr. Douglas had no better fortune. Subsequently to that encounter, he showed a decided preference for speaking at other times and places than Mr. Lincoln did.

The Anti-Nebraska organization, formed at Springfield in October of that year, and embracing men of all parties opposed to the ill-judged measures which had introduced the most violent agitation in regard to slavery ever known in the country, was the beginning from which the Republican party in Illinois was to be matured. Among the resolutions at that time adopted, after setting forth in a preamble that a majority of Congress had deliberately and wantonly re-opened the controversy respecting the extension of slavery under our national jurisdiction, which a majority of the people had understood to be closed forever by the successive compromises of 1820 and 1850, were the following :

Resolved, That the doctrine affirmed by the Nebraska Bill, and gilded over by its advocates, with the specious phrases of non-intervention and popular sovereignty, is really and clearly a complete surrender of all the ground hitherto asserted and maintained by the Federal Government, with respect to the limitation of slavery, is a plain confession of the right of the slaveholder to transfer his human chattels to any part of the public domain, and there hold them as slaves as long as inclination or interest may dictate ; and that this is an attempt totally to reverse the doctrine hitherto uniformly held by statesmen and jurists, that slavery is the creature of local and State law, and to make it a national institution.

Resolved, That as freedom is national, and slavery sectional and local, the absence of all law upon the subject of slavery presumes the existence of a state of freedom alone, while slavery exists only by virtue of positive law.

Resolved, That we heartily approve the course of the freemen of Connecticut, Vermont, Iowa, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, New York, Michigan and Maine, postponing or disregarding their minor differences of opinion or preferences, and acting together cordially and trustingly in the same cause of freedom,

of free labor, and free soil, and we commend their spirit to the freemen of this and other States, exhorting each to renounce his party whenever and wherever that party proves unfaithful to human freedom.

In behalf of these principles, Mr. Lincoln had already taken the stump, and for them he did valiant service in various parts of the State.

This new party was organized late in the season, and the canvass for Treasurer, the only State officer to be elected, was but imperfectly made. In some parts of the State, there was even no distribution of tickets containing the name of this candidate. The result, even under these unfavorable circumstances, and in spite of the overwhelming Democratic preponderance during the previous twenty-five years, was extremely close, and for a long time doubtful. The Democratic candidate barely escaped defeat. This was the last election in which the party sustaining Douglas has had even the appearance of a majority in Illinois. *The revolution was now substantially accomplished.* From that day to the present, the Republican party has been steadily gaining in strength, and that opposed to it sinking more and more into a hopeless minority. Even the temporary reaction, under the Anti-Lecompton flag, was more apparent than real.

Of the nine Congressional Districts, the Opposition now, for the first time, carried a majority, electing five members, and the Democrats four. The Legislature would have been completely revolutionized, in both branches, with little doubt, but for the large number of Democrats "holding over," as members of the new Senate. In the House, the Anti-Nebraska representatives numbered forty, and the Democratic thirty-five. In the Senate, there were seventeen elected as Democrats, and eight as Opposition men. Of the former, however, there were three, elected two years previously, who repudiated Douglas and his policy, and inclined to the Opposition. These were Norman B. Judd, J. M. Palmer, and B. C. Cook. Reckoning these with the Anti-Nebraska side, the Senate stood, Opposition eleven, Democrats fourteen—leaving a

majority against the Douglas Democracy of two on joint ballot.

A United States Senator, to succeed Gen. Shields on the 4th of March, 1855, was to be chosen by this Legislature. For the first time in the history of Illinois, the election of an Anti-Democratic Senator was within the reach of possibility. Mr. Lincoln was the first choice of the great mass of the Opposition for this position. From his prominence, for a long time, in the old Whig party, it was but natural that a portion of the members having Democratic antecedents who had come into the new organization, should hesitate to give Mr. Lincoln their votes. This was especially true of the three Senators above named as holding over, they having been elected as regular Democrats. Under this state of things, it was manifest, after a few ballots, that, with the close vote in joint convention the election of a Democrat, not to be certainly relied on as an opponent of the Douglas policy, and at best uncommitted in regard to the new party organization, might be the result of adhering to Mr. Lincoln. He, accordingly, with the self-sacrificing disposition which had always characterized him, promptly appealed to his Whig friends to go over in a solid body to Mr. Trumbull, a man of Democratic antecedents, who could command the full vote of the Anti-Nebraska Democrats. By these earnest and disinterested efforts, the difficult task was accomplished, great as was the sacrifice of personal feeling which it cost the devoted friends of Mr. Lincoln. On the part of himself and them, it involved the exercise of a degree of self-denial and magnanimity, as rare as it was noble. It demonstrated their honest attachment to the great cause for which old party lines had been abandoned, and their sincere purpose of thoroughly ignoring all differences founded on mere partisan prejudice. It cemented the union of these Anti-Nebraska elements, and consolidated the new organization into a permanent party.

The joint convention for electing a United States Senator met on the 8th day of February, 1855. On the first ballot, James Shields, then Senator, who had been induced by Douglas, against his own better judgment, to vote for the

Kansas-Nebraska bill, received 41 votes, and three other Democrats had one vote each. Abraham Lincoln had 45 votes, Lyman Trumbull 5, Mr. Koerner 2, and there were three other scattering votes. On the seventh ballot, the Democratic vote was concentrated upon Gov. Matteson, with two exceptions, and he received also the votes of two Anti-Nebraska Democrats, making 44 in all. On the tenth ballot, Mr. Trumbull was elected, in the way just explained, receiving 51 votes, and Mr. Matteson 47. Every Whig vote but one was given to Mr. Trumbull.

Among the speeches delivered by Mr. Lincoln in this memorable campaign, which gave the Republicans an able Senator from Illinois, and which effectually accomplished the overthrow of the Democracy in that State, perhaps the ablest and most characteristic was the one delivered at Peoria, important portions of which were quoted by him in the canvass with Douglas, four years later. The following detached passages of this speech are specially memorable :

This declared indifference, but as I must think real zeal for the spread of slavery, I can not but hate. I hate it because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself; I hate it because it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world; enables the enemies of free institutions with plausibility to taunt us as hypocrites; causes the real friends of freedom to doubt our sincerity; and especially because it forces so many really good men among ourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of civil liberty, criticising the Declaration of Independence, and insisting that there is no right principle of action but self-interest.

When the Southern people tell us they are no more responsible for the origin of slavery, than we are, I acknowledge the fact. When it is said that the institution exists, and that it is very difficult to get rid of it in any satisfactory way, I can understand and appreciate the saying. I surely will not blame them for not doing what I should not know how to do myself. If all earthly power were given me, I should not know what to do, as to the existing institution.

When the white man governs himself, that is, self-government; but when he governs himself, and also governs another man, that is more than self-government—that is despotism. If the negro is a man, why, then my ancient faith teaches me that “all men are created equal;” and that there can be no morai

right in connection with one man's making a slave of another.

Slave States are places for poor white people to remove *from*, not to remove *to*; new free States are the places for poor people to go to and better their condition. For this use, the nation needs these territories.

Slavery is founded in the selfishness of man's nature—opposition to it, in his love of justice.

In our greedy chase to make profit of the negro; let us beware lest we “cancel and tear to pieces” even the white man's charter of freedom.

Some men, mostly Whigs, who condemn the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, nevertheless hesitate to go for its restoration, lest they be thrown in company with the Abolitionist. Will they allow me, as an old Whig, to tell them, good-humor-edly, that I think this is very silly? Stand with anybody that stands *right*. Stand with him while he is right, and *part* with him when he goes wrong.

Little by little, but steadily as man's march to the grave, we have been giving up the *old* for the *new* faith. Near eighty years ago we began by declaring that all men are created equal; but now from that beginning we have run down to the other declaration, that for *some* men to enslave *others* is a “sacred right of self-government.” These principles can not stand together. They are as opposite as God and Mammon; and whoever holds to one must despise the other.

In the course of my main argument, Judge Douglas interrupted me to say that the principle of the Nebraska bill was very old; that it originated when God made man, and placed good and evil before him, allowing him to choose for himself, being responsible for the choice he should make. At the time, I thought this was merely playful; and I answered it accordingly. But in his reply to me, he renewed it as a serious argument. In seriousness, then, the facts of this proposition are not **true**, as stated. God did not place good and evil before man, telling him to make his choice. On the contrary, He did tell him there was one tree, of the fruit of which he should not eat, upon pain of certain death. I should scarcely wish so **strong** a prohibition against slavery in Nebraska.

CHAPTER X.

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN 1856 AND '57.

The Republican Party Organized.—Their Platform adopted at Bloomington.—The Canvass of 1856.—Mr. Lincoln Sustains Fremont and Dayton.—His Active Labors on the Stump.—Col. Bissell Elected Governor of Illinois.—Mr. Buchanan Inaugurated.—His Kansas Policy.—Mr. Douglas Committed to it in June, 1857.—John Calhoun his Special Friend.—The Springfield Speech of Douglas.—Mr. Lincoln's Reply.

MR. LINCOLN took an active part in the formation of the Republican party as such. The State Convention of that organization, which met at Bloomington, on the 29th of May, 1856, sent delegates to the Philadelphia Convention of that year, held for the nomination of Presidential candidates. Among the resolutions of the Bloomington Convention were the following :

Resolved, That foregoing all former differences of opinion upon other questions, we pledge ourselves to unite in opposition to the present Administration, and to the party which upholds and supports it, and to use all honorable and constitutional means to wrest the Government from the unworthy hands which now control it, and to bring it back in its administration to the principles and practices of Washington, Jefferson, and their great and good compatriots of the Revolution.

Resolved, That we hold, in accordance with the opinions and practices of all the great statesmen of all parties, for the first sixty years of the administration of the Government, that, under the Constitution, Congress possesses full power to prohibit slavery in the Territories; and that while we will maintain all constitutional rights of the South, we also hold that justice, humanity, the principles of freedom as expressed in our Declaration of Independence, and our National Constitution, and the purity and perpetuity of our Government require that that power should be exerted, to prevent the extension of slavery into Territories heretofore free.

Resolved, That the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was unwise, unjust and injurious; in open and aggravated violation of the plighted faith of the States, and that the attempt of the present Administration to force slavery into Kansas against the

known wishes of the legal voters of that Territory, is an arbitrary and tyrannous violation of the rights of the people to govern themselves, and that we will strive, by all constitutional means, to secure to Kansas and Nebraska the legal guarantee against slavery, of which they were deprived, at the cost of the violation of the plighted faith of the nation.

With this creed, and the Philadelphia platform, subsequently adopted, the Republicans of Illinois went into the canvass of 1856. Mr. Lincoln labored earnestly during the campaign, sustaining the nominations of Fremont and Dayton. In the State canvass, Col. Wm. H. Bissell received the united support of the Opposition for Governor, and was elected by a decisive majority. On the Presidential candidates, there being, unfortunately, two tickets in the field, the divided Opposition were unsuccessful, although Fremont, in spite of the heavy Fillmore vote, ran so closely upon Buchanan that the result was for a time in doubt, and only the nearly solid vote of "Egypt" decided the result in favor of the latter. The untiring exertions of Mr. Lincoln on the stump, in enlightening the people as to the real issues involved, did much toward securing this remarkable vote.

Mr. Buchanan came into power in March, 1857, and the hopes which had been entertained of a material change, under his administration, of the unjust and execrable policy hitherto pursued toward Kansas, were speedily dissipated. After some little show of resistance at first, he was soon found acting in accordance with the dictates of the extreme pro-slavery interest. A deep scheme was concocted, into the secrets of which even the Governor and Secretary of that territory were not admitted, for forcing Kansas into the Union as a slave State. This plot began to be suspected, and its existence more and more confirmed by the course of events, not long after Mr. Buchanan's inauguration. The thin veil of "bogus Popular Sovereignty," with which Douglas had tried to hide the naked deformity of the act under which Kansas and Nebraska were organized, was to be rent asunder. People were beginning to look with curiosity for the next evasion or artful afterthought by which he would attempt to escape the force of a public sentiment which was already rapidly bearing him down, before

this more complete exposure became inevitable. This interest in his course was the more lively, for the reason that his Senatorial term had nearly expired, and that, without some remarkable change of affairs, or some ingenious device, the curse he had himself pronounced in advance upon the disturber of the Missouri compact, was to be most signally realized.

Meantime, the machinery had been put in motion for a Convention at Lecompton, which was to ratify a Constitution prepared at Washington, under Administration auspices, and to secure the great purpose intended by the Southern supporters of the Kansas-Nebraska scheme. How grossly unjust and unequal were the provisions of the act calling this Convention, and how deliberate was its design of excluding the free State men from any effectual voice in determining "the domestic institutions" of a State in which the party of free labor comprised about four-fifths of the people, as had already been distinctly indicated, need not be here rehearsed. To Douglas, at least, the real facts were not unknown. That these iniquities must all ultimately come out, and receive the condemnation of the people, he can not have seriously questioned. Yet, in spite of these facts, it is undeniably true, and is clearly of record, that he committed himself in advance—not at all uncertain, most assuredly, as to what it was substantially to be—in favor of the Lecompton Constitution. John Calhoun the chosen instrument of the Administration for carrying out its plot to defeat "Popular Sovereignty" in Kansas, was one of the special friends of Douglas, and understood to share his intimate confidence. And when, in his speech at Springfield, in June, 1857, Mr. Douglas substantially indorsed the Lecompton Convention and its doings, beforehand, no one had any reason to doubt that he intended fully to sustain the Administration in attempting to force a slave Constitution on the people of Kansas—a process for which his "organic act" had prepared the way. In the course of his remarks on that occasion, he said :

Kansas is about to *speak for herself*, through her delegates assembled in convention, to form a Constitution, preparatory to her admission into the Union on an equal footing with the

original States. Peace and prosperity now prevail throughout her borders. The law under which her delegates are about to be elected is believed to be *just and fair in all its objects and provisions*. There is every reason to hope and believe that the law will be fairly interpreted and impartially executed, so as to insure every *bona fide* inhabitant the free and quiet exercise of the elective franchise. If any portion of the inhabitants, acting under the advice of political leaders in distant States, shall choose to absent themselves from the polls, and withhold their votes, with a view of leaving the Free State Democrats in a minority, and thus securing a pro-slavery Constitution in opposition to the wishes of a majority of the people living under it, let the responsibility rest on those who, for partisan purposes, will sacrifice the principles they profess to cherish and promote. Upon them, upon the political party for whose benefit and under the direction of whose leaders they act, let the blame be visited of fastening upon the people of a new State institutions repugnant to their feelings and in violation of their wishes.

Words could not have more positively indicated his purpose of sustaining all the acts of the Lecompton Convention, or that he anticipated the formation of a pro-slavery Constitution, for which he meant to charge the blame upon the Free State men and upon the Republican party in general, anticipating then that the non-voting policy would be adopted. In a subsequent part of this same speech, he still more fully and unreservedly indorsed the act providing for the Lecompton Constitutional Convention, committing himself to all its legitimate consequences. He said:

The present election law in Kansas is acknowledged to be fair and just—the rights of the voters are clearly defined—and the exercise of those rights will be efficiently and scrupulously protected. Hence, if the majority of the people of Kansas desire to have it a free State (and we are told by the Republican party that nine-tenths of the people of that Territory are free State men), *there is no obstacle in the way of bringing Kansas into the Union as a free State, by the votes and voice of her own people*, and in conformity with the great principles of the Kansas-Nebraska act; provided all the Free State men will go to the polls, and vote their principles in accordance with their professions. If such is not the result, let the consequences be visited upon the heads of those whose policy it is to produce strife, anarchy and bloodshed in Kansas, that their party may profit by slavery agitation in the Northern States of

this Union. That the Democrats in Kansas will perform their duty fearlessly and nobly, according to the principles they cherish, I have no doubt, and that the result of the struggle will be such as will gladden the heart and strengthen the hopes of every friend of the Union, I have entire confidence.

The Lecompton Convention was to settle the whole Kansas controversy, "peacefully and satisfactorily," according to the professed faith of Mr. Douglas. He fully indorsed it in its origin, and committed himself to abide by its results, which were accomplished through the instrumentality of one of his warmest personal friends. And what these results would be, in his opinion, he clearly foreshadowed in the extracts above given from his speech. He expected a pro-slavery Constitution, and he repeatedly approved, without any reservation, the convention-act which, by its regular carrying-out, accomplished that expectation. He declared, substantially, that the will of the people could be fully and fairly expressed in forming a Constitution at Lecompton, under that act; and that if they did not obtain such a Constitution as they desired, it would be *their own fault*—plainly implying that they must submit to such action as should be taken. He left himself scarcely a loophole of retreat, whatever might come of the Lecompton Convention.

In the same speech, Mr. Douglas spoke at length in indorsement of the dogmas embraced in what is popularly called the Dred Scott decision, and particularly of the one which denies the power of Congress to exclude slavery from the Territories. He tried, also, to convey the impression that the Republican party was in favor of negro equality, because dissenting in general to a judicial opinion, of which one of the details is a denial to the negro race of any legal redress for wrongs in the higher courts.

A third subject of this speech was the Utah rebellion, which Mr. Douglas proposed to end by annulling the act establishing the Territory of Utah.

To this speech Mr. Lincoln replied at Springfield, two weeks later. It is noticeable that the first two of the topics of Mr. Douglas's speech formed leading subjects of the great canvass of the next year. It is not impossible that this prompt joining

of issues may have had its influence in inducing Mr. Douglas so completely to change front, before another twelve-month had passed. In any event, these two speeches have a rare interest, from their immediate relations to the coming contest, of which they are properly the prelude. We give Mr. Lincoln's remarks at length :

SPEECH OF MR. LINCOLN, IN REPLY TO MR. DOUGLAS, ON KANSAS, THE DRED SCOTT DECISION, AND THE UTAH QUESTION.

(Delivered at Springfield, Illinois, June 26, 1857.)

FELLOW-CITIZENS: I am here to-night, partly by invitation of some of you, and partly by my own inclination. Two weeks ago Judge Douglas spoke here, on the several subjects of Kansas, the Dred Scott decision, and Utah. I listened to the speech at the time, and have read the report of it since. It was intended to controvert opinions which I think just, and to assail (politically, not personally) those men who, in common with me, entertain those opinions. For this reason I wished then, and still wish to make some answer to it, which I now take the opportunity of doing.

I begin with Utah. If it prove to be true, as is probable, that the people of Utah are in open rebellion against the United States, then Judge Douglas is in favor of repealing their territorial organization, and attaching them to the adjoining States for judicial purposes. I say, too, if they are in rebellion, they ought to be somehow coerced to obedience; and I am not now prepared to admit or deny, that the Judge's mode of coercing them is not as good as any. The Republicans can fall in with it without taking back anything they have ever said. To be sure, it would be a considerable backing down by Judge Douglas, from his much vaunted doctrine of self-government for the territories; but this is only additional proof of what was very plain from the beginning, that that doctrine was a mere deceitful pretence for the benefit of slavery. Those who could not see that much in the Nebraska act itself, which forced Governors, and Secretaries, and Judges on the people of the Territories, without their choice or consent, could not be made to see, though one should rise from the dead.

But in all this, it is very plain the Judge evades the only question the Republicans have ever pressed upon the Democracy in regard to Utah. That question the Judge well knew to be this: "If the people of Utah shall peacefully form a State Constitution tolerating polygamy, will the Democracy admit them into the Union?" There is nothing in the United States Constitution or law against polygamy; and why is it

not a part of the Judge's "sacred right of self-government" for the people to have it, or rather to keep it, if they choose? These questions, so far as I know, the Judge never answers. It might involve the Democracy to answer them either way, and they go unanswered.

As to Kansas. The substance of the Judge's speech on Kansas is an effort to put the Free State men in the wrong for not voting at the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention. He says: "There is every reason to hope and believe that the law will be fairly interpreted and impartially executed, so as to insure to every *bona fide* inhabitant the free and quiet exercise of the elective franchise."

It appears extraordinary that Judge Douglas should make such a statement. He knows that, by the law, no one can vote who has not been registered; and he knows that the Free State men place their refusal to vote on the ground that but few of them have been registered. It is possible this is not true, but Judge Douglas knows it is asserted to be true in letters, newspapers and public speeches, and borne by every mail, and blown by every breeze to the eyes and ears of the world. He knows it is boldly declared, that the people of many whole counties, and many whole neighborhoods in others, are left unregistered; yet, he does not venture to contradict the declaration, or to point out how they can vote without being registered; but he just slips along, not seeming to know there is any such question of fact, and complacently declares, "There is every reason to hope and believe that the law will be fairly and impartially executed, so as to insure to every *bona fide* inhabitant the free and quiet exercise of the elective franchise."

I readily agree that if all had a chance to vote, they ought to have voted. If, on the contrary, as they allege, and Judge Douglas ventures not particularly to contradict, few only of the Free State men had a chance to vote, they were perfectly right in staying from the polls in a body.

By the way, since the Judge spoke, the Kansas election has come off. The Judge expressed his confidence that all the Democrats in Kansas would do their duty—including "Free State Democrats" of course. The returns received here, as yet, are very incomplete; but, so far as they go, they indicate that only about one-sixth of the registered voters have really voted; and this, too, when not more, perhaps, than one-half of the rightful voters have been registered, thus showing the thing to have been altogether the most exquisite farce ever enacted. I am watching with considerable interest, to ascertain what figure the "Free State Democrats" cut in the concern. Of course they voted—all Democrats do their duty—

and of course they did not vote for Slave State candidates. We soon shall know how many delegates they elected, how many candidates they had pledged to a free State, and how many votes were cast for them.

Allow me to barely whisper my suspicion, that there were no such things in Kansas as "Free State Democrats"—that they were altogether mythical, good only to figure in newspapers and speeches in the Free States. If there should prove to be one real, living Free State Democrat in Kansas, I suggest that it might be well to catch him, and stuff and preserve his skin, as an interesting specimen of that soon to be extinct variety of the genus Democrat.

And now, as to the Dred Scott decision. That decision declares two propositions—first, that a negro can not sue in the United States Courts; and secondly, that Congress can not prohibit slavery in the Territories. It was made by a divided court—dividing differently on the different points. Judge Douglas does not discuss the merits of the decision, and in that respect, I shall follow his example, believing I could no more improve upon McLean and Curtis, than he could on Taney.

He denounces all who question the correctness of that decision, as offering violent resistance to it. But who resists it? Who has, in spite of the decision, declared Dred Scott free, and resisted the authority of his master over him?

Judicial decisions have two uses—first, to absolutely determine the case decided; and secondly, to indicate to the public how other similar cases will be decided when they arise. For the latter use, they are called "precedents" and "authorities."

We believe as much as Judge Douglas (perhaps more) in obedience to and respect for the judicial department of Government. We think its decisions on Constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control, not only the particular cases decided, but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments of the Constitution, as provided in that instrument itself. More than this would be revolution. But we think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous. We know the court that made it has often overruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have it overrule this. We offer no resistance to it.

Judicial decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents, according to circumstances. That this should be so, accords both with common sense, and the customary understanding of the legal profession.

If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with legal public expectation, and with

the steady practice of the departments, throughout our history, and had been in no part based on assumed historical facts which are not really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more than once, and had ~~there~~ been affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of years, it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, not to acquiesce in it as a precedent.

But when, as is true, we find it wanting in all these claims to the public confidence, it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat it as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country. But Judge Douglas considers this view awful. Hear him:

"The courts are the tribunals prescribed by the Constitution and created by the authority of the people to determine, expound and enforce the law. Hence, whoever resists the final decision of the highest judicial tribunal, aims a deadly blow to our whole Republican system of government—a blow which, if successful, would place all our rights and liberties at the mercy of passion, anarchy and violence. I repeat, therefore, that if resistance to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in a matter like the points decided in the Dred Scott case, clearly within their jurisdiction as defined by the Constitution, shall be forced upon the country as political issue, it will become a distinct and naked issue between the friends and enemies of the Constitution—the friends and the enemies of the supremacy of the laws."

Why, this same Supreme Court once decided a national bank to be Constitutional; but General Jackson, as President of the United States, disregarded the decision, and vetoed a bill for a re-charter, partly on Constitutional ground, declaring that each public functionary must support the Constitution, "as he understands it." But hear the General's own words. Here they are, taken from his veto message:

"It is maintained by the advocates of the bank, that its constitutionality, in all its features, ought to be considered as settled by precedent, and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I can not assent. Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding questions of Constitutional power, except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well settled. So far from this being the case on this subject, an argument against the bank might be based on precedent. One Congress, in 1791, decided in favor of a bank; another in 1811, decided against it. One Congress, in 1815, decided against a bank; another in 1816, decided in its favor. Prior to the present Congress, therefore, the pre-

dents drawn from that source were equal. If we resort to the States the expressions of legislative, judicial and executive opinions against the bank have been probably to those in its favor as four to one. There is nothing in precedent, therefore, which, if its authority were admitted, ought to weigh in favor of the act before me."

I drop the quotations merely to remark, that all there ever was, in the way of precedent, up to the Dred Scott decision, on the points therein decided, had been against that decision. But hear General Jackson further :

"If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the co-ordinate authorities of this Government. The Congress, the Executive and the Court, must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer, who takes an oath to support the Constitution, swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others."

Again and again have I heard Judge Douglas denounce that bank decision, and applaud General Jackson for disregarding it. It would be interesting for him to look over his recent speech, and see how exactly his fierce philippics against us for resisting Supreme Court decisions, fall upon his own head. It will call to mind a long and fierce political war in this country, upon an issue which, in his own language, and, of course, in his own changeless estimation, was "a distinct issue between the friends and the enemies of the Constitution," and in which war he fought in the ranks of the enemies of the Constitution.

I have said, in substance, that the Dred Scott decision was, in part, based on assumed historical facts which were not really true, and I ought not to leave the subject without giving some reasons for saying this: I, therefore, give an instance or two, which I think fully sustains me. Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of the majority of the Court, insists at great length, that negroes were no part of the people who made, or for whom was made, the Declaration of Independence, or the Constitution of the United States.

On the contrary, Judge Curtis, in his dissenting opinion, shows that in five of the then thirteen States, to-wit: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and North Carolina, free negroes were voters, and, in proportion to their numbers, had the same part in making the Constitution that the white people had. He shows this with so much particularity as to leave no doubt of its truth, and as a sort of conclusion on that point, holds the following language :

"The Constitution was ordained and established by the

people of the United States, through the action, in each State of those persons who were qualified by its laws to act thereon in behalf of themselves and all other citizens of the State. In some of the States, as we have seen, colored persons were among those qualified by law to act on the subject. These colored persons were not only included in the body of 'the people of the United States,' by whom the Constitution was ordained and established; but in at least five of the States they had the power to act, and, doubtless, did act, by their suffrages, upon the question of its adoption."

Again, Chief Justice Taney says: "It is difficult, at this day, to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted." And again, after quoting from the Declaration, he says: "The general words above quoted would seem to include the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day, would be so understood."

In these the Chief Justice does not directly assert, but plainly assumes, as a fact, that the public estimate of the black man is more favorable now than it was in the days of the Revolution. This assumption is a mistake. In some trifling particulars, the condition of that race has been ameliorated; but, as a whole, in this country, the change between then and now is decidedly the other way; and their ultimate destiny has never appeared so hopeless as in the last three or four years. In two of the five States—New Jersey and North Carolina—that then gave the free negro the right of voting, the right has since been taken away; and in the third—New York—it has been greatly abridged; while it has not been extended, so far as I know, to a single additional State, though the number of the States has more than doubled. In those days, as I understand, masters could, at their own pleasure, emancipate their slaves; but since then such legal restraints have been made upon emancipation as to amount almost to prohibition. In those days Legislatures held the unquestioned power to abolish slavery in their respective States; but now it is becoming quite fashionable for State Constitutions to withhold that power from the Legislatures. In those days, by common consent, the spread of the black man's bondage to the new countries was prohibited; but now, Congress decides that it will not continue the prohibition—and the Supreme Court decides that it could not if it would. In those days our Declaration of Independence was held

sacred by all, and thought to include all; but now, to aid in making the bondage of the negro universal and eternal, it is assailed, sneered at, construed, hawked at, and torn, till, if its framers could rise from their graves, they could not at all recognize it. All the powers of earth seem rapidly combining against him. Mammon is after him; ambition follows, philosophy follows, and the theology of the day is fast joining the cry. They have him in his prison-house; they have searched his person, and left no prying instrument with him. One after another they have closed the heavy iron doors upon him; and now they have him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of a hundred keys, which can never be unlocked without the concurrence of every key; the keys in the hands of a hundred different men, and they scattered to a hundred different and distant places; and they stand musing as to what invention, in all the dominions of mind and matter, can be produced to make the impossibility of his escape more complete than it is.

It is grossly incorrect to say or assume, that the public estimate of the negro is more favorable now than it was at the origin of the Government.

Three years and a half ago Judge Douglas brought forward his famous Nebraska bill. The country was at once in a blaze. He scorned all opposition, and carried it through Congress. Since then he has seen himself superseded in a Presidential nomination, by one indorsing the general doctrine of his measure, but at the same time standing clear of the odium of its untimely agitation, and its gross breach of national faith; and he has seen that successful rival constitutionally elected, not by the strength of friends, but by the division of his adversaries, being in a popular minority of nearly four hundred thousand votes. He has seen his chief aids in his own State, Shields and Richardson, politically speaking, successively tried, convicted, and executed, for an offense not their own, but his. And now he sees his own case, standing next on the docket for trial.

There is a natural disgust, in the minds of nearly all white people, to the idea of an indiscriminate amalgamation of the white and black races; and Judge Douglas evidently is basing his chief hope upon the chances of his being able to appropriate the benefit of this disgust to himself. If he can, by much drumming and repeating, fasten the odium of that idea upon his adversaries, he thinks he can struggle through the storm. He, therefore, clings to this hope as a drowning man to the last plank. He makes an occasion for lugging it in from the opposition to the Dred Scott decision. He finds the

Republicans insisting that the Declaration of Independence includes ALL men, black as well as white, and forthwith he boldly denies that it includes negroes at all, and proceeds to argue gravely that all who contend it does, do so only because they want to vote, eat and sleep, and marry with negroes! He will have it that they can not be consistent else. Now, I protest against the counterfeit logic which concludes that, because I do not want a black woman for a slave, I must necessarily want her for a wife. I need not have her for either. I can just leave her alone. In some respects she certainly is not my equal; but in her natural right to eat the bread she earns with her own hands, without asking leave of any one else, she is my equal, and the equal of all others.

Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, admits that the language of the Declaration is broad enough to include the whole human family; but he and Judge Douglas argue that the authors of that instrument did not intend to include negroes, by the fact that they did not at once actually place them on an equality with the whites. Now, this grave argument comes to just nothing at all, by the other fact, that they did not at once, or ever afterward, actually place all white people on an equality with one another. And this is the staple argument of both the Chief Justice and the Senator for doing this obvious violence to the plain, unmistakable language of the Declaration.

I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include *all* men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in *all* respects. They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what respects they did consider all men created equal—equal with “certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” This they said, and this meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact, they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the *right*, so that the *enforcement* of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit.

Mr. Lincoln, in conclusion, pointed out in a clear and forcible manner the real distinction between his own views and those of Mr. Douglas on this question, as he has done in other speeches.

CHAPTER XI.

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS CAMPAIGN OF 1858.

The Lecompton Struggle.—The Policy of Douglas Changed.—He Breaks with the Administration and Loses Caste at the South.—Republican Sympathies.—Douglas Falters, but Opposes the English Bill.—Passage of that Measure.—Democratic State Convention of Illinois.—Douglas Indorsed, and Efforts for his Re-Election Commenced.—The Democratic Bolt.—Meeting of the Republican State Convention in June.—Mr. Lincoln named as the First and Only Choice of the Republicans for Senator.—His Great Speech Before the Convention at Springfield.—Douglas and Lincoln at Chicago.—Speeches at Bloomington and Springfield.—Unfairness of the Apportionment Pointed out by Mr. Lincoln.—He Analyzes the Douglas Programme.—Seven Joint Debates.—Douglas Produces a Bogus Platform, and Propounds Interrogatories.—“Unfriendly Legislation.”—Lincoln Fully Defines his Position on the Slavery Question.—Result of the Canvass.—The People for Lincoln, the Apportionment for Douglas.—Public Opinion.

THE Lecompton Convention did its work according to the programme laid down at Washington. It adopted the Constitution desired, and probably devised, at the national capital, with the design of forcing slavery upon an unwilling people. One of the chief instruments in the execution of this work, so far as it could be consummated at Lecompton, was John Calhoun, an Illinois politician. The act under which that Convention was assembled, had received an unreserved and complete indorsement from Douglas, as “fair and just.” He was emphatically committed in advance by his Springfield speech to the action of that Convention, which exercised no powers not distinctly conferred upon it by the act thus indorsed, or not in strict accordance with what was contemplated from the first by its framers. Yet late in the autumn of 1857, a rumor began to be circulated that Douglas was hesitating about sustaining the Lecompton Constitution. Know-

ing his previous attitude, people were generally incredulous in regard to this report. After a time, however, some of the leading Democratic papers of Illinois began to break ground against the Lecompton scheme, and when Congress assembled, in December, there were serious doubts as to whether Douglas did not intend to break with the Administration on this subject. Suspense on this point was soon relieved. Immediately after the annual message of Mr. Buchanan was read in the Senate, Douglas took occasion to announce his disagreement with the President on the Kansas question, and this notice was followed up by an elaborate speech the next day, in which he boldly talked against "forcing this Constitution down the throats of the people of Kansas, in opposition to their wishes and in violation of our pledges." He ignored all his recent attempts to charge the responsibility upon the non-voters if the Constitution did not suit them. He seemed to forget his declaration that the act calling the Lecompton Convention was "just and fair in all its objects and provisions." He now denied the right of the minority represented at Lecompton, in accordance with the well-understood "objects and provisions" of that act, "to defraud the majority of that people out of their elective franchise."

In brief, whatever his motives—and these may be left to himself—he had completely changed his attitude during the last few months, and now co-operated with the Republicans in opposing the Lecompton policy to which the President and the Democratic party had become definitely committed before the world. These two facts, however, are undeniable. The re-election of Douglas as Senator was to depend on the coming election in Illinois, and without some definite change of course, from that he had indicated at Springfield in June previous, he would be compelled to yield his place to Abraham Lincoln, as the associate of Lyman Trumbull.

It is not necessary here to follow the history of the desperate struggle which this change cost him during the long session of Congress. He carried with him but two Democratic Senators out of nearly forty, and only a little larger fraction of the Democratic members of the House. He was generally

denounced at the South as a traitor, and this fact, added to the energy with which he carried on his warfare with the Administration against so many odds, gained him not a little sympathy in many Republican quarters. This, however, for the most part, his subsequent course alienated. It is believed that but for the firm stand taken by the lamented Broderick, in opposition to the course intended, Douglas would have made his peace with the Administration by voting for the shabby compromise known as the English Bill. That measure, in spite of his final influence against it, passed both Houses on the 4th of May.

Previous to that date, the Democratic State Convention, of Illinois, had met at Springfield (April 21st), nominated a State ticket and indorsed Douglas and his Anti-Lecompton associates from that State. The issue was thus fairly joined early in the season ; and all the influence of the Administration was brought to bear in getting up a counter Democratic organization sustaining the Lecompton policy. However promising for a time, this undertaking was not brilliantly successful. The friends of Douglas had taken time by the forelock, and made the most of their advantage in having the regular organization, with a State ticket early in the field. They spared no labor from this time forward in preparing for the re-election of Douglas. Without expecting the election of their candidates on the State ticket, they hoped, through an unequal apportionment strongly favoring their side, and from the large number of Democratic Senators holding over, to be able, at least, to get the control of the Senate, and to prevent the choice of a Republican successor to Douglas, if they could not accomplish their full purpose.

On the 16th of June—the day on which the session of Congress closed—the Republicans held their State Convention at Springfield. Richard Yates was the temporary, and Gustavus Koerner the permanent President. Nearly every one of the hundred counties of Illinois was duly represented, the delegates numbering over five hundred. Candidates were nominated for State Treasurer and for Superintendent of Public Instruction, and a Platform was adopted essentially the same as that put

forth two years previously at Bloomington, as already quoted. A resolution approving the course of Lyman Trumbull as Senator was carried without opposition. The following resolution was then introduced, which, according to the official report, "was greeted with shouts of applause, and unanimously adopted :"

Resolved, That Abraham Lincoln is the first and only choice of the Republicans of Illinois for the United States Senate, as the successor of Stephen A. Douglas.

Mr. Lincoln had not been present during the Convention, and when called on to speak, at the adjourned evening session, he had no knowledge that such a resolution had been offered. So far was it from being true that his speech on that occasion, as subsequently stated by Douglas, was made on accepting a nomination for the Senatorship, that, of course, he did not allude to that subject. The speech, too, though carefully prepared, as Mr. Lincoln afterward admitted, was never known to any one else than himself until its delivery, notwithstanding the insinuation of Douglas that it was a subject of special consultation among the Republican leaders. It was the result of a broad and profound survey of the slavery question, from the point of view then reached in the progress of parties. It laid down certain propositions as philosophical truths, derived from a close observation of events. Its opening paragraph has already become one of the most celebrated passages in the political literature of the country. However it may be perverted, there is no portion of this speech which can be successfully assailed, when taken in its true meaning. There is a moral sublimity in the rugged honesty and directness with which the grand issues in this whole slavery agitation are presented. The two forces of slavery and free labor in our civil and social system, inevitably antagonistic, *so long as they come into collision in our national politics*, have each their peculiar tendency, the one to make slavery, and the other to make free labor universal. Until slavery is again reduced to its true local and sectional character, from which Douglas, Buchanan, and other agitators had conspired to raise it into national predominance, the antagonism will not cease. What Douglas

always superficially slurred over—pretending an *indifference*, such as no earnest or sound statesman can really feel, whether “slavery is voted up or voted down”—Lincoln treats with true philosophic insight, and in the light of earnest convictions. This famous speech is in entire harmony with the views of the earlier statesmen, even of the South. If any man at first reads this great effort doubtingly, or with an inclination toward dissent—as most assuredly few really earnest, thinking men can—let him carefully look onward and see how it endures the test of a severe campaign, and how its chief positions are maintained against all the assaults of a wily foe, who is himself really on trial, solemnly indicted by that speech, yet vainly imagines that he is placing Mr. Lincoln on the defensive.

“The hall, and lobbies, and galleries were even more densely crowded and packed than at any time during the day,” says the official report, as the Convention reassembled in the evening to hear Mr. Lincoln. “As he approached the speaker’s stand, he was greeted with shouts, and hurrahs, and prolonged cheering.”

MR. LINCOLN’S FIRST SPEECH IN THE SENATORIAL CANVASS.

(*At the Republican State Convention, June 16, 1858.*)

Mr. Lincoln said—

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONVENTION:—If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could then better judge what to do, and how to do it. We are now far on into the fifth year, since a policy was initiated, with the avowed object, and confident promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease, until a crisis shall have been reached, and passed. “A house divided against itself can not stand.” I believe this Government can not endure, permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall

become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new—North as well as South.

Have we no tendency to the latter condition? Let any one who doubts, carefully contemplate that now almost complete legal combination—piece of machinery, so to speak—compounded of the Nebraska doctrine, and the Dred Scott decision. Let him consider not only what work the machinery is adapted to do, and how well adapted, but also let him study the history of its construction, and trace, if he can, or rather fail, if he can, to trace the evidences of design, and concert of action, among its chief master-workers from the beginning.

But, so far, Congress only had acted; and an indorsement by the people, real or apparent, was indispensable, to save the point already gained, and give chance for more. The new year of 1854 found slavery excluded from more than half the States by State Constitutions, and from most of the national territory by Congressional prohibition. Four days later commenced the struggle, which ended in repealing that Congressional prohibition. This opened all the national territory to slavery, and was the first point gained.

This necessity had not been overlooked, but had been provided for, as well as might be, in the notable argument of "*squatter sovereignty*," otherwise called "*sacred right of self-government*," which latter phrase, though expressive of the only rightful basis of any government, was so perverted in this attempted use of it as to amount to just this: that if any one man choose to enslave another, no third man shall be allowed to object. That argument was incorporated into the Nebraska Bill itself, in the language which follows: "It being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor exclude it therefrom; but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States."

Then opened the roar of loose declamation in favor of "*squatter sovereignty*," and "*sacred right of self-government*."

"But," said opposition members, "let us be more specific—let us *amend* the bill so as to expressly declare that the people of the territory *may* exclude slavery." "Not we," said the friends of the measure; and down they voted the amendment.

While the Nebraska Bill was passing through Congress, a law case, involving the question of a negro's freedom, by reason of his owner having voluntarily taken him first into a free State and then a territory covered by the Congressional prohibition, and held him as a slave—for a long time in each—

was passing through the U. S. Circuit Court for the District of Missouri; and both the Nebraska Bill and law suit were brought to a decision in the same month of May, 1854. The negro's name was "Dred Scott," which name now designates the decision finally made in the case.

Before the then next Presidential election case, the law came to, and was argued in the Supreme Court of the United States; but the decision of it was deferred until *after* the election. Still, *before* the election, Senator Trumbull, on the floor of the Senate, requests the leading advocate of the Nebraska Bill to state *his opinion* whether a people of a territory can constitutionally exclude slavery from their limits; and the latter answers, "That is a question for the Supreme Court."

The election came. Mr. Buchanan was elected, and the *indorsement*, such as it was, secured. That was the *second* point gained. The indorsement, however, fell short of a clear popular majority by nearly four hundred thousand votes, and so, perhaps, was not overwhelmingly reliable and satisfactory. The outgoing President in his last annual message, as impressively as possible echoed back upon the people the weight and authority of the indorsement.

The Supreme Court met again; did not announce their decision, but ordered a re-argument. The Presidential inauguration came, and still no decision of the court; but the incoming President, in his Inaugural Address, fervently exhorted the people to abide by the forthcoming decision, *whatever it might be*. Then, in a few days, came the decision.

This was the third point gained.

The reputed author of the Nebraska Bill finds an early occasion to make a speech at this capitol indorsing the Dred Scott decision, and vehemently denouncing all opposition to it. The new President, too, seizes the early occasion of the Silliman letter to indorse and strongly construe that decision, and to express his astonishment that any different view had ever been entertained. At length a squabble springs up between the President and the author of the Nebraska Bill on the mere question of fact, whether the Lecompton Constitution was or was not, in any just sense, made by the people of Kansas; and, in that squabble, the latter declares that all he wants is a fair vote for the people, and that he cares not whether slavery be voted down or voted up. I do not understand his declaration that he cares not whether slavery be voted down or voted up, to be intended by him other than as an apt definition of the policy he would impress upon the public mind—the principle for which he declares he *has suffered* much, and is ready to suffer to the end.

And well may he cling to that principle. If he has any parental feeling, well may he cling to it. That principle is the only shred left of his original Nebraska doctrine. Under the Dred Scott decision, "squatter sovereignty" squatted out of existence, tumbled down like temporary scaffolding—like the mold at the foundry, served through one blast, and fell back into loose sand—helped to carry an election, and then was kicked to the winds. His late joint struggle with the Republicans, against the Lecompton Constitution, involves nothing of the original Nebraska doctrine. That struggle was made on a point—the right of a people to make their own Constitution—upon which he and the Republicans have never differed.

The several points of the Dred Scott decision, in connection with Senator Douglas's "care not" policy, constitute the piece of machinery in its present state of advancement. The working points of that machinery are:

First, That no negro slave imported as such from Africa, and no descendant of such, can ever be a citizen of any State, in the sense of that term as used in the Constitution of the United States.

This point is made in order to deprive the negro, in every possible event, of the benefit of this provision of the United States Constitution, which declares that—"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

Secondly, that "subject to the Constitution of the United States," neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature can exclude slavery from any United States Territory.

This point is made in order that individual men may fill up the Territories with slaves, without danger of losing them as property, and thus to enhance the chances of permanency to the institution through all the future.

Thirdly, that whether the holding a negro in actual slavery in a free State makes him free, as against the holder, the United States courts will not decide, but will leave to be decided by the courts of any slave State the negro may be forced into by the master.

This point is made, not to be pressed immediately; but, if acquiesced in for a while, and apparently indorsed by the people at an election, then, to sustain the logical conclusion that what Dred Scott's master might lawfully do with Dred Scott, in the free State of Illinois, every other master may lawfully do with any other one, or one thousand slaves, in Illinois, or in any other free State.

Auxiliary to all this, and working hand in hand with it,

the Nebraska doctrine, or what is left of it, is to educate and mold public opinion, at least Northern public opinion, not to care whether slavery is voted down or voted up.

This shows exactly where we now are, and partially also, whither we are tending.

It will throw additional light on the latter, to go back, and run the mind over the string of historical facts already stated. Several things will now appear less dark and mysterious than they did when they were transpiring. The people were to be left "perfectly free," "subject only to the Constitution." What the Constitution had to do with it, outsiders could not then see. Plainly enough now, it was an exactly fitted niche for the Dred Scott decision afterward to come in, and declare that perfect freedom of the people, to be just no freedom at all.

Why was the amendment, expressly declaring the right of the people to exclude slavery, voted down? Plainly enough now, the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred Scott decision.

Why was the court decision held up? Why even a Senator's individual opinion withheld till after the Presidential election? Plainly enough now; the speaking out then would have damaged the "*perfectly free*" argument upon which the election was to be carried.

Why the outgoing President's felicitation on the indorsement? Why the delay of a re-argument? Why the incoming President's advance exhortation in favor of the decision? These things look like the cautious patting and petting of a spirited horse, preparatory to mounting him, when it is dreaded that he may give the rider a fall. And why the hasty after-indorsements of the decision, by the President and others?

We can not absolutely know that all these exact adaptations are the result of pre-concert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have been gotten out, at different times and places, and by different workmen—Stephen, Franklin, Roger and James, for instance—and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortices exactly fitting, and all the lengths and proportions of the different pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not a piece too many or too few—not omitting even scaffolding—or, if a single piece be lacking, we can see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared to yet bring such piece in—in such a case, we find it impossible not to believe that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft drawn up before the first blow was struck.

It should not be overlooked that, by the Nebraska Bill, the people of a State as well as Territory, were to be left "*perfectly free*," "*subject only to the Constitution*." Why mention a State? They were legislating for Territories, and not for or about States. Certainly the people of a State are and ought to be subject to the Constitution of the United States; but why is mention of this lugged into this merely territorial law? Why are the people of a Territory and the people of a State therein lumped together, and their relation to the Constitution therein treated as being precisely the same?

While the opinion of the court, by Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions of all the concurring judges, expressly declare that the Constitution of the United States neither permits Congress nor a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the people of a State to exclude it. *Possibly*, this was a mere *omission*; but who can be quite sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of unlimited power in the people of a State to exclude slavery from their limits, just as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska Bill—I ask, who can be quite sure that it would not have been voted down, in the one case, as it had been in the other.

The nearest approach to the point of declaring the power of a State over slavery, is made by Judge Nelson. He approaches it more than once, using the precise idea, and almost the language, too, of the Nebraska Act. On one occasion his exact language is, "except in cases where the power is restrained by the Constitution of the United States, the law of the State is supreme over the subject of slavery within its jurisdiction."

In what cases the power of the State is so restrained by the United States Constitution, is left an open question, precisely as the same question, as to the restraint on the power of the Territories was left open in the Nebraska Act. Put that and that together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a State to exclude slavery from its limits. And this may especially be expected if the doctrine of "care not whether slavery be voted down or voted up," shall gain upon the public mind sufficiently to give promise that such a decision can be maintained when made.

Such a decision is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in all the States. Welcome or unwelcome, such decision is probably coming, and will soon be upon us, unless the

power of the present political dynasty shall be met and overthrown. We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free; and we shall awake to the reality, instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave State.

To meet and overthrow the power of that dynasty, is the work now before all those who would prevent that consummation. That is what we have to do. But how can we best do it?

There are those who denounce us openly to their own friends, and yet whisper softly, that Senator Douglas is the *aptest* instrument there is, with which to effect that object. They do not tell us, nor has he told us, that he wishes any such object to be effected. They wish us to infer all, from the facts that he now has a little quarrel with the present head of the dynasty; and that he has regularly voted with us, on a single point, upon which he and we have never differed.

They remind us that *he* is a very *great man*, and that the largest of us are very small ones. Let this be granted. But "a *living dog* is better than a *dead lion*." Judge Douglas, if not a *dead lion* for this work, is at least a *caged* and *toothless* one. How can he oppose the advances of slavery? He don't care anything about it. His avowed mission is impressing the "public heart" to care nothing about it.

A leading Douglas Democratic newspaper thinks Douglas's superior talent will be needed to resist the revival of the African slave-trade. Does Douglas believe an effort to revive that trade is approaching? He has not said so. Does he *really* think so? But if it is, how can he resist it? For years he has labored to prove it a *sacred right* of white men to take negro slaves into the new Territories. Can he possibly show that it is less a sacred right to buy them where they can be bought cheapest? And, unquestionably they can be bought cheaper in Africa than in Virginia.

He has done all in his power to reduce the whole question of slavery to one of a mere right of property; and as such, how can he oppose the foreign slave-trade—how can he refuse that trade in that "property" shall be "perfectly free"—unless he does it as a *protection* to the home production? And as the home *producers* will probably not ask the protection, he will be wholly without a ground of opposition.

Senator Douglas holds, we know, that a man may rightfully be wiser to-day than he was yesterday—that he may rightfully change when he finds himself wrong. But, can we for that reason run ahead and infer that he will make any particular change, of which he himself has given no intimation? Can we safely base our action upon any such vague inferences?

Now, as ever. I wish not to misrepresent Judge Douglas's position, question his motives, or do aught that can be personally offensive to him. Whenever, *if ever*, he and we can come together on *principle*, so that our great cause may have assistance from his great ability, I hope to have interposed no adventitious obstacle.

But clearly, he is not now with us—he does not pretend to be—he does not promise ever to be. Our cause, then, must be intrusted to, and conducted by its own undoubted friends—those whose hands are free, whose hearts are in the work—who do care for the result.

Two years ago the Republicans of the nation mustered over thirteen hundred thousand strong. We did this under the single impulse of resistance to a common danger, with every external circumstance against us. Of strange, discordant, and even hostile elements, we gathered from the four winds, and formed and fought the battle through, under the constant hot fire of a disciplined, proud and pampered enemy. Did we brave all then to falter now?—*now*—when that same enemy is wavering, dissevered and belligerent?

The result is not doubtful. We shall not fail—if we stand firm, we shall not fail. *Wise counsels may accelerate or mistakes delay it*, but, sooner or later, the victory is *sure* to come.

Mr. Douglas, having lingered for more than three weeks on his way homeward, preparing for the struggle before him, arrived in Chicago on the 9th of July, amid the most showy demonstrations of his friends. He made a long speech on the occasion, which Mr. Lincoln was present to hear. Douglas claimed great credit as having defeated the President's Lecompton policy, and imperiously returned thanks to the Republicans for “coming up manfully and sustaining” him and his little band in opposition to the Administration—a course, certainly, for which the Republican party deserved no special thanks, as it required of them no sacrifice of either consistency or partizan fellowship. Subsequently he charged an alliance between the Republicans and the Administration party for his defeat. He took care again to avow an utter indifference as to whether Kansas should be slave soil or free soil, only asking that the popular majority should prevail. At length he came to the great opening speech of Mr. Lincoln, which had been carefully pondered during the last **three weeks.**

"I have observed," he said with condescending assurance, "I have observed from the public prints, that but a few days ago the Republican party of the State of Illinois assembled in convention at Springfield, and not only laid down their platform, but nominated a candidate for the United States Senate as my successor. I take great pleasure in saying that I have known, personally and intimately, for about a quarter of a century, the worthy gentleman who has been nominated *for my place*; and I will say that I regard him as a kind, amiable and intelligent gentleman, a good citizen, and an honorable opponent; and whatever issue I may have with him will be of principle, and not involving personalities." He then proceeded to specify his two chief points of attack on Mr. Lincoln, after citing a portion of the first paragraph of his Springfield speech. Mr. Douglas endeavored thus to put his opponent in a false position, by selecting sentences out of their connection, and imputing to them a perverted meaning. His first point he thus states :

In other words, Mr. Lincoln asserts as a fundamental principle of this Government, that there must be uniformity in the local laws and domestic institutions of each and all the States of the Union, and he therefore invites all the non-slaveholding States to band together, organize as one body, and make war upon slavery in Kentucky, upon slavery in Virginia, upon slavery in the Carolinas, upon slavery in all of the slaveholding States in this Union, and to persevere in that war until it shall be exterminated. He then notifies the slaveholding States to stand together as a unit and make an aggressive war upon the free States of this Union, with a view of establishing slavery in them all; of forcing it upon Illinois, of forcing it upon New York, upon New England, and upon every other free State, and that they shall keep up the warfare until it has been formally established in them all. In other words, Mr. Lincoln advocates boldly and clearly a war of sections, a war of the North against the South, of the free States against the slave States—a war of extermination—to be continued relentlessly until the one or the other should be subdued, and all the States shall either become free or become slave.

His other point was made in these words :

The other proposition discussed by Mr. Lincoln in his

speech, consists in a crusade against the Supreme Court of the United States on account of the Dred Scott decision. On this question, also, I desire to say to you, unequivocally, that I take direct and distinct issue with him. I have no warfare to make on the Supreme Court of the United States, either on account of that or any other decision which they have pronounced from that bench. The Constitution of the United States has provided that the powers of Government (and the Constitution of each State has the same provision) shall be divided into three departments — executive, legislative, and judicial. The right and the province of expounding the Constitution, and constructing the law, is vested in the judiciary established by the Constitution. As a lawyer, I feel at liberty to appear before the court and controvert any principle of law while the question is pending before the tribunal; but when the decision is made, my private opinion, your opinion, all other opinions, must yield to the majesty of that authoritative adjudication.

Later in the same speech, Mr. Douglas said on this head:

On the other point, Mr. Lincoln goes for a warfare upon the Supreme Court of the United States, because of their decision in the Dred Scott case. I yield obedience to the decisions of that court—to the final determination of the highest judicial tribunal known to our Constitution. He objects to the Dred Scott decision because it does not put the negro in the possession of the rights of citizenship on an equality with the white man. I am opposed to negro equality. I repeat that this nation is a white people—a people composed of European descendants—a people that have established this Government for themselves and their posterity, and I am in favor of preserving not only the purity of the blood, but the purity of the Government, from any mixture or amalgamation with inferior races. I have seen the effects of this mixture of superior and inferior races—this amalgamation of white men and Indians and negroes; we have seen it in Mexico, in Central America, in South America, and in all the Spanish-American States, and its result has been degeneration, demoralization, and degradation below the capacity for self-government.

How completely, yet artfully, the positions of Mr. Lincoln were misrepresented in these extracts, will partly appear from reading his speech made at Springfield on the 26th of June, 1857. These perversions were completely disposed of in Mr Lincoln's reply, at Chicago, on the following evening, July

10th. An intense eagerness to hear his answer drew together a great crowd, and the reception of Mr. Lincoln, on his appearance, was most enthusiastic, the applause continuing for several minutes.

MR. LINCOLN'S REPLY TO DOUGLAS.

(At Chicago, on the evening of July 10, 1858.)

Mr. Lincoln said :

MY FELLOW-CITIZENS: On yesterday evening, upon the occasion of the reception given to Senator Douglas, I was furnished with a seat very convenient for hearing him, and was otherwise very courteously treated by him and his friends, for which I thank him and them. During the course of his remarks my name was mentioned in such a way as, I suppose, renders it at least not improper that I should make some sort of reply to him. I shall not attempt to follow him in the precise order in which he addressed the assembled multitude upon that occasion, though I shall perhaps do so in the main.

THE ALLEGED ALLIANCE.

There was one question to which he asked the attention of the crowd, which I deem of somewhat less importance—at least of propriety for me to dwell upon—than the others, which he brought in near the close of his speech, and which I think it would not be entirely proper for me to omit attending to, and yet if I were not to give some attention to it now, I should probably forget it altogether. While I am upon this subject, allow me to say that I do not intend to indulge in that inconvenient mode sometimes adopted in public speaking, of reading from documents; but I shall depart from that rule so far as to read a little scrap from his speech, which notices this first topic of which I shall speak—that is, provided I can find it in the paper. [Examines the morning's paper.]

“I have made up my mind to appeal to the people against the combination that has been made against me! the Republican leaders having formed an alliance, an unholy and unnatural alliance, with a portion of unscrupulous federal office-holders. I intend to fight that allied army wherever I meet them. I know they deny the alliance, but yet these men who are trying to divide the Democratic party for the purpose of electing a Republican Senator in my place, are just as much the agents and tools of the supporters of Mr. Lincoln. Hence I shall deal with this allied army just as the Russians dealt with the allies at Sebastopol—that is, the Russians did

not stop to inquire, when they fired a broadside, whether it hit an Englishman, a Frenchman, or a Turk. Nor will I stop to inquire, nor shall I hesitate, whether my blows shall hit these Republican leaders or their allies, who are holding the federal offices and yet acting in concert with them."

Well, now, gentlemen, is not that very alarming? Just to think of it! right at the outset of his canvass, I, a poor, kind, amiable, intelligent gentleman, I am to be slain in this way. Why, my friends, the Judge, is not only, as it turns out, not a dead lion, nor even a living one—he is the rugged Russian Bear! [Laughter and applause.]

But if they will have it—for he says that we deny it—that there is any such alliance, as he says there is—and I don't propose hanging very much upon this question of veracity—but if he will have it that there is such an alliance—that the Administration men and we are allied, and we stand in the attitude of English, French and Turk, he occupying the position of the Russian, in that case, I beg that he will indulge us while we barely suggest to him that these allies took Sebastopol. [Great applause.]

Gentlemen, only a few more words as to this alliance. For my part, I have to say, that whether there be such an alliance, depends, so far as I know, upon what may be a right definition of the term *alliance*. If for the Republican party to see the other great party to which they are opposed divided among themselves, and not try to stop the division and rather be glad of it—if that is an alliance, I confess I am in: but if it is meant to be said that the Republicans had formed an alliance going beyond that, by which there is contribution of money or sacrifice of principle on the one side or the other, so far as the Republican party is concerned, if there be any such thing, I protest that I neither know any thing of it, nor do I believe it. I will, however, say—as I think this branch of the argument is lugged in—I would before I leave it, state, for the benefit of those concerned, that one of those same Buchanan men did once tell me of an argument that he made for his opposition to Judge Douglas. He said that a friend of our Senator Douglas had been talking to him, and had among other things said to him: "Why, you don't want to beat Douglas?" "Yes," said he. "I do want to beat him, and I will tell you why. I believe his original Nebraska Bill was right in the abstract, but it was wrong in the time that it was brought forward. It was wrong in the application to a Territory in regard to which the question had been settled; it was brought forward at a time when nobody asked him; it was tendered to the South when the South had not asked for it,

but when they could not well refuse it; and for this same reason he forced that question upon our party; it has sunk the best men all over the nation, everywhere; and now when our President, struggling with the difficulties of this man's getting up, has reached the very hardest point to turn in the case, he deserts him, and I *am* for putting him where he will trouble us no more."

Now, gentlemen, that is not my argument—that is not my argument at all. I have only been stating to you the argument of a Buchanan man. You will judge if there is any force in it.

WHAT IS POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY.

Popular sovereignty! everlasting popular sovereignty! Let us for a moment inquire into this vast matter of popular sovereignty. What is popular sovereignty? We recollect that in an early period in the history of this struggle, there was another name for the same thing—*Squatter Sovereignty*. It was not exactly Popular Sovereignty, but Squatter Sovereignty. What do those terms mean? What do those terms mean when used now? And vast credit is taken by our friend, the Judge, in regard to his support of it, when he declares the last years of his life have been, and all the future years of his life shall be, devoted to this matter of popular sovereignty. What is it? Why, it is the sovereignty of the people! What was Squatter Sovereignty? I suppose if it had any significance at all it was the right of the people to govern themselves, to be sovereign in their own affairs while they were squatted down in a country not their own, while they had squatted on a Territory that did not belong to them, in the sense that a State belongs to the people who inhabit it—when it belonged to the nation—such right to govern themselves was called "Squatter Sovereignty."

Now I wish you to mark. What has become of that Squatter Sovereignty? What has become of it? Can you get any body to tell you now that the people of a Territory have any authority to govern themselves, in regard to this mooted question of slavery, before they form a State Constitution? No such thing at all, although there is a general running fire, and although there has been a hurrah made in every speech on that side, assuming that policy had given the people of a Territory the right to govern themselves upon this question; yet the point is dodged. To-day it has been decided—no more than a year ago it was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, and is insisted upon to-day, that the people

of a Territory have no right to exclude slavery from a Territory. that if any one man chooses to take slaves into a Territory, all the rest of the people have no right to keep them out. This being so, and this decision being made one of the points that the Judge approved, and one in the approval of which he says he means to keep me down—*put me down* I should not say, for I have never been up. He says he is in favor of it, and sticks to it, and expects to win his battle on that decision, which says that there is no such thing as Squatter Sovereignty; but that any one man may take slaves into a Territory, and all the other men in the Territory may be opposed to it, and yet by reason of the Constitution they can not prohibit it. When that is so, how much is left of this vast matter of Squatter Sovereignty I should like to know? [A voice—"It is all gone."]

When we get back, we get to the point of the right of the people to make a Constitution. Kansas was settled, for example, in 1854. It was a Territory yet, without having formed a Constitution, in a very regular way, for three years. All this time negro slavery could be taken in by any few individuals, and by that decision of the Supreme Court, which the Judge approves, all the rest of the people can not keep it out; but when they come to make a Constitution they may say they will not have slavery. But it is there; they are obliged to tolerate it some way, and all experience shows it will be so—for they will not take negro slaves and absolutely deprive the owners of them. All experience shows this to be so. All that space of time that runs from the beginning of the settlement of the Territory until there is sufficiency of people to make a State Constitution—all that portion of time popular sovereignty is given up. The seal is absolutely put down upon it by the Court decision, and Judge Douglas puts his on the top of that, yet he is appealing to the people to give him vast credit for his devotion to popular sovereignty. [Applause.]

Again, when we get to the question of the right of the people to form a State Constitution as they please, to form it with slavery or without slavery—if that is any thing new, I confess I don't know it. Has there ever been a time when any body said that any other than the people of a Territory itself should form a Constitution? What is now in it that Judge Douglas should have fought several years of his life, and pledge himself to fight all the remaining years of his life for? Can Judge Douglas find any body on earth that said that any body else should form a Constitution for a

people? [A voice, "Yes."] Well, I should like you to name him; I should like to know who he was. [Same voice, "John Calhoun."]

Mr. Lincoln—No, Sir, I never heard of even John Calhoun saying such a thing. He insisted on the same principle as Judge Douglas; but his mode of applying it in fact, was wrong. It is enough for my purpose to ask this crowd, when ever a Republican said anything against it? They never said anything against it, but they have constantly spoken for it; and whosoever will undertake to examine the platform, and the speeches of responsible men of the party, and of irresponsible men, too, if you please, will be unable to find one word from anybody in the Republican ranks, opposed to that Popular Sovereignty which Judge Douglas thinks that he has invented. [Applause.] I suppose that Judge Douglas will claim in a little while, that he is the inventor of the idea that the people should govern themselves; that nobody ever thought of such a thing until he brought it forward. We do remember, that in that old Declaration of Independence, it is said that "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." There is the origin of Popular Sovereignty. [Loud applause.] Who, then, shall come in at this day and claim that he invented it?

[After referring, in appropriate terms, to the credit claimed by Douglas for defeating the Lecompton policy, Mr. Lincoln proceeds]:

I defy you to show a printed resolution passed in a Democratic meeting—I take it upon myself to defy any man to show a printed resolution of a Democratic meeting, large or small, in favor of Judge Trumbull, or any of the five to one Republicans who beat that bill. Every thing must be for the Democrats! They did every thing, and the five to the one that really did the thing, they snub over, and they do not seem to remember that they have an existence upon the face of the earth.

LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS—THE PERVERTED ISSUES.

Gentlemen, I fear that I shall become tedious. I leave this branch of the subject to take hold of another. I take up that part of Judge Douglas's speech in which he respectfully attended to me.

Judge Douglas made two points upon my recent speech at Springfield. He says they are to be the issues of this campaign. The first one of these points he bases upon the language in a speech which I delivered at Springfield, which I believe I can quote correctly from memory. I said there that "we are now far on in the fifth year since a policy was instituted for the avowed object, and with the confident promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation; under the operation of that policy, that agitation had not only not ceased, but had constantly augmented. I believe it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. A house divided against itself can not stand. I believe this Government can not endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved"—I am quoting from my speech—"I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will come all one thing or the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward until it shall have become alike lawful in all the States, North as well as South."

In this paragraph which I have quoted in your hearing, and to which I ask the attention of all, Judge Douglas thinks he discovers great political heresy. I want your attention particularly to what he has inferred from it. He says I am in favor of making all the States of this Union uniform in all their internal regulations; that in all their domestic concerns I am in favor of making them entirely uniform. He draws this inference from the language I have quoted to you. He says that I am in favor of making war by the North upon the South for the extinction of slavery; that I am also in favor of inviting, as he expresses it, the South to a war upon the North, for the purpose of nationalizing slavery. Now, it is singular enough, if you will carefully read that passage over, that I did not say that I was in favor of any thing in it. I only said what I expected would take place. I made a prediction only—it may have been a foolish one perhaps. I did not even say that I desired that slavery should be put in course of ultimate extinction. I do say so now, however, so there need be no longer any difficulty about that. It may be written down in the next speech.

Gentlemen, Judge Douglas informed you that this speech of mine was probably carefully prepared. I admit that it was. I am not master of language; I have not a fine education; I am not capable of entering into a disquisition upon dialectics, as I believe you call it; but I do not believe the language I

employed bears any such construction as Judge Douglas puts upon it. But I don't care about a quibble in regard to words. I know what I meant, and I will not leave this crowd in doubt, if I can explain it to them, what I really meant in the use of that paragraph.

I am not, in the first place, unaware that this Government has endured eighty-two years, half slave and half free. I know that. I am tolerably well acquainted with the history of the country, and I know that it has endured eighty-two years, half slave and half free. I *believe*—and that is what I meant to allude to there—I *believe* it has endured, because during all that time, until the introduction of the Nebraska bill, the public mind did rest all the time in the belief that slavery was in course of ultimate extinction. That was what gave us the rest that we had through that period of eighty-two years; at least, so I believe. I have always hated slavery, I think, as much as any Abolitionist. I have been an Old Line Whig. I have always hated it, but I have always been quiet about it until this new era of the introduction of the Nebraska Bill began. I always believed that everybody was against it, and that it was in course of ultimate extinction. [Pointing to Mr. Browning, who stood near by:] Browning thought so; the great mass of the nation have rested in the belief that slavery was in course of ultimate extinction. They had reason so to believe.

The adoption of the Constitution and its attendant history led the people to believe so; and that such was the belief of the framers of the Constitution itself. Why did those old men, about the time of the adoption of the Constitution, decree that slavery should not go into the new territory, where it had not already gone? Why declare that within twenty years the African slave-trade, by which slaves are supplied, might be cut off by Congress? Why were all these acts? I might enumerate more of such acts—but enough. What were they but a clear indication that the framers of the Constitution intended and expected the ultimate extinction of that institution? [Cheers.] And now, when I say, as I said in this speech that Judge Douglas has quoted from, when I say that I think the opponents of slavery will resist the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest with the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction, I only mean to say, that they will place it where the founders of this Government originally placed it.

I have said a hundred times, and I have no inclination to take it back, that I believe there is no right, and ought to be no inclination in the people of the free States to enter into

the slave States, and to interfere with the question of slavery at all. I have said that always. Judge Douglas has heard me say it—if not quite a hundred times, at least as good as a hundred times; and when it is said that I am in favor of interfering with slavery where it exists, I know that it is unwarranted by anything I have ever intended, and, as I believe, by anything I have ever said. If, by any means, I have ever used language which could fairly be so construed (as, however, I believe I never have), I now correct it.

So much, then, for the inference that Judge Douglas draws, that I am in favor of setting the sections at war with one another. I know that I never meant any such thing, and I believe that no fair mind can infer any such thing from anything I have ever said.

Now in relation to his inference that I am in favor of a general consolidation of all the local institutions of the various States. I will attend to that for a little while, and try to inquire, if I can, how on earth it could be that any man could draw such an inference from any thing I said. I have said, very many times, in Judge Douglas's hearing, that no man believed more than I in the principle of self-government; that it lies at the bottom of all my ideas of just government, from beginning to end. I have denied that his use of that term applies properly. But for the thing itself, I deny that any man has ever gone ahead of me in his devotion to the principle, whatever he may have done in efficiency in advocating it. I think that I have said it in your hearing—that I believe each individual is naturally entitled to do as he pleases with himself and with the fruit of his labor, so far as it in no wise interferes with any other man's rights—[applause] that each community, as a State, has a right to do exactly as it pleases with all the concerns within that State that interfere with the right of no other State, and that the General Government, upon principle, has no right to interfere with any thing other than that general class of things that does concern the whole. I have said that at all times. I have said as illustrations, that I do not believe in the right of Illinois to interfere with the cranberry laws of Indiana, the oyster laws of Virginia, or the liquor laws of Maine. I have said these things over and over again, and I repeat them here as my sentiments. * * * * *

So much then as to my disposition—my wish—to have all the State Legislatures blotted out, and to have one consolidated government, and a uniformity of domestic regulations in all the States; by which I suppose it is meant, if we raise corn here, we must make sugar-cane grow here too, and we must

make those which grow North grow in the South. All this I suppose he understands I am in favor of doing. Now, so much for all this nonsense—for I must call it so. The Judge can have no issue with me on a question of established uniformity in the domestic regulations of the States.

DRED SCOTT DECISION.

A little now on the other point—the Dred Scott decision. Another of the issues he says that is to be made with me, is upon his devotion to the Dred Scott decision, and my opposition to it.

I have expressed heretofore, and I now repeat my opposition to the Dred Scott decision, but I should be allowed to state the nature of that opposition, and I ask your indulgence while I do so. What is fairly implied by the term Judge Douglas has used, “resistance to the decision?” I do not resist it. If I wanted to take Dred Scott from his master, I would be interfering with property, and that terrible difficulty that Judge Douglas speaks of, of interfering with property would arise. But I am doing no such thing as that, but all that I am doing is refusing to obey it as a political rule. If I were in Congress, and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new Territory, in spite of the Dred Scott decision, I would vote that it should.

That is what I would do. Judge Douglas said last night, that before the decision he might advance his opinion, and it might be contrary to the decision when it was made; but *after* it was made he would abide by it until it was reversed. Just so! We let this property abide by the decision, but we will try to reverse that decision. [Loud applause.] We will try to put it where Judge Douglas will not object, for he says he will obey it until it is reversed. Somebody has to reverse that decision, since it was made, and we mean to reverse it, and we mean to do it peaceably.

What are the uses of decisions of courts? They have two uses. As rules of property they have two uses. First—they decide upon the question before the court. They decide in this case that Dred Scott is a slave. Nobody resists that. Not only that, but they say to every body else, that persons standing just as Dred Scott stands, is as he is. That is, they say that when a question comes up upon another person, it will be so decided again unless the court decides in another way, unless the court overrules its decision. [Renewed applause.] Well, we mean to do what we can to have the court decide the other way. That is one thing we mean to try to do.

The sacredness that Judge Douglas throws around this decision is a degree of sacredness that has never been before thrown round any other decision. I have never heard of such a thing. Why, decisions apparently contrary to that decision, or that good lawyers thought were contrary to that decision, have been made by that very court before. It is the first of its kind; it is an *astonisher* in legal history. It is a new wonder of the world. It is based upon falsehoods in the main as to the facts—allegations of facts upon which it stands are not facts at all in many instances, and no decision made on any question—the first instance of a decision made under so many unfavorable circumstances—thus placed, has ever been held by the profession as law, and it has always needed confirmation before the lawyers regarded it as settled law. But Judge Douglas will have it that all hands must take this extraordinary decision, made under these extraordinary circumstances, and give their vote in Congress in accordance with it, yield to it and obey it in every possible sense. Circumstances alter cases. Do not gentlemen here remember the case of that same Supreme Court, twenty-five or thirty years ago, deciding that a National Bank was Constitutional? I ask, if somebody does not remember that a National Bank was declared to be Constitutional? Such is the truth, whether it be remembered or not. The Bank charter ran out, and a re-charter was granted by Congress. That re-charter was laid before General Jackson. It was urged upon him, when he denied the Constitutionality of the Bank, that the Supreme Court had decided that it was Constitutional; and that General Jackson then said that the Supreme Court had no right to lay down a rule to govern a co-ordinate branch of the Government, the members of which had sworn to support the Constitution—that each member had sworn to support that Constitution as he understood it. I will venture here to say, that I have heard Judge Douglas say that he approved of General Jackson for that act. What has now become of all his tirade about “resistance to the Supreme Court?” * *

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

We were often—more than once, at least—in the course of Judge Douglas’s speech last night, reminded that this Government was made for white men—that he believed it was made for white men. Well, that is putting it into a shape in which no one wants to deny it; but the Judge then goes into his passion for drawing inferences that are not warranted. I protest, now and forever, against that counterfeit logic which presumes that because I did not want a negro woman for a slave, I do

necessarily want her for a wife. My understanding is that I need not have her for either; but, as God made us separate, we can leave one another alone, and do one another much good thereby. There are white men enough to marry all the white women, and enough black men to marry all the black women, and in God's name let them be so married. The Judge regales us with the terrible enormities that take place by the mixture of races; that the inferior race bears the superior down. Why, Judge, if you do not let them get together in the Territories they won't mix there.

A voice — "Three cheers for Lincoln." (The cheers were given with a hearty good will.)

Mr. L. — I should say at least that this is a self-evident truth.

Now, it happens that we meet together once every year, some time about the Fourth of July, for some reason or other. These Fourth of July gatherings I suppose have their uses. If you will indulge me, I will state what I suppose to be some of them.

We are now a mighty nation; we are thirty, or about thirty millions of people, and we own and inhabit about one-fifteenth part of the dry land of the whole earth. We run our memory back over the pages of history for about eighty-two years, and we discover that we were then a very small people in point of numbers, vastly inferior to what we are now, with a vastly less extent of country, with vastly less of every thing we deem desirable among men — we look upon the change as exceedingly advantageous to us and to our posterity, and we fix upon something that happened away back, as in some way or other being connected with this rise of prosperity. We find a race of men living in that day whom we claim as our fathers and grandfathers; they were iron men; they fought for the principle that they were contending for; and we understood that by what they then did it has followed that the degree of prosperity which we now enjoy has come to us. We hold this annual celebration to remind ourselves of all the good done in this process of time, of how it was done and who did it, and how we are historically connected with it; and we go from these meetings in better humor with ourselves — we feel more attached the one to the other, and more firmly bound to the country we inhabit. In every way we are better men in the age, and race, and country in which we live, for these celebrations. But after we have done all this, we have not yet reached the whole. There is something else connected with it. We have, besides these — men descended by blood from our ancestors — those among us, perhaps half our people, who are not descendants at all of these men; they are men who

have come from Europe—German, Irish, French and Scandinavian—men that have come from Europe themselves, or whose ancestors have come hither and settled here, finding themselves our equals in all things. If they look back through this history to trace their connection with those days by blood, they find they have none; they can not carry themselves back into that glorious epoch and make themselves feel that they are part of us; but when they look through that old Declaration of Independence, they find that those old men say that “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,” and then they feel that that moral sentiment, taught on that day, evidences their relation to those men, that it is the father of all moral principle in them, and that they have a right to claim it as though they were blood of the blood and flesh of the flesh of the men who wrote that Declaration [loud and long-continued applause], and so they are. That is the electric cord in that Declaration that links the hearts of patriotic and liberty-loving men together, that will link those patriotic hearts as long as the love of freedom exists in the minds of men throughout the world. [Applause.]

Now, sirs, for the purpose of squaring things with this idea of “don’t care if slavery is voted up or voted down,” for sustaining the Dred Scott decision, for holding that the Declaration of Independence did not mean any thing at all, we have Judge Douglas giving his exposition of what the Declaration of Independence means, and we have him saying that the people of America are equal to the people of England. According to his construction, you Germans are not connected with it. Now I ask you in all soberness, if all these things, if indulged in, if ratified, if confirmed and indorsed, if taught to our children and repeated to them, do not tend to rub out the sentiment of liberty in the country, and to transform this Government into a government of some other form. These arguments that are made, that the inferior race are to be treated with as much allowance as they are capable of enjoying; that as much is to be done for them as their condition will allow—what are these arguments? They are the arguments that Kings have made for enslaving the people in all ages of the world. You will find that all the arguments in favor of King-craft were of this class; they always bestrode the necks of the people, not that they wanted to do it, but because the people were better off for being ridden. That is their argument, and this argument of the Judge is the same old serpent that says: You work and I eat, you toil and I will enjoy the fruits of it. Turn it whatever way you will—whether it come from the mouth of a King, an excuse for

enslaving the people of his country, or from the mouth of men of one race as a reason for enslaving the men of another race, it is all the same old serpent, and I hold if that course of argumentation that is made for the purpose of convincing the public mind that we should not care about this, should be granted, it does not stop with the negro. I should like to know if, taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle, you begin making exceptions to it, where you will stop? If one man says it does not mean a negro, why not another say it does not mean some other man? If that declaration is not the truth, let us get the statute book, in which we find it, and tear it out! Who is so bold as to do it! If it is not true, let us tear it out! [cries of "no, no"]; let us stick to it then; let us stand firmly by it then. [Applause.]

It may be argued that there are certain conditions that make necessities and impose them upon us, and to the extent that a necessity is imposed upon a man, he must submit to it. I think that was the condition in which we found ourselves when we established this Government. We had slaves among us; we could not get our Constitution unless we permitted them to remain in slavery; we could not secure the good we did secure if we grasped for more; and having, by necessity, submitted to that much, it does not destroy the principle that is the charter of our liberties. Let that charter stand as our standard.

My friend has said to me that I am a poor hand to quote Scripture. I will try it again, however. It is said in one of the admonitions of our Lord: "As your Father in Heaven is perfect, be ye also perfect." The Saviour, I suppose, did not expect that any human creature could be perfect as the Father in Heaven; but He said: "As your Father in Heaven is perfect, be ye also perfect." He set that up as a standard, and he who did most toward reaching that standard, attained the highest degree of moral perfection. So I say in relation to the principle that all men are created equal, let it be as nearly reached as we can. If we can not give freedom to every creature, let us do nothing that will impose slavery upon any other creature. [Applause.] Let us then turn this Government back into the channel in which the framers of the Constitution originally placed it. Let us stand firmly by each other. If we do not do so we are turning in the contrary direction, that our friend Judge Douglas proposes—not intentionally—as working in the traces tends to make this one universal slave nation. He is one that runs in that direction, and as such I resist him.

My friends, I have detained you about as long as I desired to do, and I have only to say, let us discard all this quibbling about this man and the other man—this race and that race and the other race being inferior, and therefore they must be placed in an inferior position—discarding our standard that we have left us. Let us discard all these things, and unite as one people throughout this land, until we shall once more stand up declaring that all men are created equal.

My friends, I could not, without launching off upon some new topic, which would detain you too long, continue to-night. I thank you for this most extensive audience that you have furnished me to-night. I leave you, hoping that the lamp of liberty will burn in your bosoms until there shall no longer be a doubt that all men are created free and equal.

Mr. Lincoln retired amid a perfect torrent of applause and cheers.

A week later than his Chicago speech, Mr. Douglas spoke at Bloomington, in continuation of his canvass. Here again he laid great stress upon his "popular sovereignty" device, and upon his Anti-Lecompton rebellion. He also repeated substantially his two issues against Mr. Lincoln, based upon the Springfield speech of June 16th. Mr. Lincoln was present and heard him. The next day, Douglas made a speech of similar character at Springfield, at which Mr. Lincoln was not present. The latter, however, spoke on the same evening at that place. The following are some of the chief points of Mr. Lincoln's speech on this occasion (July 17, 1858):

INEQUALITIES OF THE CONTEST—THE APPORTIONMENT, ETC.

FELLOW CITIZENS: Another election, which is deemed an important one, is approaching, and, as I suppose, the Republican party will, without much difficulty, elect their State ticket. But in regard to the Legislature, we, the Republicans, labor under some disadvantages. In the first place, we have a Legislature to elect upon an apportionment of the representation made several years ago, when the proportion of the population was far greater in the South (as compared with the North) than it now is; and inasmuch as our opponents hold almost entire sway in the South, and we a correspondingly large majority in the North, the fact that we are now to be represented as we were years ago, when the population was different, is, to us, a very great disadvantage. We had in the year 1855, according to law, a census, or enumeration of the inhabitants, taken for

the purpose of a new apportionment of representation. We know what a fair apportionment of representation upon that census would give us. We know that it could not, if fairly made, fail to give the Republican party from six to ten more members of the Legislature than they can probably get as the law now stands. It so happened at the last session of the Legislature, that our opponents, holding the control of both branches of the Legislature, steadily refused to give us such an apportionment as we were rightly entitled to have upon the census already taken. The Legislature would pass no bill upon that subject, except such as was at least as unfair to us as the old one, and in which, in some instances, two men from the Democratic regions were allowed to go as far toward sending a member to the Legislature as three were in the Republican regions. Comparison was made at the time as to representative and senatorial districts, which completely demonstrated that such was the fact. Such a bill was passed, and tendered to the Republican Governor for his signature ; but, principally for the reasons I have stated, he withheld his approval, and the bill fell without becoming a law.

Another disadvantage under which we labor is, that there are one or two Democratic Senators who will be members of the next Legislature, and will vote for the election of Senator, who are holding over in districts in which we could, on all reasonable calculation, elect men of our own, if we only had the chance of an election. When we consider that there are but twenty-five Senators in the Senate, taking two from the side where they rightfully belong, and adding them to the other, is to us a disadvantage not to be lightly regarded. Still, so it is ; we have this to contend with. Perhaps there is no ground of complaint on our part. In attending to the many things involved in the last general election for President, Governor, Auditor, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Members of Congress and of the Legislature, County Officers, and so on, we allowed these things to happen for want of sufficient attention, and we have no cause to complain of our adversaries, so far as this matter is concerned. But we have some cause to complain of the refusal to give us a fair apportionment.

There is still another disadvantage under which we labor, and to which I will ask your attention. It arises out of the relative position of the two persons who stand before the State as candidates for the Senate. Senator Douglas is of world-wide renown. All the anxious politicians of his party, or who have been of his party for years past, have been looking upon him as certainly, at no distant day, to be the President of the

United States. They have seen in his round, jolly, fruitful face, post offices, land offices, marshalships, and cabinet appointments, chargeships and foreign missions, bursting and sprouting out in wonderful luxuriance, ready to be laid hold of by their greedy hands. [Great laughter.] And as they have been gazing upon this attractive picture so long, they can not, in the little distraction that has taken place in the party, bring themselves to give up the charming hope; but with greedier anxiety they rush about him, sustain him, and give him marches, triumphal entries, and receptions, beyond what even in the days of his highest prosperity they could have brought about in his favor. On the contrary, nobody has ever expected me to be President. In my poor, lean, lank face, nobody has ever seen that any cabbages were sprouting out. [Cheering and laughter.] These are disadvantages all, that the Republicans labor under. We have to fight this battle upon principle, and upon principle alone. I am, in a certain sense, made the standard-bearer in behalf of the Republicans. I was made so merely because there had to be some one so placed—I being in no wise preferable to any other one of the twenty-five—perhaps a hundred we have in the Republican ranks. Then I say I wish it to be distinctly understood and borne in mind, that we have to fight this battle without many—perhaps without any—of the external aids which are brought to bear against us. So I hope those with whom I am surrounded have principle enough to nerve themselves for the task, and leave nothing undone, that can be fairly done, to bring about the right result.

THE DOUGLAS PROGRAMME.

After Senator Douglas left Washington, as his movements were made known by the public prints, he tarried a considerable time in the city of New York; and it was heralded that, like another Napoleon, he was lying by and framing the plan of his campaign. It was telegraphed to Washington city, and published in the *Union*, that he was framing his plan for the purpose of going to Illinois to pounce upon and annihilate the treasonable and disunion speech which Lincoln had made here on the 16th of June. Now, I do suppose the Judge really spent some time in New York maturing the plan of the campaign, as his friends heralded for him. I have been able, by noting his movements since his arrival in Illinois, to discover evidences confirmatory of that allegation. I think I have been able to see what are the material points of that plan. I will, for a little while, ask your attention to some of them.

And will point out, though not showing the whole plan, are, nevertheless, the main points, as I suppose.

They are not very numerous. The first is Popular Sovereignty. The second and third are attacks upon my speech made on the 16th of June. Out of these three points—drawing within the range of popular sovereignty the question of the Lecompton Constitution—he makes his principal assault. Upon these his successive speeches are substantially one and the same. On this matter of popular sovereignty I wish to be a little careful. Auxiliary to these main points, to be sure, are their thunderings of cannon, their marching and music, their fizzle-gigs and fire-works; but I will not waste time with them. They are but the little trappings of the campaign.

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY.

Coming to the substance—the first point—“popular sovereignty.” It is to be labeled upon the cars in which he travels, put upon the hacks he rides in; to be flaunted upon the arches he passes under, and the banners which wave over him. It is to be dished up in as many varieties as a French cook can produce soups from potatoes. Now, as this is so great a staple of the plan of the campaign, it is worth while to examine it carefully; and if we examine only a very little, and do not allow ourselves to be misled, we shall be able to see that the whole thing is the most arrant Quixotism that was ever enacted before a community. What is this matter of popular sovereignty? The first thing, in order to understand it, is to get a good definition of what it is, and after that to see how it is applied.

I suppose almost every one knows, that in this controversy, whatever has been said has had reference to the question of negro slavery. We have not been in a controversy about the right of the people to govern themselves in the *ordinary* matters of domestic concern in the States and Territories. Mr. Buchanan, in one of his late messages (I think when he sent up the Lecompton Constitution), urged that the main point to which the public attention had been directed, was not in regard to the great variety of small domestic matters, but it was directed to the question of negro slavery—and he asserts, that if the people had had a fair chance to vote on that question, there was no reasonable ground of objection in regard to minor questions. Now, while I think that the people had *not* had given, or offered them, a fair chance upon that slavery question; still, if there had been a fair submission to a vote upon that main question, the President's proposition would have been true to the uttermost. Hence, when hereafter I speak

of popular sovereignty, I wish to be understood as applying what I say to the question of slavery only, not to other minor domestic matters of a Territory or a State.

Does Judge Douglas, when he says that several of the past years of his life have been devoted to the question of "popular sovereignty," and that all the remainder of his life shall be devoted to it, does he mean to say that he has been devoting his life to securing to the people of the Territories, the right to exclude slavery from the Territories? If he means so to say, he means to deceive; because he and every one knows that the decision of the Supreme Court, which he approves and makes an especial ground of attack upon me for disapproving, forbids the people of a Territory to exclude slavery. This covers the whole ground, from the settlement of a Territory till it reaches the degree of maturity entitling it to form a State Constitution. So far as all that ground is concerned, the Judge is not sustaining popular sovereignty, but absolutely opposing it. He sustains the decision which declares that the popular will of the Territories has no Constitutional power to exclude slavery during their Territorial existence. [Cheers.] This being so, the period of time, from the first settlement of a Territory till it reaches the point of forming a State Constitution, is not the thing that the Judge has fought for, or is fighting for, but on the contrary, he has fought for, and is fighting for, the thing that annihilates and crushes out that same popular sovereignty.

Well, so much being disposed of, what is left? Why, he is contending for the right of the people, when they come to make a State Constitution, to make it for themselves, and precisely as best suits themselves. I say again, that is Quixotic. I defy contradiction, when I declare that the Judge can find no one to oppose him on that proposition. I repeat, there is nobody opposing that proposition on *principle*. Let me not be misunderstood. I know that, with reference to the Lecompton Constitution, I may be misunderstood; but when you understand me correctly, my proposition will be true and accurate. Nobody is opposing, or has opposed, the right of the people, when they form a Constitution, to form it for themselves. Mr. Buchanan and his friends have not done it; they, too, as well as the Republicans and the Anti-Lecompton Democrats, have not done it; but, on the contrary, they together have insisted on the right of the people to form a Constitution for themselves. The difference between the Buchanan men, on the one hand, and the Douglas men and the Republicans on the other, has not been on a question of principle, but on a question of *fact*.

The dispute was upon the question of fact, whether the Lecompton Constitution had been fairly formed by the people, or not. Mr. Buchanan and his friends have not contended for the contrary principle, any more than the Douglas men or the Republicans. They have insisted, that whatever of small irregularities existed in getting up the Lecompton Constitution, were such as happen in the settlement of all new Territories. The question was, was it a fair emanation of the people? It was a question of fact, and not of principle. As to the principle, all were agreed. Judge Douglas voted with the Republicans upon that matter of fact.

He and they, by their voices and votes, denied that it was a fair emanation of the people. The Administration affirmed that it was. With respect to the evidence bearing upon the question of fact, I readily agree that Judge Douglas and the Republicans had the right on their side, and that the Administration was wrong. But I state again that, as a matter of principle, there is no dispute upon the right of a people in a Territory, merging into a State, to form a Constitution for themselves, without outside interference from any quarter. This being so, what is Judge Douglas going to spend his life for? Is he going to spend his life in maintaining a principle that nobody on earth opposes? [Cheers.] Does he expect to stand up in majestic dignity, and go through his *apotheosis*, and become a god, in the maintaining of a principle which neither man nor mouse, in all God's creation, is opposing? Great applause.]

THE LECOMPTON ISSUE.

How will he prove that we have ever occupied a different position in regard to the Lecompton Constitution, or any principle in it? He says he did not make his opposition on the ground as to whether it was a free or a slave Constitution, and he would have you understand that the Republicans made their opposition because it ultimately became a slave Constitution. To make proof in favor of himself on this point, he reminds us that he opposed Lecompton before the vote was taken declaring whether the State was to be free or slave. But he forgets to say, that our Republican Senator, Trumbull, made a speech against Lecompton even before he did.

Why did he oppose it? Partly, as he declares, because the members of the Convention who framed it were not fairly elected by the people; that the people were not allowed to vote unless they had been registered; and that the people of whole counties, in some instances, were not registered. For these reasons he declares the Constitution was not an emanation, in

any true sense, from the people. He also has an additional objection as to the mode of submitting the Constitution back to the people. But bearing on the question of whether the delegates were fairly elected, a speech of his made something more than twelve months ago, from this stand, becomes important. It was made a little while before the election of the delegates who made Lecompton. In that speech he declared there was every reason to hope and believe the election would be fair; and if any one failed to vote it would be his own fault.

I, a few days after, made a sort of answer to that speech. In that answer, I made, substantially, the very argument with which he combated his Lecompton adversaries in the Senate last winter. I pointed to the fact that the people could not vote without being registered, and that the time for registering had gone by. I commented on it as wonderful that Judge Douglas could be ignorant of these facts, which every one else in the nation so well knew.

[Mr. Lincoln then proceeded to notice the attacks made by Douglas on the 6th of June speech of the former. In substance, it is like his reply at Chicago. Some of its more striking passages are here subjoined.]

He charges, in substance, that I invite a war of sections; that I propose that all the local institutions of the different States shall become consolidated and uniform. What is there in the language of that speech which expresses such purpose, or bears such construction? I have again and again said that I would not enter into any of the States to disturb the institution of slavery. Judge Douglas said, at Bloomington, that I used language most able and ingenious for concealing what I really meant; and that, while I had protested against entering into the slave States, I nevertheless did mean to go on the banks of the Ohio and throw missiles into Kentucky, to disturb the people there in their domestic institutions.

I said in that speech, and I meant no more, that the institution of slavery ought to be placed in the very attitude where the framers of this Government placed it, and left it. I do not understand that the framers of our Constitution left the people of the free States in the attitude of firing bombs or shells into the slave States. I was not using that passage for the purpose for which he infers I did use it. * * * Now you all see, from that quotation, I did not express my *wish* on anything. In that passage I indicated no wish or purpose of my own; I simply expressed my *expectation*.

[Further on, Mr. Lincoln said :]

Mr. Brooks, of South Carolina, in one of his speeches, when they were presenting him canes, silver plate, gold pitchers and the like, for assaulting Senator Sumner, distinctly affirmed his opinion that when this Constitution was formed, it was the belief of no man that slavery would last to the present day.

He said, what I think, that the framers of our Constitution placed the institution of slavery where the public mind rested in the hope that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. But he went on to say that the men of the present age, by their experience, have become wiser than the framers of the Constitution ; and the invention of the cotton-gin had made the perpetuity of slavery a necessity in this country.

[Recurring to the Dred Scott case, after citing Jefferson's views on judicial decisions, and alluding to the course of the Democracy, Douglas included, in regard to the National Bank decision, Mr. Lincoln said :]

Now, I wish to know what the Judge can charge upon me, with respect to decisions of the Supreme Court, which does not lie in all its length, breadth and proportions at his own door. The plain truth is simply this : Judge Douglas is *for* Supreme Court decisions when he likes and against them when he does not like them. He is for the Dred Scott decision because it tends to nationalize slavery—because it is part of the original combination for that object. It so happened, singularly enough, that I never stood opposed to a decision of the Supreme Court till this. On the contrary, I have no recollection that he was ever particularly in favor of one till this. He never was in favor of any, nor I opposed to any, till the present one, which helps to nationalize slavery.

Free men of Sangamon—free men of Illinois—free men everywhere—judge ye between him and me, upon this issue.

Near the close of July, various speeches having been made by each at different points, an arrangement for one joint discussion in each of the seven Congressional districts, in which they had not already both spoken, was agreed upon. At this stage of the canvass, the people of the whole country were beginning to take a lively interest in this contest, and the reports of the first debate at Ottawa were eagerly sought for and read, at the East and at the West. The friends of Mr. Lincoln, and the Republicans in general, were well pleased

with the manner in which he acquitted himself in this joint discussion. At each succeeding encounter of this sort, the impression was strengthened, throughout the country, that Mr. Lincoln was obtaining decided advantages over his opponent. At Freeport, he forced Douglas into an attempted reconciliation of the hitherto unexplained inconsistencies between his squatter sovereignty theory, and his support of the Dred Scott decision, which utterly excludes squatter sovereignty in practice. His "unfriendly legislation" device, on that occasion, cost Douglas the loss of the last possibility of any reconciliation with the Southern Democracy. While this answer, most unwillingly given, perhaps, yet announced with apparent alacrity, contributed something toward effecting his immediate, temporary purpose, it undoubtedly destroyed all his remoter chances as a Presidential candidate of a united Democracy.

The Ottawa debate is memorable for one of the most surprising political devices ever resorted to by a man in high position, like Douglas. It consisted in quoting a series of ultra resolutions adopted at a small local convention long before the party was formed, and palming them off as the platform adopted by "the first mass State convention ever held in Illinois by the Black Republican party." On these resolutions, to which he assumed that Lincoln was committed, Douglas based a series of questions, which the former, duly exposing the imposition thus practiced, frankly and most explicitly answered at Freeport, the scene of the second debate, as follows :

OPENING PASSAGES OF MR. LINCOLN'S FREEPORT SPEECH.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :—On Saturday last, Judge Douglas and myself first met in public discussion. He spoke one hour, I an hour and a half, and he replied for half an hour. The order is now reversed. I am to speak an hour, he an hour and a half, and then I am to reply for half an hour. I propose to devote myself during the first hour to the scope of what was brought within the range of his half-hour speech at Ottawa. Of course there was brought within the scope of that half-hour's speech something of his own opening speech. In the course of that opening argument Judge Douglas proposed to me seven distinct interrogatories. In my speech of

an hour and a half, I attended to some other parts of his speech, and incidentally, as I thought, answered one of the interrogatories then. I then distinctly intimated to him that I would answer the rest of his interrogatories on condition only that he should agree to answer as many for me. He made no intimation at the time of the proposition, nor did he in his reply allude at all to that suggestion of mine. I do him no injustice in saying that he occupied at least half of his reply in dealing with me as though I had *refused* to answer his interrogatories. I now propose that I will answer any of the interrogatories, upon condition that he will answer questions from me not exceeding the same number. I give him an opportunity to respond. The Judge remains silent. I now say that I will answer his interrogatories, whether he answers mine or not [applause]; and that after I have done so, I shall propound mine to him. [Applause.]

I have supposed myself, since the organization of the Republican party at Bloomington, in May, 1856, bound as a party man by the platforms of the party, then and since. If in any interrogatories which I shall answer I go beyond the scope of what is within these platforms, it will be perceived that no one is responsible but myself.

Having said thus much, I will take up the Judge's interrogatories as I find them printed in the *Chicago Times*, and answer them *seriatim*. In order that there may be no mistake about it, I have copied the interrogatories in writing, and also my answers to them. The first one of these interrogatories is in these words:

Question 1. "I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law?"

Answer. I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law.

Q. 2. "I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day, as he did in 1854, against the admission of any more slave States into the Union, even if the people want them?"

A. I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged against the admission of any more slave States into the Union.

Q. 3. "I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of a new State in the Union, with such a Constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make."

A. I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union, with such a Constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make.

Q. 4. "I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia?"

A. I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

Q. 5. "I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States?"

A. I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States.

Q. 6. "I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States, North as well as South of the Missouri Compromise line?"

A. I am impliedly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the *right* and *duty* of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United States Territories. (Great applause.)

Q. 7. "I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?"

A. I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and, in any given case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition, accordingly as I might think such acquisition would or would not agitate the slavery question among ourselves.

Now, my friends, it will be perceived, upon an examination of these questions and answers, that so far I have only answered that I was not *pledged* to this, that or the other. The Judge has not framed his interrogatories to ask me any thing more than this, and I have answered in strict accordance with the interrogatories, and have answered truly that I am not *pledged* at all upon any of the points to which I have answered. But I am not disposed to hang upon the exact form of his interrogatory. I am rather disposed to take up at least some of these questions, and state what I really think upon them.

As to the first one, in regard to the Fugitive Slave law, I have never hesitated to say, and I do not now hesitate to say, that I think, under the Constitution of the United States, the people of the Southern States are entitled to a Congressional Slave law. Having said that, I have had nothing to say in regard to the existing Fugitive Slave law, further than that I think it should have been framed so as to be free from some of the objections that pertain to it, without lessening its efficiency. And inasmuch as we are not now in an agitation in regard to an alteration or modification of that law, I would not be the man to introduce it as a new subject of agitation upon the general question of slavery.

In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the admission of any more slave States into the Union, I state to you very frankly that I would be exceedingly sorry

ever to be put in a position of having to pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that there would never be another slave State admitted into the Union; but I must add, that if slavery shall be kept out of the Territories during the Territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people shall, having a fair chance and a clear field, when they come to adopt the Constitution, do such an extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave Constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative if we own the country, but to admit them into the Union. [Applause.]

The third interrogatory is answered by the answer to the second, it being, as I conceive, the same as the second.

The fourth one is in regard to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. In relation to that, I have my mind very distinctly made up. I should be exceedingly glad to see slavery abolished in the District of Columbia. I believe that Congress possesses the constitutional power to abolish it. Yet as a member of Congress, I should not, with my present views, be in favor of *endeavoring* to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, unless it would be upon these conditions: *First*, that the abolition should be gradual; *second*, that it should be on a vote of the majority of qualified voters in the District; and *third*, that compensation should be made to unwilling owners. With these three conditions, I confess I would be exceedingly glad to see Congress abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and, in the language of Henry Clay, "sweep from our Capital that foul blot upon our nation."

In regard to the fifth interrogatory, I must say here, that as to the question of the abolition of the slave-trade between the different States, I can truly answer, as I have, that I am *pledged* to nothing about it. It is a subject to which I have not given that mature consideration that would make me feel authorized to state a position so as to hold myself entirely bound by it. In other words, that question has never been prominently enough before me to induce me to investigate whether we really have the constitutional power to do it. I could investigate it if I had sufficient time to bring myself to a ~~conclusion~~ conclusion upon that subject; but I have not done so, and I say so frankly to you here, and to Judge Douglas. I must say, however, that if I should be of opinion that Congress does possess the constitutional power to abolish slave-trading among the different States, I should still not be in favor of the exercise of that power, unless upon some conservative principle as I conceive it, akin to what I have said

in relation to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

My answer as to whether I desire that slavery should be prohibited in all Territories of the United States, is full and explicit within itself, and can not be made clearer by any comments of mine. So I suppose in regard to the question whether I am opposed to the acquisition of any more territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein, my answer is such that I could add nothing by way of illustration, or making myself better understood, than the answer which I have placed in writing.

Now in all this, the Judge has me, and he has me on the record. I suppose he had flattered himself that I was really entertaining one set of opinions for one place, and another set for another place—that I was afraid to say at one place what I uttered at another. What I am saying here, I suppose I say to a vast audience as strongly tending to Abolitionism as any audience in the State of Illinois, and I believe I am saying that which, if it would be offensive to any persons and render them enemies to myself, would be offensive to persons in this audience.

At Jonesboro, in the lower part of "Egypt," where their third debate was held, Douglas reiterated his often-refuted charges of ultraism against Lincoln, which the latter just as coolly and convincingly disposed of, as if there had been no unreasonable pertinacity in making unjust accusations against him. After bringing home the sin of re-opening agitation, to the door of Douglas, he proceeded to show as extravagant radicalism in the recorded professions of the Democracy as of any persons acting with the Republican party. He then completely riddled the "unfriendly legislation" theory of Douglas, exhibiting its utter inconsistency with fidelity to his constitutional oaths, so long as he indorsed the validity of the political dogmas of Judge Taney, in his Dred Scott opinion.

In the fourth debate, at Charleston, the attempts of Douglas to make capital out of the Mexican War question were appropriately disposed of. Here, also, Douglas was convicted, on conclusive testimony, of having *stricken out* of the Toombs Kansas Bill a clause requiring the Constitution that should be formed under its provisions, to be submitted to the people.

This had an important bearing on one objection upon which Douglas based his Anti-Lecompton rebellion.

The fifth joint discussion was held at Galesburg, the sixth at Quincy, and the last at Alton. The main topics and methods of these debates, as of the rest, did not substantially differ from those of the speeches at Chicago and Springfield.

The Alton debate occurred on the 15th of October. As the day of the election (November 2d) approached, it became more and more evident that strong efforts were making, aided by the advice of Senator Crittenden on the one hand, and of Vice-President Breckinridge on the other, to secure a diversion of "Conservative" votes—American, Democratic, and Whig—in the central and southern parts of the State, in favor of Douglas. These endeavors succeeded to such an extent that, with the immense advantages the Douglas party had in their unequal and utterly unfair apportionment of Legislative Districts, and in the lucky proportion of Democratic Senators holding over, they secured a small majority in each branch of the new Legislature. The Senate had 14 Democrats and 11 Republicans—the House 40 Democrats and 35 Republicans. The popular voice was for Lincoln, by *more than four thousand majority*, over Douglas.

Admiration of the manly bearing and gallant conduct of Mr. Lincoln, throughout this campaign, which had early assumed a national importance, led to the spontaneous suggestion of his name, in various parts of the country, as a candidate for the Presidency. From the beginning to the end of the contest, he had proved himself an able statesman, an effective orator, a true gentleman, and an honest man. While, therefore, Douglas was returned to the Senate, there was a general presentiment that a juster verdict was yet to be had, and that Mr. Lincoln and his cause would be ultimately vindicated before the people. That time was to come, even sooner, perhaps, than his friends, in their momentary despondency, expected. From that hour to the present, the fame of Abraham Lincoln has been enlarging and ripening, and the love of his noble character has become **more and more deeply fixed in the popular heart.**

CHAPTER XII.

SPEECHES OF 1859-'60.

Mr. Lincoln in Ohio.—His Speech at Columbus.—Denial of the Negro Suffrage Charge.—Troubles of Douglas with His "Great Principle."—Territories Not States.—Doctrines of the Fathers.—His Cincinnati Speech.—"Shooting Over the Line."—What the Republicans Mean to Do.—Plain Questions to the Democracy.—The People Above Courts and Congress.—Uniting the Opposition.—Eastern Tour.—The Cooper Institute Speech.—Mr. Bryant's Introduction.—What the Fathers Held.—What will Satisfy the Southern Democracy?—Counsels to the Republicans.—Mr. Lincoln Among the Children.

DURING the year following his great contest with Douglas, which had resulted in a barren triumph through the injustice of the previous Democratic Legislature in refusing a fair and equal apportionment, Mr. Lincoln again gave himself almost exclusively to professional labors. During the autumn campaign of 1859, however, when Douglas visited Ohio, and endeavored to turn the tide of battle in favor of the Democracy in that State, so as to secure the re-election of Mr. Pugh, and to gain other partisan benefits, an earnest invitation was sent to Lincoln to assist the Republicans in their canvass. He complied, and delivered two most effective speeches in Ohio, one at Columbus, and the other at Cincinnati.

In his speech at the former place (September 16, 1859), he began by noticing a statement which he read from the central Democratic organ, averring that in the canvass of the previous year with Douglas, "Mr. Lincoln declared in favor of negro suffrage." This charge he quickly disposed of, showing by quotations from his printed ~~note~~ of that canvass, that he

distinctly and repeatedly declared himself *opposed* to the policy thus attributed to him.

Mr. Lincoln then noticed the recent Columbus speech of Mr. Douglas, in which he "dealt exclusively" in the "negro topics" of discussion. Mr. L. spoke at some length on these issues, and thoroughly exposed the distinctions between genuine popular sovereignty, and the spurious sort which Douglas and his friends passed off for the reality. He then went on to notice the great amount of trouble which Mr. Douglas had had with his spurious popular sovereignty, and to illustrate how "his explanations explanatory of explanations explained are interminable." The *Harper's Magazine* essay of Douglas on this subject was dissected, and left without any logical vitality or cohesion. Two or three brief points in the remainder of this speech are subjoined :

STATES AND TERRITORIES.

There is another little difficulty about this matter of treating the Territories and States alike in all things, to which I ask your attention, and I shall leave this branch of the case. If there is no difference between them, why not make the Territories States at once? What is the reason that Kansas was not fit to come into the Union when it was organized into a Territory, in Judge Douglas' view? Can any of you tell any reason why it should not have come into the Union at once? They are fit, as he thinks, to decide upon the slavery question—the largest and most important with which they could possibly deal—what could they do by coming into the Union that they are not fit to do, according to his view, by staying out of it? Oh, they are not fit to sit in Congress and decide upon the rates of postage, or questions of *ad valorem* or specific duties on foreign goods, or live oak timber contracts. [Laughter.] They are not fit to decide these vastly important matters, which are national in their import, but they are fit, "from the jump," to decide this little negro question. But, gentlemen, the case is too plain; I occupy too much time on this head, and I pass on.

STAND BY THE DOCTRINES OF THE FATHERS.

I see in the Judge's speech here a short sentence in these words: "Our fathers, when they formed this Government under which we live, understood this question just as",

even better than we do now." That is true. I stick to that [Great cheers and laughter.] I will stand by Judge Douglas in that to the bitter end. [Renewed laughter.] And now, Judge Douglas, come and stand by me, and faithfully show how they acted, understanding it better than we do. All I ask of you, Judge Douglas, is to stick to the proposition that the men of the Revolution understood this subject better than we do now, *and with that better understanding they acted better than you are trying to act now.* [Applause.]

At Cincinnati, on the 17th of September, Mr. Lincoln addressed an immense audience on the same general political topics, and in his ablest manner. He did not repeat or merely play variations upon his Columbus speech, but adopted new modes of illustrating and enforcing his views. He was listened to with an interest rarely excited by any orator who ever spoke in this city, even in the most exciting campaign. No extracts can give a true idea of its ability and power as a whole. Alluding to Douglas' perversions of his views, and to the charge of wishing to disturb slavery in the States by "shooting over" the line, Mr. Lincoln said:

SHOOTING OVER THE LINE.

It has occurred to me here to-night, that if I ever do shoot over at the people on the other side of the line in a slave State, and purpose to do so, keeping my skin safe, that I have now about the best chance I shall ever have. [Laughter and applause.] I should not wonder if there are some Kentuckians about this audience; we are close to Kentucky, and whether that be so or not, we are on elevated ground, and by speaking distinctly, I should not wonder if some of the Kentuckians should hear me on the other side of the river. [Laughter.] For that reason I propose to address a portion of what I have to say to the Kentuckians.

I say, then, in the first place, to the Kentuckians, that I am what they call, as I understand it, a "Black Republican." [Applause and Laughter.] I think that slavery is wrong, morally, socially and politically. I desire that it should be no further spread in these United States, and I should not object if it should gradually terminate in the whole Union. [Applause.] While I say this for myself, I say to you, Kentuckians, that I understand that you differ radically with me upon this proposition; that you believe slavery is a good thing that ~~is~~ right: that it ought to be extended and

perpetuated in this Union. Now, there being this broad difference between us, I do not pretend in addressing myself to you, Kentuckians, to attempt proselyting you at all; that would be a vain effort. I do not enter upon it. I only propose to try to show you that you ought to nominate for the next Presidency, at Charleston, my distinguished friend, Judge Douglas. [Applause.] In whatever there is a difference between you and him, I understand he is as sincerely for you, and more wisely for you, than you are for yourselves. [Applause.] I will try to demonstrate that proposition. Understand, now, I say that I believe he is as sincerely for you, and more wisely for you, than you are for yourselves.

Mr. Lincoln then went on to show that Douglas was constantly endeavoring to "mold the public opinion of the North to the ends" desired by the South; that he only differed from the South in so far as was necessary to retain any hold upon his own section; that not daring to maintain that slavery is right, he professed an indifference whether it was "voted up or voted down"—thus indirectly advancing the opinion that it is not wrong; and that he had taken a step in advance, by doing what would not have been thought of by any man five years ago, to-wit:—denying that the Declaration of Independence asserts any principle intended to be applicable to black men, or that properly includes them. The tendency of this doctrine "is to bring the public mind to the conclusion that when men are spoken of, the negro is not meant; that when negroes are spoken of, brutes alone are contemplated.

Of the certainty of a speedy Republican triumph in the nation, and of its results, Mr. Lincoln said:

WHAT THE OPPOSITION MEAN TO DO.

I will tell you, so far as I am authorized to speak for the Opposition, what we mean to do with you. We mean to treat you, as nearly as we possibly can, as Washington, Jefferson, and Madison treated you. [Cheers.] We mean to leave you alone, and in no way to interfere with your institution; to abide by all and every compromise of the Constitution, and, in a word, coming back to the original proposition, to treat you, so far as degenerated men (if we have degenerated) may imitating the examples of those noble fathers—Wash-

ington, Jefferson and Madison. [Applause.] We mean to remember that you are as good as we; that there is no difference between us, other than the difference of circumstances. We mean to recognize and bear in mind always that you have as good hearts in your bosoms as other people, or as we claim to have, and treat you accordingly. We mean to marry your girls when we have a chance—the white ones I mean—[laughter] and I have the honor to inform you that I once did get a chance in that way. [A voice, "Good for you," and applause.]

PLAIN QUESTIONS TO THE DISUNION DEMOCRACY.

I have told you what we mean to do. I want to know, now, when that thing takes place, what you mean to do. I often hear it intimated that you mean to divide the Union whenever a Republican, or anything like it, is elected President of the United States. [A voice, "That is so."] "That is so," one of them says. I wonder if he is a Kentuckian. [A voice, "He is a Douglas man."] Well, then, I want to know what you are going to do with your half of it? [Applause and laughter.] Are you going to split the Ohio down through, and push your half off a piece? Or are you going to keep it right alongside of us outrageous fellows? Or are you going to build up a wall someway between your country and ours, by which that movable property of yours can't come over here any more, and you lose it? Do you think you can better yourselves on that subject, by leaving us here under no obligation whatever to return those specimens of your movable property that come hither? You have divided the Union because we would not do right with you, as you think, upon that subject; when we cease to be under obligations to do anything for you, how much better off do you think you will be? Will you make war upon us and kill us all? Why, gentlemen, I think you are as gallant and as brave men as live; that you can fight as bravely in a good cause, man for man, as any other people living: that you have shown yourselves capable of this upon various occasions; but, man for man, you are not better than we are, and there are not so many of you as there are of us. [Loud cheering.] You will never make much of a hand at whipping us. If we were fewer in numbers than you, I think that you could whip us; if we were equal, it would likely be a drawn battle; but being inferior in numbers, you will make nothing by attempting to master us.

WHAT REPUBLICANS MUST DO.

I say that we must not interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists, because the Constitution

forbids it, and the general welfare does not require us to do so. We must not withhold an efficient fugitive slave law, because the Constitution requires us, as I understand it, not to withhold such a law, but we must prevent the outspreading of the institution, because neither the Constitution nor the general welfare requires us to extend it. We must prevent the revival of the African slave-trade and the enacting by Congress of a Territorial slave-code. We must prevent each of these things being done by either Congresses or Courts. **THE PEOPLE OF THESE UNITED STATES ARE THE RIGHTFUL MASTERS OF BOTH CONGRESSES AND COURTS** [applause], not to overthrow the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who pervert that Constitution. [Applause.]

After expressing an earnest desire "that all the elements of the Opposition should unite in the next Presidential election and in all future time," on a right and just basis; and after saying, "There are plenty of men in the slave States that are altogether good enough for me to be either President or Vice-President, provided they will profess sympathy with our purpose in the election, and will place themselves upon such ground that our men, upon principle, can vote for them," Mr. Lincoln brought his remarks to a close.

In the spring of 1860, Mr. Lincoln yielded to the calls which came to him from the East for his presence and aid in the exciting political canvasses there going on. He spoke at various places in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, and also in New York city, to very large audiences, and was everywhere warmly welcomed. Perhaps one of the greatest speeches of his life, was that delivered by him at the Cooper Institute, in New York, on the 27th of February, 1860. A crowded audience was present, which received Mr. Lincoln with enthusiastic demonstrations. William Cullen Bryant presided, and introduced the speaker in terms of high compliment to the West, and to the "eminent citizen" of that section, whose political labors in 1856 and '58 were appropriately eulogized.

THE COOPER INSTITUTE SPEECH.

Mr. Lincoln then proceeded to address his auditors in an extended and closely-reasoned argument, proving in the most convincing manner that the Republican party stands where

"the Fathers" stood on the slavery question, and eloquently enforcing the sentiment expressed by Mr. Douglas in his Columbus speech of the previous autumn, namely: "Our fathers, when they framed the Government under which we live, understood this question just as well, and even better, than we do now." The argument and its illustrations were masterly; the logic unanswerable. A few paragraphs of his concluding remarks are all that can be given here:

WHAT WILL SATISFY THE SOUTHERN DEMOCRACY?

A few words now to Republicans. It is exceedingly desirable that all parts of this great Confederacy shall be at peace, and in harmony one with another. Let us Republicans do our part to have it so. Even though much provoked, let us do nothing through passion and ill temper. Even though the Southern people will not so much as listen to us, let us calmly consider their demands, and yield to them, if, in our deliberate view of our duty, we possibly can. Judging by all they say and do, and by the subject and nature of their controversy with us, let us determine, if we can, what will satisfy them.

Will they be satisfied if the Territories be unconditionally surrendered to them? We know they will not. In all their present complaints against us, the Territories are scarcely mentioned. Invasions and insurrections are the rage now. Will it satisfy them if, in the future, we have nothing to do with invasions and insurrections? We know it will not. We so know, because we know we never had anything to do with invasions and insurrections; and yet this total abstaining does not exempt us from the charge and the denunciation.

The question recurs, What will satisfy them? Simply this: We must not only let them alone, but we must, somehow, convince them that we do let them alone. This, we know by experience, is no easy task. We have been so trying to convince them, from the very beginning of our organization, but with no success. In all our platforms and speeches, we have constantly protested our purpose to let them alone; but this has had no tendency to convince them. Alike unavailing to convince them is the fact, that they have never detected a man of us in any attempt to disturb them.

These natural and apparently adequate means all failing, what will convince them? This, and this only: cease to call slavery *wrong*, and join them in calling it *right*. All this must be done thoroughly—done in *acts* as well as in *words*. * *

If our sense of duty forbids this, then let us stand by our **duty**, fearlessly and effectively. Let us be diverted by none of

those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously plied and belabored—contrivances such as groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong, vain as the search for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead man—such as a policy of “don’t care” on a question about which all true men do care—such as Union appeals, beseeching true Union men to yield to Disunionists, reversing the Divine rule, and calling, not the sinners, but the righteous to repentance—such as invocations of Washington, imploring men to unsay what Washington said, and undo what Washington did. Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the Government, nor of dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes might; and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty, as we understand it.

This is the last of the great speeches of Mr. Lincoln, prior to the election of 1860, of which there is any complete report. It forms a brilliant close to this period of his life, and a fitting prelude to that on which he was about to enter.

It was during this visit to New York that the following incident occurred, as related by a teacher in the Five Points House of Industry, in that city:

Our Sunday-school in the Five Points was assembled, one Sabbath morning, a few months since, when I noticed a tall and remarkable-looking man enter the room and take a seat among us. He listened with fixed attention to our exercises, and his countenance manifested such genuine interest, that I approached him and suggested that he might be willing to say something to the children. He accepted the invitation with evident pleasure, and coming forward began a simple address, which at once fascinated every little hearer, and hushed the room into silence. His language was strikingly beautiful, and his tones musical with intensest feeling. The little faces around would droop into sad conviction as he uttered sentences of warning, and would brighten into sunshine as he spoke cheerful words of promise. Once or twice he attempted to close his remarks, but the imperative shout of “Go on!” “Oh, do go on!” would compel him to resume. As I looked upon the gaunt and sinewy frame of the stranger, and marked his powerful head and determined features, now touched into softness by the impressions of the moment, I felt an irrepressible curiosity to learn something more about him, and when he was quietly leaving the room, I begged to know his name. He courteously replied. “It is Abraham Lincoln, from Illinois!”

CHAPTER XIII.

MR. LINCOLN'S NOMINATION FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

The Republican National Convention at Chicago.—The Charleston Explosion.—“Constitutional Union” Nominations.—Distinguished Candidates among the Republicans.—The Platform.—The Ballotings.—Mr. Lincoln Nominated.—Unparalleled Enthusiasm.—The Ticket Completed with the name of Senator Hamlin.—Its Reception by the Country.—Mr. Lincoln's Letter of Acceptance.

THE Republican National Convention met at Chicago on the 16th of May, 1860, to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President of the United States. At the date of its assembling, the great quadrennial convention of the Democratic party had been held at Charleston, and, after nearly two weeks' session, had adjourned without any agreement upon either platform or candidates. Douglas, with his Freeport record, which had become necessary in order to accomplish his temporary purpose, had proved an irreconcilably disturbing element in that convention. The nomination of Douglas by a united Democracy had been demonstrated to be impossible, and the only alternative of his withdrawal or an incurable disruption was presented. Subsequently, a “Constitutional Union” Convention had assembled at Baltimore, and nominated a Presidential ticket, with no other definitely avowed object than that professed in common by all citizens, everywhere, of supporting the Constitution and the Union. All eyes were now turned toward Chicago, as the point at which the problem of the next Presidency was to be definitely solved.

Before the Republican National Convention met, the names

of many distinguished statesmen had been proposed for the first place on the Presidential ticket, and their merits and availability had been extensively discussed. In this preliminary canvassing there had been no bitterness or unseemly personalities. There was a general indication of harmony in ultimate action, and of unbroken union upon whatever ticket should be selected.

The first day of the convention was spent in organizing, and on the second day the committee, selected for that purpose, reported a platform of principles which was unanimously adopted, and has been strongly approved by the people.

On the morning of the 18th, amid the most intense though subdued excitement of the twelve thousand people inside of the "Wigwam" in which the convention was held, and amid the anxious solicitude and suspense of the still greater numbers outside who could not gain admission, it was voted to proceed at once to ballot for a candidate for President of the United States. Seven names were formally presented in the following order :

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, of New York ; ABRAHAM LINCOLN, of Illinois ; WILLIAM L. DAYTON, of New Jersey ; SIMON CAMERON, of Pennsylvania ; SALMON P. CHASE, of Ohio ; EDWARD BATES, of Missouri ; and JOHN MCLEAN, of Ohio.

Loud and long-continued applause greeted the first two of these names, in particular, between which it was soon apparent that the chief contest was to be.

On the first ballot Mr. Seward received 173 votes, Mr. Lincoln 102, Mr. Cameron 50, Mr. Chase 49, Mr. Bates 48, Mr. Dayton 14, Mr. McLean 12, and there were 16 votes scattered among candidates not put in nomination. For a choice, 233 votes were required.

on the second ballot (Mr. Cameron's name having been withdrawn) the vote for the several candidates was as follows : Mr. Seward 184, Mr. Lincoln 181, Mr. Chase 42, Mr. Bates 35, Mr. Dayton 10, Mr. McLean 8, scattering 4.

The third ballot was immediately taken, and, when the call of the roll was ended, the footings were as follows : For Mr.

Lincoln 231, Mr. Seward 180, Mr. Chase 24, Mr. Bates 22, all others 7. Immediately, before the result was announced, four Ohio delegates changed their votes to Mr. Lincoln, giving him a majority.

The scene which followed—the wild manifestations of approval and delight, within and without the hall, prolonged uninterruptedly for twenty minutes, and renewed again and again for a half hour longer—no words can describe. Never before was there a popular assembly of any sort, probably, so stirred with a contagious and all-pervading enthusiasm. The nomination was made unanimous, on motion of Mr. Everts, of New York, who had presented the name of Mr. Seward, and speedily, on the wings of lightning, the news of the great event was spread to all parts of the land. Subsequently, with like heartiness and unanimity, the ticket was completed by the nomination, on the second ballot, of Senator HANNIBAL HAMLIN, of Maine, for Vice-President.

These demonstrations at Chicago were but a representation of the common sentiments of the masses of the Republican party, and of thousands among the people, not before included in its ranks in the country at large. From that day to the present, the wisdom of the nomination of Abraham Lincoln for the highest place in the American Government has been more and more confirmed. As a man of the people, in cordial sympathy with the masses, he had the undoubting confidence of the sincere friends of free labor, regardless of party distinctions. As a man of sterling integrity and incorruptible honesty, he was to become the fitting agent for upholding the Federal Government in the days of its greatest trial. As a man of eminent ability, and of sound principles, after the earliest and best standard in our political history, his election was to give to the country an administration creditable to our republican polity, and to result in the complete removal of the great disquieting element which at length convulsed the nation with a gigantic civil war.

The brief letter of Mr. Lincoln, in acceptance of the Presidential nomination, is subjoined.

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., May 23, 1860.

HON. GEO. ASHMUN,

President of the Republican National Convention :

SIR :—I accept the nomination tendered me by the convention over which you presided, and of which I am formally apprised in the letter of yourself and others, acting as a committee of the convention for that purpose.

The declaration of principles and sentiments, which accompanies your letter, meets my approval; and it shall be my care not to violate nor disregard it, in any part.

Imploring the assistance of Divine Providence, and with due regard to the views and feelings of all who were represented in the convention; to the rights of all the States, and Territories, and the people of the nation; to the inviolability of the Constitution, and to the perpetual union, harmony and prosperity of all, I am most happy to co-operate for the practical success of the principles declared by the convention

Your obliged friend and fellow-citizen,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The popular favor with which the nomination of Mr. Lincoln was first received was strengthened by the spirited canvass which followed. The electoral votes of the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and Oregon, seventeen States, were cast for Lincoln and Hamlin. The votes of Maryland, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas and Texas, eleven States, were cast for Breckinridge and Lane. The votes of Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee were cast for Bell and Everett. The electoral vote of Missouri was given for Douglas and Johnson. The vote of New Jersey was divided, four being given for Lincoln and three for Douglas.

The aggregate electoral vote for each Presidential candidate, as found by the official canvass in joint session of the two Houses of Congress, on the 13th day of February, 1861, was as follows : For Abraham Lincoln, 180 ; for John C. Breckinridge, 72 , for John Bell, 39 ; and for Stephen A. Douglas,

12. The Vice-President, Mr. Breckinridge, then officially declared Mr. Lincoln elected President of the United States for four years, commencing on the 4th of March, 1861.

The aggregate popular vote for each of the Presidential candidates, at this election, was as follows: For Mr. Lincoln, 1,866,452; for Mr. Douglas, 1,375,157; for Mr. Breckinridge, 847,953; and for Mr. Bell, 590,631. The last speech of Mr. Douglas, in the ensuing spring, urged upon his friends an earnest support of the Administration in putting down the rebellion, as in his speech at Norfolk, Va., during the preceding canvass, he had declared in favor of coercion, as the remedy for secession. Mr. Bell went over to the secession cause, co-operating with Mr. Breckinridge, afterward a General in the Rebel army. The total vote for the two loyal candidates was 3,241,609.

On the morning of February 11th, Mr. Lincoln, with his family, left Springfield for Washington. A large concourse of citizens had assembled at the depot, on the occasion of his departure, whom, with deep emotion, he addressed as follows :

MY FRIENDS: No one, not in my position, can appreciate the sadness I feel at this parting. To this people I owe all that I am. Here I have lived more than a quarter of a century; here my children were born, and here one of them lies buried. I know not how soon I shall see you again. A duty devolves upon me which is, perhaps, greater than that which has devolved upon any other man since the days of Washington. He never could have succeeded except for the aid of Divine Providence, upon which he at all times relied. I feel that I can not succeed without the same Divine aid which sustained him; and in the same Almighty being I place my reliance for support, and I hope you, my friends will all pray that I may receive that Divine assistance, without which I can not succeed, but with which success is certain. Again, I bid you all an affectionate farewell.

The first speech of Mr. Lincoln on his journey was that delivered at Indianapolis, on the evening of the same day, addressed to a multitude of people assembled to welcome him. As containing the earliest direct intimation of his views on the all-engrossing topic of the time, it is appropriately given here:

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF INDIANA: I am here to thank you for this magnificent welcome, and still more for the very generous support given by your State to that political cause, which, I think, is the true and just cause of the whole country and the whole world. Solomon says, "there is a time to keep silence;" and when men wrangle by the mouth, with no certainty that they mean the same thing while using the same words, it perhaps were as well if they would keep silence.

The words "coercion" and "invasion" are much used in these days, and often with some temper and hot blood. Let us make sure, if we can, that we do not misunderstand the meaning of those who use them. Let us get the exact definitions of these words—not from dictionaries, but from the men themselves, who certainly deprecate the things they would represent by the use of the words.

What, then, is coercion? What is invasion? Would the marching of an army into South Carolina, without the consent of her people, and with hostile intent toward them, be invasion? I certainly think it would, and it would be coercion also, if the South Carolinians were forced to submit. But if the United States should merely hold and retake its own forts and other property, and collect the duties on foreign importations, or even withhold the mails from places where they were habitually violated, would any or all of these things be invasion or coercion? Do our professed lovers of the Union, who spitefully resolve that they will resist coercion and invasion, understand that such things as these, on the part of the United States, would be coercion or invasion of a State? If so, their idea of means to preserve the object of their great affection would seem to be exceedingly thin and airy. If sick, the little pills of the homeopathist would be much too large for it to swallow. In their view, the Union, as a family relation, would seem to be no regular marriage, but rather a sort of "free-love" arrangement, to be maintained on passional attraction.

By the way, in what consists the special sacredness of a State? I speak not of the position assigned to a State in the Union by the Constitution, for that is a bond we all recognize. That position, however, a State can not carry out of the Union with it. I speak of that assumed primary right of a State to rule all which is less than itself, and to ruin all which is larger than itself. If a State and a County, in a given case, should be equal in number of inhabitants, in what, as a matter of principle, is the State better than the County? Would an exchange of name be an exchange of rights? Upon what principle, upon what rightful principle, may a State, being no more than

one-fiftieth part of the nation in soil and population, break up the nation, and then coerce a proportionably large subdivision of itself in the most arbitrary way? What mysterious right to play tyrant is conferred on a district of country with its people, by merely calling it a State? Fellow-citizens, I am not asserting anything. I am merely asking questions for you to consider. And now allow me to bid you farewell.

Enthusiastic greetings awaited the President elect all along his route, the people hailing the approach of the day which was to witness, under his auspices, the beginning of a *new regime* for the nation.

At Philadelphia, on the 22d of February, he visited Independence Hall, where throngs of people gathered to see him, and where he raised a national flag to its place on the staff above, as requested, amid the cheers of the thousands present. In a brief speech, he referred with much emotion to the men who had assembled in this Hall in 1776, and to the principles there proclaimed on the 4th of July—principles which he declared it to be his purpose never to yield, even if he must seal his devotion to them by a violent death. On the next day he reached Harrisburg.

Positive information had now been received at Washington, of a plot to assassinate Mr. Lincoln at Baltimore. When this was communicated to him, he was averse to any change of the time fixed upon for his transit through that city. On the earnest representations of Mr. Seward, however, who sent a special messenger to the President elect at Harrisburg, to urge this course, he left the latter place on the night train, a few hours in advance of that which he was expected to take, and passing through Baltimore without recognition, arrived, on the following morning in Washington.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

Commencement of President Lincoln's Administration.—Retrospect and Summary of Public Events.—Fort Sumter.

On the 4th day of March, 1861, Mr. Lincoln took the oath of office, as President of the United States. The administration of James Buchanan, and eight years of intensely southern sway in all branches of the National Government, were now at an end. During the four months that had intervened since the people decreed this change not a moment had been lost by the leaders in the now clearly developed scheme of revolt, in making energetic preparation for its consummation. So well had they succeeded, by the aid of bold treason or of inert complicity at the national capital, that they imagined they had assured the full attainment of their object, almost without the hazard of a single campaign. While professing, however, to believe in a fancied right of peaceable secession, and proclaiming their desire to be left unmolested in the execution of their revolutionary purposes, the chief conspirators well knew that this immunity could only be gained by such use of the remaining days of the outgoing administration that the crisis should already be over, or resistance to their treason be rendered ineffectual, when the new administration should begin. They industriously collected the materials of war, yet spared no efforts to bring about a state of things which should insure either peaceful submission to their will or a sure vantage ground for an appeal to arms.

While yet the question of passing a secession ordinance was pending in South Carolina, President Buchanan, in his annual message, after having urged the unconstitutionality of the pro

posed action, distinctly notified the complotters that he was equally without constitutional power to oppose their carrying out that purpose. When appealed to by the veteran head of the army, at a still earlier day, to take firm military possession of the United States forts on the southern coast, the same public functionary could find no means of adopting this prudent precaution. Consequently, the rebellious South Carolina leaders carried through their ordinance of secession on the 20th of December, 1860. Fort Moultrie, by an overt act of treason, was seized on the 28th, and the Palmetto flag was raised over Government property in Charleston. On the 3d of January, 1861, without even the pretext of a secession ordinance, or any form of authority from his own State, Gov. Brown, of Georgia, seized Forts Pulaski and Jackson, at Savannah; and this example was followed next day, in Alabama, by the occupation of Fort Morgan, at Mobile.

The patient submission with which all these acts were witnessed by the Executive, nay, the meekness with which he had himself invited them, and the ready assistance rendered to these efforts of treason by some of the highest officers immediately about him, were followed by the natural results. On the 9th of January, the steamer *Star of the West*, tardily dispatched with a small re-enforcement for Fort Sumter, now held by a totally inadequate garrison, was fired into from rebel batteries erected on Morris' Island, and from Fort Moultrie. On the same day, the conspirators in Mississippi, now, as in the times of repudiation, under the lead of Jefferson Davis, followed their co-laborers in South Carolina, in the pretense of secession. Alabama, Florida and Georgia were speedily subjected to a similar process of rebel manipulation. Louisiana, on the 28th of January, and Texas on the 1st of February, were proclaimed as having dissolved their connection with the Union. Meanwhile, the delegates of these States successively withdrew from Congress.

On the 10th of December, Howell Cobb, Secretary of the Treasury, had resigned the position he had so zealously perverted to the aid of the great conspiracy, and departed to the more immediate scene of action, that he might hasten the con-

summation, for a time delayed, and so earnestly resisted in Georgia as seemingly to involve the result in doubt. The venerable Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, surrendered his place four days later, in disgust at the hopelessness of his efforts to rouse President Buchanan to some effective resistance to the destructive blows aimed at the national life. John B. Floyd soon after (Dec. 29) retired from the office of Secretary of War, which he had used to disarm the loyal portion of the country, and to fill the rebellious States with cannon and muskets, which they were not slow to appropriate to the uses of rebellion. Jacob Thompson, without resigning, absented himself on a tour in the South, throwing all the weight of his influence as a cabinet officer in favor of rebellion in his native State of North Carolina. Bold speculation was meanwhile left to do its work in his department, in aid of the treasonable labors of high officials in crippling the Government, and in rendering the new administration as powerless as possible to meet the approaching crisis. The Secretary of the Navy had notoriously dispersed our war vessels to distant seas, so that months must pass before the incoming administration could bring an effective naval force to bear on the rebellion.

Delegates from the seven States in which this spreading insurrection had become predominant assembled at Montgomery, in Alabama, on the 6th of February, organized their "Confederacy" under a temporary constitution, and, on the 9th, selected Jefferson Davis to be their President, with Alexander H. Stephens as Vice President. The latter had been chosen as a representative of the more conservative sentiment, having strenuously resisted secession, as an utterly needless rebellion against "the best government upon earth," and his acceptance was a token of the general acquiescence of all political leaders of the States concerned in the rebellion now organized. Around this nucleus of seven States, thus completely in revolt, it was expected by the conspirators that every State in which slavery existed would soon be gathered, by a common interest, in the bonds of a common crime. The leaven of rebellion was industriously diffused through every other slaveholding State, and in several, movements were

already in progress, which afterward culminated in secession ordinances.

While this confederacy of seven States was forming, a convention, composed of delegates from most of the free States, and from all the border slave States, was in session at Washington, aiming to bring about, by compromise, a peaceable solution of the pending struggle. On the part of leading loyal men this conference was conducted in good faith, in a conciliatory spirit, and with an earnest desire to avert any more serious collision than had already occurred. On the other hand, it was manifest that at least the delegates from Virginia, with John Tyler at their head, were aiming only to use this means to widen the gulf already existing, and to overcome the decided Union majority still existing in all the border slave States. While a series of propositions, therefore, looking to peace on the basis of a preserved Union, were agreed to by a majority of the Convention (which adjourned on the 1st of March), no practical result appeared in the rebellious districts, unless of an adverse character. This action did serve, however, to proclaim to all the world the anxiety of the people of the free States to avert, by any possible concessions, the full initiation of civil war. On the 11th of February, likewise, the Federal House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution, introduced by Mr. Corwin, of Ohio (soon after concurred in by the Senate), providing for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, forever prohibiting any legislation by Congress interfering with slavery in any State of the Union—a measure that fully set aside one of the chief pretended occasions for revolt. Going still further, in the way of concession, and in fact surrendering the long controversy about slavery in the Territories, were the resolutions known as the Crittenden Compromise, and which certain Southern Senators deliberately defeated, in their own house, by withholding their votes.

The temper and purpose of the secession leaders were thus distinctly manifested. They would have no compromise. On their own terms, of final separation alone, would they listen to terms of peace. Many of them manifestly desired war, and exulted in the hope of such revenge upon their Northern oppo-

nents as war only could bring; while all insisted on yielding nothing, except on the condition of substantially gaining everything they aimed at, by a full recognition of a separate and independent Confederacy comprising all the slaveholding States. For to this end, though less than half the number of those States had already been carried by the revolutionists, they were zealously laboring, and of the final issue no doubt was entertained, when once the Montgomery organization was countenanced as a legitimate government.

It is unpleasant to mention, yet impartial history can not omit the fact, that hopes of peaceable submission to secession were seemingly encouraged in Southern minds by newspapers and orators in the North, at this period, and that a number of political leaders, with scarcely any apparent popular support, it is true, earnestly advocated what they termed the policy of peaceable separation. To this day, perhaps, it may be doubtful to many minds whether, had not a spirit of unbounded insolence and a haughty defiance, that spurned even the slightest concession, been manifested by the secession leaders, this complacent policy—more fatal than any former compromise—might not have gained the ascendancy in the popular mind.

So much had been brought to final accomplishment by the conspirators during the closing months of Mr. Buchanan's administration. Such was the spirit manifested by them to repel conciliation in every form, to maintain peace solely on condition of the complete submission of the loyal States to every essential demand of secessionism. And such, on the other hand, was the amicable disposition of loyal men everywhere, and their earnest wish to avoid a collision of arms, if any other solution were possible short of absolute degradation and ruin to the nation. Jefferson Davis, in assuming power as head of the "Confederacy," at Montgomery, February 18, stated the sole conditions of peace in the following unmistakable language:

If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue *our separate political career*, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled. But *if this be denied us*, and the integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed,

it will but remain for us with firm resolve *to appeal to arms*, and invoke the blessing of Providence on a just cause.

This was immediately followed by the recommendation that a Confederate army be organized and put in training for the emergency ; " a well instructed, disciplined army, more numerous than would usually be required, on a peace establishment," being distinctly indicated as essential to his plans.

While it is thus clear that he and all his coadjutors were determined on war from the outset, and at all hazards, unless disunion were recognized as an accomplished fact, and the jurisdiction of the Government over the rebellious districts were abandoned without a struggle, it is equally manifest that not a single grievance complained of could have failed of redress, under our popular institutions, by peaceable methods. While deluding their adherents with smooth words, they deliberately chose an appeal to arms, and scorned a peaceable solution, which was equally at their disposal, under the Constitution and the laws.

Some acts of vigor and patriotic fidelity, during the closing days of Mr. Buchanan's administration, deserve to be remembered, to the honor of those cabinet ministers, to whom alone the country was indebted for these redeeming deeds. Dix, Stanton and Holt had preserved a remainder of popular respect for a Government that all the loyalty of the nation rejoiced to see transferred to the hands of a new executive, untried though he was, and terrible as was the task devolving upon him.

Despite all the threats, constantly repeated for months past, that Mr. Lincoln should never be permitted to occupy the Presidential chair, and desperate as had been the plottings for his assassination, he appeared at the east front of the capitol and received, at the appointed time, the oath from Chief Justice Taney. During the period that had elapsed since the election, Mr. Lincoln had carefully studied the situation, closely watching the course of events. His inaugural address shows the results of his observation, and of the application of his sterling good sense and comprehensive practical judgment to the mastery of the problem to be solved by him as head of the nation. He

clearly understood how everything depended, so far as his administration was concerned, on a true insight into the very heart of the question, and on the initiation, at the very outset, of an appropriate policy in dealing with the rebellion. The great insurrection is the uppermost thought—almost the exclusive theme—of his inaugural address. That this was the wisest utterance of the time, manifesting a rare foresight, as well as a remarkable skill in briefly presenting the true questions at issue, in their proper bearings, with a calm, candid appeal to the nation, in all its parts, in behalf of law, order and peace, will more and more clearly appear in the light of after events. Whoever would acquaint himself with the inmost traits of Mr. Lincoln's character, as a public man, and at the same time discover, in honest and plain words, a statement in advance of the fundamental principles by which his administration has been guided, let him carefully study this paper, every sentence of which is full of meaning:

MR. LINCOLN'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES: In compliance with a custom as old as the Government itself, I appear before you to address you briefly, and to take, in your presence, the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, to be taken by the President before he enters on the execution of his office.

I do not consider it necessary, at present, for me to discuss those matters of administration about which there is no special anxiety or excitement. Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States, that, by the accession of a Republican Administration, their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed, and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches, when I declare that "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists." I believe I have no lawful right to do so; and I have no inclination to do so. Those who nominated and elected me, did so with the full knowledge that I had made this, and made many similar decla-

rations, and had never recanted them. And, more than this they placed in the platform, for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read :

“Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend ; and we denounce the lawless invasion, by armed force, of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.”

I now reiterate these sentiments ; and in doing so I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in anywise endangered by the now incoming administration.

I add, too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given to all the States when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause, as cheerfully to one section as to another.

There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from service or labor. The clause I now read is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions :

“No person held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.”

It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves ; and the intention of the lawgiver is the law.

All members of Congress swear their support to the whole Constitution—to this provision as well as any other. To the proposition, then, that slaves whose cases come within the terms of this clause *“shall be delivered up,”* their oaths are unanimous. Now, if they would make the effort in good temper, could they not, with nearly equal unanimity, frame and pass a law by means of which to keep good that unanimous oath ?

There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be enforced by National or by State authority ; but surely that difference is not a very material one. If the slave is to be surrendered, it can be of but little consequence to him or to others by which authority it is done ; and should any one, in any case, be content that this oath shall go unkept on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to how it shall be kept ?

Again, in any law upon this subject, ought not all the safeguards of liberty known in the civilized and humane jurisprudence to be introduced, so that a free man be not, in any case, surrendered as a slave? And might it not be well at the same time to provide by law for the enforcement of that clause in the Constitution which guarantees that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States?"

I take the official oath to-day with no mental reservations, and with no purpose to construe the Constitution or laws by any hypercritical rules; and while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much safer for all, both in official and private stations, to conform to and abide by all those acts which stand unrepealed, than to violate any of them, trusting to find impunity in having them held to be unconstitutional.

It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a President under our National Constitution. During that period, fifteen different and very distinguished citizens have in succession administered the executive branch of the Government. They have conducted it through many perils, and generally with great success. Yet, with all this scope for precedent, I now enter upon the same task, for the brief constitutional term of four years, under great and peculiar difficulties.

A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted. I hold that in the contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our National Constitution, and the Union will endure forever, it being impossible to destroy it, except by some action not provided for in the instrument itself.

Again, if the United States be not a government proper, but an association of States in the nature of a contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a contract may violate it—break it, so to speak; but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it? Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union itself.

The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued in the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured, and the faith of all the then

thirteen States expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of the Confederation, in 1778; and, finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was to form a more perfect Union. But if the destruction of the Union by one or by a part only of the States be lawfully possible, the Union is less than before, the Constitution having lost the vital element of perpetuity.

It follows from these views that no State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect, are legally void; and that acts of violence within any State or States against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances.

I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken, and, to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union shall be faithfully executed in all the States. Doing this, which I deem to be only a simple duty on my part, I shall perfectly perform it, so far as is practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisition, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary.

I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself.

In doing this there need be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless it is forced upon the National authority.

The power confided to me *will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government*, and collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere.

Where hostility to the United States shall be so great and so universal as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people that object. While the strict legal right may exist of the Government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego, for the time, the uses of such offices.

The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union.

So far as possible, the people everywhere shall have that

sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection.

The course here indicated will be followed, unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper; and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised according to the circumstances actually existing, and with a view and hope of a peaceful solution of the National troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections.

That there are persons, in one section or another, who seek to destroy the Union at all events, and are glad of any pretext to do it, I will neither affirm nor deny. But if there be such, I need address no word to them.

To those, however, who really love the Union, may I not speak, before entering upon so grave a matter as the destruction of our National fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes? Would it not be well to ascertain why we do it? Will you hazard so desperate a step, while any portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence? Will you, while the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones you fly from? Will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake? All profess to be content in the Union if all constitutional rights can be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right, plainly written in the Constitution, has been denied? I think not. Happily the human mind is so constituted, that no party can reach to the audacity of doing this.

Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a plainly-written provision of the Constitution has ever been denied. If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly-written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify revolution; it certainly would, if such right were a vital one. But such is not our case.

All the vital rights of minorities and of individuals are so plainly assured to them by affirmations and negations, guarantees and prohibitions in the Constitution, that controversies never arise concerning them. But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every question which may occur in practical administration. No foresight can anticipate, nor any document of reasonable length contain, express provisions for all possible questions. Shall fugitives from labor be surrendered by National or by State authorities? The Constitution does not expressly say. Must Congress protect slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. From questions of this class, spring all our constitutional controversies, and we divide upon them into majorities and minorities.

If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the Government must cease. There is no alternative for continuing the Government but acquiescence on the one side or the other. If a minority in such a case, will secede rather than acquiesce, they make a precedent which, in turn, will ruin and divide them for a minority of their own will secede from them whenever a majority refuses to be controlled by such a minority. For instance, why not any portion of a new Confederacy, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it? All who cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper of doing this. Is there such perfect identity of interests among the States to compose a new Union as to produce harmony only, and prevent renewed secession? Plainly, the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy.

A majority held in restraint by constitutional check and limitation, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a majority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible. So that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism, in some form, is all that is left.

I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to a very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government; and while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice.

At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon the vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by the decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, as in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own masters, unless having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.

Nor is there in this view any assault upon the Court or the Judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink, to decide cases properly brought before them; and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political pur-

poses. One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended ; and this is the only substantial dispute ; and the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the foreign slave-trade, are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law can ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I think, can not be perfectly cured, and it would be worse in both cases after the separation of the sections than before. The foreign slave-trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived, without restriction, in one section ; while fugitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other.

Physically speaking, we can not separate ; we can not remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other, but the different parts of our country can not do this. They can not but remain face to face ; and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before ? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws ? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends ? Suppose you go to war, you can not fight always ; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you.

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it. I can not be ignorant of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of having the National Constitution amended. While I make no recommendation of amendment, I fully recognize the full authority of the people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the instrument itself, and I should, under existing circumstances, favor, rather than oppose, a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it.

I will venture to add, that to me the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments to originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take or reject propositions originated by others not especially chosen

for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such as they would wish either to accept or refuse. I understand that a proposed amendment to the Constitution (which amendment, however, I have not seen) has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of States, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments, so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable.

The Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix the terms for the separation of the States. The people themselves, also, can do this if they choose, but the Executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to administer the present government as it came to his hands, and to transmit it unimpaired by him to his successor. Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our present differences is either party without faith of being in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of nations, with his eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal, the American people. By the frame of the Government under which we live, this same people have wisely given their public servants but little power for mischief, and have with equal wisdom provided for the return of that little to their own hands at very short intervals. While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any extreme wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the Government in the short space of four years.

My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and well upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time.

If there be an object to hurry any of you, in hot haste, to a step which you would never take deliberately, that object will be frustrated by taking time; but no good object can be frustrated by it.

Such of you as are now dissatisfied still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and on the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the new administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change either.

If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the right side in the dispute, there is still no single reason for pre

capitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land, are still competent to adjust, in the best way, all our present difficulties.

In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you.

You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the Government; while I shall have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect, and defend" it.

I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.

The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.

Both to the large assemblage that listened to the distinct recital of this address, in tones which made every word audible to the throng, and to loyal men everywhere, as it was brought to them a few minutes or hours later, by the aid of telegraph and printing press, it was a welcome message. The people saw in it an assurance that imbecility, double-dealing, or treachery, no longer had sway in the nation; that the new President was determined to carry out the behests of the people in maintaining the National integrity; and that, while thus faithfully observing his official oath, he would use every lawful and rational means to avert the convulsions of domestic war. He distinctly suggested the holding of a National Constitutional Convention, which would have power to adjust all the questions properly at issue, even including peaceable separation in a lawful manner, by a change of the organic law. He demonstrated unanswerably the utter causelessness of war, and distinctly assured the conspirators that if hostilities were commenced, it must be by them, and not by the Government. He laid down a line of policy which, had it been met in a corresponding spirit on the other side, would inevitably have averted disastrous years of bloodshed and all their consequences. While thus announcing his views, and

reaffirming sentiments formerly uttered by himself, as well as those of the political convention which nominated him for the Presidency, he also plainly indicated that the benefits secured by the Constitution to any portion of the people could not be claimed by them while trampling that instrument under foot. He told them plainly that the course he thus marked out was not one to be pursued toward rebels who should plunge the nation in war. He gave them seasonable notice that no immunities could be claimed under the assurances given on this or any other occasion, inconsistent with the changed condition of affairs, should they madly appeal to arms.

The whole address breathes an earnest yearning for an honorable peace. It does not, however, like the unfortunate message of his predecessor, of the previous December, base the desire for peace on a confessed helplessness of the Government or an indisposition to exert its power of self-preservation. A new political era had begun, and true patriots breathed more freely.

One of the first duties of the President was to purge the Government of disloyal or doubtful men in responsible places. Long-continued Democratic precedent justified a general change of civil officers, from highest to lowest, on the ground of political differences alone. But after the treasonable developments of the previous months and years, a thorough sifting of all the Departments became indispensable, from high considerations of duty, on the basis of loyalty and disloyalty, rather than of mere partisanship. No practical measures could be adopted before this change was at least partially accomplished. The magnitude of such a work, to which the President gave the most earnest and unwearying attention for weeks, need not be indicated. The patience with which the "claims" of different candidates for place were weighed, and the kindness (tempered often with a wholesome firmness) which characterized his deportment toward all, usually retained the confidence and esteem of those whom he felt compelled to disappoint.

It was during the days between his arrival in Washington and his inauguration, that the construction of his Cabinet, perhaps substantially settled in his own mind before he left Illi-

nois, was definitely determined. The position occupied by Mr Seward before the country, was such as to leave no hesitation as to the propriety of offering him the highest place of honor under the Executive, as Secretary of State. This position was, at an early day, placed at Mr. Seward's disposal. The office of Attorney General was, with like promptitude, tendered to Judge Bates, of Missouri, whose leading position as a Southern statesman, with anti-slavery tendencies, of the Clay school, had caused his name to be prominently and widely used in connection with the Presidency before the nomination for that office, made at Chicago. Governor Chase, of Ohio, who had recently been elected to a second term in the Senate, after four years of useful and popular service in the executive chair of his State, perhaps quite as early occurred to the mind of Mr. Lincoln as a man specially fitted to manage the finances of the nation through the troublous times that were felt to be approaching. This difficult post Mr. Chase surrendered his seat in the Senate to accept. Mr. Cameron, of Pennsylvania, selected as Secretary of War; Mr. Welles, of Connecticut, as Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. Montgomery Blair, of Maryland, as Postmaster General, were all leading representatives of the Democratic element of the party which had triumphed in the late election. Mr. Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana, a contemporary of Mr. Lincoln in Congress, and for years one of the most distinguished Whig politicians of the West, was tendered the place of Secretary of the Interior, which he accepted.

It deserves remark here, that John Bell, of Tennessee, who had received a large popular vote at the Presidential election, and whose strength in the electoral college made him the third of four Presidential nominees, was at this time in Washington, and his appointment to a place in the Cabinet, as a loyal Border State man, was desired by many, especially in the West. But Mr. Blair, an avowed Anti-Slavery man, and viewed as one of the most radical of Republicans, was preferred to Mr. Bell, zealous partisan opponent, and one whose unreliable character as developed by his sudden defection to the Rebel cause, President Lincoln was not slow to perceive.

Next to the indispensable and primary duty of securing, in

the places under him, trustworthy men, in sympathy with himself as to the great questions uppermost in the public mind, was that of more directly preparing, at home and abroad, to grapple with the rebellion, now fully organized at Montgomery, and manifestly emerging, with mad haste, into open hostilities. This work involved nice problems of foreign diplomacy, as well as prudent care, at once to avert divisions in the loyal States when the sharp crisis should come, and to place the *onus* of commencing civil war unequivocally upon the secession leaders, if it were to begin. The utmost energy was also needed in so prearranging affairs that means might not be wanting when battle should be forced upon the nation.

In this view, much of the seeming mystery which enveloped the six weeks preceding the attack on Fort Sumter, disappears without inquiring into State secrets, if, at this period, there were such, over which the curtain should still rest.

For several days the inaugural address was quietly working its way among the people, giving heart to the supporters of the Government and startling the conspirators by its calm and telling appeal to thinking men every-where. With the Rebel leaders it became a study to prevent the natural effect of this State paper upon those whom they wished to follow them, not only in the eight Slave States which had, as yet, held back from the fatal step, but even in those States already in insurrection. They scrupled at nothing in their attempts to ward off its influence and to pervert the attitude of the Government. At the same time they were zealous and active in completing the direct preparations for war which had been commenced many months before.

Equally busy, and for a much longer period, had they been in poisoning the public mind of Europe. The diplomatic agents employed by Mr. Buchanan had been, in large proportion, from the Slave States, and of those from the North some were far from manifesting a genuine fidelity to the Government that had accredited them. To change these Foreign Ministers and Consuls, and to instruct their successors, was not the work of a day, nor did a removal of these men from office by any means necessarily involve their retirement from the vantage

ground they had gained. They had rather been largely reinforced by numerous emissaries sent abroad during the preceding autumn and winter.

It was the early care of Mr. Lincoln's Administration, through the polished pen of Mr. Seward, and through the new diplomats sent abroad, to counteract these influences. From this period commenced the gradual formation and concentration of a public sentiment abroad favorable to the Government. Yet the change was not immediately apparent, and the work was a slow and toilsome one. The aim to convince Foreign Nations that the malcontents were clearly and wholly in the wrong, that the intentions of the Government were pacific, and that there was no revolutionary purpose of overturning Southern society while the dissentients yielded obedience to the Constitution and the laws, can not have failed of speedy success with candid and thoughtful men abroad as well as at home. On whom the whole responsibility of war would rest, should war come, no longer admitted of doubt.

The Montgomery "Congress," on the 9th of March, passed an act, pursuant to the recommendation of Mr. Davis, for the organization of a Confederate army. Three days later Mr. Forsyth, of Alabama, and Mr. Crawford, of Georgia, presented themselves at the State Department in Washington, in the attitude of "Confederate Commissioners," with the pretended purpose of seeking to negotiate a treaty, on the assumption of representing "an independent nation *de facto* and *de jure*." While well knowing, both from the nature of the controversy, and from the distinct avowals of Mr. Lincoln's inaugural address, that this preliminary claim, if noticed at all, would be promptly rejected, and passing over altogether the President's frank and honorable suggestion of a National Convention, in which all the States should be represented and all grievances listened to and constitutionally adjusted, they presumed to assert that the persons represented by them "earnestly desire a peaceful solution" of the "great questions" "growing out of this political separation." The President declined all recognition of these negotiating parties, and, with a simple "memorandum" of Mr. Seward, apprising them of this fact, was

inclosed a copy of the inaugural address, to which they were referred for the views controlling the Government, and which, in fact, had undoubtedly been carefully perused by them before undertaking this false mission, intended solely for diplomatic effect, both in the loyal States and in Europe.

To the Government this dilatory episode gave a few days of much needed time for the work now in hand. These "Commissioners" at length retired from Washington, discharging their Parthian arrow, in the shape of a final communication to the Secretary of State, on the 9th of April. It was an evidence of that forbearance manifested by Mr. Lincoln through all the earliest stages of this conflict, a forbearance the value of which all the world can now appreciate, however distasteful to more excitable minds at the time, that these defiant rebels were permitted to return to their homes, instead of taking their well-earned place within prison walls.

Five weeks and more had now passed since the inauguration, and the situation of affairs in Fort Sumter, to which the gallant Anderson had transferred his little garrison of seventy men from Fort Moultrie, near the close of the year, portended an approaching crisis. The overt act of war had long since been committed by the Charleston rebels, in firing on the Star of the West as she went to carry relief to that Fort, on which beleaguering batteries, not before unmasked, were already preparing to open. The supply vessel turned back, and though nearly two months had passed before Mr. Buchanan vacated the Presidential chair, his Administration was permitted to expire without an attempt to retrieve that humiliation.

As time wore on, no military preparations, as yet, being visible, Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford being known to be still in Washington, without any thing being positively disclosed as to the character of their intercourse with the State Department, and those persons having been finally permitted to depart, with only the public certainty that they had been denied official recognition, a general uneasiness began to pervade the popular mind. This growing discontent was fanned by the positive assertions of busy quidnuncs that Fort Sumter was to be evacuated in obedience to the demand of the Charleston traitors.

The visit of Mr. Fox to Major Anderson on the 22d day of March, afforded little relief to the current anxiety, so conflicting were the reports as to the purpose of his mission. The visit of still another supposed agent of the Government to Charleston, three days later, was generally construed unfavorably. Sanguine and nervous people were beginning to despond, or to speak openly of "weakness and vacillation" on the part of the President. It was only those who did not thoroughly know Mr. Lincoln who could seriously have doubted him for a moment. And yet, the stranger lingering in the capital during those calm yet dubious days which preceded the outburst of a storm, every moment's delay of which was an incalculable gain to the Government, would almost have pronounced the Administration doomed to ignominious failure, to popular repudiation, such as a counter-revolution of loyal men in the North must inevitably follow, at the very outset of its career.

To omit to record this state of things, vividly impressed as it must be on the mind of every man in Washington, who observed events from the outside, would be to leave out the most striking view in the foreground of the picture. When taken in connection with subsequent events, it would also be as unjust to the fame of President Lincoln, as false to the facts of history.

It was during this period that Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, (who, recreant to the sterling words in which, a few short months earlier, he had denounced this insane attempt to destroy the best Government on earth, for no real grievance whatever, but solely to gratify and revenge the thwarted ambition of defeated politicians, was now enjoying the mimic honors of the "Confederate" Vice Presidency,) delivered a remarkable speech in the city of Savannah, (March 21,) which must also have its permanent place in the annals of the time. The over-crowded audience, the enthusiastic applause, the solemnities of the occasion, and the known, frank, and positive character of the man, all combine to mark this utterance as a genuine reproduction of the thought and purpose of the chief conspirators, and their ready followers, at this hour. Only some of its chief points

can be recalled here, as showing both the estimate placed upon Mr. Lincoln's official action hitherto, and the real animus of the rebellion, when relieved of the disguises which Stephens had already stripped off in his anti-secession speech on the 19th of January, in the Georgia Convention.

After proceeding at some length to point out the "Improvements" he discerned in the Montgomery Constitution over that which the seven "Confederate States" had repudiated, Mr. Stephens said :

But not to be tedious in enumerating the numerous changes for the better, allow me to allude to one other—though last, not least : The new Constitution has put at rest forever all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institutions—African slavery as it exists among us—the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. Jefferson, in his forecast, had anticipated this, as the rock upon which the old Union would split. He was right. What was conjecture with him, is now a realized fact. But whether he fully comprehended the great truth upon which that rock stood and stands, may be doubted. The prevailing ideas, *entertained by him and most of the leading statesmen*, at the time of the formation of the old Constitution, were, *that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature ; that it was WRONG IN PRINCIPLE, SOCIALLY, MORALLY AND POLITICALLY.* It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with ; but the general opinion of the men of that day was, *that, somehow or other, in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away.*

Let us pause here, for a moment, to consider this distinct concession—truthful in every word—as to the views of Jefferson "and most of the leading statesmen" of the Constitutional era. How perfectly this agrees with the admission, two months earlier, that under an eminently Southern administration of the Government under the Constitution, for a long period of years, *the South* had no grievance whatever to complain of ! Still more striking is the suggestion which this passage makes of that portion of Mr. Lincoln's celebrated Springfield speech, quoted by the author of the elaborate paper, in imitation of the Declaration of Independence, setting forth the causes of South Carolina's secession, when he says :

Observing the forms of the Constitution, a sectional party has found within that article establishing the Executive Department, the means of subverting the Constitution itself. A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the States north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States, *whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery*. He is to be intrusted with the administration of the common government, because he has declared that that "Government can not endure permanently half slave, half free," and *that the public mind must rest in the belief that slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction*.

Setting aside the special pleading and inaccurate statement of the South Carolinian, how completely is he answered at every point by the Georgian, who had already, beyond a doubt, carefully perused the former's argument! In a word, Stephens fairly and honorably concedes that the exact position held by Jefferson, and most of his contemporary statesmen, in regard to slavery, is precisely that which Mr. Rhett, even in his less candid effusion, attributes to Mr. Lincoln, and both practically unite in bearing testimony to the following clear enunciation of the grand spirit and purpose of the rebellion, as stated in his Savannah speech by Mr. Stephens, after pronouncing these ideas of Jefferson and his contemporaries to be "fundamentally wrong," as resting "upon the assumption of the equality of races :"

Our new Government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas. Its foundations are laid, *its corner-stone rests*, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; *that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition*. This, our new Government, is the first, in the history of the world, BASED UPON *this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth*. * * * * * It is upon this, as I have stated, our social fabric is firmly planted; and I can not permit myself to doubt the ultimate success of a full recognition of this principle throughout the civilized and enlightened world. * * * * * This stone *which was rejected by the first builders*, "is become the chief stone of the corner" in our new edifice.

Mr. Stephens, after discussing the ability of the seven States already banded together to go on in their undertaking without the "Border States," and the hopes and wishes entertained in regard to the latter, goes on to discuss the prospect in regard to hostilities with the National Government, as follows :

As to whether we shall have war with our late confederates, or whether all matters of difference between us shall be amicably settled, I can only say that the prospect for a peaceful adjustment *is better, so far as I am informed, than it has been.* The prospect of war is, at least, not so threatening as it has been. The idea of coercion, shadowed forth in Mr. Lincoln's inaugural, *seems not to be followed up, thus far, so vigorously as was expected.* Fort Sumter, it is believed, will soon be evacuated. What course will be pursued toward Fort Pickens, and the other forts on the Gulf, is not so well understood. *It is to be greatly desired that all of them should be surrendered.* Our object is peace, not only with the North, but with the world.

* * * The idea of coercing us, or subjugating us, is utterly preposterous. Whether the intention of evacuating Fort Sumter is to be received as an evidence of a desire for a peaceful solution of our difficulties with the United States, or the result of necessity, I will not undertake to say. I would fain hope the former. Rumors are afloat, however, that it is the result of necessity. All I can say to you, therefore, on that point, is, *keep your armor bright, and your powder dry.*

That Mr. Stephens well understood the impossibility of peace on the only terms he ventured even to hint, is sufficiently manifest, and his reporter further adds, referring to a later part of his speech :

He alluded to the difficulties and embarrassments which seemed to surround the question of a peaceful solution of the controversy with the old Government. How can it be done? is perplexing many minds. The President seems to think that he can not recognize our independence, *nor can he, with and by the advice of the Senate, do so.* *The Constitution makes no such provision.* A general convention of all the States has been suggested by some.

He closed without recommending this, or any other practicable method of peace—which, perhaps, for himself he would

have consented to—well knowing that quite another policy was predetermined by conspirators older in the work than he, and to whose scheme he had already undoubtedly given his full consent.

The Rebels saw no hope but in war. Any thing short of that would amount only to a brief ebullition, in the States in which insurrection was already dominant. Something was yet needed to “fire the Southern heart.” All the initiated knew that the match was soon to be applied to the industriously prepared train. They may have dreamed of the surrender of Sumter or Pickens as a military necessity; but they little understood the purpose of the President, if it was ever thought possible on any other ground. They certainly greatly mistook his intentions, in either event.

It must be remembered that the close of the last Administration found, still in the office of the Adjutant-General of the Army, a man (General Cooper) who now holds a like position in the Confederate service. The Departments and the city were filled with men of like sympathy, whose knowledge of affairs enabled them to communicate immediate information as to every movement inaugurated, and even of the avowed purposes or projects of every high officer of the Government, civil or military. Men deemed entirely trustworthy and faithful, even, were afterward found to have been in complicity with the traitors, and not a few holding military commissions—which could not be revoked without positive grounds—were regarded as doubtful. For a time it was uncertain how far any one—with a few noble exceptions—in responsible places, in Army or Navy, could be relied on for a cordial support of any efficient policy, even of defense. The event has shown how well founded, in numerous instances beside that of General Cooper, was this distrust.

Mr. Lincoln fully appreciated his surroundings. Disloyalty was rampant among the citizens of the capital. In the Departments, or just relieved therefrom, were men who watched every move, and were anxious to aid the rebellion. The sifting process has been steadily going on, yet how impossible was an immediate purification, is manifest. Under all the circumstances

of his position, the President had no resource but to keep his own counsel. Inexperienced in military affairs, he had the ready advice and faithful service of the illustrious head of the Army, Lieutenant-General Scott. True and loyal as that veteran General was, however, his political sympathies had never gone with the now dominant party, while his Virginian birth and associations led him to shrink from every appearance of attempted coercion. It is no secret that General Scott openly and earnestly advocated the evacuation of Fort Sumter—on military, if not also on political, grounds. It is believed that he carried over nearly every Cabinet Minister to his views. The President, while adjusting his new agencies, and learning the spirit of the men about him, in the Army and in the Navy, as well as awaiting, with attentive eye, the developments of opinion and action, in both sections, allowed the consideration of this question to be continued, from day to day, without indicating his purpose. The emissaries who waited here on their false diplomatic mission kept duly apprised, through channels easily imaginable after what has since transpired, of the opinions of General Scott and the deliberations thereon. They had constantly communicated with the leaders at home, it being deemed expedient to allow, during all this period, free intercourse by mail and telegraph. The result was a general impression at the South—for which no word of the Chief Executive ever gave any warrant, although he obviously had no occasion to correct any such misconception—that Fort Sumter was to be evacuated, and that no attempt would be made to reinforce Fort Pickens.

The parting missive of these pseudo-diplomats, on the 9th of April, makes the following statement on this point (addressed to Mr. Seward):

The memorandum [of the Secretary of State, before referred to,] is dated March 15, and was not delivered until April 8. Why was it withheld during the intervening twenty-three days? In the postscript to your memorandum you say it "was delayed, as was understood, with their (Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford's) consent." *This is true;* but it is also true that, *on the 15th of March, Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford were assured by a person occu-*

pying a high official position in the Government, and who, as they believed, was speaking by authority, that Fort Sumter would be evacuated within a very few days, and that no measure changing the existing status, prejudicially to the Confederate States, as respects Fort Pickens, was then contemplated, and these assurances were subsequently repeated, with the addition that any contemplated change, as respects Pickens, would be notified to us. On the 1st of April we were again informed that there might be an attempt to supply Fort Sumter with provisions, but that Governor Pickens should have previous notice of the attempt. There was no suggestion of reinforcements. The undersigned *did not hesitate to believe that these assurances expressed the intentions of the Administration at the time, or, at all events, of prominent members of that Administration.* This delay was assented to, for the express purpose of attaining the great end of the mission of the undersigned, to-wit: A pacific solution of existing complications. * * * The intervening twenty-three days were employed in active unofficial efforts, the object of which was to smooth the path to a pacific solution, *the distinguished personage alluded to coöperating with the undersigned; and every step of that effort is recorded in writing, and now in possession of the undersigned and of their Government.* * * * * It is proper to add that, during these twenty-three days, two gentlemen of official distinction, *as high as that of the personage hitherto alluded to, aided the undersigned as intermediaries in these unofficial negotiations for peace.*

Without stopping to inquire how far the veracity of a document, conceived in such a spirit and designed for immediate effect, North and South, is to be implicitly relied on, it is enough to say that, by its very terms, this paper shows clearly that neither the President, nor any one authorized in any manner to speak for him, ever gave the assurances stated, even in unofficial intercourse. If these conspirators were deceived by "intermediaries," holding responsible places in the Government, yet so abusing the confidence of their superiors as to communicate their military plans to the emissaries of rebels who had already levied war against the Government, and fired upon its flag, it is manifest that neither Mr. Lincoln nor his Constitutional advisers need regret the deception. The President, however, it is proper distinctly to state, never had the

slightest knowledge of the communications alleged, if they ever took place.

It should also be definitely stated here, that Mr. Lincoln (whatever military or civil advisers may have imagined) never seriously entertained the purpose of peaceably and voluntarily abandoning any Government fortifications or property. Much less was he prepared to leave the gallant garrisons of Forts Sumter and Pickens to starvation or humiliating surrender.

As early as the 18th of March, General Bragg, then in command of the Confederate forces at Pensacola, issued his order cutting off supplies of every kind from Fort Pickens as well as from the "armed vessels of the United States," then in the harbor—a military step toward the reduction of the fort, in marked contrast with the pacific professions and affected good faith set forth in the Rebel document just quoted from. An intention of precipitating more active hostilities there was plainly indicated by the insurgents, and the necessity of decisive action on the part of the Government was apparent. A small fleet, of eight vessels, was got in readiness with all possible expedition, (including the two sloops-of-war, Pawnee and Powhatan, with transports carrying troops and supplies,) the first of which set sail from the Washington Navy-Yard on the 6th of April, and the remainder during the next three days. The orders were sealed, but the movement could not be altogether a secret. In fact, it seems to have been almost immediately known at the headquarters of secession in the South. While a portion of this fleet paused off Charleston harbor, the remainder saved Fort Pickens by a timely reinforcement.

On the 7th of April, General Beauregard, at Charleston, followed his co-laborer at Pensacola, and issued an order, notice of which was sent to Major Anderson, prohibiting further intercourse between that fort and the city. This was another military step, backed by the rapid concentration of Rebel troops at Charleston, toward compelling the surrender of Fort Sumter. It left no course to the Government short of furnishing supplies to the garrison of that sea-girt fort. And how careful the President was, from the outset, to avoid, so far as was possible, every act that might even unwarrantably provoke a collision of arms

is well illustrated in this instance. On the 8th of April—the day after Beauregard's hostile order—the President caused the parties interested at Charleston to be officially informed that provisions were to be dispatched to Major Anderson by an unarmed vessel. It is easy to see on which side the true pacific purpose lay. The act of war, commenced by firing on the Star of the West, in January, was renewed by Beauregard in the attempt to starve out Major Anderson. This renewal, again, was met by the mere effort to supply, in a peaceable way, the rations of a garrison that could not thus be abandoned.

Beauregard at once communicated the movement, thus officially explained, to the Rebel Secretary of War, and, under special instructions, received April 10th, demanded, on the following day, the surrender of Fort Sumter—the indisputable property of the Federal Government, the right of domain and jurisdiction over which had been expressly and solemnly granted to that Government by the uncanceled vote of South Carolina herself. The demand was courteously refused. Major Anderson was again called on to name a time at which he would evacuate the fort, meanwhile committing no hostile act. That officer replied, on the 12th, that he would, “if provided with the proper and necessary means of transportation, evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th instant,” should he not “receive, prior to that time, controlling instructions” from the Government, “or additional supplies.” To this eminently peaceful and reasonable proposition, the reply was returned that the commandant of “the provisional forces of the Confederate States” would open the fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from the date of this “pacific” message, “April 12, 1861, 2:30 A. M.” This “Confederate” assurance accorded with the result. After enduring the long-continued fire of numerous batteries, Anderson and his garrison of seventy men were compelled to surrender the fort to Beauregard and his seven thousand rebels in arms.

Thus began in dread earnest, by a clearly unwarrantable and unprovoked act, following repeated protestations of a desire for a “peaceable solution” of troubles resulting solely from the constitutional election of a President, confessedly standing on

the same platform, in regard to special Southern interests, as Jefferson, and most of the founders of the Government, a civil war, designed to establish a new Government on the chief corner-stone of slavery, and to revolutionize the opinions of the civilized world in regard to that system. Whatever could be done to avert this final step, was patiently, kindly, sincerely done by Abraham Lincoln. All truthful history will record this of him, through all ages, to his lasting praise. No rough passion, no fretful impatience, no revengeful impulse, ever ruffled his spirit during all these days of suspense. But the gauntlet was at length thrown down, and no alternative was left but to meet force with force.

CHAPTER II.

**The Loyal Uprising.—The Border Slave States.—Summary of Events
Battle of Bull Run.**

THE first effect of the fall of Fort Sumter was to silence, for the time, all opposition to the President in the Free States. One sentiment was uppermost in the minds of all loyal people—that of indignation at the authors of the war, now inaugurated at Charleston, mingled with the purpose of vindicating the National Flag, and of restoring the legitimate authority of the Government in all the States. Wherever a contrary feeling existed, the strong manifestations of popular enthusiasm for the Government caused such treachery to be carefully disguised. For once, the people of the Free States were a unit in action. The demand for vigorous preparation to protect the National Capital, and to suppress the insurrection, was universal. Simultaneously with this development of loyalty, Mr. Lincoln prepared his proclamation of April 15th, calling on the States for their several proportions of an army of seventy-five thousand men. He also, in the same paper, called an extra session of Congress, to commence on the 4th day of July following.

A like unanimity had been hoped by the conspirators in every Slave State. It was, perhaps, chiefly in order to produce this effect, that the responsibility of beginning the war was assumed by the Rebel leaders. As yet the seven States which had originally entered into the Confederacy at Montgomery had received no accessions from the eight remaining States, supposed to have a common interest with them, from a common peculiarity of institutions. On the very next day after that combination was entered into (February 9), the people of Tennessee had voted against secession, by a large majority. On the

1st day of March a similar vote had been taken in Missouri. On the 4th day of April, a secession ordinance had been rejected in the State Convention of Virginia, by a vote of 45 yeas and 89 nays. In Maryland, the firmness and earnest loyalty of Gov. Hicks had defeated all the schemes for assembling a convention in that State to consider the question of secession. Delaware had manifested a decided Union spirit, and the canvass on this question in Arkansas had thus far developed a strong disinclination to embark in the disunion scheme of Davis and his fellow-conspirators. In North Carolina and Kentucky, all the efforts to seduce the people into rebellion appeared to have been of little avail. Thus, with two tiers of Slave States extending from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, two west of the Mississippi, and the two north-east of Virginia, a majority of all, having many interests diverse from those of the Cotton States, now nominally confederated in the crimes of their leaders, the rebellion was manifestly doomed from the outset, if peace and the opportunity for calm deliberation were allowed.

The rebels undoubtedly wished to avoid the lasting odium of bringing on a desolating and destructive civil war. They saw clearly, however, whither the quiet and pacific policy of the Administration was tending. Not another State would join the Secession movement, if that policy were permitted to continue. From the 1st day of February to the fall of Sumter—two months and a half—not a State had joined the movement, and two, on the immediate border of the Cotton States, had deliberately rejected the proposition, although the State Governments of both were in the hands of active Secessionists. The fatal blow—a necessity to the mad project in hand—was accordingly struck. The immediate object was to gain over the remaining Slave States, and naturally, as second only to the preparation for war, the course to be pursued by those States became an object of chief interest.

The necessity of at once gaining over Virginia to the Secession side, in order to the prosecution of their plans, was now manifest to the leading conspirators at Montgomery and Richmond. The Convention of that State, as already seen, had

hitherto proved intractable. In electing that body, the people had decided for the Union by a very large majority. What show or pretense of right, even on Secession principles, had these representatives to repudiate alike the clearly expressed wishes of their constituents and their own personal pledges? In the hope of gaining some plausible pretext for such an act of double perfidy, to be used in connection with threats rapidly growing into a reign of terror, a committee of three was appointed by the Convention, just at the time of the impending attack on Fort Sumter, to wait on the President, avowedly to ascertain his intended policy toward the rebellious States. Mr. Lincoln granted this committee an interview on the 13th of April, and gave them the subjoined response :

To Hon. Messrs. PRESTON, STUART and RANDOLPH—*Gentlemen*: As a committee of the Virginia Convention, now in session, you present me a preamble and resolution in these words :

“WHEREAS, In the opinion of this Convention, the uncertainty which prevails in the public mind as to the policy which the Federal Executive intends to pursue toward the seceded States, is extremely injurious to the industrial and commercial interests of the country, tends to keep up an excitement which is unfavorable to the adjustment of the pending difficulties, and threatens a disturbance of the public peace ; therefore,

“*Resolved*, That a committee of three delegates be appointed to wait on the President of the United States, present to him this preamble, and respectfully ask him to communicate to this Convention the policy which the Federal Executive intends to pursue in regard to the Confederate States.”

In answer I have to say, that having, at the beginning of my official term, expressed my intended policy as plainly as I was able, it is with deep regret and mortification I now learn there is great and injurious uncertainty in the public mind as to what that policy is, and what course I intend to pursue. Not having as yet seen occasion to change, it is now my purpose to pursue the course marked out in the inaugural address. I commend a careful consideration of the whole document as the best expression I can give to my purposes. As I then and therein said, I now repeat, “The power confided in me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imports ; but beyond what is necessary for these objects there will be no

invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere." By the words "property and places belonging to the Government," I chiefly allude to the military posts and property which were in possession of the Government when it came into my hands. But if, as now appears to be true, in pursuit of a purpose to drive the United States authorities from these places, an unprovoked assault has been made upon Fort Sumter, I shall hold myself at liberty to repossess it, if I can, like places which had been seized before the Government was devolved upon me; and in any event I shall, to the best of my ability, repel force by force. In case it proves true that Fort Sumter has been assaulted, as is reported, I shall, perhaps, cause the United States mails to be withdrawn from all the States which claim to have seceded, believing that the commencement of actual war against the Government justifies and possibly demands it. I scarcely need to say that I consider the military posts and property situated within the States which claim to have seceded, as yet belonging to the Government of the United States as much as they did before the supposed secession. Whatever else I may do for the purpose, I shall not attempt to collect the duties and imposts by any armed invasion of any part of the country; not meaning by this, however, that I may not land a force deemed necessary to relieve a fort upon the border of the country. From the fact that I have quoted a part of the inaugural address, it must not be inferred that I repudiate any other part, the whole of which I reaffirm, except so far as what I now say of the mails may be regarded as a modification.

The Governors of Virginia and Kentucky, thoroughly in fellowship with the South Carolina policy from the outset, promptly sent back defiant messages in response to the President's call for troops. "Kentucky will furnish no troops," said Governor Magoffin, "for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States." "The militia of Virginia," wrote Letcher to Secretary Cameron, "will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view." Similar was the reply of Governor Harris, of Tennessee. Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, with greater moderation in his language, plainly intimated his purpose not to respond to the President's call. On the 17th, the Virginia Convention, yielding at length to the artifices and intimidations of the busy conspirators, in whose service an ignorant mob was

conspicuous, passed, in the darkness of a secret conclave, an ordinance of secession. The processes resorted to for the accomplishment of this object were yet insufficient to move many honorable delegates from their fidelity, but the fatal majority was obtained. Although there was still to be, nominally, a vote of the people on this question, on the 23d of May, Union sentiments were no longer tolerated at Richmond. Violence and terror insured a majority for the insurrection in a State which, on a fair vote, would still have pronounced emphatically against secession.

The conspirators in North Carolina also triumphed, as was to be expected after this defection, and Tennessee and Arkansas followed. Thus four States were gained to the "Confederacy"—by no means through a fair or honest vote—as a result of the war begun in Charleston harbor. The desperate efforts to win over Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, utterly failed, as would have been the case with the other four States, just named, had the pacific policy of the Administration been permitted to continue.

The week following the President's proclamation was crowded with important events. Public meetings were held all through the loyal States, and the response to the call for troops was hearty and universal. Companies and regiments were rapidly filled up and started for the National Capital. But a few hours intervened before Massachusetts had one regiment at its rendezvous, and ready for departure. Pennsylvania and New York were on the alert, and a battalion of volunteers, from the former State, were the first to reach Washington, while the New York Seventh was at nearly the same time on its way. The spirit already roused throughout the country was greatly intensified by the attempts of a secession mob in Baltimore to prevent the passage of the Massachusetts Sixth through that city. Here the first blood of Union troops was shed, on an ever memorable anniversary, the 19th day of April. Enlistments followed with such rapidity, that it was soon only a question whose services should be declined, of the tens of thousands offering themselves.

The city of Washington, an object of threatened attack, and

thronged with people, who either openly proclaimed their hostility to the Government, or were of doubtful fidelity, was full of excitement—liable at any moment to an *emeute* or to an irruption of rebel troops already in the field in Virginia. Alexandria was in their possession, or easily accessible at any moment from Richmond. Rumors were current of an immediate intention on the part of the Confederate leaders to occupy Arlington Heights, completely commanding the city, while as yet only a few companies of the regular service, with two or three light field batteries, were in Washington for its defense. To these were added a few hundred volunteer militia, made up chiefly of transient sojourners at the Capital. A few dragoons, with a detachment of artillery, guarded the Long Bridge, and the Navy Yard and other portions of the city had a small guard of extemporized infantry. There was also a single company of sappers and miners, under Lieut. (now General) Weitzel. Thus passed an anxious week, while every exertion was made by the Government and its loyal supporters to assemble an adequate defensive force. How easily the place might have been taken, with not one of the present numerous and strong fortifications, with no army but half a dozen scattered companies of infantry, cavalry and artillery, and with so large a number within ready to rise and give active welcome to the assailing force they so eagerly expected, need not here be discussed. From one extremity of the country to the other, the danger was seen and felt. The few days needful, fortunately were gained.

The 19th of April is further memorable for the proclamation issued on that day, declaring a blockade of every port of the States in insurrection, in the following terms :

WHEREAS, An insurrection against the Government of the United States has broken out in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas, and the laws of the United States for the collection of the revenue can not be efficiently executed therein conformably to that provision of the Constitution which requires duties to be uniform throughout the United States :

AND WHEREAS, A combination of persons, engaged in such

insurrection, have threatened to grant pretended letters of marque to authorize the bearers thereof to commit assaults on the lives, vessels, and property of good citizens of the country lawfully engaged in commerce on the high seas, and in waters of the United States :

AND WHEREAS, An Executive Proclamation has already been issued, requiring the persons engaged in these disorderly proceedings to desist therefrom, calling out a militia force for the purpose of repressing the same, and convening Congress in extraordinary session to deliberate and determine thereon :

Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, with a view to the same purposes before mentioned, and to the protection of the public peace, and the lives and property of quiet and orderly citizens pursuing their lawful occupations, until Congress shall have assembled and deliberated on the said unlawful proceedings, or until the same shall have ceased, have further deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and of the laws of nations in such cases provided. For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach, or shall attempt to leave any of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will indorse on her register the fact and date of such warning ; and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port, for such proceedings against her and her cargo as prize as may be deemed advisable.

And I hereby proclaim and declare, that if any person, under the pretended authority of said States, or under any other pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy.

By the President :

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

Washington, April 19, 1861.

Intelligence having been received that Virginic troops were marching on Harper's Ferry, to take possession of the important Government property there, the public works were destroyed and the place evacuated by Lieut. Jones, the commandant. Almost simultaneously the Fourth Massachusetts

Regiment, dispatched by wise forethought, arrived at Fortress Monroe (soon after reinforced by the First Vermont, under Col. Phelps), and secured a permanent occupation of that strong position in the Old Dominion, which had now become (without waiting for the consummation of the farce of a popular vote under duress) the eighth State of the Rebel Confederacy.

During this brief period—at the close of a week of unprecedented excitement at Washington and of loyal enthusiasm throughout the country—earnest appeals were made to the President by prominent Marylanders to stop all attempts to transport troops through that State to the National Capital. His prompt reply set all such petitions at rest. The usual thoroughfares, meanwhile, had been obstructed. Treason hoped the work was already accomplished, and relief cut off. Timorous or hesitating men feared that the effort would be useless. But the purpose of Mr. Lincoln was not for an instant shaken. The route by Annapolis was opened by Gen. Butler and his Massachusetts force, and on the 25th of April troops from the North began to pour into Washington, relieving all immediate anxiety. The people had nobly responded. The “great uprising” was an assured event.

Toward the veteran Lieutenant-General of the Army all eyes were turned as the fit organizer and leader of the Government forces. His counsels were potent, necessarily, in the formation of plans suited to the juncture. Compelled to resort to force by armed aggressive rebellion, the foremost purpose was strictly a defensive one. To protect the capital first of all—for in the flush of triumph over the reduction of Fort Sumter, the determination to take Washington, a city surrounded by territory claimed as destined to form part of the Confederacy, was boldly avowed, alike by the Rebel Secretary of War and by the organs of public opinion every-where in the insurrectionary States—was the object aimed at by the President, and energetically undertaken by Gen. Scott. Secondary to this, and a labor for the future, was the reoccupation and re-possession of Federal forts and Federal property already seized by the Rebels, and the retention of such as were threatened, as

distinctly promised by the President in his inaugural address—forcibly now, since the peaceable alternative was no longer possible. The blockade by sea, and a defensive campaign by land, were the immediate steps recommended by the General-in-Chief and adopted by the Administration.

On the 27th of April the following announcement of new Military Departments and Commanders was made by Adj.-Gen. Thomas: 1. The Department of Washington, including the District of Columbia, according to its original boundary, Fort Washington and the adjacent country, and the State of Maryland as far as Bladensburgh, inclusive; under the command of Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield—headquarters at Washington. 2. The Department of Annapolis, including the country for twenty miles on each side of the railroad from Annapolis to the city of Washington, as far as Bladensburgh; under the command of Gen. B. F. Butler—headquarters at Annapolis. 3. The Department of Pennsylvania, including that State, the State of Delaware, and all of the State of Maryland not embraced within the Departments first named; under command of Gen. Robert Patterson—headquarters at Philadelphia, “or any other point he may temporarily occupy.” This organization of Departments indicates the field of contemplated military operations in the East. The Department of Washington extended no further southward than the old limits of the District of Columbia, an extension into Virginia only for the obvious purpose of including Alexandria and Arlington Heights, as essential to the defenses of the capital.

To these Departments were added a fourth, on the 10th day of May, including the States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, under the command of Gen. George B. McClellan—headquarters at Cincinnati. This Department was also manifestly organized with a view to the maintenance of a defensive line, on the Ohio river, from Wheeling to Cairo. During the first week succeeding the fall of Fort Sumter, indications were apparent which led the people along this extended line—and particularly at Cincinnati and Cairo, deemed especially vulnerable points—to desire some efficient preparation to repel any Rebel advance. The debatable ground of Kentucky was early cov

eted as a field for military occupancy by the confident insurgents. The Governor of that State was in open sympathy with the rebellion, and, under the guise of neutrality which even the most loyal of her citizens seemed for a time to acquiesce in as the wisest expedient, was believed to be preparing to subject the State to Rebel domination. Across this middle territory by the Covington and Lexington Railroad, on the one hand, and by the Mississippi river, from Columbus and Paducah, on the other, an invasion of Ohio or Illinois was reasonably apprehended. That sympathizers and complotters with the Montgomery leaders were eagerly designing and ready to aid such invasion, in both sections of Kentucky, was well understood.

It was from the wish for prompt and decisive action in securing this defensive line, which involved the occupation of all necessary points on the Kentucky side of the river commanding the north bank of the Ohio, just as the possession of the heights south of the Potomac, near Washington, was essential to the defense of that city, that the appointment of Gen. McClellan by Gov. Dennison, of Ohio, as Commander of the Volunteer Militia of that State, was made. This was earnestly desired, especially by influential citizens of Cincinnati, where McClellan had been quietly residing during the previous year or two, charged with responsible duties in the management of an important railroad. It was known that he had a military education and that he was an experienced engineer, which latter quality specially commended him to the favor of those who were anxious for the protection of the city. To render this appointment efficient, by giving him authority to pass the limits of Ohio and to occupy the heights on the Kentucky side of the river, his appointment, by the Federal Government, to a position in the regular army was strenuously urged, and ere long secured. In assigning him so large an area as his Department, its contemplated reorganization at an early day was distinctly announced.

It was also on the 10th day of May that the Rebel Secretary of War issued his order, at Montgomery, directing Gen. Robert E. Lee to assume command of the "forces of the Confederate States in Virginia."

Of the eight Slave States which had stood aloof from the Montgomery Confederacy at the outset, Virginia had nominally entered into an alliance with that pretended Government, as already seen, and practically joined the insurrection, in advance of the promised popular vote. Tennessee and Arkansas followed this example on the 6th of May, and North Carolina (her rulers being previously in practical alliance), on the 20th. Maryland, Missouri and Kentucky, as the event proved, were saved from this suicidal conduct, not without the aid of Federal arms. Delaware remained true.

On the 29th of April the blockade was extended, in accordance with a proclamation of the President, so as to embrace the ports of Virginia and North Carolina, owing to rebellious acts in those States, antecedent to their pretended secession, yet clearly pointing to such an event as practically determined. Jefferson Davis, on the same day, having hastily convened his "Confederate Congress" to make provision for more effective hostilities, submitted his message to that body, containing an elaborate attempt to justify the war that had been precipitated upon the country, appealing to slaveholding interest and prejudice, and instigating a united and zealous prosecution of the war. He recognized, solely, the issue of slavery as the one cause which had led to the outbreak. As to the mode of action pursued by the Rebel leaders, he distinctly claimed that the Constitutional right of secession had been steadily maintained by "the Democratic party of the United States," and urged its pledges "that it would faithfully abide by and uphold" those principles, as they were "laid down in the Kentucky and Virginia Legislatures of 1799," and its adoption of "those principles as constituting one of the main foundations of its political creed." (How vain this appeal, let the prompt and cordial action of such Democrats as Douglas, Andrew Johnson, B. F. Butler, Daniel S. Dickinson, Lewis Cass, and hundreds of other faithful leaders in the ranks of their party testify. The reorganized party, assuming the Democratic name, at a later day, under the auspices of Vallandigham, Richardson, Wood, Cox and their compeers, may perhaps as heartily, though not as openly, indorse this exposition of the "Democratic" faith, as

it directly sustains the allegation of Davis that Northern aggressions are the cause of the war.)

The Rebel champion further asserts that these "principles were maintained by overwhelming majorities of the people of all the States of the Union at different elections, especially in the election of Mr. Jefferson, in 1805, Mr. Madison, in 1809, and Mr. Pierce in 1852." Equally veracious are his narratives of the impudent efforts of Crawford and his associates to make an appearance of negotiating for peaceable separation, and of the events immediately preceding the attack on Fort Sumter, with a view to rid himself of the terrible responsibility of inaugurating a war that must consign his name to lasting infamy. He boasts of his attempt to organize piracy on the high seas, by assuming the power of issuing letters of marque and reprisal, without a shadow of right under international laws, even conceding his claim of a national existence for his pseudo-Confederacy. He expresses his entire confidence "that, ere you [the 'Confederate Congress'] shall have been many weeks in session, the whole of the Slaveholding States of the late Union will respond to the call of honor and affection. and by uniting their fortune with ours, promote our common interests and secure our common safety." He speaks of "the rapid development of the purpose of the President of the United States to invade our soil, capture our forts, blockade our ports, and wage war against us," and refers to the report of the "Confederate" Secretary of War "for a full history of the occurrences in Charleston harbor, prior to and including the bombardment and reduction of Fort Sumter, and of the measures subsequently taken for common defense, on receiving the intelligence of the declaration of war" (so this scrupulous personage chooses to say) "against us by the President of the United States." He gives the number of his troops "now in the field at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and Pulaski," as 19,000 men, with 16,000 more "now en route for Virginia." He adds: "It is proposed to organize and hold in readiness for instant action, in view of the present exigencies of the country, an army of 100,000 men;" and declares that volunteers "are constantly tendering their services far in excess

of our wants." He does not conclude his extended document without uttering the now familiar words, equally as appropriate to brigands and pirates as to traitors : "All we ask is, to be let alone."

Partly by way of inciting slaveholders to unite as a body in his unhallowed schemes, and partly to influence public opinion abroad, for the hour, the arch conspirator prepared this skillful, but eminently fallacious, message, and he found the pseudo-Congress he addressed to be willing instruments in organizing the formidable war power he desired.

These preparations at Montgomery and the growing requirements of a service already expanded through so wide a field, made it necessary for Mr. Lincoln to anticipate the extra session of Congress, called for the 4th of July, and to issue, on the 3d of May, a proclamation for 42,000 additional volunteers, for the term of three years, unless sooner discharged, and for eight regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery, numbering 22,714 in the aggregate, to be added to the regular army. A call was also made, in the same proclamation, for 18,000 additional seamen for the naval service. This action, clearly justified by the requirements of the occasion, or rather made obligatory upon him by the necessities of the situation, was confirmed and legalized, without opposition, by Congress at its extra session. It met the universal approval of the loyal men of the country, and the quick response to this call in a few days more than filled the demand for army volunteers.

Cairo, Illinois, had been occupied by Government forces, under Col. B. M. Prentiss, during the latter part of April. On the Kentucky and Missouri sides of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, and particularly on each side of the former, at Columbus, Belmont and below, preparations on the part of the insurgents were soon manifest, threatening an aggressive movement, and certainly intended to hold the Mississippi, as a rebel possession, from Cairo to New Orleans. The prompt movement of Illinois volunteers saved the West from invasion. This little army of occupation at Camp Defiance prepared the way for enterprises, enlarging to a magnitude perhaps little imagined at the moment.

At this time, also, Capt. Nathaniel Lyon (subsequently General) was taking prompt measures to protect the United States arms in the Arsenal at St. Louis from seizure by Secessionists, who were scheming to get possession of this prize—of incalculable value to the Union troops then volunteering. The Government now, as for months afterward, though untiring in its efforts, found it no easy task to provide muskets in numbers at all adequate to the emergency. Adroit management secured the very considerable supply at St. Louis to the Department of the Ohio. Like timely action, soon after, broke up a Secession camp forming in the same city, and defeated the plots of a traitorous Governor for betraying the State of Missouri into the hands of the insurgents. Camp Jackson, with a large supply of arms and munitions of war, and several hundred prisoners, were surrendered on the 10th of May—a memorable day for Missouri.

On the 11th of the same month, Gen. W. S. Harney, of the regular army, returning from Richmond, whither he had been taken as a prisoner, captured in Western Virginia, while on his way to Washington, assumed command of the Military Department of the West. His career was a brief one, practically culminating in a compact entered into, on the 21st, with Gen. Sterling Price, acting on behalf of the disloyal Governor of Missouri, to the effect that the whole responsibility and labor of maintaining peace and order in that State should be intrusted to the State authorities; while Gen. Harney, on his part, should make no military movements, and carefully avoid any acts tending to produce jealousy and excitement. It is needless to say that such an engagement never had the sanction of the President. It was definitely set aside by an order of the Adjutant General addressed to Harney, under date of May 27th, and a force was promptly put in the field, under command of Gen. Lyon.

Meanwhile, at Washington, since the free arrival of troops had commenced, the whole country south of the Potomac, except as explored by scouts, was little better than an unknown land. At Alexandria, a secession flag floated in sight of the Capital, while at Manassas Junction a threatening force was

gathering. It was not until the morning of the 24th of May that an advance into Virginia, by the forces under Gen. Mansfield, was deemed expedient. This movement, awakening great interest among the people, who had anticipated early and decisive results, and began already to weary of indispensable delay, had no further immediate purpose than the occupancy of Arlington Heights and Alexandria, for the greater security of Washington; for any more extended undertaking, this improvised army, as all now see after three years of war, was entirely inadequate, either in itself or in its appliances. An advance on Manassas Junction, at this time, was indeed discussed in official circles, but military opinions were decidedly against the undertaking, and the Department of Washington was not now enlarged.

This advance into Virginia, early in the morning of the day after the farce of a popular vote for Secession had been enacted, was executed without resistance. Col. Ellsworth, who commanded a regiment ordered to Alexandria, lost his life by the hands of an assassin, in hauling down, with his own hand, the Rebel flag that had, for many days, flaunted defiance toward Washington; otherwise, no serious casualty occurred. To the people of Alexandria this movement was a surprise, and some prisoners fell into the hands of our troops. The number of men who crossed the Potomac, at this time, was about 13,000. They immediately commenced constructing earthworks, where Fort Ellsworth, Fort Corcoran, the defenses of the Long Bridge, and other memorials of like purpose, still attest the labors then entered upon.

Two days later, the Postmaster General issued his order suspending all postal service in the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas, to take effect on the 31st of May. Tennessee, although in league with the Confederate insurgents, through the State officers, was intentionally omitted in this order. Obvious advantages had resulted from a continuance of the United States mails in all the States hitherto, and it was only when, more active hostilities being imminent, these advantages would be more than counterbalanced, that this order

was issued. To the leaders and people of the insurgent districts it was no light matter, as at once practically felt, to be deprived of this beneficent intervention of the Federal Government, maintained, as it always had been, in part, by a tax upon the correspondence of the Free States. This order marks the date of the first decisive step toward the enforcement of non-intercourse with the Rebel population, except as their territory might successively fall within the lines of our armies, now rapidly preparing for the field.

A great portion of the army which had been forming under the eye of Gen. McClellan, was to have its first employment, by direction of the President, in sustaining the loyal people of Western Virginia. The force sent into that region was to drive back the Rebel troops which had gone out to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and to subjugate that part of the State, in which a purpose to repudiate secession was already manifested. The order was issued by the General from his headquarters at Cincinnati on the 26th of May, and the First Virginia Regiment of volunteers, under Col. B. F. Kelly, was sent out from Bellaire on the Wheeling branch of the railroad, while the Fourteenth Ohio Regiment of volunteers, under Col. J. B. Steadman, advanced on the Parkersburg branch of the road, toward Grafton.

For several days after this movement commenced, Gen. McClellan remained at Cincinnati. Under the auspices of Gov. Magoffin and his Inspector-General, Simon B. Buckner, a force was organizing in Kentucky, believed to be covertly intended for the Rebel service, and watched with apprehension by loyal people north of the Ohio. During the progress of Buckner's preparations he visited Cincinnati and had a protracted interview with Gen. McClellan, on the 8th of June. In an official report to Gov. Magoffin, made public on the 22d of that month, Buckner set forth in detail what he alleged as a formal agreement between McClellan and himself, the substance of which, after an engagement on the part of Kentucky to maintain "neutrality" between the "United States" and the "Southern States," is contained in the following extract from that document:

Gen. McClellan stipulates that the territory of Kentucky shall be respected on the part of the United States, even though the Southern States should occupy it; but in the latter case he will call upon the authorities of Kentucky to remove the Southern forces from our territory. Should Kentucky fail to accomplish this object in a reasonable time, Gen. McClellan claims the same right of occupancy given to the Southern forces. I have stipulated, in that case, to advise him of the inability of Kentucky to comply with her obligations, and to invite him to dislodge the Southern forces. He stipulates that if he is successful in doing so, he will withdraw his forces from the territory of the State as soon as the Southern forces shall have been removed. This, he assures me, is the policy which he will adopt toward Kentucky.

That this interview took place, is an undisputed fact. That any compact of this nature was entered into, would seem incredible, without other evidence than Buckner's word of honor. But that Gen. McClellan, while commanding the Department of the Ohio, did nothing inconsistent with the alleged terms of agreement, must be conceded. Thus was one controlling purpose in his first appointment by the Governor of Ohio completely defeated. The occupation and defense of the southern bank of the river, near Cincinnati, was voluntarily abandoned—either by reason of this stipulation or without it—by the man specially chosen for that work. Near the same date, Gen. McClellan addressed a letter to the late Mr. Crittenden, expressing regret that some of Gen. Prentiss' men, in making an excursion down the Mississippi, on the 12th of June, had landed on the Kentucky shore and cut down and brought away a Secession flag which they saw flying at Columbus. He disclaimed all responsibility for this intrusion.

Thus cautious was the Commanding General to be no aggressor on the soil of any Slave State, and to wound the sensibilities of neither incipient Rebels nor "neutrals," who were supporters of slave institutions. Even while sending a force to the aid of loyal Western Virginia, at the request of her people, he was careful to assure them:

Notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among you will be signal.

ized by interference with your slaves, understand one thing clearly—not only will we abstain from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrection on their part.

The first engagement in Western Virginia was fought at Philippi, on the 2d of June, Gen. Thomas A. Morris, of Indiana, being the officer in actual command of the forces now concentrated at and near Grafton, with headquarters at that place. The arduous and successful expedition thence to Philippi, surprising and breaking up an important camp of Rebels, was under the immediate direction of Col. Dumont, of Indiana.

On the 3d of June, Gen. Patterson issued an address from his headquarters, now at Chambersburg, Pa., to the troops of his Department, promising that they should “soon meet the insurgents.” He added: “You must bear in mind you are going for the good of the whole country, and that, while it is your duty to punish sedition, you must protect the loyal, and, should the occasion offer, at once suppress servile insurrection.”

It is worthy of note here that Mr. Lincoln, with that magnanimity which would see only an endangered country, had put at the head of three important Military Departments three of the most decided of his political opponents—Patterson, Butler and McClellan. These appointments were made under the earnest conviction—how well justified by the result will presently appear—that these officers possessed the military capacity and skill suited to the wants of the occasion, and that they would heartily sustain the Government in its work of self-preservation. Patterson and McClellan had each been selected by the Republican Executives of their own States. Both had served in Mexico, under the eye of Gen. Scott, and their selection had his approval.

To the voluntary promises made by Patterson and McClellan, that slavery should be upheld by force of arms, if need be, it must be added that a like assurance was given by Butler to the people of Maryland, soon after his occupation of Annapolis.

A few days after the victory at Philippi, Gen. Thomas A. Morris, the General in actual command, on whom, with Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, the direction of the campaign now inaugu-

rated in West Virginia mainly depended, issued his proclamation from headquarters at Grafton, calling on the people to arm for their own protection against the enemies of their "freedom and peace," and to rally in arms to the support of the Constitutional Government. The Convention of loyal Virginia Delegates, held at Wheeling, proclaimed, on the 17th of June, their repudiation of the pretended ordinance of secession by which Virginia was called on "to separate from and wage war against the Government of the United States," and in the name of the people, declared that "the offices of all who adhere to" the Richmond Convention and Gov. Letcher (in the enumerated acts of treason and usurpation perpetrated by them), whether legislative, executive or judicial, are vacated. A new State Government was promptly organized, with Francis H. Pierpont for Governor. In due time a State Legislature was chosen, and Senators and Representatives in Congress were elected. Thus, with the full approbation of President Lincoln, and with his substantial support, was the first step inaugurated toward a restoration of a loyal local Government in the insurgent States. The State Government thus organized was for Virginia in its integrity, and it was sustained by the people, wherever our armies held in check the armed forces of the Rebels.

On the 23d of June, three weeks after the battle of Philippi, Gen. McClellan, having just arrived, issued another proclamation to the people from headquarters at Grafton, announcing that the Army of the Ohio, "headed by Virginia troops, is rapidly occupying all Western Virginia." He reaffirmed the promises of his former proclamation, adding: "Your houses, families, property and all your rights will be religiously respected." He denounced upon guerrillas and marauders the severest penalties of military law. To the soldiers of his Army he issued an order enjoining good conduct, and inspiring them for the work before them. "We have come here," he said, "to save, not to upturn."

Nearly three weeks later, July 12th (after a skirmish at Laurel Hill, on the 10th), an engagement was had with the Rebels under Col. Pegram, commonly known as the battle of Rich Mountain, resulting in the surrender of that officer and a

number of men, officially estimated as "nine hundred or one thousand," as well as in the rout and close pursuit of Gen. Garnett and the forces he was bringing to the support of Pegram, and in the death of Garnett at Carrickford, on the 14th. Without discussing the merits of this brief campaign, in which the number of men engaged on either side may be estimated at rather more than 10,000, it will suffice to quote the final summing up, by the Commanding General, in his dispatch to the War Department, of July 14th, as follows:

HUTTONSVILLE, VA., *July 14, 1861.*

Col. E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General:

Gen. Garnett and his forces have been routed and his baggage and one gun taken. His army are completely demoralized. Gen. Garnett was killed while attempting to rally his forces at Carrickford, near St. George.

We have completely annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia.

Our loss is but thirteen killed and not more than forty wounded, while the enemy's loss is not far from two hundred killed, and the number of prisoners we have taken will amount to at least one thousand. We have captured seven of the enemy's guns null.

A portion of Garnett's forces retreated, but I look for their capture by General Hill, who is in hot pursuit.

The troops that Garnett had under his command are said to be the crack regiments of Eastern Virginia, aided by Georgians, Tennesseans and Carolinians.

Our success is complete, and I firmly believe that secession is killed in this section of the country.

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. U. S. A.

A similar work was simultaneously going on in Missouri, under the earnest and skillful guidance of Gen. Nathaniel Lyon. Missouri was nearly betrayed by its Secessionist Governor and his subordinates, without the aid of a conspiring Convention, yet she was drifting, under unscrupulous management, in the same direction which Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee had gone. Gov. Claiborne F. Jackson had defied the popular repudiation of Secession, issued his proclamation, on the 12th, calling out 50,000 militia, to repel "invasion," etc., and immediately organized a further Rebel force at the State Capital

after the breaking up of Camp Jackson, at St. Louis, as already narrated. Gen. Lyon approaching Jefferson City with a moderate force, Jackson evacuated the place on the 14th of June, and the Union forces occupied it on the following day. On the 17th, Gen. Lyon, finding that the Rebel Governor was fortifying at Boonville, forty miles distant (his forces being commanded by Gen. Sterling Price), advanced to that point and gained a complete victory, dispersing the insurgents, who lost heavily in killed, wounded and prisoners. These energetic movements at once secured the possession of a large portion of the State from Rebel interference.

The defeat of the conspirators, first at St. Louis and afterward at Boonville, had been so complete that it was several weeks before any considerable force was rallied to disturb the quiet into which the State was settling down, under the new government of loyal rulers, which was meanwhile forming. On the 31st of July, Hamilton R. Gamble was elected Provisional Governor by the Missouri State Convention, and duly inaugurated, with other loyal officers, chosen at the same time. The future of that State was thus assured.

In Gen. Butler's Department a movement, preparatory to opening the way to Yorktown, was made by a small force, on the 10th of June, resulting in a repulse at Big Bethel. Coming a week after the cheering success at Philippa, under Gen. Morris, the effect of this reverse, unimportant as it may seem, was sadly felt by the country, and placed the Commanding General under a cloud, from which he unfortunately did little to redeem himself, during the time he retained this command.

The fight at Falling Waters, on the 2d of July, was the chief event, which had thus far relieved the general quietude, not to say dullness, prevailing in the Department of Gen. Patterson. This skirmish occurred near Hainesville, Md., in the tardy execution of a long-deferred movement of Patterson's force from Chambersburg, by Williamsport, to Harper's Ferry. The loss was small on either side, yet, as an indication of some approaching activity, it was not without its effect on an already impatient people. With further delays and hesitations, the force of Patterson was at length thrown across the Potomac.

At this time, a considerable Rebel force was believed to have accumulated at Manassas Junction and at Winchester. The popular demand was almost universal that our troops, now so long in arms, the brief term of a large portion of whom was about to expire, should be led against the enemy. Gen. Scott at length decided on a movement upon Manassas—resulting in the battle of Bull Run, with which this first period of the war may be said to have closed.

Gen. Irvin McDowell took command of the troops on the Virginia side of the Potomac, May 27th, three days after they had crossed over. His headquarters were at the Arlington House. On the 31st of May, a company of cavalry, under Lieut. Tompkins, dashed into the village of Fairfax Court House, where several hundred Rebel cavalry were stationed, killing a number of the enemy and capturing five prisoners. His own loss was one killed and five wounded or missing. This may be called the first cavalry raid. As a reconnoissance, this otherwise unimportant affair was of service, the officer in command reporting the presence of Rebel troops at that point to the number of 1,500 men.

After the manifestations, here as well as in the Shenandoah Valley, of a gradual aggressive movement of the insurgents, threatening alike Alexandria, Washington and the upper part of Maryland, the impatience of the people—ignorant as they were of the difficulties in the way of properly equipping a force, even then so much out of proportion to any organized in this country during the last forty years—was natural, when, with only skirmishing along the Potomac, no general movement to thrust back these aggressors had been commenced until the middle of July. That the causes of this delay were beyond the control of the Executive, and that even when commenced the experienced military leaders in command had failed to put their forces in full readiness, is now apparent. The Rebels themselves anticipated an earlier attack, and had prepared for it awaiting the onset on their chosen ground. Meanwhile batteries began to be erected along the Potomac, at Acquia Creek and elsewhere, threatening a complete blockade of the river. On the 27th of June, Capt. James H. Ward, of the Navy, had

lost his life in an attack on the obstructions at Matthias Point. The hope and purpose of capturing Washington and subjugating Maryland were clearly shown by the procedure of the Rebels, and not without reason, when we remember their military preparations during a whole year, and the advantages given them by the Administration just closed.

Baltimore, in which there had been, since the 19th of April, constant conspiracies in aid of the rebellion, and which was relied on by the Rebel leaders for important aid in the general scheme of extending their military sway northward to Mason and Dixon's line, had been occupied by Gen. Butler on the 14th of May. Strong works thrown up on Federal Hill, and elsewhere, as well as Fort McHenry, now held the conspirators in check, and their designs were effectually overthrown before Butler's transfer to the new Department of Virginia, a few days later. This Department originally embraced Eastern Virginia to the summit of the Blue Ridge, and the States of North Carolina and South Carolina. Gen. N. P. Banks succeeded to the command at Baltimore, and continued the vigorous measures of his predecessor.

On the 15th of July, Gen. Patterson's army advanced, occupying Bunker Hill, and the Rebel force under J. E. Johnston fell back on Winchester. Patterson was expected at least to occupy the attention of the Rebels, to whose force his own actually was, as believed at the time in Washington, largely superior. Almost simultaneously with this "demonstration" in the Valley, Gen. McDowell issued an order (July 16th) distributing his troops into divisions, and took up the line of march toward Fairfax Court House. This place his advance column occupied on the following day, without resistance. His entire effective force was not far from 50,000 men: the First Division under command of Gen. Daniel Tyler, of Connecticut, the Second under Col. David Hunter, of the Army; the Third under Col. S. P. Heintzelman, of the Army; the Fourth under Gen. Theodore Runyon, of New Jersey, and the Fifth under Col. D. S. Miles, of the Army. The two last divisions were intended to act as the Reserve.

On the 18th, Patterson's force, instead of attacking Johnston

at Winchester, was moved on Charlestown—a step which all critics, judging after the event, will agree to have been unfortunate, in consequence of which no effectual coöperation with the Manassas movement was rendered. On the same day, (Thursday) McDowell resumed his march in the direction of Centreville, and a premature engagement was brought on at Blackburn's Ford, by a portion of Gen. Tyler's division. The slight repulse which followed ended an immediate advance, and detained the army, inactive, at and near Centreville, for the next two days.

The plan of battle, as now seen in the published order of Gen. McDowell, for Sunday the 21st, was a good one, but the execution of some of its details was imperfect, and the delay of troops in moving to the scene of action prepared the way for the final disaster, through the arrival of Rebel reënforcements from Johnston, whom Patterson had failed to occupy as ordered. The immediate purpose of giving battle at this time, was to force the enemy from his position commanding the Warrenton road, and to destroy the railroad from Manassas to the Valley of Virginia, preventing communication with the large Rebel force in the latter locality.

The stream named Bull Run passes in a southeasterly direction through the ravine at the foot of the slope beyond Centreville. Three roads lead from the latter place to the South and West—one nearly due south, crossing Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford; a second due west toward Groveton, over the Stone Bridge; and a third, about midway between these two, at an angle of forty-five degrees, to each, extending more directly to Newmarket, (near Manassas Junction), where Beauregard, commanding the Rebel forces, had his headquarters. This last road is known as the Warrenton turnpike. Beyond the run are the Manassas Plains, extending for miles, mostly an open country, like a Western prairie. On the rolling ground near the stream the woods are dense, and there are occasional groves farther away. The Rebel lines extended for a distance of six to ten miles along the right bank of Bull Run, from near Blackburn's Ford to the Stone Bridge, and beyond the Groveton road. The Rebel lines were two or three miles distant, at

the nearest point, from Newmarket, and visible from the headquarters of Beauregard. The number of his men, on Sunday morning, is believed to have been about forty thousand in line, with fifteen or twenty thousand in reserve, exclusive of reenforcements arriving during the day.

A large portion of Johnston's forces had previously reached Manassas Junction, and that General was present in person, but waiving his seniority of rank, allowed Beauregard to conduct the engagement, his dispositions having already been made.

Leaving part of the division under Miles—two brigades with two batteries—as a reserve at Centreville, together with Richardson's brigade, temporarily assigned to the same division, which was to threaten Blackburn's Ford, covered by the enemy's right, McDowell ordered Tyler's division to take position on the Warrenton road, menacing the Rebel center. To Hunter's division was intrusted the important work of turning the Rebel left, going to the right of the Groveton road, and crossing Bull Run above Sudley's Spring. This force was to be followed by Heintzelman's division, which was to cross lower down, after Hunter had effected his crossing and descended the right bank to a point nearly opposite, driving away any force that might be there to dispute the passage. These two divisions were the ones most actively engaged in the ensuing battle. The necessity of strongly guarding against the contingency of a Rebel movement to occupy Centreville, either by Blackburn's Ford or the Warrenton road was strongly impressed on the mind of the Commanding General. This led to the detachment of one of Heintzelman's brigades, after the movement commenced, to be added to the force on our left. The event showed the wisdom of his action in protecting this position, which the Rebel General had deliberately planned to assail, if we may credit his report, written long afterward, and which but for McDowell's precautions, might have been taken at the close of the battle, to the much more serious discomfiture of our army.

More time was consumed in getting the men in position, on the morning of the 21st, than had been anticipated. Tyler opened with his artillery at half past six o'clock, eliciting no

reply. Burnside's brigade, under Hunter, successfully crossed the stream, and emerged from the wooded bank into the open plain beyond. Almost immediately, the head of the column encountered a heavy Rebel force, but Tyler and Heintzelman had each, from their respective positions, succeeded in throwing part of their force across, and presently nearly all but the reserves before mentioned were brought into action. The ground was hotly contested from half past ten o'clock until three. The advantage at the latter hour was clearly on the side of our arms, and the victory seemed assured. That such was the view taken by the Rebel commanders even, is seen from the accounts of the battle from that side.

At this important juncture, a further reënforcement from Johnston's army at Winchester (perhaps, in fact, "the residue" of that army, as supposed by Gen. McDowell) arrived on the field. Our men, who had been up since two o'clock, had marched several miles, and had fought for many hours, were exhausted by the privations they had necessarily undergone, and from the fatigue incident to such labors in an excessively hot day. Most were inexperienced troops. This was their first engagement. The new masses now hurled upon them decided the event. The battle was lost. Panic and pell-mell retreat ensued. Only on reaching Centreville was any degree of order restored, after the first falling back. The official report of Gen. McDowell states his loss as 481 killed, and 1,011 wounded, without an enumeration of prisoners. Beauregard stated his own losses as 269 killed, and 1,438 wounded, and estimated McDowell's entire loss (including prisoners) at over 1,500. The battle field remained in possession of the insurgents, yet, in spite of their superior numbers, they failed to improve their victory by either a destructive pursuit or an early movement upon Washington. The Rebel General confesses, in his official report, that he was intending, before the battle, to attack McDowell, instead of awaiting his farther advance, manifestly hoping, after uniting Johnston's forces and his own, to gain possession of the Federal Capital. The hard-contested field of Bull Run postponed farther attempts to accomplish this purpose, and the prompt and efficient measures

taken for the defense of Washington rendered the joint campaign of Johnston and Beauregard as unproductive of material results, as the advance of McDowell, unsustained by Patterson, had been wanting in military success. It was chiefly in its moral effect, at home and abroad, that this battle had any special significance

CHAPTER III.

Extra Session of Congress.—President Lincoln's Message.—Retel Affairs at Richmond.

CONGRESS had convened on the 4th of July, in accordance with the President's call in his proclamation of April 15th, and organized by the election of Mr. Grow, of Pennsylvania, as Speaker. Little decisive action had been taken prior to the date to which military events have been traced in the preceding chapter. The President's Message to Congress, at the opening of this extra session, contains a concise statement of the situation of affairs at that time, four months having passed since the delivery of his Inaugural Address, and presents his views as to what was required to be done for the maintenance of the Constitutional Government. With a review of the circumstances under which hostilities were commenced, and with a conclusive exposure of the false pretenses of Secessionism, it also clearly sets forth the acts, motives and purposes of the President. This document is here given at length :

MR. LINCOLN'S FIRST MESSAGE.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: Having been convened on an extraordinary occasion, as authorized by the Constitution, your attention is not called to any ordinary subject of legislation. At the beginning of the present Presidential term, four months ago, the functions of the Federal Government were found to be generally suspended within the several States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Florida, excepting only those of the Postoffice Department.

Within these States all the Forts, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, Custom-Houses, and the like, including the movable and stationary property in and about them, had been seized, and were held in open hostility to this Government, excepting only

Forts Pickens, Taylor and Jefferson, on and near the Florida coast, and Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor, South Carolina. The forts thus seized had been put in improved condition, new ones had been built, and armed forces had been organized, and were organizing, all avowedly with the same hostile purpose.

The forts remaining in possession of the Federal Government in and near these States were either besieged or menaced by warlike preparations, and especially Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded by well-protected hostile batteries, with guns equal in quality to the best of its own, and outnumbering the latter as, perhaps, ten to one—a disproportionate share of the Federal muskets and rifles had somehow found their way into these States, and had been seized to be used against the Government.

Accumulations of the public revenue lying within them had been seized for the same object. The navy was scattered in distant seas, leaving but a very small part of it within the immediate reach of the Government.

Officers of the Federal Army had resigned in great numbers, and of those resigning a large proportion had taken up arms against the Government.

Simultaneously, and in connection with all this, the purpose to sever the Federal Union was openly avowed. In accordance with this purpose an ordinance had been adopted in each of these States, declaring the States respectively to be separated from the National Union. A formula for instituting a combined Government of those States had been promulgated, and this illegal organization, in the character of the "Confederate States," was already invoking recognition, aid and intervention from foreign powers.

Finding this condition of things, and believing it to be an imperative duty upon the incoming Executive to prevent, if possible, the consummation of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union, a choice of means to that end became indispensable. This choice was made and was declared in the Inaugural Address.

The policy chosen looked to the exhaustion of all peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger ones. It sought only to hold the public places and property not already wrested from the Government, and to collect the revenue, relying for the rest on time, discussion and the ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the mails, at Government expense, to the very people who were resisting the Government, and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbances to any of the people, or any of their rights, of all that which a President might con-

stitutionally and justifiably do in such a case; every thing was forborne, without which it was believed possible to keep the Government on foot.

On the 5th of March, the present incumbent's first full day in office, a letter from Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th of February, and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was by that Department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer, that reënforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the time for its relief rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force less than 20,000 good and well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieut. Gen. Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in his opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of the Army and Navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly but decidedly to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the Government, or could be raised and brought to the ground, within the time when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted. In a purely military point of view, this reduced the duty of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort.

It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it would be our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be reached, Fort Pickens might be reënforced. This last would be a clear indication of policy, and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was received just one week before the fall of Sumter. The news itself was that the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been transferred!

from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of the late Administration, and of the existence of which the present Administration, up to the time the order was dispatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention, had refused to land the troops. To now reënforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was impossible, rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions at the latter named fort. In precaution against such a conjuncture the Government had a few days before commenced preparing an expedition, as well adapted as might be, to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to be ultimately used or not, according to circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using it was now presented, and it was resolved to send it forward as had been intended. In this contingency it was also resolved to notify the Governor of South Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made to provision the fort, and that if the attempt should not be resisted there would be no attempt to throw in men, arms or ammunition, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given, whereupon the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition.

It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter, was, in no sense, a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit aggression upon them; they knew they were expressly notified that the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would, on that occasion, be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more. They knew that this Government desired to keep the garrison in the fort, not to assail them, but merely to maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve the Union from actual and immediate dissolution; trusting, as hereinbefore stated, to time, discussion, and the ballot-box for final adjustment, and they assailed and reduced the fort, for precisely the reverse object, to drive out the visible authority of the Federal Union, and thus force it to immediate dissolution; that this was their object the Executive well understood, having said to them in the Inaugural Address, "you can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors." He took pains not only to keep this declaration good, but also to keep the case so far from ingenious sophistry as that the world should not misunderstand it. By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its surrounding circumstances, that point was reached. Then and thereby the assailants of the Government began the conflict of arms—without a gun in sight, or in expectancy, to return their fire,

save only the few in the fort sent to that harbor years before, for their own protection, and still ready to give that protection in whatever was lawful. In this act, discarding all else, they have forced upon the country the distinct issue, immediate dissolution or blood, and this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a Constitutional Republic or Democracy, a Government of the people, by the same people, can or can not maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes. It presents the question whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to control the Administration according to the organic law in any case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or any other pretenses, or arbitrarily without any pretense, break up their Government, and thus practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask, "Is there in all republics this inherent and fatal weakness?" Must a Government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence? So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government, and so to resist the force employed for its destruction by force for its preservation. The call was made, and the response of the country was most gratifying, surpassing, in unanimity and spirit, the most sanguine expectation. Yet none of the States, commonly called Slave States, except Delaware, gave a regiment through the regular State organization. A few regiments have been organized within some others of those States by individual enterprise, and received into the Government service. Of course the seceded States, so called, and to which Texas had been joined about the time of the inauguration, gave no troops to the cause of the Union. The Border States, so called, were not uniform in their action, some of them being almost for the Union, while in others, as in Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, the Union sentiment was nearly repressed and silenced. The course taken in Virginia was the most remarkable, perhaps the most important. A Convention, elected by the people of that State to consider this very question of disrupting the Federal Union, was in session at the capital of Virginia when Fort Sumter fell.

To this body the people had chosen a large majority of professed Union men. Almost immediately after the fall of Sumter many members of that majority went over to the original disunion minority, and with them adopted an ordinance for withdrawing the State from the Union. Whether this change was wrought by their great approval of the assault upon Sumter, or their great resentment at the Government's resistance to that

assault, is not definitely known. Although they submitted the ordinance for ratification to a vote of the people, to be taken on a day then somewhat more than a month distant, the Convention and the Legislature, which was also in session at the same time and place, with leading men of the State, not members of either, immediately commenced acting as if the State was already out of the Union. They pushed military preparations vigorously forward all over the State. They seized the United States Armory at Harper's Ferry, and the Navy Yard at Gosport, near Norfolk. They received, perhaps invited into their State, large bodies of troops, with their warlike appointments, from the so-called seceded States.

They formally entered into a treaty of temporary alliance with the so-called Confederate States, and sent members to their Congress at Montgomery, and finally they permitted the insurrectionary Government to be transferred to their capitol at Richmond. The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant insurrection to make its nest within her borders, and this Government has no choice left but to deal with it where it finds it, and it has the less to regret as the loyal citizens have, in due form, claimed its protection. Those loyal citizens this Government is bound to recognize and protect as being in Virginia. In the Border States, so called, in fact the Middle States there are those who favor a policy which they call armed neutrality, that is, an arming of those States to prevent the Union forces passing one way or the disunion forces the other over their soil. This would be disunion completed. Figuratively speaking, it would be the building of an impassable wall along the line of separation, and yet not quite an impassable one, for under the guise of neutrality it would tie the hands of the Union men, and freely pass supplies from among them to the insurrectionists, which it could not do as an open enemy. At a stroke it would take all the trouble off the hands of secession, except only what proceeds from the external blockade. It would do for the disunionists that which of all things they most desire, feed them well and give them disunion without a struggle of their own. It recognizes no fidelity to the Constitution, no obligation to maintain the Union, and while very many who have favored it are doubtless loyal citizens, it is, nevertheless, very injurious in effect.

Recurring to the action of the Government it may be stated that at first a call was made for 75,000 militia, and rapidly following this a proclamation was issued for closing the ports of the insurrectionary districts by proceedings in the nature of blockade. So far all was believed to be strictly legal.

At this point the insurrectionists announced their purpose to enter upon the practice of privateering.

Other calls were made for volunteers, to serve three years, unless sooner discharged, and also for large additions to the regular army and navy. These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would ratify them.

It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress. Soon after the first call for militia it was considered a duty to authorize the Commanding General, in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised, but very sparingly. Nevertheless the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has been called to the proposition that one who is sworn to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, should not himself violate them. Of course some consideration was given to the questions of power and propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted, and failing of execution in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that, by use of the means necessary to their execution, some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that practically it relieves more of the guilty than the innocent, should, to a very great extent, be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself to go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case would not the official oath be broken if the Government should be overthrown when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it.

But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it, is equivalent to a provision that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ, which was authorized to be made. Now, it is insisted that

Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it can not be believed that the framers of the instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case by the rebellion. No more extended argument is now afforded, as an opinion at some length will probably be presented by the Attorney-General. Whether there shall be any legislation on the subject, and if so, what, is submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress. The forbearance of this Government had been so extraordinary, and so long continued, as to lead some foreign nations to shape their action as if they supposed the early destruction of our National Union was probable. While this, on discovery, gave the Executive some concern, he is now happy to say that the sovereignty and rights of the United States are now everywhere practically respected by foreign Powers, and a general sympathy with the country is manifested throughout the world.

The reports of the Secretaries of the Treasury, War, and the Navy, will give the information, in detail, deemed necessary and convenient for your deliberation and action, while the Executive and all the Departments will stand ready to supply omissions or to communicate new facts considered important for you to know.

It is now recommended that you give the legal means for making this contest a short and decisive one; that you place at the control of the Government for the work at least 400,000 men and \$400,000,000; that number of men is about one-tenth of those of proper ages within the regions where apparently all are willing to engage, and the sum is less than a twenty-third part of the money value owned by the men who seem ready to devote the whole. A debt of \$600,000,000 now is a less sum per head than was the debt of our Revolution when we came out of that struggle, and the money value in the country bears even a greater proportion to what it was then than does the population. Surely each man has as strong a motive now to preserve our liberties as each had then to establish them.

A right result at this time will be worth more to the world than ten times the men and ten times the money. The evidence reaching us from the country leaves no doubt that the material for the work is abundant, and that it need only the hand of legislation to give it legal sanction, and the hand of the Executive to give it practical shape and efficiency. One of the greatest perplexities of the Government is to avoid

receiving troops faster than it can provide for them ; in a word the people will save their Government if the Government will do its part only indifferently well. It might seem at first thought to be of little difference whether the present movement at the South be called secession or rebellion. The movers, however, well understand the difference. At the beginning they knew that they could never raise their treason to any respectable magnitude by any name which implies violation of law ; they knew their people possessed as much of moral sense, as much of devotion to law and order, and as much pride in its reverence for the history and Government of their common country, as any other civilized and patriotic people. They knew they could make no advancement directly in the teeth of these strong and noble sentiments. Accordingly they commenced by an insidious debauching of the public mind ; they invented an ingenious sophism, which, if conceded, was followed by perfectly logical steps through all the incidents of the complete destruction of the Union. The sophism itself is that any State of the Union may, consistently with the Nation's Constitution, and therefore lawfully and peacefully, withdraw from the Union without the consent of the Union or of any other State.

The little disguise that the supposed right is to be exercised only for just cause, themselves to be the sole judge of its justice, is too thin to merit any notice with rebellion. Thus sugar-coated, they have been drugging the public mind of their section for more than thirty years, and until at length they have brought many good men to a willingness to take up arms against the Government the day after some assemblage of men have enacted the farcical pretense of taking their State out of the Union, who could have been brought to no such thing the day before. This sophism derives much, perhaps the whole of its currency, from the assumption that there is some omnipotent and sacred supremacy pertaining to a State, to each State of our Federal Union. Our States have neither more nor less power than that reserved to them in the Union by the Constitution, no one of them ever having been a State out of the Union. The original ones passed into the Union before they cast off their British Colonial dependence, and the new ones came into the Union directly from a condition of dependence, excepting Texas, and even Texas, in its temporary independence, was never designated as a State. The new ones only took the designation of States on coming into the Union, while that name was first adopted for the old ones in and by the Declaration of Independence. Therein the United Colonies were declared to be *free and independent* States. But even then the

object plainly was not to declare their independence of one another of the Union, but directly the contrary, as their mutual pledge and their mutual action before, at the time, and afterward, abundantly show. The express plight of faith by each and all of the original thirteen States in the Articles of Confederation two years later that the Union shall be perpetual, is most conclusive. Having never been States either in substance or in name outside of the Union, whence this magical omnipotence of State rights, asserting a claim of power to lawfully destroy the Union itself. Much is said about the sovereignty of the States, but the word even is not in the National Constitution, nor, as is believed, in any of the State constitutions. What is sovereignty in the political sense of the word? Would it be far wrong to define it a political community without a political superior? Tested by this, no one of our States, except Texas, ever was a sovereignty. And even Texas gave up the character on coming into the Union; by which act, she acknowledged the Constitution of the United States, and the laws and treaties of the United States, made in pursuance of the Constitution, to be, for her, the supreme law of the land. The States have their *status* in the Union, and they have no other legal *status*. If they break from this they can only do so against law and by revolution. The Union and not themselves separately procured their independence and their liberty by conquest or purchase. The Union gave each of them whatever of independence and liberty it has. The Union is older than any of the States, and, in fact, it created them, as States. Originally, some dependent Colonies made the Union, and in turn the Union threw off their old dependence for them and made them States, such as they are. Not one of them ever had a State constitution independent of the Union. Of course it is not forgotten that all the new States formed their constitutions before they entered the Union; nevertheless, dependent upon, and preparatory to coming into the Union. Unquestionably the States have the powers and rights reserved to them in and by the National Constitution.

But among these surely are not included all conceivable powers, however mischievous or destructive, but at most such only as were known in the world at the time as governmental powers, and certainly a power to destroy the Government itself had never been known as a governmental, as a merely administrative power. This relative matter of National power and State rights as a principle, is no other than the principle of generality and locality. Whatever concerns the whole should be conferred to the whole General Government, while whatever

concerns only the State should be left exclusively to the State. This is all there is of original principle about it. Whether the National Constitution, in defining boundaries between the two, has applied the principle with exact accuracy, is not to be questioned. We are all bound by that defining without question. What is now combatted is the position that secession is consistent with the Constitution, is lawful and peaceful. It is not contended that there is any express law for it, and nothing should ever be implied as law which leads to unjust or absurd consequences. The nation purchased with money the countries out of which several of these States were formed. Is it just that they shall go off without leave and without refunding? The nation paid very large sums in the aggregate, I believe nearly a hundred millions, to relieve Florida of the aboriginal tribes. Is it just that she shall now be off without consent, or without any return? The nation is now in debt for money applied to the benefit of these so-called seceding States, in common with the rest. Is it just, either that creditors shall go unpaid, or the remaining States pay the whole? A part of the present National debt was contracted to pay the old debt of Texas. Is it just that she shall leave and pay no part of this herself? Again, if one State may secede so may another, and when all shall have seceded none is left to pay the debts. Is this quite just to creditors? Did we notify them of this sage view of ours when we borrowed their money? If we now recognize this doctrine by allowing the seceders to go in peace, it is difficult to see what we can do if others choose to go, or to extort terms upon which they will promise to remain. The seceders insist that our Constitution admits of secession. They have assumed to make a National Constitution of their own, in which, of necessity, they have either discarded or retained the right of secession, as they insist exists in ours. If they have discarded it, they thereby admit that on principle it ought not to exist in ours; if they have retained it, by their own construction of ours that shows that to be consistent, they must secede from one another whenever they shall find it the easiest way of settling their debts, or effecting any other selfish or unjust object. The principle itself is one of disintegration, and upon which no Government can possibly endure. If all the States save one should assert the power to drive that one out of the Union, it is presumed the whole class of seceder politicians would at once deny the power, and denounce the act as the greatest outrage upon State rights. But suppose that precisely the same act, instead of being called driving the one out, should be called the seceding of the others from that one, it would be exactly what the Seceders claim to do, unless.

indeed, they made the point that the one, because it is a minority, may rightfully do what the others, because they are a majority, may not rightfully do. These politicians are subtle, and profound in the rights of minorities. They are not partial to that power which made the Constitution, and speaks from the preamble, calling itself, "We, the people." It may be well questioned whether there is to-day a majority of the legally qualified voters of any State, except, perhaps, South Carolina, in favor of disunion. There is much reason to believe that the Union men are the majority in many, if not in every one of the so-called seceded States. The contrary has not been demonstrated in any one of them. It is ventured to affirm this, even of Virginia and Tennessee, for the result of an election held in military camps, where the bayonets are all on one side of the question voted upon, can scarcely be considered as demonstrating popular sentiment. At such an election all that large class who are at once for the Union and against coercion would be coerced to vote against the Union. It may be affirmed, without extravagance, that the free institutions we enjoy have developed the powers and improved the condition of our whole people beyond any example in the world. Of this we now have a striking and impressive illustration. So large an army as the Government has now on foot was never before known, without a soldier in it but who has taken his place there of his own free choice. But more than this, there are many single regiments whose members, one and another, possess full practical knowledge of all the arts, sciences, professions, and whatever else, whether useful or elegant, is known in the whole world, and there is scarcely one from which there could not be selected a President, a Cabinet, a Congress, and perhaps a Court, abundantly competent to administer the Government itself. Nor do I say this is not true also in the army of our late friends, now adversaries, in this contest. But it is so much better the reason why the Government which has conferred such benefits on both them and us should not be broken up. Whoever in any section proposes to abandon such a Government, would do well to consider in deference to what principle it is that he does it. What better he is likely to get in its stead, whether the substitute will give, or be intended to give so much of good to the people. There are some foreshadowings on this subject. Our adversaries have adopted some declarations of independence in which, unlike our good old one penned by Jefferson, they omit the words, "all men are created equal." Why? They have adopted a temporary National Constitution, in the preamble of which, unlike our good old one signed by Washington, they omit, "We, the people," and

substitute "We, the deputies of the sovereign and independent States." Why? Why this deliberate pressing out of view the rights of men and the authority of the people? This is essentially a people's contest. On the side of the Union it is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of Government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men, to lift artificial weights from all shoulders, to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all, to afford all an unfettered start and a fair chance in the race of life, yielding to partial and temporary departures from necessity. This is the leading object of the Government, for whose existence we contend.

I am most happy to believe that the plain people understand and appreciate this. It is worthy of note that while in this, the Government's hour of trial, large numbers of those in the army and navy who have been favored with the offices, have resigned and proved false to the hand which pampered them not one common soldier or common sailor is known to have deserted his flag. Great honor is due to those officers who remained true despite the example of their treacherous associates, but the greatest honor and the most important fact of all, is the unanimous firmness of the common soldiers and common sailors. To the last man, so far as known, they have successfully resisted the traitorous efforts of those whose commands but an hour before they obeyed as absolute law. This is the patriotic instinct of plain people. They understand without an argument that the destroying the Government which was made by Washington means no good to them. Our popular Government has often been called an experiment. Two points in it our people have settled: the successful establishing and the successful administering of it. One still remains. Its successful maintenance against a formidable internal attempt to overthrow it. It is now for them to demonstrate to the world that those who can fairly carry an election, can also suppress a rebellion; that ballots are the rightful and peaceful successors of bullets, and that when ballots have fairly and constitutionally decided, there can be no successful appeal back to bullets; that there can be no successful appeal except to ballots themselves at succeeding elections. Such will be a great lesson of peace, teaching men that what they can not take by an election, neither can they take by a war, teaching all the folly of being the beginners of a war.

Lest there be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men as to what is to be the course of the Government toward the Southern States after the rebellion shall have been suppressed, the Executive deems it proper to say it will be his purpose then, as ever, to be guided by the Constitution and

the laws, and that he probably will have no different understanding of the powers and duties of the Federal Government relatively to the rights of the States and the people under the Constitution than that expressed in the Inaugural Address. He desires to preserve the Government that it may be administered for all, as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal citizens every-where have a right to claim this of their Government, and the Government has no right to withhold or neglect it. It is not perceived that in giving it there is any coercion, conquest or subjugation in any sense of these terms.

The Constitution provided, and all the States have accepted the provision, "that the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of government," but if a State may lawfully go out of the Union, having done so, it may also discard the Republican form of Government. So that to prevent its going out is an indispensable means to the end of maintaining the guarantee mentioned; and when an end is lawful and obligatory, the indispensable means to it are also lawful and obligatory.

It was with the deepest regret that the Executive found the duty of employing the war power. In defense of the Government forced upon him, he could but perform this duty or surrender the existence of the Government. No compromise by public servants could in this case be a cure, not that compromises are not often proper, but that no popular government can long survive a marked precedent, that those who carry an election can only save the Government from immediate destruction by giving up the main point upon which the people gave the election. The people themselves and not their servants can safely reverse their own deliberate decisions.

As a private citizen the Executive could not have consented that these institutions shall perish, much less could he, in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust as these free people had confided to him. He felt that he had no moral right to shrink, nor even to count the chances of his own life in what might follow.

In full view of his great responsibility, he has so far done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours. He sincerely hopes that your views and your actions may so accord with his as to assure all faithful citizens who have been disturbed in their rights, of a certain and speedy restoration to them, under the Constitution and laws, and having thus chosen our cause without guile, and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, and go forward without fear and with manly hearts.

July 4, 1861.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

To the recommendation that \$400,000,000 be appropriated and 400,000 men raised, for the prosecution of the war, Congress responded with great unanimity, granting instead \$500,000,000 in money, and calling for 500,000 volunteers for the army. This action was consummated on the 22d of July—the day following the battle of Bull Run. The Senate had passed a bill of similar character on the 10th—five Senators, Messrs. Johnson, of Missouri, Kennedy, Polk, Powell and Saulsbury, voting in favor of an amendment reducing the number of men to 200,000. Otherwise, the measure was unopposed in that body.

On the 22d of July, the House of Representatives passed, with only two dissenting votes, the following resolution, introduced by Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky :

Resolved, By the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the country by the Disunionists of the Southern States now in revolt against the Constitutional Government, and in arms around the capital; that in this National emergency Congress, banishing all feeling of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country; that this war is not waged on our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union, with all the dignities, equality and rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease.

On the 10th of July, a bill passed the House of Representatives, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to effect a National loan, of not exceeding \$250,000,000, on bonds bearing seven per cent. interest, redeemable in twenty years, or in Treasury-notes of a denomination not less than \$50, payable in three years, at an interest of seven and three-tenths per cent. Only five Representatives voted in the negative, namely: Messrs. Burnett, Reid, Norton, Vallandigham and Wood. The first three of these, from Kentucky and Missouri, were soon after direct participants in the rebellion, either as civil or mili

tary officials. The subsequent course of the other two, living at the North, has been steadily in keeping with this association of their names and acts.

With certain modifications, which need not be particularized, the financial policy thus indicated was ultimately adopted by both houses of Congress, and approved by the President. A new tariff bill, designed to increase the revenue from imports, and a direct tax bill to raise \$20,000,000, also became a law on the 2d of August. A confiscation act, moderate in its provisions, was also passed near the close of the session. An act legalizing the official measures of the President, during the recent emergency, received the support of nearly every member of both houses. The extra session closed on the 6th day of August.

On the 20th day of July, the so-called Congress of the Rebe Confederacy assembled at Richmond, the seat of the civil branch of the rebellion having been removed to that city from Montgomery, where the same body had closed its first session on the 21st of May. Eight days after the latter date Davis arrived in Richmond, and his "government" was there put in operation. His message was sent in on the 20th of July. He therein congratulates his friends on the accession of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas to the seceding sisterhood, making in all eleven States against twenty-three still loyal. The subjoined extracts will serve to show the general character of the document, giving also an authentic Southern view of the contest down to the day preceding the battle of Manassas.

I deemed it advisable to direct the removal of the several Executive departments, with their archives, to this city, to which you have removed the seat of government. Immediately after your adjournment, the aggressive movements of the enemy required prompt, energetic action. The accumulation of his forces on the Potomac sufficiently demonstrated that his efforts were to be directed against Virginia, and from no point could necessary measures for her defense and protection be so effectively decided as from her own capital. The rapid progress of events for the last few weeks has fully sufficed to lift the veil, behind which the true policy and purposes of the

Government of the United States had been previously concealed. Their odious features now stand fully revealed. The message of their President, and the action of their Congress during the present month, confess their intention of the subjugation of these States, by a war by which it is impossible to attain the proposed result, while its dire calamities, not to be avoided by us, will fall with double severity on themselves.

Referring to the hearty response of Congress to the recommendation of President Lincoln as to men and means for prosecuting the war begun at Fort Sumter—the responsibility of which he vainly endeavors, by angry special pleading, to fix upon the Government—Davis, with a recklessness commensurate with his passion, goes on to say :

These enormous preparations in men and money, for the conduct of the war, on a scale more grand than any which the new world ever witnessed, is a distinct avowal, in the eyes of civilized man, that the United States are engaged in a conflict with a great and powerful nation. They are at last compelled to abandon the pretense of being engaged in dispersing rioters and suppressing insurrections, and are driven to the acknowledgment that the ancient Union has been dissolved. They recognize the separate existence of these Confederate States, by an interdictive embargo and blockade of all commerce between them and the United States, not only by sea, but by land ; not only in ships, but in cars ; not only with those who bear arms, but with the entire population of the Confederate States. Finally, they have repudiated the foolish conceit that the inhabitants of this Confederacy are still citizens of the United States ; for they are waging an indiscriminate war upon them all with savage ferocity, unknown in modern civilization.

After a highly-wrought picture of imaginary outrages perpetrated in Virginia by Federal armies that had scarcely begun to move, except in Western Virginia, where no pretext for such complaints existed, and by the Government in its adoption of the policy of non-intercourse, he comes to the case of certain captured privateersmen who were in close confinement, awaiting their trial for piracy. No terms for an exchange of prisoners had yet been agreed upon—the number on either side being very small, and the civil bearings of the question being yet under consideration. On this subject Davis fiercely remarks.

The prisoners of war taken by the enemy on board the armed schooner Savannah, sailing under our commission, were, as I was credibly advised, treated like common felons, put in irons, confined in a jail usually appropriated to criminals of the worst dye, and threatened with punishment as such. I had made application for the exchange of these prisoners to the commanding officer of the enemy's squadron off Charleston, but that officer had already sent the prisoners to New York when application was made. I therefore deemed it my duty to renew the proposal for the exchange to the constitutional Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, the only officer having control of the prisoners. To this end, I dispatched an officer to him under a flag of truce, and, in making the proposal, I informed President Lincoln of my resolute purpose to check all barbarities on prisoners of war by such severity of retaliation on prisoners held by us as should secure the abandonment of the practice. This communication was received and read by an officer in command of the United States forces, and a message was brought from him by the bearer of my communication, that a reply would be returned by President Lincoln as soon as possible. I earnestly hope this promised reply (which has not yet been received) will convey the assurance that prisoners of war will be treated, in this unhappy contest, with that regard for humanity, which has made such conspicuous progress in the conduct of modern warfare. As measures of precaution, however, and until this promised reply is received, I still retain in close custody some officers captured from the enemy, whom it had been my pleasure previously to set at large on parole, and whose fate must necessarily depend on that of prisoners held by the enemy.

The bearer of the communication referred to in this extract had come, under a flag of truce, to the headquarters of Gen. McDowell, at the Arlington House, on the 8th of July, causing much speculation, for a brief time, as to the object of his mission. Its real purport, however, was soon known. Capt. Taylor, who bore the insolent letter of Davis, reported to the latter on the 10th of July, that the missive had been delivered, and added:

After reading your communication to Mr. Lincoln, Gen Scott informed me that a reply would be returned by Mr. Lincoln as soon as possible

It would be more than doubtful, on such equivocal evidence alone, whether any reply was ever "promised," or even remotely suggested by the President. Certain it is that he made neither promise nor reply. At a subsequent date it was decided to put captured privateersmen on the same footing as other prisoners of war.

After persuasive allusions to the Border Slave States, with a palliation of the Kentucky neutrality so unsparingly dealt with by President Lincoln in his message, the Rebel "Executive" proceeds to other topics :

The operations in the field will be greatly extended by reason of the policy which heretofore has been secretly entertained, and is now *avowed* and acted on by us. The forces hitherto raised provide amply for the defense of seven States which originally organized in the Confederacy, as is evidently the fact, since, with the exception of three fortified islands, whose defense is efficiently aided by a preponderating naval force, the enemy has been driven completely out of these stations ; and now, at the expiration of five months from the formation of the Government, not a single hostile foot presses their soil. These forces, however, must necessarily prove inadequate to repel invasion by the half million of men now proposed by the enemy, and a corresponding increase of our forces will become necessary.

To speak of subjugating such a people, so united and determined, is to speak in a language incomprehensible to them ; to resist attack on their rights or their liberties is with them an instinct. Whether this war shall last one, or three, or five years, is a problem they leave to be solved by the enemy alone. It will last till the enemy shall have withdrawn from their borders ; till their political rights, their altars, and their homes are freed from invasion. Then, and then only, will they rest from this struggle to enjoy, in peace, the blessings which, with the favor of Providence, they have secured by the aid of their own strong hearts and steady arms.

It may be added that the chief conspirator found his subordinates of the self-styled Confederate Congress ready to second his wishes, and to act in the spirit of his communication to them. They voted, without stint—in their assumption of authority—men and means for carrying on aggressive as well as defensive war, on the scale planned by their chief.

The issue was now fairly joined. No possible solution remained but one to be achieved by arms, and the most serious stage of the contest seemed to be at hand. On both sides the armies were rapidly filling up, and receiving the necessary organization and discipline under leaders deemed, at the time, best suited for the emergency. From this time onward, the history of Mr. Lincoln's Administration is, to a large extent, merged in that of the war. The most important measures of legislation and all the principal Executive acts and orders, are closely related to the suppression of a revolt which surpasses, in the magnitude of its proportions and of the final issues involved, any other recorded in authentic annals.

CHAPTER IV.

Military Reorganization.—Resumé of Events to the December Session of Congress.—Action in Regard to “Contrabands” and Slavery.

THE first depression which followed the disaster at Manassas, speedily gave place to an uprising of the loyal sentiment of the nation, surpassing in earnestness and grandeur even that which immediately succeeded the fall of Fort Sumter. For this effect in deepening and strengthening the popular determination, the Rebel cause had received no substantial compensation through its barren victory. The losses were too nearly equal, the ground won was too insignificant, and the fruits which might have been gathered by a Napoleonic general had too completely eluded the grasp of Beauregard and his superior, Davis, (who had come up from Richmond just in time to witness the closing spectacle), to afford real occasion for the exultation universally manifested throughout the territory occupied by the insurgents. Yet, at home and abroad, the immediate effect was auspicious in appearance for the now very sanguine leaders of secession. They looked forward to nothing less than early occupation of Washington, with the subjection of Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky and Missouri, under an armed invasion, and a recognition, throughout the world, of the Rebel Empire.

A prompt reorganization of our armies in front of Washington and in the Shenandoah was ordered by the President. Whatever the merits of McDowell, it was necessary to call another to his place who could better command the public confidence. The ardent dispatches of the young commander in West Virginia were yet fresh in all minds. He had the favoring support of Gen. Scott, and on every side there was a predisposition to hope the most and the best from his assignment

to a larger command. If the President erred, it was only in common with the people whose will he had undertaken to execute, and not from favoritism or partiality, political or personal, toward an officer whom he had never seen.

The 25th of July, 1861, is memorable as the day on which Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont arrived in St. Louis, and entered on his command of the Department of the West; as the day on which Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks (previously in command at Baltimore) reached Harper's Ferry, superseding Gen. Patterson; and as that on which Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan arrived in Washington to take command of the Army of the Potomac. His former place, as commander of the Army in West Virginia, was, by an order issued on the same day, given to the hero of Rich Mountain, Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans. At Baltimore, Maj. Gen. John A. Dix assumed command in place of Banks.

For the three months succeeding the battle of Bull Run, the Army of the Potomac, from which the people impatiently awaited worthy deeds to redeem and avenge the former failure, has only the history of rapidly increasing numbers, of improving organization and discipline, and of the needed preparation, in respect to arms, equipments, supplies and experience of camp life. During this period, the number of men under McClellan's command had come to be estimated at about 200,000. It is believed that the effective force, on the 21st of October, when the first movement commenced, fell but little, if any, short of that number. Meanwhile the Potomac had become substantially closed by a Rebel blockade, injurious to many interests, and hazardous in a military point of view. But the prudent General, guarding himself against premature movements, in accordance with the monition which he saw in the result of McDowell's advance, deemed it unwise to risk a general action by coöperating with a naval force, as was desired, to reopen navigation on the river.

On the 18th of August, the command at Fortress Monroe was surrendered to Gen. John E. Wool, by Gen. Butler, who proceeded northward to organize a separate expedition, the destination of which was not disclosed.

In the West stirring events had transpired prior to the arrival of Gen. Fremont at the headquarters of his Department. In Missouri, the Rebel forces had been gradually driven toward the Southwest by the small army under Gens. Lyon and Sigel with occasional engagements, until finally the insurgents, with greatly increased numbers, had made a stand at a place nine miles beyond Springfield, on Wilson's Creek. Here, on the 10th of August, was fought a memorable battle, which may be termed the second considerable engagement of the war. Gen. Lyon, whose entire force appears to have been less than 6,000, attacked the enemy in camp, reported to be 22,000 strong, now under command of Ben. McCulloch. The advance was made in two columns: one under Lyon himself, moving directly on the enemy; the other, making a circuit of fifteen miles toward the left, was to turn the enemy's right. This well-planned movement was commenced on the night of the 9th. Gen. Lyon's column, after resting two hours, following the night's march, resumed its course at four o'clock in the morning, and his advance drove in the enemy's pickets an hour later. The camp was soon in full view, extending for three miles along the valley, and the attack was commenced by Blair's Missouri regiment, while Totten's battery began to shell the tents more distant. The Iowa First and two Kansas regiments were also brought up. A cavalry charge of the enemy was met and repulsed. Another attack, about nine o'clock, somewhat staggered our forces, and in placing himself at the head of the Iowa regiment, to lead a bayonet charge, Gen. Lyon, who had already received three wounds that morning, was shot through the breast by a rifle ball and fell dead on the field. The last Rebel advance, made about one o'clock in the afternoon, was repulsed.

The movement under Gen. Sigel was successful at first, and resulted in the destruction of the enemy's tents and entire baggage train, about noon. Sigel's column, however, was obliged at length to give way. Both columns now retired toward Springfield, the entire loss being reported as eight hundred killed and wounded. The enemy is believed to have suffered heavily, especially from the well-directed fire of our artillery

He did not pursue our forces, which were led away by Gen. Sigel without confusion or disorder. Although not successful in occupying the enemy's position, yet the partial advantages gained, with so great a disparity of numbers, left a very different moral impression from that of the defeat at Manassas, on the 21st of July.

The loss of Nathaniel Lyon would have been a dear price for the most decided victory. As a General, as a patriot, as a man, his name will remain one of the brightest among those of the memorable heroes of his time.

Gen. Fremont, on his arrival at St. Louis, had set about organizing his forces for an energetic campaign, not only to restore order in Missouri, but also to gain control of the Mississippi river. Volunteers in great numbers sought service under him, his name awakening an enthusiasm, particularly among citizens of German origin, beyond that of any other commander. The operations began under Lyon and Sigel were allowed to continue, substantially following out the plans already formed, while he was carefully fortifying the city of St. Louis, and organizing a gunboat service, afterward to become so important an auxiliary on the Western waters. But a brief time had elapsed, after Fremont's arrival at St. Louis, before the engagement at Wilson's Creek—fought at greatly unequal odds, for which his personal opponents vehemently censured him—and the subsequent retreat, together with the constantly occurring disturbances in various parts of the State, satisfied the commanding General that he had no light task in reestablishing peace and order in Missouri alone. Before he assumed command, Gen. Pope had already been obliged to resort to energetic measures in the northern part of the State, to suppress the irregular warfare there prevalent, and to quiet the deadly feuds existing between the two parties into which the communities were divided. The necessity of more stringent proceedings throughout the State was daily becoming manifest.

It was under these circumstances that, at length, Gen. Fremont issued his famous order proclaiming martial law, in the following terms:

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, }
St. Louis, August 30, 1861. }

Circumstances in my judgment are of sufficient urgency to render it necessary that the commanding General of this department should assume the administrative powers of the State. Its disorganized condition, helplessness of civil authority, and the total insecurity of life, and devastation of property by bands of murderers and marauders, who infest nearly every county in the State, and avail themselves of public misfortunes, in the vicinity of a hostile force, to gratify private and neighborhood vengeance, and who find an enemy wherever they find plunder, finally demand the severest measures to repress the daily increasing crimes and outrages which are driving off the inhabitants and ruining the State.

In this condition the public safety and success of our arms require unity of purpose, without let or hindrance to the prompt administration of affairs. In order, therefore, to suppress disorders, maintain the public peace, and give security to the persons and property of loyal citizens, I do hereby extend and declare established martial law throughout the State of Missouri. The lines of the army occupation in this State are for the present declared to extend from Leavenworth, by way of posts of Jefferson City, Rolla and Ironton, to Cape Girardeau on the Mississippi river. All persons who shall be taken with arms in their hands within these lines shall be tried by court-martial, and if found guilty will be shot. Real and personal property of those who shall take up arms against the United States, or who shall be directly proven to have taken an active part with their enemies in the field, is declared confiscated to public use, and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared free men.

All persons who shall be proven to have destroyed, after the publication of this order, railroad tracks, bridges, or telegraph lines, shall suffer the extreme penalty of the law. All persons engaged in treasonable correspondence, in giving or procuring aid to the enemy, in fermenting turmoil, and disturbing public tranquillity, by creating or circulating false reports, or incendiary documents, are warned that they are exposing themselves.

All persons who have been led away from allegiance are required to return to their homes forthwith. Any such absence, without sufficient cause, will be held to be presumptive evidence against them. The object of this declaration is to place in the hands of military authorities power to give instantaneous effect to the existing laws, and supply such deficiencies as the conditions of the war demand; but it is not in

tended to suspend the ordinary tribunals of the country, where law will be administered by civil officers in the usual manner, and with their customary authority, while the same can be peaceably administered.

The commanding General will labor vigilantly for the public welfare, and, by his efforts for their safety, hopes to obtain not only acquiescence, but the active support of the people of the country

J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.

An order of this character could not fail to become a topic of general discussion throughout the land. The attention of the President was early called to the subject, and the strongest opposition was manifested to the proposed exercise of the military power, by a subordinate commander, for the confiscation of slave property. This sentiment was clearly expressed in a letter to the President, by the Hon. Joseph Holt, under date of September 12th, in which he said :

The late act of Congress providing for the confiscation of the estates of persons in open rebellion against the Government was, as a necessary war measure, accepted and fully approved by the loyal men of the country. It limited the penalty of confiscation to property actually employed in the service of the rebellion with the knowledge and consent of its owners, and, instead of emancipating slaves thus employed, left their status to be determined either by the Courts of the United States or by subsequent legislation. The proclamation, however, of Gen. Fremont, under date of the 30th of August, transcends, and, of course, violates the law in both these particulars, and declares that the property of rebels, whether used in support of the rebellion or not, shall be confiscated, and if consisting in slaves, that they shall be at once manumitted. The act of Congress referred to was believed to embody the conservative policy of your Administration upon this delicate and perplexing question, and hence the loyal men of the Border Slave States have felt relieved of all fears of any attempt on the part of the Government of the United States to liberate suddenly in their midst a population unprepared for freedom, and whose presence could not fail to prove a painful apprehension, if not a terror, to the homes and families of all. You may, therefore, well judge of the alarm and condemnation with which the Union-loving citizens of Kentucky—the State

with whose popular sentiment I am best acquainted—**have** read this proclamation.

The hope is earnestly indulged by them as it is by myself, that this paper was issued under the pressure of military necessity, which Gen. Fremont believed justified the step, but that in the particulars specified it has not your approbation and will not be enforced in derogation of law. The magnitude of the interest at stake, and my extreme desire that by no misapprehension of your sentiments or purposes shall the power and fervor of the loyalty of Kentucky be at this moment abated or chilled, must be my apology for the frankness with which I have addressed you, and for the request I venture to make of an expression of your views upon the points of Gen. Fremont's proclamation on which I have commented.

The President had already written and transmitted the following letter to Gen. Fremont, expressing in definite terms, as a public order, what had been before more privately indicated to him, immediately after that officer's action on this subject was known :

WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 11, 1861.

Major General John C. Fremont :

SIR: Yours of the 8th, in answer to mine of the 2d inst., is just received. Assured that you, upon the ground, could better judge of the necessities of your position than I could at this distance, on seeing your proclamation of August 30, I perceived no general objection to it; the particular clause, however, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves appeared to me to be objectionable in its non-conformity to the act of Congress, passed the 6th of last August, upon the same subjects, and hence I wrote you, expressing my wish that that clause should be modified accordingly. Your answer just received expresses the preference on your part that I should make an open order for the modification which I very cheerfully do. It is, therefore, ordered that the said clause of the said proclamation be so modified, held, and construed as to conform with and not to transcend the provisions on the same subject contained in the act of Congress entitled "An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes," approved August 6, 1861, and that said act be published at length with this order.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

It will be observed that this modification merely requires the General commanding in the Department of the West "to conform with, and not to transcend, the provisions" of the Confiscation Act in regard to the slaves of Rebels; in other words, it merely required obedience to the law. At the present time, in view of what the President has since done, as Commander-in-chief of the Army, as well as of his sentiments on Slavery clearly set forth, previously, on all proper occasions, no word is needed to prevent misapprehension as to this Executive order.

By a timely movement, anticipating the contemplated advance of Gen. Polk from Hickman and Columbus, Gen. Grant, of Fremont's command, on the 6th of September, occupied Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee river—a position virtually flanking that of the Rebel forces on the Mississippi, in Kentucky. Com. A. H. Foote had been ordered, a few days previously, (August 26,) to the command of the naval forces on the Western waters. Price and Jackson were actively engaged in endeavoring to raise a formidable army, and to overrun the State. Their attack on our forces at Lexington had terminated in the surrender of Col. Mulligan and the men under him at that place, on the 12th of September. Fremont at length prepared to take the field in person against the insurgents, in Southwestern Missouri. He collected all the troops which he regarded as properly available for the purpose, and, leaving Jefferson City for Sedalia, on the 8th of October seemed to be energetically commencing a campaign which many thought to have been quite too long deferred. Price's force gradually fell back once more before the National columns, and were finally reported to be preparing to give battle near Springfield. Here Fremont, who was apparently on the point of engaging the enemy, was overtaken by the order relieving him from his command. He was temporarily succeeded by Gen. Hunter, who soon handed over the command to Gen. Halleck.

Gen. Fremont had been created a Major General by the voluntary action of President Lincoln, from a conviction of the fitness of such appointment. When assigned to the command of the Army of the West he was received in that quarter with

general enthusiasm, despite the seeming tardiness with which he entered on his work. Of the charges made against him, and of the grounds which seemed to make a change in the command advisable, it is enough to say here that they did not so far influence the mind of Mr. Lincoln against Gen. Fremont, as to prevent his subsequently assigning him a high military trust. The President's action was then, and still may be, to some extent, misconstrued; but no candid person, with the facts before him, will question that honorable and patriotic motives led to an order which was, on mere personal considerations, reluctantly given.

Under Gen. Hunter, our forces retreated without a battle, and the Rebel hordes again advanced over the already devastated country beyond and around Springfield. It was at the latter place, which had been speedily reoccupied by Price, that, on the 25th of October, Fremont's body guard, of three hundred mounted men, under Maj. Zagonyi, charged upon and routed two thousand Rebels, drawn up in line of battle, dispersed them pell-mell, and retired without serious loss—a deed of heroic daring unsurpassed in any war.

In West Virginia, after the departure of McClellan, our army found its labors by no means so completely terminated as that officer had supposed at the date of his glowing dispatch announcing the victory at Rich Mountain. On the contrary, serious work was still to be done, and there were active enemies to meet, not only under such Brigadiers as Floyd and Wise, but also under Gen. Robert E. Lee. The well-planned schemes of all these Rebel leaders for subjugating the loyal people of that section were foiled by Gen. Rosecrans, but not without his utmost vigilance, and only after labors, hardships and battles, which were by no means unimportant in comparison with those of the earlier summer. On the 10th of September, Floyd was beaten in the battle of Carnifex Ferry, while Lee's attempt to lead a force through Greenbriar County to coöperate in crushing the Ohio forces, which had advanced up the Kanawha and the Gauley, ended at Big Sewell Mountain, in utter failure. It was only on the sudden and final retreat of Floyd, from Gauley Bridge, eluding the grasp of Gen. Renham, to the disappoint

ment of Rosecrans, that, on the 20th of November, West Virginia was substantially freed from armed Rebels, and the campaign in that quarter ended.

During the progress of these events, of the autumn of 1861, two expeditions were in preparation, one under the command of Gen. Butler, and the other under Gen. Burnside. These expeditions, undertaken against the persistent opposition of McClellan, were regarded with interest and hope by the people, who were becoming wearied with the long inaction of the Army of the Potomac, in the presence of an enemy notoriously much inferior in numbers. The fine condition of the roads and the pleasant weather seemed to invite the long-delayed and long-expected advance, which the public had again and again been led to believe, by intimations from headquarters, was about to be commenced. One, at least, of the expeditions named, was for a time believed to be intended to aid McClellan's promised movement, by ascending the Rappahannock or otherwise. Without the slightest detriment, twenty thousand men might have been spared for such a purpose from the already too cumbersome army near Washington. Yet so little did this suit the policy of the commanding General, in whom there was still confidence, that the forces for Butler and Burnside were raised elsewhere, and they were so delayed, in consequence, as in part to thwart their original purpose, and to impair their effectiveness. That under Gen. Butler, acting jointly with a naval force under Com. Stringham, took possession of the Hat-teras forts on the 29th of August. The Rebel commandant, Barron, formerly of the United States Navy, after enduring a severe cannonade from the fleet, surrendered the position, with the officers and soldiers under him. This intelligence was received by the country with lively satisfaction, at a time when some reassuring success was specially needed.

In the month of August the Rebels had occupied Munson's Hill, in full view of the capital, and six or seven miles distant in a right line. The force thus advanced was not formidable and the character of the works thrown up there, as discovered on the voluntary withdrawal of the occupants, clearly showed that their purpose was not serious. They held this position

until the 28th of September, on which day a foraging party went out eight miles on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, without encountering any enemy, or finding any definite trace of his previous presence in that direction. The prompt occupation of Munson's Hill, after its evacuation, by a force which McClellan, with his staff, had accompanied in person, electrified the people with the hope of some decisive action, on the part of the new commander. He shortly returned to Washington, however, and nearly another month passed before there were again visible symptoms of vitality—beyond that of military reviews and rhetorical army orders, or occasional reconnoissances, magnified by admiring correspondents—in the Army of the Potomac.

The movement of Oct. 21st, resulting in the well-known affair at Ball's Bluff, was scarcely less disastrous in its effects than the failure at Bull Run on the 21st of July. Coming after such complete and thorough preparation; following such manifold and inexcusable delays; and transpiring as the first of the weighty manifestations of McClellan's generalship, the consequence could only be mortification to the Administration, and discouragement, mingled with indignation, to the country at large. In this ill-starred fight fell Col. E. D. Baker, of Mexican War fame, the eloquent Senator from Oregon. The loss on our side was officially stated as 150 killed or drowned, 250 wounded, and 500 prisoners. The whole force engaged was given as 2,100. The rebel Gen. Evans, commanding on the other side, states his own loss in killed and wounded as 153. He estimates the Union loss at 1,300 killed, wounded and drowned, and asserts that 710 prisoners were captured, making a total of over 2,000, nearly equal to the whole number actively engaged. This exaggerated claim was not needed to show the destructive character of the engagement. In his general order on this occasion, dated Oct. 25, McClellan gave this version of the disaster:

The gallantry and discipline there displayed deserved a more fortunate result; but situated as these troops were—cut off alike from retreat and reinforcements, and attacked by an overwhelming force—five thousand against one thousand seven

hundred—it was not possible that the issue could have been successful.

The fact that Gen. McCall's division was almost simultaneously withdrawn by Gen. McClellan from a position effectually within supporting distance on the Virginia side of the river, instead of being advanced to coöperate in the movement on Leesburg, has not been satisfactorily explained. It is fair to presume, however, that there was no more culpable motive for this than a desire for the presence of McCall's troops at a grand review which was progressing near Lewinsville, while Col. Baker and his men were pushed forward into the jaws of destruction.

With the light thrown on this affair by subsequent investigations, it may well be doubted whether the President should not have viewed this result, after three months of wearisome and unaccountable inaction, as sufficient cause for withdrawing all further confidence from the commanding General. For the time, however, it was made to appear that the blame should rest elsewhere, and Gen. C. P. Stone, the subordinate in the field, became the scapegoat for his superior.

Despite the popular impatience, and all the circumstances favoring prompt action, nothing more was attempted by the commander of the Army of the Potomac—scarcely so much as a picket skirmish disturbed the general stagnation during those calm, dry days—for the next two months.

To Gen. Scott's generous appreciation, perhaps, more than to any other circumstance, was due the confidence extended by President Lincoln, at the outset, to Gen. McClellan, unknown as he was to almost every one else at Washington. His affiliations had formerly been with another class of public men, the principal of whom were now actively engaged in rebellion. With Jefferson Davis in particular, he seems to have been a youthful favorite, as his selection for a place on the Crimean Commission attests. Gen. Scott had formed a favorable opinion of the young Lieutenant in Mexico, and had very essentially aided in securing him credit with the present Administration. Of his subsequent deportment toward Gen. Scott,

this is not the place to speak, further than to say that the veteran Lieutenant General, his immediate superior, keenly felt the disrespectful bearing of his subordinate.

Increasing physical infirmity led the Lieutenant General to desire relief from all active duties, and from apparent responsibility for acts in which he really had no share. Directly after the affair at Ball's Bluff, he made known this wish to the President. The request was one which, urged as it was, could not be refused. The following is the President's order on this subject:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Nov. 1, 1861.

On the 1st day of November, A. D. 1861, upon his own application to the President of the United States, Brevet Lieut. Gen. Winfield Scott is ordered to be placed, and hereby is placed, upon the list of retired officers of the Army of the United States, without reduction in his current pay, subsistence or allowances.

The American people will hear with sadness and deep emotion that Gen. Scott has withdrawn from the active control of the army, while the President and the unanimous Cabinet express their own and the nation's sympathy in his personal affliction, and their profound sense of the important public services rendered by him to his country during his long and brilliant career, among which will ever be gratefully distinguished his faithful devotion to the Constitution, the Union and the flag, when assailed by a parricidal rebellion.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

This order was read to Gen. Scott, at his residence, by the President, the Cabinet being present. The veteran General replied:

PRESIDENT: This honor overwhelms me. It overpays all services I have attempted to render to my country. If I had any claims before, they are all obliterated by this expression of approval by the President, with the unanimous support of his Cabinet. I know the President and this Cabinet well—I know that the country has placed its interests, in this trying crisis in safe keeping. Their counsels are wise. Their labors are untiring as they are loyal, and their course is the right one.

President, you must excuse me; I am unable to stand longer to give utterance to the feelings of gratitude which oppress me. In my retirement I shall offer up my prayer to God for this

Administration, and for my country. I shall pray for it with confidence in its success over its enemies, and that speedily.

On Gen. McClellan, who now held the highest rank in the army, the President temporarily devolved the duties of General-in-chief, and that position was assumed in a general order, issued on the day of the Lieutenant General's retirement.

On the 7th of November, an expedition, under the joint command of Com. Dupont and Gen. T. W. Sherman, effected a landing on the South Carolina coast, having achieved a brilliant victory in Port Royal Harbor. In thus approaching a portion of the South densely populated with slaves, it became necessary to define more clearly the policy to be acted upon by our military officers. In doing so, former orders to General Butler, on first entering Virginia, in May, were repeated. The following is the official order to Gen. Sherman :

WAR DEPARTMENT, Oct. 14, 1861.

SIR: In conducting military operations within States declared by the proclamation of the President to be in a state of insurrection, you will govern yourself, so far as persons held to service under the laws of such States are concerned, by the principles of the letters addressed by me to Maj. Gen. Butler, on the 30th of May and the 8th of August, copies of which are herewith furnished to you. As special directions, adapted to special circumstances, can not be given, much must be referred to your own discretion, as Commanding General of the expedition. You will, however, in general, avail yourself of the services of any persons, whether fugitives from labor or not, who may offer them to the National Government; you will employ such persons in such services as they may be fitted for, either as ordinary employees, or, if special circumstances seem to require it, in any other capacity, with such organization in squads, companies, or otherwise, as you deem most beneficial to the service. This, however, not to mean a general arming of them for military service. You will assure all loyal masters that Congress will provide just compensation to them for the loss of the services of the persons so employed. It is believed that the course thus indicated will best secure the substantial rights of loyal masters, and the benefits to the United States of the services of all disposed to support the Government, while it avoids

all interference with the social systems or local institutions of every State, beyond that which insurrection makes unavoidable, and which a restoration of peaceful relations to the Union, under the Constitution, will immediately remove.

SIMON CAMERON
Secretary of War.

BRIG. GEN. T. W. SHERMAN,
Commanding Expedition to the Southern Coast.

Gen. Butler having, in his letter of May 27th, apprised the War Department as to his views and action in regard to fugitive slaves coming within his lines—such “property” being, in his opinion, *contraband of war*—the Secretary of War had replied :

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1861.

SIR : Your action in respect to the negroes who came within your lines, from the service of the Rebels, is approved. The Department is sensible of the embarrassments, which must surround officers conducting military operations in a State, by the laws of which slavery is sanctioned. The Government can not recognize the rejection by any State of its Federal obligation, resting upon itself, among these Federal obligations. However, no one can be more important than that of suppressing and dispersing any combination of the former for the purpose of overthrowing its whole constitutional authority. While, therefore, you will permit no interference, by persons under your command, with the relations of persons held to service under the laws of any State, you will, on the other hand, so long as any State within which your military operations are conducted, remain under the control of such armed combinations, refrain from surrendering to alleged masters any persons who come within your lines. You will employ such persons in the services to which they will be best adapted, keeping an account of the labor by them performed, of the value of it, and the expenses of their maintenance. The question of their final disposition will be reserved for future determination.

The other letter to Gen. Butler, referred to above, is in the following terms :

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1861.

GENERAL : The important question of the proper disposition to be made of fugitives from service in the States in insur

rection against the Federal Government, to which you have again directed my attention, in your letter of July 20, has received my most attentive consideration. It is the desire of the President that all existing rights in all the States be fully respected and maintained. The war now prosecuted on the part of the Federal Government is a war for the Union, for the preservation of all the constitutional rights of the States and the citizens of the States in the Union; hence no question can arise as to fugitives from service within the States and Territories in which the authority of the Union is fully acknowledged. The ordinary forms of judicial proceedings must be respected by the military and civil authorities alike for the enforcement of legal forms. But in the States wholly or in part under insurrectionary control, where the laws of the United States are so far opposed and resisted that they can not be effectually enforced, it is obvious that the rights dependent upon the execution of these laws must temporarily fail, and it is equally obvious that the rights dependent on the laws of the States within which military operations are conducted must necessarily be subordinate to the military exigences created by the insurrection, if not wholly forfeited by the treasonable conduct of the parties claiming them. To this the general rule of the right to service forms an exception. The act of Congress approved Aug. 6, 1861, declares that if persons held to service shall be employed in hostility to the United States, the right to their services shall be discharged therefrom. It follows of necessity that no claim can be recognized by the military authority of the Union to the services of such persons when fugitives.

A more difficult question is presented in respect to persons escaping from the service of loyal masters. It is quite apparent that the laws of the State under which only the services of such fugitives can be claimed must needs be wholly or almost wholly superseded, as to the remedies, by the insurrection and the military measures necessitated by it; and it is equally apparent that the substitution of military for judicial measures for the enforcement of such claims must be attended by great inconvenience, embarrassments and injuries. Under these circumstances, it seems quite clear that the substantial rights of loyal masters are still best protected by receiving such fugitives as well as fugitives from disloyal masters, into the service of the United States, and employing them under such organization and in such occupations as circumstances may suggest or require. Of course a record should be kept showing the names and descriptions of the fugitives, the names and characters, as loyal or disloyal, of their masters, and such facts as may be

necessary to a correct understanding of the circumstances of each case.

After tranquillity shall have been restored upon the return of peace, Congress will doubtless properly provide for all the persons thus received into the service of the Union, and for a just compensation to loyal masters. In this way only, it would seem, can the duty and safety of the Government and just rights of all be fully reconciled and harmonized. You will, therefore, consider yourself instructed to govern your future action in respect to fugitives from service by the premises herein stated, and will report from time to time, and at least twice in each month, your action in the premises to this Department. You will, however, neither authorize nor permit any interference by the troops under your command with the servants of peaceable citizens in a house or field, nor will you in any manner encourage such citizens to leave the lawful service of their masters, nor will you, except in cases where the public good may seem to require it, prevent the voluntary return of any fugitive to the service from which he may have escaped. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War.

To MAJ. GEN. BUTLER,
Commanding Department of Virginia, Fortress Monroe.

On the 6th of November, a force under Gens. Grant and McClernand left Cairo on transports for the purpose of breaking up a Rebel camp on the Missouri side of the Mississippi river, nearly opposite Columbus, the headquarters of Gen. Polk. The whole number of men engaged in this expedition, including a Chicago battery and two companies of cavalry, was about 3,500. The gunboats Tyler and Lexington accompanied them. The troops effected a landing and were formed in line of battle about eight o'clock the following morning, and at once advanced upon the Rebel works. The Rebels, under Gen. Cheatham, met this attack, but were driven back over the wooded field, fighting from tree to tree, into and through their camp. Twelve guns were captured from the Rebels, their camp burned, and baggage, horses, and many prisoners were taken. Reënforcements from Columbus subsequently crossed to Belmont, compelling the Union forces to return to their transports, under cover of the gunboats. Though a decided success in

the early part of the day, the engagement terminated less favorably, and victory was claimed by the Rebels.

About the same time, it is worthy of note, a gunboat reconnaissance was made to Fort Donelson. The movement at Belmont, made by order of Gen. Fremont, perhaps aided another ere long to be undertaken in the latter direction, as well as the advance into Southwestern Missouri, then in progress.

A large force, under Gen. W. T. Sherman, had meanwhile advanced as far as Bowling Green, to meet an invasion of Kentucky under the Rebel Gen. Bragg, while on the left of Sherman, Gen. William Nelson, on the 8th, gained a decisive victory over the Rebels, under Col. Williams, clearing the northeastern part of the State of invaders. Thus the prompt occupation of Paducah by Gen. Grant, the advance of Sherman, and the energy of Nelson, had defeated a well-devised plan of the Rebels for overrunning and subjugating Kentucky. Gen. Buckner, not long after his interview with McClellan at Cincinnati, in June, had thrown off the mask, and was zealously engaged in an attempt to draw Kentucky into the Secession gulf-stream, and to gather a large force of Kentuckians for the Rebel Army. In the latter purpose he was not without success.

On the 10th of November, Gen. H. W. Halleck was appointed to the command of the Department of the West, in the place of Gen. Fremont. At the same date Gen. W. T. Sherman, having lately resigned his command in Kentucky, Gen. D. C. Buell took that General's place.

During the Summer and Autumn, the Navy Department had manifested great energy in collecting the before scattered navy, and in fitting out, equipping and manning for service on the seas and navigable rivers, where available, an adequate force of war vessels, gunboats and transports. A blockade of remarkable stringency, under circumstances so adverse, had been maintained along our immense sea-coast, and numerous prizes had rewarded the vigilance of our naval commanders and seamen. Blockade-running, though frequently attempted, and sometimes too successful, had become hazardous, and communication with foreign countries was but casual, and attended with constant peril. The capture of the forts at Hatteras Inlet

effectually closed one avenue of blockade running, and the Port Royal expedition was of like value in sealing another important harbor.

On the 12th of October, the steamer *Theodora* evaded the blockading fleet off Charleston, and went to sea with two noted Rebel leaders on board, James M. Mason and John Slidell, recently Senators of the United States, now "accredited," respectively, to the Governments of England and France, as Representatives of the Davis Confederacy. Their immediate destination was Cardenas, with the intention of proceeding to Europe by steamer from Havana. At the time of the arrival of these emissaries in Cuba, Com. Wilkes, cruising for the Rebel privateer *Sumter*, was at Cienfuegos, on the southern coast of that island. Having been notified by Consul Shufeldt, he made all haste to intercept the *Theodora* on her return, but on arriving at Havana, Oct. 31st, he found she had already gone, and that Mason and Slidell were waiting there, intending to leave for St. Thomas in the British Mail steamer *Trent*. Com. Wilkes took position with his vessel, the *San Jacinto*, to intercept the *Trent*, designing to make prisoners of her two diplomatic passengers. This purpose he accomplished on the 8th of November. The intelligence of this capture, of course, created no little excitement in this country and in Europe. As involving a question of international rights and jurisdiction, the event was widely discussed, while the loyal sentiment of the people undeniably went strongly with Com. Wilkes in his bold action. Secretary Welles promptly congratulated that officer, complimenting him, and his subordinates and crew—fully appreciating the worthy motive, and the energy of the procedure. Meanwhile, Mason and Slidell, having arrived at New York, were transferred to close quarters at Fort Warren, in Boston harbor

CHAPTER V.

The President's Message, December, 1861.—Proceedings of Congress.—Emancipation.—Confiscation.—Messages and Addresses of Mr. Lincoln.

CONGRESS reassembled on the 2d day of December, 1861. During the last few months public attention had been earnestly directed to the policy of turning to account the great element of Rebel strength or weakness—as it should prove—in shortening a war becoming gigantic in its dimensions and cost. A large portion of the people had come to believe that a proper exercise of the war power would require the slaves of the rebels to be not only withdrawn from producing for the support of the Confederate armies, but also to be actively employed, so far as might be, on the right side. A small class, more radical in their views, insisted on setting aside, by Executive act, all legal or constitutional guarantees of slavery in general, and not merely in so far as they inured to the benefit of Rebels, who had repudiated all laws, and the Constitution itself, by taking up arms against the supreme authority. Had every Slave State joined in the Secession movement, this question would have been free from all embarrassments. But when Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, only seven of these States had been ranged on the side of the rebellion, while eight remained in an attitude of loyalty. And, in the final event, but four of the remaining eight were drawn into Secession. As the President of an undivided Union, the President had thus far felt compelled, as well in the avowals of his Inaugural Address as in his subsequent action, not to interfere directly with the relations of master and slave. It was only where the slave, in accordance with all the laws of war, could be actually used by military commanders in the field, to subserve military purposes, and not by any general blow at a recognized insti-

tution, that he had authorized the relation to be forcibly disturbed.

The existence of this popular agitation, as well as of a similar debate in his own mind, perceptibly appears in the President's annual Message to Congress.

It is likewise to be observed, that the military results, thus far, had not been quite satisfactory, either to the President or to the people. Despite the lavish means provided at the July session of Congress, with a manifest view to energetic aggressive war, little more had been accomplished—and that certainly not a little, however short of expectation—than to protect the National capital, and to save Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri, from being subjugated by Rebel armies. Manassas and Ball's Bluff, in the East, were still unavenged, or but partly compensated by the capture of Hatteras and Port Royal. In the West, large Rebel armies were threatening to overrun Kentucky from Bowling Green and Columbus, and Missouri from the Southwest, as well as holding the Mississippi river to within a few miles of Cairo.

In addition, was the exciting question growing out of the arrest of Mason and Slidell, on board a British ship on the high seas. The popular feeling, on the one hand, seemed to be unanimous in favor of retaining possession of these prisoners, as conspirators and traitors; while on the other, the British Government, in spite of its own precedents, and backed by French influence, seemed determined to regard such action on our part as a cause for war. The juncture was critical. Every sympathizer with rebellion was exultant in the confidence that the Administration would be wrecked upon Scylla or Charybdis—that it would be ruined at home, or involved in a foreign war that must end any further effective effort to put down the rebellion.

The President, fully sensible of the besetting dangers, and mindful of the situation of affairs in these and other respects, submitted to Congress the following views, in a message which was received with great popular favor :

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES : In the midst of unprecedented political troubles,

we have cause of great gratitude to God for unusual good health and most abundant harvests.

You will not be surprised to learn that, in the peculiar exigences of the times, our intercourse with foreign nations has been attended with profound solicitude, chiefly turning upon our own domestic affairs.

A disloyal portion of the American people have, during the whole year, been engaged in an attempt to divide and destroy the Union. A nation which endures factious domestic division, is exposed to disrespect abroad; and one party, if not both, is sure, sooner or later, to invoke foreign intervention.

Nations thus tempted to interfere, are not always able to resist the counsels of seeming expediency and ungenerous ambition, although measures adopted under such influences seldom fail to be unfortunate and injurious to those adopting them.

The disloyal citizens of the United States who have offered the ruin of our country, in return for the aid and comfort which they have invoked abroad, have received less patronage and encouragement than they probably expected. If it were just to suppose, as the insurgents have seemed to assume, that foreign nations, in this case, discarding all moral, social and treaty obligations, would act solely, and selfishly, for the most speedy restoration of commerce, including, especially, the acquisitions of cotton, those nations appear, as yet, not to have seen their way to their object more directly, or clearly, through the destruction than through the preservation of the Union. If we could dare to believe that foreign nations are actuated by no higher principle than this, I am quite sure a sound argument could be made to show them that they can reach their aim more readily and easily by aiding to crush this rebellion than by giving encouragement to it.

The principal lever relied on by the insurgents for exciting foreign nations to hostility against us, as already intimated, is the embarrassment of commerce. Those nations, however, not improbably, saw from the first, that it was the Union which made, as well our foreign, as our domestic commerce. They can scarcely have failed to perceive that the effort for disunion produces the existing difficulty; and that one strong nation promises more durable peace, and a more extensive, valuable and reliable commerce, than can the same nation broken into hostile fragments.

It is not my purpose to review our discussions with foreign States; because whatever might be their wishes or dispositions, the integrity of our country and the stability of our Government mainly depend, not upon them, but on the loyalty, virtue, patriotism and intelligence of the American people. The cor-

respondence itself, with the usual reservations, is herewith submitted.

I venture to hope it will appear that we have practiced prudence and liberality toward foreign powers, averting causes of irritation, and with firmness maintaining our own rights and honor.

Since, however, it is apparent that here, as in every other State, foreign dangers necessarily attend domestic difficulties, I recommend that adequate and ample measures be adopted for maintaining the public defenses on every side. While, under this general recommendation, provision for defending our sea-coast line readily occurs to the mind, I also, in the same connection, ask the attention of Congress to our great lakes and rivers. It is believed that some fortifications and depots of arms and munitions, with harbor and navigation improvements, all at well-selected points upon these, would be of great importance to the National defense and preservation. I ask attention to the views of the Secretary of War, expressed in his report, upon the same general subject.

I deem it of importance that the loyal regions of East Tennessee and Western North Carolina should be connected with Kentucky, and other faithful parts of the Union, by railroad. I therefore recommend, as a military measure, that Congress provide for the construction of such road as speedily as possible. Kentucky, no doubt, will coöperate, and, through her Legislature, make the most judicious selection of a line. The northern terminus must connect with some existing railroad; and whether the route shall be from Lexington or Nicholasville to the Cumberland Gap, or from Lebanon to the Tennessee line, in the direction of Knoxville, or on some still different line, can easily be determined. Kentucky and the General Government coöperating, the work can be completed in a very short time; and when done, it will be not only of vast present usefulness, but also a valuable permanent improvement, worth its cost in all the future.

Some treaties, designed chiefly for the interests of commerce, and having no grave political importance, have been negotiated, and will be submitted to the Senate for their consideration.

Although we have failed to induce some of the commercial powers to adopt a desirable melioration of the rigor of maritime war, we have removed all obstructions from the way of this humane reform, except such as are merely of temporary and accidental occurrence.

I invite your attention to the correspondence between Her Britannic Majesty's Minister, accredited to this Government,

and the Secretary of State, relative to the detention of the British ship *Perthshire*, in June last, by the United States steamer *Massachusetts*, for a supposed breach of the blockade. As this detention was occasioned by an obvious misapprehension of the facts, and as justice requires that we should commit no belligerent act not founded in strict right, as sanctioned by public law, I recommend that an appropriation be made to satisfy the reasonable demand of the owners of the vessel for her detention.

I repeat the recommendation of my predecessor, in his annual message to Congress in December last, in regard to the disposition of the surplus which will probably remain after satisfying the claims of the American citizens against China, pursuant to the awards of the commissioners under the act of the 3d of March, 1859. If, however, it should not be deemed advisable to carry that recommendation into effect, I would suggest that authority be given for investing the principal, over the proceeds of the surplus referred to, in good securities, with a view to the satisfaction of such other just claims of our citizens against China as are not unlikely to arise hereafter in the course of our extensive trade with that empire.

By the act of the 5th of August last, Congress authorized the President to instruct the commanders of suitable vessels to defend themselves against and to capture pirates. This authority has been exercised in a single instance only. For the more effectual protection of our extensive and valuable commerce, in the Eastern seas especially, it seems to me that it would also be advisable to authorize the commanders of sailing vessels to recapture any prizes which pirates may make of United States vessels and their cargoes, and the consular courts, now established by law in Eastern countries, to adjudicate the cases, in the event that this should not be objected to by the local authorities.

If any good reason exists why we should persevere longer in withholding our recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Hayti and Liberia, I am unable to discern it. Unwilling, however, to inaugurate a novel policy in regard to them without the approbation of Congress, I submit for your consideration the expediency of an appropriation for maintaining a charge d'affaires near each of those new States. It does not admit of doubt that important commercial advantages might be secured by favorable treaties with them.

The operations of the treasury during the period which has elapsed since your adjournment have been conducted with signal success. The patriotism of the people has placed at the disposal of the Government the large means demanded by the pub

lic exigences. Much of the National loan has been taken by citizens of the industrial classes, whose confidence in their country's faith, and zeal for their country's deliverance from present peril, have induced them to contribute to the support of the Government the whole of their limited acquisitions. This fact imposes peculiar obligations to economy in disbursement and energy in action.

The revenue from all sources, including loans, for the financial year ending on the 30th of June, 1861, was eighty-six million eight hundred and thirty-five thousand nine hundred dollars and twenty-seven cents, and the expenditures for the same period, including payments on account of the public debt, were eighty-four million five hundred and seventy-eight thousand eight hundred and thirty-four dollars and forty-seven cents; leaving a balance in the treasury on the 1st of July of two million two hundred and fifty-seven thousand sixty-five dollars and eighty cents. For the first quarter of the financial year, ending on the 30th of September, 1861, the receipts from all sources, including the balance of the 1st of July, were one hundred and two million five hundred and thirty-two thousand five hundred and nine dollars and twenty-seven cents, and the expenses ninety-eight million two hundred and thirty-nine thousand seven hundred and thirty-three dollars and nine cents; leaving a balance on the 1st of October, 1861, of four million two hundred and ninety-two thousand seven hundred and seventy-six dollars and eighteen cents.

Estimates for the remaining three-quarters of the year, and for the financial year 1863, together with his views of ways and means for meeting the demands contemplated by them, will be submitted to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury. It is gratifying to know that the expenditures made necessary by the rebellion are not beyond the resources of the loyal people, and to believe that the same patriotism which has thus far sustained the Government will continue to sustain it till peace and Union shall again bless the land.

I respectfully refer to the report of the Secretary of War for information respecting the numerical strength of the Army, and for recommendations having in view an increase of its efficiency and the well being of the various branches of the service intrusted to his care. It is gratifying to know that the patriotism of the people has proved equal to the occasion, and that the number of troops tendered greatly exceeds the force which Congress authorized me to call into the field.

I refer with pleasure to those portions of his report which make allusion to the creditable degree of discipline already

attained by our troops, and to the excellent sanitary condition of the entire army.

The recommendation of the Secretary for an organization of the militia upon a uniform basis is a subject of vital importance to the future safety of the country, and is commended to the serious attention of Congress.

The large addition to the regular army, in connection with the defection that has so considerably diminished the number of its officers, gives peculiar importance to his recommendation for increasing the corps of cadets to the greatest capacity of the Military Academy.

By mere omission, I presume, Congress has failed to provide chaplains for hospitals occupied by volunteers. This subject was brought to my notice, and I was induced to draw up the form of a letter, one copy of which, properly addressed, has been delivered to each of the persons, and at the dates respectively named and stated, in a schedule, containing also the form of the letter, marked A, and herewith transmitted.

These gentlemen, I understand, entered upon the duties designated, at the times respectively stated in the schedule, and have labored faithfully therein ever since. I therefore recommend that they be compensated at the same rate as chaplains in the army. I further suggest that general provision be made for chaplains to serve at hospitals, as well as with regiments.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy presents in detail the operations of that branch of the service, the activity and energy which have characterized its administration, and the results of measures to increase its efficiency and power. Such have been the additions, by construction and purchase, that it may almost be said a navy has been created and brought into service since our difficulties commenced.

Besides blockading our extensive coast, squadrons larger than ever before assembled under our flag have been put afloat, and performed deeds which have increased our naval renown.

I would invite special attention to the recommendation of the Secretary for a more perfect organization of the Navy by introducing additional grades in the service.

The present organization is defective and unsatisfactory, and the suggestions submitted by the Department will, it is believed, if adopted, obviate the difficulties alluded to, promote harmony, and increase the efficiency of the navy.

There are three vacancies on the bench of the Supreme Court—two by the decease of Justices Daniel and McLean, and one by the resignation of Justice Campbell. I have so far forbore making nominations to fill these vacancies for reasons which I will now state. Two of the outgoing judges

resided within the States now overrun by revolt ; so that if successors were appointed in the same localities, they could not now serve upon their circuits ; and many of the most competent men there probably would not take the personal hazard of accepting to serve, even here, upon the Supreme Bench. I have been unwilling to throw all the appointments northward, thus disabling myself from doing justice to the South on the return of peace ; although I may remark that to transfer to the North one which has heretofore been in the South would not, with reference to territory and population, be unjust.

During the long and brilliant judicial career of Judge McLean his circuit grew into an empire—altogether too large for any one judge to give the courts therein more than a nominal attendance—rising in population from one million four hundred and seventy thousand and eighteen, in 1830, to six million one hundred and fifty-one thousand four hundred and five in 1860.

Besides this, the country generally has outgrown our present judicial system. If uniformity was at all intended, the system requires that all the States shall be accommodated with circuit courts, attended by supreme judges, while, in fact, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Florida, Texas, California and Oregon, have never had any such courts. Nor can this well be remedied without a change in the system ; because the adding of judges to the Supreme Court, enough for the accommodation of all parts of the country, with circuit courts, would create a court altogether too numerous for a judicial body of any sort. And the evil, if it be one, will increase as new States come into the Union. Circuit courts are useful, or they are not useful ; if useful, no State should be denied them ; if not useful, no State should have them. Let them be provided for all, or abolished as to all.

Three modifications occur to me, either of which, I think, would be an improvement upon our present system. Let the Supreme Court be of convenient number in every event. Then, first, let the whole country be divided into circuits of convenient size, the supreme judges to serve in a number of them corresponding to their own number, and independent circuit judges be provided for all the rest. Or, secondly, let the supreme judges be relieved from circuit duties, and circuit judges provided for all the circuits. Or, thirdly, dispense with circuit courts altogether, leaving the judicial functions wholly to the district courts, and an independent Supreme Court.

I respectfully recommend to the consideration of Congress the present condition of the statute laws, with the hope that

Congress will be able to find an easy remedy for many of the inconveniencies and evils which constantly embarrass those engaged in the practical administration of them. Since the organization of the Government, Congress has enacted some five thousand acts and joint resolutions, which fill more than ~~six~~ thousand closely printed pages, and are scattered through many volumes. Many of these acts have been drawn in haste and without sufficient caution, so that their provisions are often obscure in themselves, or in conflict with each other, or at least so doubtful as to render it very difficult for even the best informed persons to ascertain precisely what the statute law really is.

It seems to me very important that the statute laws should be made as plain and intelligible as possible, and be reduced to as small a compass as may consist with the fullness and precision of the will of the legislature and the perspicuity of its language. This, well done, would, I think, greatly facilitate the labors of those whose duty it is to assist in the administration of the laws, and would be a lasting benefit to the people, by placing before them, in a more accessible and intelligible form, the laws which so deeply concern their interests and their duties.

I am informed by some whose opinions I respect, that all the acts of Congress now in force, and of a permanent and general nature, might be revised and re-written, so as to be embraced in one volume (or, at most, two volumes,) of ordinary and convenient size. And I respectfully recommend to Congress to consider of the subject, and, if my suggestion be approved, to devise such plan as to their wisdom shall seem most proper for the attainment of the end proposed.

One of the unavoidable consequences of the present insurrection is the entire suppression, in many places, of all the ordinary means of administering civil justice by the officers and in the forms of existing law. This is the case, in whole or in part, in all the insurgent States; and as our armies advance upon and take possession of parts of those States, the practical evil becomes more apparent. There are no courts nor officers to whom the citizens of other States may apply for the enforcement of their lawful claims against citizens of the insurgent States; and there is a vast amount of debt constituting such claims. Some have estimated it as high as two hundred million dollars, due, in large part, from insurgents, in open rebellion, to loyal citizens, who are, even now, making great sacrifices, in the discharge of their patriotic duty, to support the Government.

Under these circumstances, I have been urgently solicited to

establish, by military power, courts to administer summary justice in such cases. I have thus far declined to do it, not because I had any doubt that the end proposed—the collection of the debts—was just and right in itself, but because I have been unwilling to go beyond the pressure of necessity in the unusual exercise of power. But the powers of Congress, I suppose, are equal to the anomalous occasion, and therefore I refer the whole matter to Congress, with the hope that a plan may be devised for the administration of justice in all such parts of the insurgent States and Territories as may be under the control of this Government, whether by a voluntary return to allegiance and order, or by the power of our arms. This, however, not to be a permanent institution, but a temporary substitute, and to cease as soon as the ordinary courts can be reestablished in peace.

It is important that some more convenient means should be provided, if possible, for the adjustment of claims against the Government, especially in view of their increased number by reason of the war. It is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals. The investigation and adjudication of claims, in their nature, belong to the judicial department; besides, it is apparent that the attention of Congress will be more than usually engaged for some time to come with great national questions. It was intended, by the organization of the Court of Claims, mainly to remove this branch of business from the halls of Congress; but while the court has proved to be an effective and valuable means of investigation, it in a great degree fails to effect the object of its creation for want of power to make its judgments final.

Fully aware of the delicacy, not to say the danger, of the subject, I commend to your careful consideration whether this power of making judgments final may not properly be given to the court, reserving the right of appeal on questions of law to the Supreme Court, with such other provisions as experience may have shown to be necessary.

I ask attention to the report of the Postmaster General, the following being a summary statement of the condition of the department:

The revenue from all sources during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1861, including the annual permanent appropriation of seven hundred thousand dollars for the transportation of "free mail matter," was nine million forty-nine thousand two hundred and ninety-six dollars and forty cents, being about two per cent. less than the revenue for 1860.

The expenditures were thirteen million six hundred and six thousand seven hundred and fifty-nine dollars and eleven cents, showing a decrease of more than eight per cent. as compared with those of the previous year, and leaving an excess of expenditure over the revenue for the last fiscal year of four million five hundred and fifty-seven thousand four hundred and sixty-two dollars and seventy-one cents.

The gross revenue for the year ending June 30, 1863, is estimated at an increase of four per cent. on that of 1861, making eight million six hundred and eighty-three thousand dollars, to which should be added the earnings of the department in carrying free matter, viz: seven hundred thousand dollars, making nine million three hundred and eighty-three thousand dollars.

The total expenditures for 1863 are estimated at twelve million five hundred and twenty-eight thousand dollars, leaving an estimated deficiency of three million one hundred and forty-five thousand dollars to be supplied from the treasury, in addition to the permanent appropriation.

The present insurrection shows, I think, that the extension of this District across the Potomac river, at the time of establishing the capital here, was eminently wise, and consequently that the relinquishment of that portion of it which lies within the State of Virginia was unwise and dangerous. I submit for your consideration the expediency of regaining that part of the District, and the restoration of the original boundary thereof, through negotiations with the State of Virginia.

The report of the Secretary of the Interior, with the accompanying documents, exhibits the condition of the several branches of the public business pertaining to that department. The depressing influences of the insurrection have been specially felt in the operations of the Patent and General Land Offices. The cash receipts from the sales of public lands during the past year have exceeded the expenses of our land system only about two hundred thousand dollars. The sales have been entirely suspended in the Southern States, while the interruptions to the business of the country, and the diversions of large numbers of men from labor to military service, have obstructed settlements in the new States and Territories of the Northwest.

The receipts of the Patent Office have declined in nine months about one hundred thousand dollars, rendering a large reduction of the force employed necessary to make it self-sustaining.

The demands upon the Pension Office will be largely increased by the insurrection. Numerous applications for pen

sions, based upon the casualties of the existing war, have already been made. There is reason to believe that many who are now upon the pension rolls, and in receipt of the bounty of the Government, are in the ranks of the insurgent army, or giving them aid and comfort. The Secretary of the Interior has directed a suspension of the payment of the pensions of such persons upon the proof of their disloyalty. I recommend that Congress authorize that officer to cause the names of such persons to be stricken from the pension rolls.

The relations of the Government with the Indian tribes have been greatly disturbed by the insurrection, especially in the Southern Superintendency and in that of New Mexico. The Indian country south of Kansas is in the possession of insurgents from Texas and Arkansas. The agents of the United States appointed since the 4th of March for this superintendency have been unable to reach their posts, while the most of those who were in office before that time have espoused the insurrectionary cause, and assume to exercise the powers of agents by virtue of commissions from the insurrectionists. It has been stated in the public press that a portion of those Indians have been organized as a military force, and are attached to the army of the insurgents. Although the Government has no official information upon this subject, letters have been written to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs by several prominent chiefs, giving assurance of their loyalty to the United States, and expressing a wish for the presence of Federal troops to protect them. It is believed that upon the repossession of the country by the Federal forces the Indians will readily cease all hostile demonstrations, and resume their former relations to the Government.

Agriculture, confessedly the largest interest of the nation, has not a department, nor a bureau, but a clerkship only, assigned to it in the Government. While it is fortunate that this great interest is so independent in its nature as to not have demanded and extorted more from the Government, I respectfully ask Congress to consider whether something more can not be given voluntarily with general advantage.

Annual reports exhibiting the condition of our agriculture, commerce and manufactures, would present a fund of information of great practical value to the country. While I make no suggestion as to details, I venture the opinion that an agricultural and statistical bureau might profitably be organized.

The execution of the laws for the suppression of the African slave-trade has been confided to the Department of the Interior. It is a subject of gratulation that the efforts which have been made for the suppression of this inhuman traffic

have been recently attended with unusual success. Five vessels being fitted out for the slave-trade have been seized and condemned. Two mates of vessels engaged in the trade, and one person in equipping a vessel as a slaver, have been convicted and subjected to the penalty of fine and imprisonment, and one captain, taken with a cargo of Africans on board his vessel, has been convicted of the highest grade of offense under our laws, the punishment of which is death.

The Territories of Colorado, Dakota, and Nevada, created by the last Congress, have been organized, and civil administration has been inaugurated therein under auspices especially gratifying, when it is considered that the leaven of treason was found existing in some of these new countries when the Federal officers arrived there.

The abundant natural resources of these Territories, with the security and protection afforded by organized government, will doubtless invite to them a large immigration when peace shall restore the business of the country to its accustomed channels. I submit the resolutions of the Legislature of Colorado, which evidence the patriotic spirit of the people of the Territory. So far, the authority of the United States has been upheld in all the Territories, as it is hoped it will be in the future. I commend their interests and defense to the enlightened and generous care of Congress.

I recommend to the favorable consideration of Congress the interests of the District of Columbia. The insurrection has been the cause of much suffering and sacrifice to its inhabitants, and as they have no representative in Congress, that body should not overlook their just claims upon the Government.

At your late session a joint resolution was adopted authorizing the President to take measures for facilitating a proper representation of the industrial interests of the United States at the exhibition of the industry of all nations, to be holden at London in the year 1862. I regret to say I have been unable to give personal attention to this subject—a subject at once so interesting in itself, and so extensively and intimately connected with the material prosperity of the world. Through the Secretaries of State and of the Interior a plan, or system, has been devised, and partly matured, and which will be laid before you.

Under and by virtue of the act of Congress entitled “An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,” approved August 6, 1861, the legal claims of certain persons to the labor and service of certain other persons have become forfeited; and numbers of the latter, thus liberated, are already

dependent on the United States, and must be provided for in some way. Besides this, it is not impossible that some of the States will pass similar enactments for their own benefit respectively, and by operations of which persons of the same class will be thrown upon them for disposal. In such case I recommend that Congress provide for accepting such persons from such States according to some mode of valuation, in lieu, *pro tanto*, of direct taxes, or upon some other plan to be agreed on with such States, respectively; that such persons, on such acceptance by the General Government, be at once deemed free; and that, in any event, steps be taken for colonizing both classes (or the one first mentioned, if the other shall not be brought into existence) at some place or places in a climate congenial to them. It might be well to consider, too, whether the free colored people already in the United States could not, so far as individuals may desire, be included in such colonization.

To carry out the plan of colonization may involve the acquiring of territory, and also the appropriation of money beyond that to be expended in the territorial acquisition. Having practiced the acquisition of territory for nearly sixty years, the question of constitutional power to do so is no longer an open one with us. The power was questioned at first by Mr. Jefferson, who, however, in the purchase of Louisiana, yielded his scruples on the plea of great expediency. If it be said that the only legitimate object of acquiring territory is to furnish homes for white men, this measure effects that object, for the emigration of colored men leaves additional room for white men remaining or coming here. Mr. Jefferson, however, placed the importance of procuring Louisiana more on political and commercial grounds than on providing room for population.

On this whole proposition, including the appropriation of money with the acquisition of territory, does not the expediency amount to absolute necessity—that without which the Government itself can not be perpetuated?

The war continues. In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing the insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle. I have, therefore, in every case thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the primary object of the contest on our part, leaving all questions which are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate action of the legislature.

In the exercise of my best discretion, I have adhered to the blockade of the ports held by the insurgents, instead of putting

in force, by proclamation, the law of Congress enacted at the late session for closing those ports.

So, also, obeying the dictates of prudence, as well as the obligations of law, instead of transcending, I have adhered to the act of Congress to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes. If a new law upon the same subject shall be proposed, its propriety will be duly considered. The Union must be preserved; and hence all indispensable means must be employed. We should not be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable.

The inaugural address at the beginning of the administration, and the message to Congress at the late special session, were both mainly devoted to the domestic controversy out of which the insurrection and consequent war have sprung. Nothing now occurs to add or subtract to or from the principles or general purposes stated and expressed in those documents.

The last ray of hope for preserving the Union peaceably expired at the assault upon Fort Sumter; and a general review of what has occurred since may not be unprofitable. What was painfully uncertain then is much better defined and more distinct now; and the progress of events is plainly in the right direction. The insurgents confidently claimed a strong support from north of Mason and Dixon's line, and the friends of the Union were not free from apprehension on the point. This, however, was soon settled definitely, and on the right side. South of the line, noble little Delaware led off right from the first. Maryland was made to *seem* against the Union. Our soldiers were assaulted, bridges were burned, and railroads torn up within her limits, and we were many days, at one time, without the ability to bring a single regiment over her soil to the capital. Now her bridges and railroads are repaired and open to the Government; she already gives seven regiments to the cause of the Union and none to the enemy; and her people, at a regular election, have sustained the Union by a larger majority and a larger aggregate vote than they ever before gave to any candidate or any question. Kentucky, too, for some time in doubt, is now decidedly, and, I think, unchangeably, ranged on the side of the Union. Missouri is comparatively quiet, and I believe can not again be overrun by the insurrectionists. These three States of Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, neither of which would promise a single soldier at first, have now an aggregate of not less than forty thousand in the field for the Union; while of their citizens certainly not more than a third of that number, and they of doubtful whereabouts and doubtful existence, are in arms against it. After a some-

what bloody struggle of months, winter closes on the Union people of Western Virginia, leaving them masters of their own country.

An insurgent force of about fifteen hundred, for months dominating the narrow peninsular region, constituting the counties of Accomac and Northampton, and known as the eastern shore of Virginia, together with some contiguous parts of Maryland, have laid down their arms; and the people there have renewed their allegiance to, and accepted the protection of, the old flag. This leaves no armed insurrectionist north of the Potomac or east of the Chesapeake.

Also we have obtained a footing at each of the isolated points, on the southern coast, of Hatteras, Port Royal, Tybee Island, near Savannah, and Ship Island; and we likewise have some general accounts of popular movements, in behalf of the Union, in North Carolina and Tennessee.

These things demonstrate that the cause of the Union is advancing steadily and certainly southward.

Since your last adjournment, Lieut. Gen. Scott has retired from the head of the army. During his long life, the nation has not been unmindful of his merit; yet, on calling to mind how faithfully, ably and brilliantly he has served the country, from a time far back in our history, when few of the now living had been born, and thenceforward continually, I can not but think we are still his debtors. I submit, therefore, for your consideration, what further mark of recognition is due to him, and to ourselves, as a grateful people.

With the retirement of Gen. Scott came the Executive duty of appointing, in his stead, a General-in-chief of the army. It is a fortunate circumstance that neither in council nor country was there, so far as I know, any difference of opinion as to the proper person to be selected. The retiring chief repeatedly expressed his judgment in favor of Gen. McClellan for the position, and in this the nation seemed to give a unanimous concurrence. The designation of Gen. McClellan is, therefore, in considerable degree, the selection of the country as well as of the Executive; and hence there is better reason to hope there will be given him the confidence and cordial support thus, by fair implication, promised, and without which he can not, with so full efficiency, serve the country.

It has been said that one bad General is better than two good ones; and the saying is true, if taken to mean no more than that an army is better directed by a single mind, though inferior, than by two superior ones at variance and cross-purposes with each other.

And the same is true in all joint operations wherein those

engaged *can* have none but a common end in view, and *can* differ only as to the choice of means. In a storm at sea, no one on board *can* wish the ship to sink, and yet, not unfrequently, all go down together because too many will direct and no single mind can be allowed to control.

It continues to develop that the insurrection is largely, if not exclusively, a war upon the first principle of popular government—the rights of the people. Conclusive evidence of this is found in the most grave and maturely-considered public documents, as well as in the general tone of the insurgents. In those documents we find the abridgment of the existing right of suffrage and the denial to the people of all right to participate in the selection of public officers, except the legislative, boldly advocated, with labored arguments to prove that large control of the people in government is the source of all political evil. Monarchy itself is sometimes hinted at as a possible refuge from the power of the people.

In my present position I could scarcely be justified were I to omit raising a warning voice against this approach of returning despotism.

It is not needed nor fitting here that a general argument should be made in favor of popular institutions; but there is one point, with its connections, not so hackneyed as most others, to which I ask a brief attention. It is the effort to place *capital* on an equal footing with, if not above *labor*, in the structure of government. It is assumed that labor is available only in connection with capital—that nobody labors unless somebody else, owning capital, somehow by the use of it induces him to labor. This assumed, it is next considered whether it is best that capital shall *hire* laborers, and thus induce them to work by their own consent, or *buy* them, and drive them to it without their consent. Having proceeded so far, it is naturally concluded that all laborers are either *hired* laborers, or what we call slaves. And further, it is assumed that whoever is once a hired laborer is fixed in that condition for life.

Now, there is no such relation between capital and labor as assumed; nor is there any such thing as a free man being fixed for life in the condition of a hired laborer. Both these assumptions are false, and all inferences from them are groundless.

Labor is prior to and independent of capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher consideration. Capital has its rights, which are as worthy of protection as any other rights. Nor is it denied that there is, and probably always will be, a relation

between labor and capital producing mutual benefits. The error is in assuming that the whole labor of community exists within that relation. A few men own capital, and that few avoid labor themselves, and with their capital hire or buy another few to labor for them. A large majority belong to neither class—neither work for others nor have others working for them. In most of the Southern States a majority of the whole people, of all colors, are neither slaves nor masters, while in the Northern a large majority are neither hirers nor hired. Men, with their families—wives, sons, and daughters—work for themselves, on their farms, in their houses, and in their shops, taking the whole product to themselves, and asking no favors of capital, on the one hand, nor of hired laborers or slaves on the other. It is not forgotten that a considerable number of persons mingle their own labor with capital—that is, they labor with their own hands, and also buy or hire others to labor for them; but this is only a mixed, and not a distinct class. No principle stated is disturbed by the existence of this mixed class.

Again, as has already been said, there is not, of necessity, any such thing as the free hired laborer being fixed to that condition for life. Many independent men every-where in these States, a few years back in their lives, were hired laborers. The prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land for himself, then labors on his own account another while, and at length hires another new beginner to help him. This is the just, and generous, and prosperous system, which opens the way to all—gives hope to all, and consequent energy, and progress, and improvement of condition to all. No men living are more worthy to be trusted than those who toil up from poverty; none less inclined to take or touch aught which they have not honestly earned. Let them beware of surrendering a political power which they already possess, and which, if surrendered, will surely be used to close the door of advancement against such as they, and to fix new disabilities and burdens upon them, till all of liberty shall be lost.

From the first taking of our National Census to the last are seventy years; and we find our population at the end of the period eight times as great as it was at the beginning. The increase of those other things which men deem desirable has been even greater. We thus have at one view what the popular principle, applied to Government through the machinery of the States and the Union, has produced in a given time, and also what it firmly maintained, it promises for the future. There are already among us those who, if the Union be pre-

served, will live to see it contain two hundred and fifty millions. The struggle *of* to-day is not altogether *for* to-day; it is for a vast future also. With a reliance on Providence all the more firm and earnest, let us proceed in the great task which events have devolved upon us.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1861.

The organization of an opposition party, taking the Democratic name, had been effected under the auspices of a few anti-war men in Congress, who had occasionally ventured to speak out their dissent at the previous session. This faction, represented in Ohio by Vallandigham, and in Illinois by Richardson, having apparently very little support among the people, began at this session to work in earnest, boldly aspiring to assume control of the House of Representatives to be elected during the coming season. Already, too, plans were formed for carrying the next Presidential election, and there were not wanting sagacious observers, who believed that schemes of this sort had the sympathy of at least one Major General in the army.

At this session of Congress it was early apparent that a great advance had taken place in the public mind on the question of Slavery. Neither Secretary Seward's diplomatic assurances to Governments abroad that no change in Southern institutions was contemplated in any event, nor McClellan's manifesto on this subject to the people of Virginia, nor Halleck's order excluding fugitive slaves from the lines of the Army of the West, nor the 22d of July resolution of Mr. Crittenden, were now satisfactory to the people, who began already to demand that the Rebellion should be attacked in its vital and vulnerable point. On the third day of the session, the Crittenden Resolution was laid on the table, in the popular branch of Congress, by a vote of 71 to 65. The demand of the people for the destruction of Slavery was daily becoming more manifest and more earnest. The President, in his inaugural address, had clearly foreseen a time when, if war should come, the destruction of Slavery must follow. He made no pledge, under such circumstances, not to hasten its destruction by all the means in his power. So soon as the people, whose will he

intended faithfully to execute, should sustain him in such a war measure—now beginning to be deemed necessary—he had no dread to strike. A joint committee of both Houses to inquire into the conduct of the war was appointed in the Senate, on the 18th, and in the House on the 19th of December. It is needless to say that this proceeding arose from the general dissatisfaction felt at the inaction of the Army of the Potomac, in the face of a greatly inferior enemy, as well as from the disastrous issue of the only positive movement yet attempted—that at Ball's Bluff. The members of that committee were: Messrs. Wade, Chandler, and Andrew Johnson (whose place was subsequently supplied by Mr. Wright, of Indiana), of the Senate; and Messrs. Gooch, Covode, Julian, and Odell, of the House. The evidence collected by this committee from the best sources of information, including the testimony of the highest Generals was, from time to time, laid before the President for his consideration, and subsequently given to the public.

The exciting subject of the arrest of Mason and Slidell was early seized upon by the leaders of the Opposition in the House, as one suited to their purpose. An adroitly worded resolution with an elaborate preamble, reciting the complimentary order of the Secretary of the Navy on this arrest, and the unanimous thanks of the House to Com. Wilkes already passed, was offered in the House, calling upon the President not to yield "to any menace or demand of the British Government." This was referred, against the wishes of the mover, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs—ayes 109, nays 16. At a later period, December 30, the President transmitted to Congress the correspondence between Mr. Seward and the authorities of Great Britain on this subject, conceding the illegality of the arrest, though strictly according to English precedent, and offering the proper satisfaction. Mason and Slidell were placed on board a British vessel lying off Boston, to be transported to their original destination. If this decision caused a momentary disappointment, its profound wisdom and prudence were at once apparent. It was to the supporters of Davis, and to the sympathizers with him, the defeat of an ardently cherished hope that so unimportant a matter as the detention or surrender

of their two diplomatic friends would involve this country in a foreign war.

A motion in the House, on the 10th of December, involving the question of the "arbitrary arrests" of bold complotters of treason, in the loyal States, showed 108 members in favor of sustaining the President, and 26 in opposition.

At this session, Congress provided for the issue of legal-tender notes, and passed an internal revenue bill, which should largely increase the receipts into the Treasury, insuring a basis for the payment of interest on loans, also authorized, and confidence in the redemption of the National currency. The policy adopted was substantially that recommended and approved by the distinguished head of the Treasury Department, Mr. Chase. Much of the time of Congress was also occupied in considering various bills for confiscating the property of Rebels, and in maturing the measure ultimately passed.

On the 13th of January, 1862, Mr. Cameron resigned his place in the Cabinet as Secretary of War, receiving an appointment as Minister to Russia, and the Hon. Edwin M. Stanton was appointed in his stead.

The message sent by President Lincoln to Congress on the 6th of March, in regard to gradual and compensated emancipation, shows that he had now come to look seriously upon the question of employing some means for the complete eradication of Slavery. He intimates plainly that such a conviction was on his mind when preparing his message of Dec. 3, 1861. His emancipation message is in these words:

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: I recommend the adoption of a joint resolution by your honorable bodies, which shall be substantially as follows:

Resolved, That the United States ought to coöperate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system.

If the proposition contained in the resolution does not meet the approval of Congress and the country, there is the end; but if it does command such approval, I deem it of importance

that the States and people immediately interested should be at once distinctly notified of the fact, so that they may begin to consider whether to accept or reject it. The Federal Government would find its highest interest in such a measure as one of the most efficient means of self-preservation. The leaders of the existing insurrection entertain the hope that this Government will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the independence of some part of the disaffected region, and that all the Slave States north of such part will then say, "the Union for which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with the southern section." To deprive them of this hope substantially ends the rebellion, and the initiation of emancipation completely deprives them of it as to all the States initiating it. The point is not that *all* the States tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation, but that, while the offer is equally made to all, the more northern shall, by such initiation, make it certain to the more southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter in their proposed confederacy. I say "initiation," because, in my judgment, gradual, and not sudden emancipation, is better for all. In the mere financial or pecuniary view, any member of Congress, with the census tables and treasury reports before him, can readily see for himself how very soon the current expenditures of this war would purchase, at fair valuation, all the slaves in any named State. Such a proposition on the part of the General Government sets up no claim of a right by Federal authority to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the State and its people immediately interested. It is proposed as a matter of perfectly free choice with them.

In the annual message last December I thought fit to say, "the Union must be preserved; and hence all indispensable means must be employed." I said this not hastily, but deliberately. War has been made, and continues to be an indispensable means to this end. A practical reacknowledgment of the National authority would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease. If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue, and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency toward ending the struggle, must and will come.

The proposition now made, though an offer only, I hope it may be esteemed no offense to ask whether the pecuniary consideration tendered would not be of more value to the States and private persons concerned than are the institutions and property in it, in the present aspect of affairs.

While it is true that the adoption of the proposed resolution would be merely initiatory, and not within itself a practical measure, it is recommended in the hope that it would soon lead to important practical results. In full view of my great responsibility to my God and to my country, I earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to the subject.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

March 6, 1862.

The resolution recommended in the foregoing paper was passed by the House on the 11th of March—ayes 97, noes 36. Only five of the affirmative votes were from the Slave States. The resolution was concurred in by the Senate, with little opposition, and signed by the President on the 10th of April.

Early in April the Senate passed a bill abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, with compensation to the loyal owners of slaves. This bill passed the House on the 11th of the same month, four days after its transmission—ayes 92, noes 39. In communicating his approval of this measure, the President, departing from the usual practice, sent a message to Congress in the following terms :

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES : The act entitled “ An act for the release of certain persons held to service or labor in the District of Columbia,” has this day been approved and signed.

I have never doubted the constitutional authority of Congress to abolish slavery in this District, and I have ever desired to see the National Capital freed from the institution in some satisfactory way. Hence there has never been, in my mind, any question upon the subject except the one of expediency, arising in view of all the circumstances. If there be matters within and about this act which might have taken a course or shape more satisfactory to my judgment, I do not attempt to specify them. I am gratified that the two principles of compensation and colonization are both recognized and practically applied in the act.

In the matter of compensation it is provided that claims may be presented within ninety days from the passage of the act, “ but not thereafter,” and there is no saving for minors, *femmes-couvert*, insane or absent persons. I presume this is un-

omission by mere oversight, and I recommend that it be supplied by an amendatory or supplemental act.

April 16, 1862.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

On the 10th of June, President Lincoln communicated to Congress a copy of a treaty negotiated with Great Britain, having for its design a complete suppression of the African slave-trade.

The Confiscation Act, as finally matured and passed by Congress, with a special provision for conditional pardon and amnesty, received the approval of the Executive on the last day of the session, July 17th. To obviate constitutional objections known to exist in the President's mind, to the measure as at first passed, a supplementary joint resolution had been adopted, limiting the forfeiture of real estate to the lifetime of its rebel owner. His views on this subject were officially set forth in a document, from which the following memorable sentences are quoted :

It is startling to say that Congress can free a slave within a State, and yet were it said that the ownership of a slave had first been transferred to the nation, and that Congress had then liberated him, the difficulty would vanish ; and this is the real case. The traitor against the General Government forfeits his slave at least as justly as he does any other property, and he forfeits both to the Government against which he offends. The Government, so far as there can be ownership, owns the forfeited slaves, and the question for Congress in regard to them is, shall they be made free or sold to new masters? I see no objection to Congress deciding in advance that they shall be free.

That those who make a causeless war should be compelled to pay the cost of it, is too obviously just to be called in question. To give Government protection to the property of persons who have abandoned it, and gone on a crusade to overthrow the same Government, is absurd, if considered in the mere light of justice. The severest justice may not always be the best policy. * * I think our military commanders, when, in military phrase, they are within the enemy's country, should, in an orderly manner, seize and keep whatever of real or personal property may be necessary or convenient for their commands, and at the same time preserve in some way the evidence of what they do.

A few days before the adjournment, the President, evidently looking forward to the necessity of a more radical and decisive policy in regard to Slavery, invited the Senators and Representatives of the border Slave States to a conference. The disastrous Peninsular campaign was now over, and depression prevailed throughout the country. The war must somehow be ended, with the rebellion overthrown; and the employment of every effective and legitimate war measure, he felt to be now demanded. He desired the great change to come as lightly as possible on the still loyal Slave States, and it was in this spirit that the interview was solicited by him. Having convened at the Executive Mansion, on the 12th of July, these Representatives were addressed by Mr. Lincoln (reading what he had carefully prepared for the occasion) as follows:

GENTLEMEN: After the adjournment of Congress, now near, I shall have no opportunity of seeing you for several months. Believing that you of the Border States hold more power for good than any other equal number of members, I feel it a duty which I can not justifiably waive to make this appeal to you.

I intend no reproach or complaint when I assure you that, in my opinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the gradual emancipation message of last March, the war would now be substantially ended. And the plan therein proposed is yet one of the most potent and swift means of ending it. Let the States which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no event will the States you represent ever join their proposed Confederacy, and they can not much longer maintain the contest. But you can not divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them so long as you show a determination to perpetuate the institution within your own States. Beat them at elections, as you have overwhelmingly done, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you as their own. You and I know what the lever of their power is. Break that lever before their faces, and they can shake you no more forever.

Most of you have treated me with kindness and consideration, and I trust you will not now think I improperly touch what is exclusively your own, when, for the sake of the whole country, I ask, "Can you, for your States, do better than to take the course I urge?" Discarding *punctilio* and maxims adapted to more manageable times, and looking only to the unprecedentedly stern facts of our case, can you do better in

any possible event? You prefer that the constitutional relations of the States to the nation shall be practically restored without disturbance of the institution; and, if this were done, my whole duty in this respect, under the Constitution and my oath of office, would be performed. But it is not done, and we are trying to accomplish it by war. The incidents of the war can not be avoided. If the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion—by the mere incidents of the war. It will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. How much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once shortens the war, and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event! How much better to thus save the money which else we sink forever in the war! How much better to do it while we can, lest the war, ere long, render us pecuniarily unable to do it! How much better for you, as seller, and the nation, as buyer, to sell out and buy out that without which the war could never have been, than to sink both the thing to be sold and the price of it, in cutting one another's throats!

I do not speak of emancipation at once, but of a decision at once to emancipate gradually. Room in South America for colonization can be obtained cheaply and in abundance, and when numbers shall be large enough to be company and encouragement for one another, the freed people will not be so reluctant to go.

I am pressed with a difficulty not yet mentioned—one which threatens division among those who, united, are none too strong. An instance of it is known to you. General Hunter is an honest man. He was, and I hope still is, my friend. I valued him none the less for his agreeing with me in the general wish that all men every-where could be freed. He proclaimed all men free within certain States, and I repudiated the proclamation. He expected more good and less harm from the measure than I could believe would follow. Yet, in repudiating it, I gave dissatisfaction, if not offense, to many whose support the country can not afford to lose. And this is not the end of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me, and is increasing. By conceding what I now ask you can relieve me, and, much more, can relieve the country in this important point.

Upon these considerations, I have again begged your attention to the Message of March last. Before leaving the Capitol, consider and discuss it among yourselves. You are patriots

and statesmen, and as such, I pray you consider this proposition, and, at the least, commend it to the consideration of your States and people. As you would perpetuate popular government for the best people in the world, I beseech you that you do in no wise omit this. Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring a speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world; its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness, and swell that grandeur, and to link your own names therewith forever.

Twenty of the Senators and Representatives thus addressed replied in respectful, but decidedly unfavorable, terms. Nine only made friendly and approving responses.

CHAPTER VI.

**Military Events.—Inaction on the Potomac.—Western Campaigns.—
Capture of New Orleans.**

THE summary of political events in the preceding chapter has somewhat outrun the course of military operations. Gen. McClellan, as General-in-chief of the entire army, had nominally assumed control alike over Gen. Halleck, commanding in the Department of the West, over Gen. Burnside and Gen. T. W. Sherman in North and South Carolina, and over the vast Army of the Potomac. During the two months succeeding the retirement of Lieut. Gen. Scott, every day's delay, while calm skies and dry roads invited to action, added new weight to the impatience of the people. But at length wintry weather put an end to all immediate hope of action. Opinions as to the General-in-chief were divided. Ready excuses on the part of those immediately about him as to still needed preparations, and lavish promises as to results when the time of action should come, with frequent intimations of an early movement, satisfied many who would otherwise have been despondent. To the President himself, Gen. McClellan, while reticent as to details, preserved an air of earnest determination, and held out the prospect of effective action at no remote day. An engagement near Dranesville, Md., under Gen. Ord, favorable to our arms, yet unimportant in results, had, on the 20th of December, awakened only to disappoint an expiring hope of some decisive action before another season. Some occasional collisions between detachments of the opposing armies were all that occurred in the Eastern Departments after the successful landing of the Southern expedition until the opening of spring.

The contrast between this inaction in the East, and the energetic and decisive movements in the West during the same period, was marked. Neither this fact, nor the customary mode of

stating the plan of the General-in-chief—which was one of simultaneous movement on all sides—would seem consistent with the supposition that affairs in the West were under any real control of the nominal military head at Washington. His actual relation to these events will in due time appear.

Early in January, Col. Garfield again cleared the eastern border of Kentucky of Rebels, defeating an invading force under Humphrey Marshall, at Middle Creek, near Prestonburg, on the 10th. Gen. George B. Crittenden, at the head of another Rebel force, about 12,000 strong, had issued his proclamation to the people of Kentucky on the 6th, from his headquarters at Mill Spring, a point near the south bank of the Tennessee river, where that stream, making a wide sweep, bends farthest northward into the State. It was in this vicinity that a brilliant victory was gained on the 19th of January, by our forces under command of Gen. George H. Thomas. This achievement, utterly routing the rebel force, with severe loss, including that of Gen. Zollicoffer, killed, and penetrating the extended line of the Rebels opposed to Gen. Buell, was hailed as the promise of more stirring days. On the occasion of receiving this news, the Secretary of War issued the following order:

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 22, 1862.

The President, Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, has received information of a brilliant victory achieved by the United States forces over a large body of armed traitors and rebels at Mill Spring, in the State of Kentucky.

He returns thanks to the gallant officers and soldiers who won that victory, and when the official reports shall be received, the military skill and personal valor displayed in battle will be acknowledged and rewarded in a fitting manner.

The courage that encountered and vanquished the greatly superior numbers of the Rebel force, pursued and attacked them in their intrenchments, and paused not until the enemy was completely routed, merits and receives commendation.

The purpose of this war is to attack, pursue and destroy a rebellious enemy, and to deliver the country from danger menaced by traitors. Alacrity, daring, courageous spirit and patriotic zeal, on all occasions and under every circumstance, are expected from the Army of the United States.

In the prompt and spirited movements and daring battle of Mill Spring, the nation will realize its hopes, and the people of the United States will rejoice to honor every soldier and officer who proves his courage by charging with the bayonet and storming intrenchments, or in the blaze of the enemy's fire.

By order of the President.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

These words of cheer, following acts so successful, reassured despondent hearts, and turned all eyes toward new scenes of hope.

The Rebel line from Columbus, on the Mississippi, to Bowling Green, on Green river, as will be seen from a map of that region, was penetrated by the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, running in a northerly and nearly parallel direction, about ten miles apart, from the boundary between Kentucky and Tennessee, into the Ohio river, cutting off a triangle comprising seven or eight counties in the south-western part of the former State. To secure their line against the gunboats, which were now making their appearance on the Western rivers, the Rebels had constructed a fort near the State line, on the Tennessee, in the immediate vicinity of Panther Island, called Fort Henry. At a point nearly on the same parallel, on the Cumberland, eastward, near Dover, in Tennessee, was another work named Fort Donelson. These points are about ninety miles distant from the mouths of the respective rivers.

Gen. Grant, almost simultaneously with the movement on Mill Spring, had planned an attack on Fort Henry, with a cooperating gunboat fleet under Com. Foote. This movement was authorized by Gen. Halleck, there being signs of intended reënforcements to the rebel left. Although the roads were in very bad condition, and movements of infantry and artillery were difficult, the high water in the Tennessee was specially favorable for the execution of that portion of the movement under the charge of Com. Foote.

On the 6th of February, the gunboats Essex, Carondelet, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Conestoga, Tyler and Lexington, advanced to the attack on Fort Henry, opening a rapid and

heavy fire, replied to by the guns of the fort. After an hour and a quarter the latter were silenced, the fort was surrendered, and Gen. Tilghman, with his staff and sixty men, gave themselves up as prisoners. The remainder of the garrison escaped, the force sent forward by Grant, under Gen. McClelland, owing to the state of the roads or other causes, not having arrived in season to participate in the action. This engagement first thoroughly tested the gunboats, and proved their great value.

Gen. Grant lost no time in dispatching about 15,000 men from Fort Henry, to invest Fort Donelson. The gunboats, meanwhile, had returned to the mouth of the Tennessee, and made their way up the Cumberland, together with sixteen transports loaded with fresh troops, arriving on the 14th. The three divisions engaged were under the command of Gens. C. F. Smith, McClelland, and Lewis Wallace. The infantry and batteries having taken position, the gunboats opened fire on the fort at about two o'clock on that day, with less decisive effect than at Fort Henry. The St. Louis became seriously disabled, and Gen. Grant, making a complete investment of the fort, and strengthening his position, was designing to wait for the gunboats to renew the attack. On the following morning, however, the enemy within the fort, lately heavily reënforced, attacked our extreme right, under McClelland, which rested on Dover, and brought on a general and severe engagement, which had apparently almost resulted in a disastrous repulse of our forces. The right was seasonably reënforced, and after a hardly contested fight, lasting until dark, in which both sides suffered heavily, the Rebels were driven back within their fortifications. Early on the morning of the 16th, a white flag was raised by the Rebel Gen. Buckner, asking an armistice for the purpose of agreeing upon terms of capitulation. In reply, Gen. Grant sent the following memorable note :

HEADQUARTERS ON THE FIELD, FORT DONELSON, }
February 16, 1862. }

TO GEN. S. B. BUCKNER—*Sir*: Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and the appointment of commissioners to

settle on the terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms, except unconditional and immediate surrender, can be accepted. I propose to move immediately on your works.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Brigadier General Commanding.

Gens. Floyd and Pillow, with a portion of the Rebel force, had escaped during the night. Gen. Buckner, and about 15,000 men, were unconditionally surrendered as prisoners of war, and 20,000 stand of arms, with a large amount of stores, fell into the hands of Gen. Grant. A victory so complete and substantial was hailed with joy by the Government and by loyal men every-where, and gave its hero at once a prominent place in the hearts of the people.

Finding his right and left flanks thus completely turned by Thomas and Grant, the enemy evacuated Bowling Green on the 15th, rapidly falling back south of the Cumberland river. Clarksville and Nashville, Tenn., were promptly occupied by our forces. This succession of triumphs, exciting grateful enthusiasm throughout the loyal portion of the nation, caused a corresponding humiliation and despondency in the Rebel States. The border line of the Rebellion, in the West, this side of the Mississippi, was thereby contracted a long distance southward, leaving Kentucky free, and promising a speedy restoration of Tennessee under loyal sway.

The forts on Roanoke Island, on the coast of North Carolina, were captured by a joint expedition under Gen. Burnside and Com. Goldsborough, on the 8th of February, after two days' fighting, in which the losses were comparatively small. Over two thousand prisoners, forty guns, and three thousand small arms, were captured.

In Missouri, Gen. Price had fallen back from point to point on the approach of our forces under Gen. Curtis. He finally retired from the State, taking up his headquarters at Cross Hollows, in Arkansas, during the latter part of February. On the 23d of that month Gen. Curtis had advanced in pursuit, as far as Fayetteville, Ark., on the White river, in the north western part of that State.

The evacuation of Columbus, Kentucky, on the 27th of February, as a necessary result of Grant's capture of Fort Donelson, and the dispersion of the main force of the Rebels in Missouri, invited the attempt to repossess the Mississippi, hitherto blockaded by the Rebels. The importance of this possession, not alone for its commercial consequence to the North-west, but also from military considerations, was too obvious to escape the notice of a Western President. Three Illinois regiments occupied Columbus on the 3d of March, a gunboat fleet having accompanied the transports which conveyed this force. On the same day, an engagement, indecisive in its results, was fought by forces under Gen. Pope, with Rebels, under Gen. Jeff. Thompson, near New Madrid. It soon became evident that, in retreating from Columbus, the Rebels had occupied Island Number Ten, in the Mississippi river, several miles below, and a little distance above New Madrid. This was the beginning of the memorable siege of that place, ultimately captured, with a large number of prisoners and valuable property, on the 8th day of April.

On the 6th, 7th, and 8th of March was fought one of the most important engagements of the war at Pea Ridge, in Arkansas, near the Missouri line. Gen. Curtis, as already seen, had driven the Rebels across the Missouri border, and had occupied Fayetteville, Arkansas, on the 23d of February, the opposing forces retiring beyond the Boston Mountains, which divide the valley of White river, on the north, from that of the Arkansas river, in the center of the State. Curtis soon after withdrew toward Missouri, his main force being concentrated at a place called Sugar-creek Hollow, with a rear guard, under Gen. Sigel, at Bentonville.

The forces under Gen. Curtis comprised four divisions—the First under command of Col. Osterhaus, the Second under Gen. Asboth, the Third under Col. Jeff. C. Davis, and the Fourth led by Col. Carr. The Rebel forces were now united under Gen. Earl Van Dorn, who had assumed command of the Trans-Mississippi Department, with his headquarters at Little Rock, on the 29th of January. There were under him in this engagement probably ten thou-

and Missouri troops, under Gen. Price; from twelve to fifteen thousand men from Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas, under Gen. McCulloch, and about five or six thousand Choctaw, Cherokee, Chickasaw and other Indians, with two white regiments—in all about seven thousand—under Albert Pike. One Rebel account states that Van Dorn's force in this expedition was reckoned as high as thirty-five thousand. The Union force did not much exceed one-third of that number.

Confident in their numerical strength, and believing, as they admitted, that their force was at least double that under Curtis, the Rebels advanced with the hope of annihilating our army. Coming up with Sigel's force at Bentonville, on the morning of the 6th of March, they compelled that General to fall back toward the main army—a movement which he executed with scarcely any loss, having sent forward his trains, while a well-managed battery protected his retreat, inflicting severe injury upon the enemy whenever he approached within shelling distance. A march of ten miles brought Sigel's force to the west end of Pea Ridge, a range of high ground just beyond Sugar Creek, where the main army of Curtis lay. It was now night, and Curtis, who had all day been busily preparing to meet the enemy, made his disposition for the eventful morrow. His force in the hollow had fronted to the south, and Sigel, with Osterhaus' division, now occupied a position about three miles to the west. The Rebel forces crossed the creek still further west, and occupied the higher ground northward and directly in the rear, his two main bodies also separated by about three miles distance—the troops under Price opposite Curtis, and those under McCulloch and McIntosh over against Sigel. A change of front was promptly made, bringing the armies face to face—Curtis commanding the right, now moved to higher ground two miles northward, and Sigel the left.

The enemy attacked our right on the morning of the 7th, and the battle was fiercely maintained throughout the day, with severe loss on both sides. The area fought over did not exceed three-fourths of a mile in diameter. Our right was finally driven back for nearly a mile, the enemy encamping on

the field they had thus won. McCulloch, meanwhile, on the left, had in the morning begun a movement south-eastwardly, to form a junction with Price, so as to surround Curtis, and cut off all retreat. Sigel endeavored to check this detected movement by sending forward three pieces of flying artillery, with a cavalry support, to delay McCulloch's advance until his infantry could come up. An overwhelming force of Rebel cavalry bore down upon this detachment, dispersing it and capturing our guns, while McCulloch's infantry gained shelter in a wood beyond a large open field. This wood and field became the scene of a prolonged contest between Osterhaus and McCulloch. The timely arrival of Davis with reënforcements turned the tide, and the enemy was utterly routed, with heavy loss, McCulloch and McIntosh being among the killed.

The position which had been gained by Van Dorn's left was naturally a strong one, cutting off our retreat, and here he concentrated his entire forces. On that chilly night the men of Curtis' army, looking forward to the coming day, might well have been disheartened. Their ultimate defeat must have seemed almost certain. With sunrise the batteries of Price reopened, and with terrible effect on the extreme right, held by Carr's division, and now supported by Davis. The position of the enemy being clearly disclosed, Sigel, with quick insight and prompt action, skillfully disposed his batteries so as to bear directly in the face of the enemy's right, causing great destruction to the latter, with little loss to himself. His thirty pieces silenced battery after battery of the enemy, making terrible havoc. For more than two hours, with admirable tact and unslackened activity, this cannonading was kept up, batteries and infantry approaching nearer and nearer the concentrated foe, until at length Curtis ordered his infantry to charge the enemy in his last shelter of the woods, and, after a short but deadly struggle, the Rebel forces gave way and scattered in confusion and utter rout. The total loss of Curtis, mostly on the 7th, is stated at 1,312 in killed, wounded and missing. The losses of Van Dorn were manifestly much greater, but they are not accurately known.

With this victory, followed six days later by the capture of

New Madrid by Gen. Pope, the conflict in Missouri was substantially brought to an end. The war was now transferred into Arkansas, and from a contest on the part of the Rebels to force an unwilling people into fellowship with a confederacy of traitors, it had now become a movement of the Union armies—ere long to prove successful—for restoring peace, order and law, under the constitutional Government, in a State temporarily overborne by the tide of Secessionism.

Soon after the occupation of Nashville, on the 25th of February, Gen. Buell concentrated his army, for the most part, at and near that city. On the 11th of March, an order of the President placed the forces of Gens. Halleek, Hunter and Buell, under the chief command of Halleek alone, consolidating in one the respective departments of the two first-named commanders, together with so much of that of Gen. Buell "as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville," the whole to be called the Department of the Mississippi. The troops under Buell were mostly from Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky. Among his Generals commanding divisions were A. McD. McCook, George H. Thomas, Ormsby M. Mitchell, Wm. Nelson and Thos. L. Crittenden.

An expedition under Gen. Grant was speedily organized, to proceed up the Tennessee river, the enemy having taken up his defensive line with the Charleston and Memphis Railroad as a base. Grant's new "Army of the Tennessee," was mainly composed of troops from Illinois, Ohio, Indiana and Iowa, with regiments from several other States. Numerous steamboats were employed for the transportation of these forces, which were accompanied by two gunboats. The divisions into which Grant's army was organized, each with its proportion of infantry, cavalry and artillery, were commanded, respectively, by Gens. W. T. Sherman, C. F. Smith, B. M. Prentiss, S. A. Hurlbut, J. A. McClernand and L. Wallace.

On the 5th of March, Gen. Beauregard, having tarried awhile at Richmond, after leaving Centreville about the 1st of February, assumed command of the Rebel "Army of the Mississippi," with his headquarters first at Jackson, Tenn., on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. The Rebel forces, under the sub

ordinate commands of Bragg, Polk, Cheatham, and others, were chiefly in camp at Corinth, Miss., with detachments at several points on the railroads. This place is at the junction of the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston Railroads, in an uneven country, and not far from the line dividing the States of Tennessee and Mississippi.

Gen. Grant landed his forces at Savannah, Tenn., a small place on the Tennessee river, about one hundred and seventy miles above Fort Henry, and about twenty-five miles from the Mississippi State line. His original force was increased by a considerable body of infantry from Ohio. As many as eighty-two steamers, laden with troops, had arrived at Savannah by the 13th of March. These "invaders" were received with enthusiastic demonstrations of joy by the inhabitants of that part of Tennessee through which they passed.

Soon after the arrival of Gen. Grant in person, the army was advanced seven miles up the river to Pittsburg Landing. Gen. Buell was ordered by Halleck to effect a junction with Grant. Little alacrity, however, was shown by Buell in complying with this order, so manifestly requiring prompt execution in view of the greatly superior Rebel force known to be in front of Grant. It was not until the 28th of March that Buell left Nashville. On the 30th, the rear of his army was at Columbia, but eighty-two miles distant from Savannah. This distance was passed over by leisurely marches, averaging less than twelve miles a day, while Beauregard was putting in execution his well-devised plan for attacking Grant in overwhelming force before Buell should come to his support.

On the 3d of April, Gen. Johnston issued a brief address to the Army of the Mississippi, to inspire them in executing the purpose formed, "to offer battle to the invaders," and the Rebel forces were put in motion toward Pittsburg Landing. Orders were at the same time issued, dividing the army into three corps, the first to be commanded by Polk, the second by Bragg, and the third by Hardee. John C. Breckinridge was given the command of a reserve division. The chief command seems to have been jointly held by Johnston and Beauregard, until the former fell, early during the first day's engagement.

Before six o'clock on the morning of Sunday, the 6th day of April, a party of the Rebels attacked Grant's left—that officer being then absent at Savannah, superintending preparations for receiving and crossing over the anxiously-expected forces of Buell. At eight o'clock the enemy advanced in strong force, and captured Gen. Prentiss, with two thousand prisoners. Hurlbut came to the support of the retreating division of Prentiss, and temporarily checked the enemy's advance. Part of Sherman's force, on the right of Prentiss, was routed, and a heavy column was thrown against McClernand's division in the center, which, before noon, was driven backward to the line of Hurlbut. The fight was bravely maintained, and the force attacking McClernand was once temporarily driven back for some distance; but the whole of our army was compelled gradually to give way. Only the most invincible courage of the men, with cool and determined leadership, could save the army now from utter defeat. The division commanded by Gen. W. H. L. Wallace, (in the absence of Gen. C. F. Smith,) on the right, had, with that of Hurlbut on the left, occupied positions next the river, and on these, with one of Sherman's brigades on the extreme left, now fell the weight of the Rebel advance. Four times attempts were made by the Rebels to charge on the gallant forces of Wallace, but each time volleys of musketry and the fire of well-directed artillery, drove back the assailants with terrible slaughter. Hurlbut's division was driven back, at length, from its camp to the shelter of woods beyond. Here, with their raking fire across the open fields, they three times repulsed the advancing enemy. The right of this division was further supported by forces rallied from the broken divisions. Meanwhile Gen. L. Wallace, who was at Crump's Landing, five miles below, was anxiously looked for, in the overwhelming odds against the remaining divisions, but unfortunately, though ordered up, he failed to reach the scene of action until nightfall.

Finally, Hurlbut's division was compelled to retire, and at length that of Wallace, who fell, mortally wounded. The whole army was now compressed into a comparatively small area, near the Landing; many guns had been lost; thousands

of prisoners taken; and one more determined attack seemed sufficient to drive the men pell-mell into the river, adequate means for transporting them across the river being wanting. Now it was that the field batteries were collected and skillfully put in position, by Col. Webster, Grant's Chief of Artillery, preparatory to the expected onset. The Rebel advance drew the destructive fire of twenty-two guns, with that of the two gunboats at the mouth of Lick Creek. Staggered by this terrible hail, the enemy were kept in check until night closed upon the bloody field.

Beauregard joyously announced to his superiors at Richmond "a complete victory," with "the loss on both sides heavy, including our commander-in-chief, Albert Sidney Johnston, who fell gallantly leading his troops into the thickest of the fight." As the vaunting author of this dispatch soon learned, however, to his cost, the announcement of victory was premature. Another day entirely changed the face of events.

Before the conflict of Sunday had fairly closed, Gen. Nelson's division of Buell's army appeared on the opposite side of the river, and both those officers in person. During the night, the divisions of Crittenden and McCook also arrived; while Gen. L. Wallace, of Grant's army, took position, about one o'clock in the morning, on the extreme right.

Thus reënforced, Grant assumed the offensive, ordering an advance at dawn. The enemy was now forced back, from point to point, all along his line, the fight continuing without intermission from nine o'clock in the morning until five in the evening. At the latter hour the whole field had been regained, and the defeated Rebels put to flight. Our troops were too weary with the two days' hard conflict to make an effective pursuit. On the next day, Gen. Beauregard sent a flag of truce from his headquarters at Monterey, asking "permission to send a mounted party to the battle-field of Shiloh, for the purpose of giving decent interment" to his dead. To this Gen. Grant replied, on the 9th, saying that, owing to the warmth of the weather, he had deemed it advisable to have all the dead of both parties buried immediately, and that this was "now accomplished."

Gen. Grant estimated his loss in killed and wounded at 5,000. There was the further loss of about 3,000 prisoners taken on Sunday, making a total of 8,000. Gen. Beauregard, in his official report, conceded a Rebel loss of 1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded, and 959 missing—an aggregate of 10,699.

The numbers engaged under Gen. Grant, on the first day, were about 40,000, many of whom were raw troops, but recently arrived. Nearly 30,000 fresh troops participated in the battle on the 7th. The Rebel force, consisting of three entire army corps, and a reserve division, may be estimated at not far from 70,000.

Gen. Halleck soon after took the field in person, and prepared for an advance on the enemy's stronghold at Corinth, to which place Beauregard retired with his army, directly after the defeat at Shiloh.

On the 22d of March, the President constituted two new military departments—the first called the **Department of the Gulf**, comprising all the coast of the Gulf of Mexico west of Pensacola harbor, and so much of the Gulf States as should be occupied by the commander, Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler; and the second, including the States of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, with the forces heretofore under Gen. T. W. Sherman, to be under the command of Maj. Gen. David Hunter.

A joint expedition under Com. Farragut and Gen. Butler, to capture and occupy New Orleans, and to coöperate thence with the movements from Cairo downward to reopen the Mississippi river, had been organized in the autumn of 1861. Gen. Butler's forces were to rendezvous at Ship Island, for which place the command of Gen. Phelps sailed from Fortress Monroe on the 27th of November, arriving on the 3d of December. During this latter month, two gunboats of Farragut had some skirmishing with Rebel gunboats in Mississippi Sound; and in January another considerable installment of Butler's force arrived at Ship Island. A mortar fleet, under **Com. D. D. Porter**, was also added to the naval portion of the expedition. **Com. Farragut** left Hampton Roads in the **steamer Hartford**, on the 3d of February, to assume command

of the squadron which was to operate against New Orleans, and arrived at Ship Island on the 20th. The chief obstacles to his intended advance, after crossing the bar, were Forts St. Philip and Jackson, on the Mississippi river, seventy-five miles below New Orleans. These works were so formidable, and the preparations to receive the "Northern armada" so thorough, that the Rebels were entirely confident of success in repelling all attacks. That part of Farragut's fleet which crossed the bar consisted of the steam sloops Hartford, 24 guns, (flag ship); Richmond, 26; Pensacola, 24; Brooklyn, 24; Mississippi, 12; Iroquois, 9; Onecida, 9; the sailing sloop-of-war Portsmouth, 17; the gunboats Varuna, 12; Cayuga, 9; and eight others of 4 guns each. Com. Porter's mortar fleet consisted of twenty schooners, mounting one large mortar, with two small guns, and was accompanied by the Harriet Lane, (flag ship,) the Miami, and three other steamers carrying five or six guns each. No part of either fleet was iron-clad.

Much time was consumed in getting these vessels over the bar at the mouths of the Mississippi. The bombardment commenced on the 18th of April, the mortar boats leading, supported by the gunboats, which made occasional approaches to the forts, drawing their fire. The bombardment continued for six days with no material result apparent, except the breaking of a heavy rifled gun on Fort St. Philip. By a bold movement, begun at two o'clock on the morning of the 24th, a portion of Farragut's fleet, after a gallant fight, succeeded in overcoming all obstructions and passing the forts. With nine of his vessels, Com. Farragut appeared before New Orleans on the 25th. Forts St. Philip and Jackson capitulated on the 28th. Gen. Butler was at hand with his forces—the Rebel Gen. Lovell made a precipitate retreat into the interior of the State, and the city was surrendered, Gen. Butler taking possession on the 1st day of May.

For a time, the cheering and substantial results recited in this chapter were claimed, by many, as triumphs due to a "grand plan" of the young General-in-chief; while others as confidently pointed out their inconsistency with an alleged scheme which involved "thunder around the whole horizon,"

when once the spell of silence should be broken. Scarcely the faintest echo, in fact, unless at Roanoke Island, where a victory had been gained in February, responded to the reverberations at Mill Spring, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh and New Orleans. All mystery on this subject was dispelled by the subsequent disclosure that, as early as January, the President had substantially revoked the broader authority given to a dilatory General-in-chief, who had caused the Army of the Potomac to waste in idleness six months that had been expected to bring forth a decisive campaign, and who had opposed the movements so brilliantly executed in the West, as well as the Southern expeditions, one of which restored New Orleans and the passes of the Mississippi to the Government. In the West and Southwest, we have seen that ample results, even in the worst season of the year, followed this wise policy of Mr. Lincoln. How the President's order for active movements was carried into effect by the commander of the Army of the Potomac, will appear in the pages immediately following.

CHAPTER VII.

Military Events in the East.—The Peninsular Campaign.

THE fortifications around Washington, commenced by Gen. J. G. Barnard, Chief Engineer under McDowell, and continued by the same officer under McClellan, had been essentially completed before the close of September, 1861. In an order issued on the 30th of that month, the commanding General designated the names by which the thirty-two principal works should be respectively known. From this time onward a large portion of the Army of the Potomac was no longer needed on merely defensive duty. In a communication addressed to the Secretary of War in the latter part of October, Gen. McClellan estimated the number of troops required for the protection of Washington at 35,000, with a further force of 23,000, to be distributed on the Upper and Lower Potomac, and at Baltimore and Annapolis. The main purpose of this vast army, raised, equipped and disciplined at such a cost, was manifestly something quite beyond what 58,000 men alone amply sufficed to accomplish. To destroy the Rebel army before Washington, and to occupy Richmond, were, in the minds alike of military men and civilians, the prime objects to be effected by the Army of the Potomac.

October, November, December, passed without result. The commanding General admits his consciousness of the anxiety no less of the people than of the President for active operations during these pleasant months, on the part of an army sustained at a cost of millions daily. Gen. McClellan's official statement gives his entire force on the 1st of December as 198,213, of whom 169,452 were present for duty, and on the first of January, 1862, as 219,707, of whom 191,480 were "effective." After deducting the 58,000 deemed necessary for defensive purposes—and most of these might also have been employed in a direct movement on Manassas—there thus remained an effective

army of 111,452 at the former date, and of 133,480 at the latter, for an aggressive movement. Beauregard, who had his headquarters at Centreville, until he was transferred to another command, on the 30th of January, certainly had at no time a force in McClellan's front exceeding one-half the number of the Army of the Potomac.

Gen. McClellan records no surprising fact, therefore, when he states that "about the middle of January, 1862, upon recovering from a severe illness," he "found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the Army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the Administration."

More than six months having elapsed since the command of this army had devolved upon Gen. McClellan, without the development of either a particular plan or a general purpose of attacking the enemy, under circumstances the most favorable, and an unexpected quiescence having followed his appointment as General-in-chief, the President at length issued his "General War Order, No. 1," as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
January 27, 1862. }

[President's General War Order, No. 1.]

ORDERED, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.

That especially the Army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the Army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky, the Army and Flotilla at Cairo, and a Naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready for a movement on that day.

That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

That the Heads of Departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

This mandate, communicated to high officers immediately

concerned, was not made public until the 11th of March following. In it, the President fully resumed his constitutional position as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, practically dispensing with the services of Gen. McClellan as a "Lieutenant," in the discharge of those high duties, as was more formally announced at a later day, on the publication of this general order.

After thus directing Gen. McClellan's efforts more particularly to the management of the Army of the Potomac, the President soon found it expedient to concentrate that officer's thoughts upon some definite plan—which had evidently been not very clearly before his mind hitherto—for rendering this great force of practical service to the Government. Consequently, four days later, the following order was communicated to McClellan :

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
January 31, 1862. }

ORDERED, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad south-westward of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the Commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before, or on, the twenty-second day of February next.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Immediately after receiving this order, Gen. McClellan prepared a long letter to Mr. Stanton, (dated January 31, 1862,) in which he set forth his objections to this movement, and vehemently urged the substitution of a plan of advance upon Richmond by the Lower Rappahannock, with Urbana as a base. He insists that a movement by Manassas must be delayed on account of the bad condition of the roads, and that this difficulty would be removed by taking the route he proposes, over a more sandy soil, and in a latitude in which the season is two or three weeks earlier. "This movement, if adopted," he says, "will not at all expose the city of Washington to danger. The total force to be thrown upon the new line would be (according to circumstances) from 110,000 to

140,000. I hope to use the latter number by bringing fresh troops into Washington, and still leaving it quite safe." The maximum number here stated would still leave more than 60,000 for the defense of Washington, without additional 'fresh troops.' Gen. McClellan closes this letter with the following earnest appeal:

In conclusion, I would respectfully but firmly advise that I may be authorized to undertake at once the movement by Urbana. I believe that it can be carried into execution so nearly simultaneously with the final advance of Buell and Halleck, that the columns will support each other. I will stake my life, my reputation, on the result,—more than that, I will stake upon it the success of our cause. I hope but little from the attack on Manassas. My judgment is against it. Foreign complications may entirely change the state of affairs, and render very different plans necessary. In that event, I will be ready to submit to them.

On the 3d of February, President Lincoln addressed to Gen. McClellan the following memorable letter, having reference to the Urbana plan, scarcely more than alluded to by McClellan in his final report, and seemingly as unceremoniously abandoned, after serving a purpose, as it had been zealously improvised:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
February 3, 1862. }

MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac; yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York river; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas.

If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of *time* and *money* than mine?

2d. Wherein is a victory *more certain* by your plan than mine?

3d. Wherein is a victory *more valuable* by your plan than mine?

4th. In fact, would it not be *less* valuable in this; that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

Yours, truly,

A. LINCOLN.

MAJ.-GEN. McCLELLAN.

These plain test questions were never directly met. In a long letter of the same date, however, addressed to the Secretary of War, arguing the merits of the two plans, Gen. McClellan avers that he "substantially answered" the President's inquiries. The subject remained for some time under consideration, the President's order not withdrawn, but its execution suspended, while McClellan at length proceeded to the work of opening the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, under urgent pressure from his superiors.

On the 26th of February, he announced, from Sandy Hook, that Loudon and Bolivar Heights, and also Maryland Heights, had been occupied by our troops, and that G. W. Smith was expected at Winchester with 15,000 Rebels. After incurring much cost and delay in the construction of canal boats to be used in crossing the Upper Potomac, he now found, on proceeding to use them, a considerable force intended for Winchester being already under orders, that, as he expressed it in a dispatch to the Secretary of War, Feb. 27th, "the lift-lock" was "too small" to permit the boats to pass up to their destination. Mr. Stanton sent this laconic reply, under the same date: "Gen. McClellan — If the lift-lock is not big enough, why can not it be made big enough? Please answer immediately." The response was, that, to do this, the entire masonry must be destroyed and rebuilt. Consequently, the boats, long patiently waited for, were summarily dispensed with, and the marching orders countermanded. At the same time, for reasons satisfactory to himself, McClellan revoked an order he had given to Hooker, for a movement toward silencing the Rebel batteries on the Potomac, which had also been earnestly pressed by the Administration. His plan at Harper's Ferry, as stated Feb. 28, was chiefly "to occupy Charlestown and Bunker Hill, so as to cover the rebuilding of the railway," making the following objections to the desired advance upon

Winchester and thorough occupation of the Shenandoah Valley: "We could not supply and move to Winchester for many days, and had I moved more troops here, they would have been at a loss for food on the Virginia side." McClellan soon after returned to Washington, and began the movement on Manassas, as required by the President's order of January 31st—a full month having now intervened.

Events in the Valley, for some time to come, may here be briefly summed up. Charlestown was occupied in force by Gen. Banks on the 28th of February, and Martinsburg on the 3d of March. Col. Geary occupied Leesburg on the 2d. Stonewall Jackson evacuated Winchester on the 11th, and was pursued by Gen. Shields (who had succeeded the lamented Gen. Lander,) until overtaken near New Market on the 19th, within supporting distance of the Rebel force under Joe Johnston, (who had taken full command, in that quarter, when Beauregard left for the West, the last of January.) Shields retreated rapidly to Winchester, on the 20th. On the 22d, by order of Gen. McClellan, the forces of Gen. Banks, now constituting the Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, were nearly all, with the exception of Shields' division, withdrawn to the vicinity of Manassas. On the same evening, the Rebels, under Jackson and Longstreet, supposed to be 10,000 strong, attacked the place, and were gallantly repulsed by Shields, whose division numbered less than 8,000. After this battle, Gen. Banks, having returned to the Valley, followed up the retreating enemy, successively occupying Strasburg, Woodstock, and (on the 26th of March) Harrisonburg. The Rebel forces now retired from that region, and the Valley was comparatively quiet for nearly two months following.

On the 28th of February, McClellan returned to Washington. The results at Harper's Ferry, as well as the delay in raising the blockade of the Lower Potomac, had been far from satisfactory to the President. The day fixed for a general movement had passed, and the plan of advancing on Richmond by the Chesapeake, if acquiesced in, was manifestly impracticable, unless by the roundabout way of Annapolis, until the Potomac had first been cleared of the Rebel batteries. Mean

while, as early as the 15th of February, measures had been taken by the Secretary of War to secure with promptness the necessary transportation by water for the forces to be moved. This fact indicates the determination of the Administration to acquiesce in a plan on which the Commanding General was ready to stake so much, rather than to insist on a movement much preferred, yet which could hardly be expected to succeed under the reluctant generalship of one who felt no confidence in its success, and who would show no alacrity in its execution.

With all that had been accomplished in the way of organization, discipline, and general preparation, the Army of the Potomac had still remained without distribution into Army Corps. The President, sustained by the best military authorities and advisers, if not by the universal practice in modern warfare, had desired such organization to be made. This Gen McClellan had failed to attend to, and it was not until he was on the eve of a movement toward Manassas, with a manifest purpose not to perfect his organization, that President Lincoln issued the following peremptory order :

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
March 8, 1862. }

President's General War Order, No. 2.]

ORDERED, I. That the Major-General commanding the Army of the Potomac proceed forthwith to organize that part of said army destined to enter upon active operations, (including the reserve, but excluding the troops to be left in the fortifications about Washington,) into four army corps, to be commanded according to seniority of rank, as follows :

First Corps, to consist of four divisions, and to be commanded by Maj.-Gen. I. McDowell.

Second Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brig.-Gen. E. V. Sumner.

Third Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brig.-Gen. S. P. Heintzelman.

Fourth Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brig.-Gen. E. D. Keyes.

II. That the divisions now commanded by the officers above assigned to the command of Corps, shall be embraced in and form part of their respective Corps.

III. The forces left for the defense of Washington will be placed in command of Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth, who shall also be Military Governor of the District of Columbia.

IV. That this order be executed with such promptness and dispatch, as not to delay the commencement of the operations already directed to be undertaken by the Army of the Potomac.

V. That the Fifth Army Corps, to be commanded by Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, will be formed from his own and Gen. Shields', late Gen. Lander's, division.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

To the execution of this order, the Commanding General interposed such obstacles as were in his power, without positive refusal. On the 9th of March, having taken the field, he telegraphed to Secretary Stanton from Hall's Hill, the headquarters of Fitz John Porter, that "in the arrangements for to-morrow it is impossible to carry" the order "into effect," and asks its suspension. The Secretary promptly replied: "I think it is the duty of every officer to obey the President's orders, nor can I see any reason why you should not obey them in the present instance. I must, therefore, decline to suspend them." McClellan, still at Hall's Hill, telegraphs, on the 10th, that he "must suspend movement, or disregard order," alleging "military necessity," and adds: "If you desire it, I will at once countermand" marching orders. To avoid this alternative, consent was granted for a temporary delay, until the impending movement should have been executed. The same day, McClellan informed the Department that the troops were in motion. Centreville was occupied that evening without opposition, and Manassas on the 11th, the only obstacle to movement being that the "roads are horrible."

Before this movement actually commenced, the President, who had reluctantly yielded his preference for such an advance on Richmond as would at the same time cover the National Capital, and who had not been indifferent to the neglect of his wishes in regard to the opening of the Potomac, or to the delays which experience had led him to dread, issued the subjoined general order:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
 March 8, 1862. }

ORDERED, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure.

That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved *en route* for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, shall be freed from the enemy's batteries, and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission.

That any movement as aforesaid, *en route* for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-chief, and which may be intended to move upon Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March, instant, and the General-in-chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day.

ORDERED, That the Army and Navy coöperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

On the 9th of March, the steamer Merrimac, which had been taken possession of by the insurgents at Norfolk, after the abandonment of that post in the spring of 1861, and converted into a formidable iron-clad vessel, re-named the Virginia, attacked and destroyed the Government sailing frigates Cumberland and Congress. The Minnesota, in coming to their assistance, ran aground. For awhile, all the shipping in the harbor seemed at the mercy of the Rebel monster. But the timely arrival of Ericsson's Monitor, just completed, and hitherto regarded as a doubtful experiment, ended the work of destruction, and caused the Merrimac to retire within shelter at Norfolk. These hurried and startling events caused great sensation at the time, both in this country and abroad, and have had a marked influence in regard to naval armaments every-where.

McClellan having now taken the field, so that a supervision of all the armies of the nation was clearly out of his power,

the President made public a change that was no secret to the General commanding the Army of the Potomac, through the following order—in which, also, two separate departments were created in the West, to be commanded by Gens. Halleck and Buell; and a third intermediate department, under the command of Gen. Fremont:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
March 11, 1862 }

President's War Order, No. 3.]

Maj.-Gen. McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac.

ORDERED, FURTHER, That the two departments now under the respective commands of Gens. Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under Gen. Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that until otherwise ordered Maj.-Gen. Halleck have command of said department.

ORDERED, ALSO, That the country west of the Department of the Potomac and east of the Department of the Mississippi be a military department, to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Maj.-Gen. Fremont.

That all the Commanders of Departments, after the receipt of this order by them respectively, report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Gen. McClellan telegraphed to the Secretary of War from Fairfax Court House, on the 13th of March, that a council of the commanders of army corps had "unanimously agreed upon a plan of operations," which Gen. McDowell would lay before him. To this the Secretary, on the same day, replied: "Whatever plan has been agreed upon, proceed at once to execute, without losing an hour for any approval."

The plan—which, in answer to a question of Mr. Stanton Gen. McClellan stated that "the council, together with himself," were unanimous in forming--was given in these words:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
 FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, March 13, 1862. }

A council of the Generals commanding army corps, at the Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, were of the opinion—

I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the Generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers: *Provided*,

1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merrimac, can be neutralized.

2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and,

3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York river.

4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.)

II. If the foregoing can not be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected, for both the Orange and Alexandria and Acquia and Richmond Railroads. (Unanimous.)

NOTE.—That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of twenty-five thousand men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell.) A total of forty thousand men for the defense of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)

The scheme having been promptly submitted to the President, the following dispatch was immediately returned:

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 13, 1862.

The President having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution:

1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

2. Leave Washington entirely secure.

3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or any-where between

here and there, or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Maj.-Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

McClellan replied that this would "be at once carried into effect."

Transportation was rapidly provided, under the direction of the War Department, this work having really commenced as early as the middle of February, and the other preparations for departure, on the part of the force intended for the Peninsula, were soon in readiness. The following statement of the numerical strength of this portion of the Army, on the 1st of April, is taken from the official report of the Adjutant General :

First Corps, under General I. McDowell,	- -	38,454
Second " " " E. V. Sumner,	-	31,037
Third, " " " S. P. Heintzelman,		38,854
Fourth, " " " E. D. Keyes,	- -	37,910
Regular Infantry,	- - - - -	4,765
Regular Cavalry,	- - - - -	3,141
Artillery Reserve,	- - - - -	3,116
Provost Guards, U. S. Engineer forces, and Headquarters Cavalry escort,	- - - - -	1,144
Total,	- - - - -	158,419

From the same authority, it appears that the total force left (according to the intention of Gen. McClellan) under command of Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth, now appointed Military Governor of the District of Washington, was 22,410, of whom less than 20,000 were present for duty. How far this number fell short of all McClellan's previous estimates of the necessary force for the defense of the city, need not be suggested to the reader of the preceding pages. Gen. Wadsworth promptly called the attention of the War Department to this striking deficiency. The plan of the Peninsular movement as submitted for Executive approval, the special order of the President consenting to this plan, on condition that the capital should be

adered secure, and the letter of Gen. Wadsworth on this subject, were referred to Adj.-Gen. Thomas and Maj.-Gen. E. A. Hitchcock, who were required to report whether the President's order, in this matter, had been carried out. Those officers, after full consideration, reported that the force proposed to be left, in execution of that order, was "entirely inadequate." They further said:

In view of the opinion expressed by the council of the commanders of army corps of the force necessary for the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the force represented by Gen. McClellan as left for that purpose, we are of opinion that the requirement of the President that this city shall be left entirely secure, not only in the opinion of the General-in-chief, but that of the commanders of all the army corps, also, has not been fully complied with.

Meanwhile, the movement of troops from Alexandria to Fortress Monroe had commenced. Gen. Hamilton's division, of the Third Corps, embarked on the 17th of March, and was followed by Fitz John Porter's division, of the same corps, on the 22d. Other troops followed at intervals, as transports were ready. Gen. McClellan himself left Alexandria on the 1st of April, and reached Fortress Monroe the next day.

There still remained two army corps which had not yet been transferred to the Peninsula, when the report of Gens. Thomas and Hitchcock was made. The only remedy for McClellan's intended disregard alike of the conditions of his own plan and of the President's requirement, respecting the force to be left at Washington and in its vicinity, was such as the President applied in the first part of the following order, the wisdom of which was soon fully demonstrated:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
April 3, 1862. }

The Secretary of War will order that one or the other of the corps of Gen. McDowell and Gen. Sumner remain in front of Washington until further orders from the Department, to operate at, or in the direction of, Manassas Junction, or otherwise as the occasion may require; that the other corps, not so ordered to remain, go forward to Gen. McClellan as speedily as possible; that Gen. McClellan commence his forward move-

ments from his new base at once, and that such incidental modifications as the foregoing may render proper, be also made

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

On the same day, Gen. McClellan had telegraphed from Fortress Monroe: "I expect to move from here to-morrow morning on Yorktown, where a force of some 15,000 of the Rebels are in intrenched position, and I think it quite possible they will attempt to resist us." On the 4th, he said: "Our advance is at Cockestown, within five miles of Yorktown. . . . I expect to fight to-morrow, as I shall endeavor to cut the communication between Yorktown and Richmond." At the same time Gen. Wool, telegraphing the departure of these forces for Yorktown, expressed a decided opinion that no serious resistance would be encountered there. It is probable, from the information since obtained, that when the movement commenced, the Rebel force under Magruder was less than 10,000. It is certain that the intrenchments were by no means so formidable as to justify the loss of time requisite for a siege, not only wasting precious days, but wearing out as many lives in the trenches as would have been sacrificed in carrying the works by assault. Such, at least, appears to have been the opinion of the President, who did not imagine for a moment, when his order above quoted was given, that a purpose to sit down before Yorktown, until the enemy had time to concentrate a strong force there, was entertained by the Commanding General.

Carrying out the policy of his order of April 3d, the President, as indicated by an order issued from the War Department on the following day, created two new military departments, including the spheres of operation and the troops left behind by McClellan on his withdrawal to the Peninsula. The Department of the Shenandoah embraced that portion of Virginia and Maryland lying between the Mountain Department and the Blue Ridge, and was put under the command of Maj.-Gen. Banks. The Department of the Rappahannock comprised that portion of Virginia east of the Blue Ridge to the Potomac and the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, together with the District of Columbia and the country between the Potomac and the Patuxent. Gen. McDowell was desig-

nated to command this department. The movements of the enemy in the valley, and the exposed condition in which McClellan had been on the point of leaving the National Capital, in disregard of instructions and of the express conditions on which the movement to the Peninsula was permitted, showed the expediency of having a responsible commander in both these localities. The remoteness of Gen. McClellan, and his occupation with other engrossing duties, seemed further to require this change.

If the President had not expected any serious loss of time at Yorktown, it is equally evident, from official dispatches, that such a thought had found no place in the mind of McClellan until about the same date as his official notification of the action of the Administration, just referred to. His dispatch, urging a reconsideration of this action, was prefaced by representations of the numbers and preparations of the enemy, not very closely agreeing with those previously given, yet at least such as to afford cogent reasons for an unhesitating advance. This significant paper is subjoined :

[Received 8.30 A. M., April 6.]

NEAR YORKTOWN, 7½ P. M., April 5.

A. LINCOLN, President : The enemy are in large force along our front, and apparently intend making a determined resistance. A reconnoissance just made by Gen. Barnard shows that their line of works extend across the entire Peninsula from Yorktown to Warwick river. Many of them are very formidable. Deserters say they are being reënforced daily from Richmond and from Norfolk. Under these circumstances, I beg that you will reconsider the order detaching the First Corps from my command. In my deliberate judgment the success of our cause will be imperiled by so greatly reducing my force when it is actually under the fire of the enemy, and active operations have commenced. Two or three of my divisions have been under fire of artillery most of the day. I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the Rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers, but whatever your decision may be I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. If you can not leave me the whole of the First Corps, I urgently ask that I may not lose Franklin and his division.

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

To this dispatch the following reply was promptly sent :

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, }
April 6, 1862. }

Maj.-Gen. GEO. B. McCLELLAN: The President directs me to say that your dispatch to him has been received. Sumner's corps is on the road to you, and will go forward as fast as possible. Franklin's division is now on the advance toward Manassas. There are no means of transportation here to send it forward in time to be of service in your present operations. Telegraph frequently, and all in the power of the Government shall be done to sustain you as occasion may require.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Magruder, who commanded the Rebel force near Yorktown, fully appreciated the element of time in this campaign, and undoubtedly maneuvered with some skill to put his adversary on a cautious policy. In general orders to be read to his troops, on the 4th of April, he said: "The enemy is before us—our works are strong—our cause is good—we fight for our homes, and must be careful. Every hour we hold out, brings us reënforcements." Instead of availing himself of his overwhelming superiority of numbers, by a resolute attack, McClellan paused to discuss still further the conduct of the Administration as to matters far away from the immediate sphere of his labors, and to beg for reënforcements. On the 6th, he sent the following dispatch, (received in Washington at 3 o'clock P. M.):

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

A. LINCOLN, President: The order forming new Departments, if rigidly enforced, deprives me of the power of ordering up wagons and troops absolutely necessary to enable me to advance to Richmond. I have by no means the transportation I must have to move my army even a few miles. I respectfully request that I may not be placed in this position, but that my orders for wagon trains, ammunition, and other material that I have prepared and necessarily left behind, as well as Woodbury's brigade, may at once be complied with. The enemy is strong in my front, and I have a most serious task before me, in the fulfillment of which I need all the aid the

Government can give me. I again repeat the urgent request that Gen. Franklin and his division may be restored to my command.

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

To this the President replied :

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN, Fortress Monroe: Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. The Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade, under your orders, is not, and will not be, interfered with. You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of Gen. Wool's command. I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick river at once. They will probably use time as advantageously as you can.

A. LINCOLN.

In disregarding this pointed advice—from one who was entitled to command—a grave, though still not irretrievable, error of the campaign, was committed at the outset. Gen. Burnside had done at Newbern, on the 14th of the previous month, what was incomparably more difficult, in carrying the works of the enemy, when manned by numbers fully equal to his own. His forces, too, were largely made up of raw recruits. The Army of the Potomac, after eight months spent in its formation and discipline, was deemed by its commander inadequate to force its way through the line of fortifications at Yorktown, though so many times more numerous than the enemy. Magruder gained the opportunity which he craved. Davis ordered Johnston and Beauregard to advance from Corinth, on the 3d of April, to crush the army of Grant at Pittsburg Landing—little dreaming then, as may well be supposed, that nearly three months would elapse before their presence would be indispensable at Richmond. The slow processes of a regular siege began in front of the little army of Magruder. Thousands sickened and died in the trenches. The nation grew weary of the same disheartening news, day by day, and week after week. Finally, the siege batteries were prepared to begin; and the enemy, though now strengthened by all the aid that thirty days could bring, was found to have deserted his

works the moment an earnest attack was believed to be imminent.

To the President's dispatch of April 6, Gen. McClellan had little else to reply than by extravagant representations of the enemy's strength, with a corresponding disparagement of his own, followed by complaining entreaties for reënforcements that could not be furnished. In this response, he also said: "Under the circumstances that have been developed since we arrived here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest."

So persistent was McClellan in these complaints and demands, that Mr. Lincoln felt constrained to address to him the following frank and kindly letter, plainly rehearsing the facts and reasons of the case, and again pointedly indicating the grand necessity of the hour:

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.

MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it — certainly not without reluctance.

After you left, I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. General Banks' corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburgh, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My implicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction: but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of

course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, *via* Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making one hundred and eight thousand then with you and *en route* to you. You now say you will have but eighty-five thousand when all *en route* to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of twenty-three thousand be accounted for?

As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time. And if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reënforcements than you can by reënforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

Gen. McClellan, in the early part of that report, in which he has given his own rhetorical coloring to his operations, as a military commander, quotes, without contradiction or objection, the following statement of Mr. Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, showing that he had landed at Fortress Monroe, by the 6th day of April, (having received the final order as early as

the 28th of February), 121,500 men for McClellan, with a number of wagons and animals manifestly well proportioned to these numbers :

In thirty-seven days from the time I received the order in Washington (and most of it was accomplished in thirty days), these vessels transported from Perryville, Alexandria, and Washington to Fort Monroe (the place of departure having been changed, which caused delay) one hundred and twenty-one thousand five hundred men, fourteen thousand five hundred and ninety-two animals, one thousand one hundred and fifty wagons, forty-four batteries, seventy-four ambulances, besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, etc., required for an army of such magnitude.

And yet McClellan telegraphed to the President on the 7th of April: "My entire force for duty only amounts to 85,000." Six days later, before receiving reinforcements, McClellan himself reported his force (as officially certified by Adj.-Gen. Thomas,) to be 117,721, of whom 100,970 were present for duty. In addition to this was the considerable force of Gen. Wool, on which he was authorized to draw at will. McDowell's command, also, so far as practicable, was put in a position for at once sustaining him and covering Washington.

To Gen. McClellan's earnest appeal for Gen. Franklin's division, on the 10th of April, Secretary Stanton replied on the following day, granting this request. At the same date, McClellan telegraphed: "Nothing is left undone to enable us to attack with the least possible delay. * * There shall not be a moment's unnecessary delay in any of the operations here." On the 12th, he sends thanks for the promised reinforcements, and adds: "I am confident as to results now." On the 13th, he says: "Our work is progressing rapidly. We shall soon be at them, and I am sure of the result." On the 14th: "We are getting up the heavy guns, mortars and ammunition quite rapidly." To the President he telegraphed at the same date: "I have seen Gen. Franklin, and beg to thank you for your kindness and consideration. I now understand the matter, which I did not before."

From day to day, his dispatches continued to hold out the expectation of almost immediate results, yet nothing of consequence occurred for many days, save an unfortunate skirmish at Lee's Mill, on the 16th, in which 35 were killed and 130 wounded, without any advantage gained. McClellan inquiring in regard to the position of McDowell, the President sent the following reply on the 21st: "Your dispatch of the 19th was received that day. Fredericksburg is evacuated and the bridge destroyed by the enemy, and a small part of McDowell's command occupies this side of the Rappahannock opposite the town. He purposes moving his whole force to that point." On the 23d, McClellan reported: "Recent rains have injured the roads and delayed us, but we are making progress all the time." On the 26th, a lunette (of the enemy's works) was carried, and on the 27th, the "first parallel essentially finished without accident," but the roads were "becoming horrid again."

The total number of McClellan's force, on the 30th of April, as officially given by Asst. Adj.-Gen. Townsend, was 130,378, of whom 112,392 are reported as "effective." This includes the division under Gen. Franklin, which had arrived several days before, but still remained on the transports.

Nearly a month had now passed, in the manner indicated by the dispatches above quoted—fair samples of all—when there came a request for additional guns, which drew from the President the following response:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
May 1, 1862. }

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN: Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me—chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is any thing to be done?

A. LINCOLN.

Two days later, on the night of May 3d, the enemy evacuated his works.

The siege of Yorktown, without a close investment, which was not attempted, if ever contemplated, could have no other than barren results, unless the retreating enemy were promptly pursued. For this, his movement was not soon enough dis

covered Here was, indeed, as the President had dreaded, "the story of Manassas repeated"—if that opinion may be hazarded in the face of Gen. McClellan's positive claim of a "brilliant success." His first announcement of the evacuation was in the following dispatch :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
May 4, 9 A. M. }

To the Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War : We have the ramparts. Have guns, ammunition, camp equipage, etc. We hold the entire line of his works, which the engineers report as being very strong. I have thrown all my cavalry and horse-artillery in pursuit, supported by infantry. I move Franklin's division, and as much more as I can transport by water, up to West Point to-day. No time shall be lost. The gunboats have gone up York river. I omitted to state that Gloucester is also in our possession. I shall push the enemy to the wall.

G. B. McCLELLAN,
Major General.

At 1 o'clock, on the same day, McClellan telegraphed as follows:

Our cavalry and horse-artillery came up with the enemy's rear guard in their intrenchments about two miles this side of Williamsburg. A brisk fight ensued. Just as my aid left, Gen. Smith's division of infantry arrived on the ground, and I presume he carried his works, though I have not yet heard.

The enemy's rear is strong, but I have force enough up there to answer all purposes.

We have thus far seventy-one heavy guns, large amounts of tents, ammunition, etc. All along the lines their works prove to have been most formidable, and I am now fully satisfied of the correctness of the course I have pursued.

The success is brilliant, and you may rest assured its effects will be of the greatest importance. There shall be no delay in following up the enemy. The rebels have been guilty of the most murderous and barbarous conduct in placing torpedoes within the abandoned works, near Mill Springs, near the flag-staffs, magazines, telegraph-offices, in carpet-bags, barrels of flour, etc.

Fortunately we have not lost many men in this manner. Some four or five have been killed and a dozen wounded. I shall make the prisoners remove them at their own peril.

His dispatches of the next day are less joyous in their tone. It is "raining hard," and he pronounces the "roads infamous" and "horrible." An important engagement was fought this day, of which he had apparently gained imperfect knowledge when sending the following dispatch, late in the evening:

BIVOUAC IN FRONT OF WILLIAMSBURG, }
May 5, 1862, 10 o'clock P. M. }

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War: After arranging for movements up York river, I was urgently sent for here. I find Gen. Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force, probably greater a good deal than my own.

Gen. Hancock has taken two redoubts and repulsed Early's Rebel brigade, by a real charge with the bayonet, taking one Colonel and a hundred and fifty other prisoners, and killing at least two Colonels and many privates. His conduct was brilliant in the extreme.

I do not know our exact loss, but fear that Gen. Hooker has lost considerably on our left.

I learn from the prisoners taken that the Rebels intend to dispute every step to Richmond.

I shall run the risk of at least holding them in check here, while I resume the original plan.

My entire force is undoubtedly inferior to that of the Rebels, who will fight well; but I will do all I can with the force at my disposal.

G. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding.

Gen. Stoneman had promptly moved his cavalry and horse-artillery, on receiving the order for pursuit, on the morning of the 4th. He first found the enemy within his works, two miles east of Williamsburg, and being unsustained by infantry, was forced to retreat, with some loss, on being attacked by the guns of Fort Magruder. During the afternoon and night, the divisions of Gens. Smith and Hooker arrived on the ground—twelve or fourteen miles distant from Yorktown—as well as the corps commanders, Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes. No portion of General Sumner's force was yet present, but, as the senior officer, he assumed command, and ordered an attack on the Rebel works, in the evening, by Smith's division. Night, however, came on before the order could be executed. During the night, Sumner posted Hancock's brigade, of that division, in a strong

position on the left. Hooker's division, by order of Gen. Heintzelman, had taken position on the Lee's Mill road, coming near Fort Magruder quite early in the morning. At half past 7 o'clock, Hooker began an attack on the works in his front. The enemy gathered in superior force at this point, and the contest continued for hours, Gen. Heintzelman anxiously awaiting the appearance of Kearney's division, which he had sent for in the morning. A heavy rain had commenced the night before, which continued until the following morning, impeding the movement of troops, but not interrupting the determined purpose to carry the enemy's works. Hooker had suffered serious loss, his ammunition was giving out, and his troops were becoming exhausted, when at length, after 2 o'clock, Gen. Kearney arrived with his men, and was ordered by Heintzelman at once to attack, which he did so vigorously as to drive the enemy back at all points, and to relieve Hooker, whose left flank was in imminent danger.

On the right, also, the enemy massed troops against Hancock, who kept up a gallant fight to maintain his position, without the reënforcement which Gen. Sumner was unwilling to hazard his center by sending him, until after the arrival of part of Couch's division, at 1 o'clock, which was followed by the remainder during the afternoon, and by Casey's division, so that the entire corps of Gen. Keyes was finally present, on the right and center. Hancock was on the point of being overwhelmed by greatly superior numbers, when the remainder of Smith's division, and Naglee's brigade from Hooker's division, were sent to his support, under the orders of McClellan, who arrived on the ground, as he states in his report, "between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon. Meanwhile, Gen. Hancock, feigning to retreat slowly, drew out the enemy from their position, then turning suddenly, staggered them by volleys of musketry, and completed their rout by a brilliant bayonet charge, with a loss to the enemy of more than five hundred, his own loss being but thirty-one men.

The brunt of the battle had been sustained by the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, under Gen. Heintzelman. The former sustained the principal losses of the day, which were

officially stated at 456 killed, 1,400 wounded, and 372 missing. This earnest and gallant battle, fought almost entirely without the knowledge of the commanding General, illustrates what was reasonably expected at the very outset at Yorktown. It seems hardly too much to say that it may have saved another month's siege at Williamsburg, where the position was perhaps even more favorable for defense than that at Yorktown, and where the enemy had a very much greater force than was originally at the latter place. As a result of this battle, the enemy retired from Williamsburg that night, and continued his retreat up the Peninsula. No immediate pursuit was attempted.

Gen. McClellan was exceedingly dissatisfied with Sumner and the other corps commanders for venturing this engagement in his absence. In his first dispatch he notices only the movement of Hancock as a success. He names only Hooker besides, and him merely to refer to his losses. He afterward made some imperfect amends to Gen. Heintzelman and others, under remonstrance, but apparently with grudging reluctance, and even in his final report, after his resentment had ample time to cool, he stops short with the praise of Hancock, giving little credit to those who had done the chief work. On occupying Williamsburg, the next day he announced: "The victory is complete," stating that the enemy lost heavily in killed.

The division under Gen. Franklin had been pushed forward by water to the right bank of the Pamunkey river, opposite West Point, and this movement was sustained by the divisions of Gens. Sedgwick, Porter and Richardson, also transported in steamers. Franklin landed his troops on the morning of the 7th, and Dana's brigade (of Sedgwick's division) arrived soon after. These forces were attacked at 9 o'clock in the morning by a formidable Rebel force, and the battle lasted until 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy was finally repulsed. Meanwhile, time had been gained for the main Rebel force to retreat unmolested, and with security to its trains. Franklin made a successful defense, only, instead of accomplishing any aggressive results. His total loss is reported as 194, including a large proportion of officers.

Communication between Williamsburg and West Point was

fully opened on the 10th. "Movements were difficult and slow." In the mean time, Norfolk had been taken by Gen Wool, and the Merrimac finally "neutralized." At this period, the President and Secretary of War—as well as the Secretary of the Treasury, who had accompanied Gen. Wool in his advance on Norfolk—were on a visit at Fortress Monroe. It was while here that the Secretary of War received the following dispatch from Gen. McClellan, dated May 9 :

To Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War: I respectfully ask permission to reorganize the Army Corps. I am not willing to be held responsible for the present arrangement, experience having proved it to be very bad, and it having nearly resulted in a most disastrous defeat. I wish rather to return to the organization by divisions, or else to be authorized to relieve incompetent commanders of Army Corps. Had I been one-half hour later on the field on the 5th, we would have been routed and would have lost every thing. Notwithstanding my positive orders, I was informed of nothing that had occurred, and I went to the field of battle myself upon unofficial information that my presence was needed to avoid defeat. I found there the utmost confusion and incompetency, the utmost discouragement on the part of the men. At least a thousand lives were really sacrificed by the organization into corps. I have too much regard for the lives of my comrades, and too deep an interest in the success of our cause, to hesitate for a moment. I learn that you are equally in earnest, and I therefore again request full and complete authority to relieve from duty with this army, commanders of corps or divisions who find themselves incompetent.

G. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General Commanding.

Secretary Stanton replied, in substance: The President directs me to say that you "may temporarily suspend that organization in the army now under your immediate command, and adopt any you see fit until further orders. He also writes you privately." The President's letter, thus referred to, is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, }
FORT MONROE, VA., May 9, 1862. }

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN—*My Dear Sir*: I have just assisted the Secretary of War in framing the part of a dispatch to you

relating to Army Corps, which dispatch, of course, will have reached you long before this will. I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the Army Corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion of every *military man* I could get an opinion from, and every modern *military book*, yourself only excepted. Of course, I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets, and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. "I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes—the commanders of these corps are, of course, the three highest officers with you : but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but Gen. Fitz John Porter, and perhaps Gen. Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just; but at all events, it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in any thing?"

When you relieved Gen. Hamilton of his command the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that Senators and Representatives speak of *me* in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with *them*.

But to return. Are you strong enough—are you strong enough even with my help—to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question to you.

The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Gen. McClellan did not conclude to make the changes which he had pronounced so indispensable. On the contrary, availing himself of the President's permission, he soon after created two new corps—the "Fifth Provisional Corps," formed of the divisions of Porter and Skyes, the former taken from the corps of Heintzelman, and the latter Regulars, to be commanded by Gen. Fitz John Porter; and the "Sixth Provisional Corps," consisting of Franklin's division, from McDowell's corps, and

Smith's division, from Keyes' corps, to be commanded by Gen. W. B. Franklin.

The headquarters of the Army of the Potomac reached the White House on the 16th of May, and three days later with the corps of Franklin and Fitz John Porter, had advanced to Tunstall's Station, five miles nearer Richmond. Complaints of the roads and requests for reënforcements were not forgotten in the official dispatches of this period; nor had the President schooled himself to perfect patience with the slow advance up the Peninsula, when he thought that not a moment's unnecessary delay should occur in "pushing the enemy to the wall." On the 14th, Gen. McClellan, being detained by bad roads, took occasion to send a long dispatch, representing his wants and opinions, to which the President, on the 15th, sent the following reply:

Your long dispatch of yesterday is just received. I will answer more fully soon; will say now that all your dispatches to the Secretary of War have been promptly shown to me. I have done and shall do all I could and can to sustain you. I hoped that the opening of James river and putting Wool and Burnside in communication with an open road to Richmond or to you, had effected something in that direction. I am still not willing to take all our force off the direct line between Richmond and here.

On the 20th of May, the advance reached the Chickahominy river, and found Bottom's Bridge, across that stream, as well as the railroad bridge, a mile above, destroyed by the enemy. The position was occupied, and the reconstruction of the bridges commenced. The river being fordable at this time, Casey's division was sent across the river and ordered to throw up defenses. Gen. Heintzelman's entire corps was also thrown across, in support. The center and right were advanced to the left bank of the river. On the 24th, the extreme right occupied Mechanicsville, and one of the brigades (Naglee's) of Heintzelman's corps drove the enemy from the Seven Pines, on the Bottom's Bridge road, the left of the army advancing to that position. The distance from the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge to Richmond is about twice as great as the dis

ance to Richmond from the same stream at Mechanicsville. The entire line now extended from the latter point to Seven Pines, about half way from the river to Richmond, the Chickahominy flowing between the left and the right and center. This stream, here about forty feet in width, is subject to sudden variations in volume, heavy rains causing it to overflow the bottom-lands on each side, and rendering it impassable except by bridges—all of which, in this vicinity, had been destroyed by the enemy. The Meadow Bridge was north of Richmond, near the Virginia Central railroad, and a short distance above the bridge at Mechanicsville. The third, following down the stream six or seven miles, was called New Bridge, and was a less distance above the York river railroad bridge. Between Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville, McClellan determined to construct as many as eleven new bridges.

The Rebel line of defenses, within which the enemy had retired, commenced nearly opposite Drewry's Bluff, on the James river, and bending in a northeasterly direction, across the York river railroad, to the Chickahominy, very nearly followed up the right bank of that stream. The diameter of this semi-circular line was about seven miles, from the center at Richmond. The main body of the enemy, it appears, was encamped on the New Bridge road. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was still in command.

By instructions from the War Department, issued on the 17th of May, Gen. McDowell, to be reënforced by Shields' division, had been directed to establish a communication, as soon as possible, between his left and McClellan's right. Corresponding directions were sent to Gen. McClellan. A gunboat expedition up the James river had meanwhile been repulsed at Fort Darling, and the attempt to approach Richmond by that means had been effectually abandoned. On the 21st, McClellan telegraphed the following, with many other matters, to the President:

I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 17th instant, addressed to myself and Gen. McDowell. If a junction is effected before we occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg and within my depart-

ment. This fact, my superior rank, and the express language of the sixty-second article of war, will place his command under my orders, unless it is otherwise specially directed by your Excellency; and I consider that he will be under my command, except that I am not to detach any portion of his forces, or give any orders which can put him out of position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction, I desire to be at once set right. Frankness compels me to say, anxious as I am for an increase of force, that the march of McDowell's column upon Richmond by the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover Washington, as to any interposition by it, as completely as its movement by water. The enemy can not advance by Fredericksburg on Washington. Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas.

The President replied as follows, under date of May 22 :

Your long dispatch of yesterday is just received. You will have just such control of Gen. McDowell and his forces as you therein indicate. McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats, if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shall be resisted, in which case the force resisting him will certainly not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he can reach you in five days after starting; whereas by water he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Franklin's single division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it. A. LINCOLN.

How the purpose above indicated came necessarily to be changed, will best appear from the two following dispatches :

MAY 24, 1862.

I left Gen. McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields' command is there, but it is so worn that he can not move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two companies cavalry, putting Gen. Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces, under Gen. Anderson, now opposing Gen. McDowell's advance, have, as their line of supply and retreat, the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridge

across the two forks of the Pamunkey and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly 15,000 men; and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the 21st.

A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McCLELLAN.

McClellan, in his report, erroneously gives a later dispatch (dated May 24) as the President's response on this occasion.

Intelligence received at a later hour on the same day, caused the President to suspend the order in regard to Gen. McDowell's movement, as the subjoined dispatch indicated to McClellan:

MAY 24, 1862.

In consequence of Gen. Banks' critical position, I have been compelled to suspend Gen. McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw Gen. Fremont's force and part of Gen. McDowell's in their rear.

A. LINCOLN.

To this, Gen. McClellan replied: "I will make my calculations accordingly."

The next dispatch clearly sets forth the situation of affairs at the time:

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862.

Your dispatch received. Gen. Banks was at Strasburg with about six thousand men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d, a Rebel force of seven to ten thousand fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Port Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th, yesterday, pushed on to get north of Banks on the road to Winchester. Gen. Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which Gen. Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is

broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap rail road, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal, with ten thousand troops, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also, that another force of ten thousand is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above McDowell has about twenty thousand of his forces moving back to the vicinity of Port Royal; and Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of his forces remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort, calling in militia from the adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces from you.

Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have.

A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

Later, on the same day, the President sent the following :

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN: The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive Banks before him—in precisely what force we can not tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary on the Manassas Gap railroad, from both north and south, in precisely what force we can not tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as could not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly.

A. LINCOLN.

On the same day, McClellan replied: "Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. The object of the movement is probably to pre-

vent reënforcements being sent to me. . . . I have two corps across the Chickahominy, within six miles of Richmond; the others on this side at other crossings within the same distance and ready to cross when bridges are completed."

Gen. Stoneman was sent out with a small cavalry force to cut the Virginia Central railroad between the Chickahominy and Hanover Court House. This is the eastern one of two lines of railroad from Richmond, both of which meet at Hanover Junction, several miles beyond the Court House. The other extends nearly due north from Richmond to Fredericksburg and Acquia Creek. Both roads cross the South Anna river a few miles south of their junction, and at no great distance apart. To have destroyed both the South Anna bridges of these roads would have cut the enemy's direct communications with the forces in the Valley, and with those resisting McDowell's advance southward. In cutting only one of these roads, several miles south of the South Anna, very little was effected. The President anxiously telegraphed, on the 26th: "Can you not cut the Acquia Creek railroad also? What impression have you as to the intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?" McClellan replied (on the same day) that he had "cut the Virginia Central railroad in three places, between Hanover Court House and the Chickahominy," and would "try to cut the other." To the other questions of the President, he replied: "I do not think Richmond intrenchments formidable; but am not certain. Hope very soon to be within shelling distance. Have railroad in operation from White House to Chickahominy. Hope to have Chickahominy bridge repaired to-night. Nothing of interest to-day." Later, he telegraphed as follows:

CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, }
May 26, 1862, 7.30 P. M. }

Have arranged to carry out your last orders. We are quietly closing in upon the enemy, preparatory to the last struggle. Situated as I am, I feel forced to take every possible precaution against disaster, and to secure my flanks against the probably superior force in front of me. My arrangements for to-morrow

are very important, and if successful, will leave me free to strike on the return of the force detached.

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

His Excellency, A. LINCOLN, President.

On the 27th, Fitz John Porter, with the Fifth Corps, was sent to disperse a Rebel force near Hanover Court House, threatening the communications of our army, and in a position to reënforce Jackson or to interfere with any southward movement of McDowell. This force was Branch's division, estimated to have been about nine thousand strong. Porter's corps, without needing the aid of Sykes' division of Regulars, sent to his support on the 28th, broke up the Rebel camp, and dispersed Branch's force. The result was thus announced by the Commanding General :

Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glorious victory ; too much credit can not be given to his magnificent division and its accomplished leader. The rout of the rebels was complete ; not a defeat, but a complete rout. Prisoners are constantly coming in ; two companies have this moment arrived with excellent arms.

The President, after receiving this and other glowing dispatches on the subject, as well as repeated demands for reënforcements on the ground that all the Rebel forces were concentrating at Richmond, sent the following :

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

I am very glad of Gen. F. J. Porter's victory ; still, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central, from Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think, can not be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. Gen. King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that fifteen thousand left Hanover Junc-

tion Monday morning to reënforce Jackson. I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard to all points.

A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

On the 29th, Gen. Marcy (chief of McClellan's staff) sent the following dispatch to the Secretary of War:

A detachment from Gen. F. J. Porter's command, under Major Williams, Sixth Cavalry, destroyed the South Anna railroad bridge at about 9 A. M. to-day; a large quantity of Confederate public property was also destroyed at Ashland this morning.

The President replied:

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862.

Your dispatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank Gen. McClellan and his army for their seizure.

A. LINCOLN.

Gen. R. B. MARCY.

The President had previously telegraphed to Gen. McDowell on the 28th: "If Porter effects a lodgment on both railroads, near Hanover Court House, consider whether your force in Fredericksburg should not push through and join him."

It is difficult to conceive any collateral operation which, at this juncture, could have had more positive results, than a thorough breaking of the enemy's communication with Jackson by destroying the South Anna bridges and otherwise. After receiving the President's congratulations, however, on the supposed accomplishment of this object, the Commanding General telegraphed as follows—clearly implying that Porter's movement had really effected little in that direction, as the event proved:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
May 30, 1862. }

From the tone of your dispatches, and the President's, I do

not think you at all appreciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. It has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously threatened; routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the Rebel forces; taken over seven hundred and fifty prisoners; killed and wounded large numbers; one gun, many small arms, and much baggage taken. It was one of the handsomest things in the war, both in itself and in its results. Porter has returned, and my army is again well in hand. Another day will make the probable field of battle passable for artillery. It is quite certain that there is nothing in front of McDowell at Fredericksburg. I regard the burning of South Anna bridges as the least important result of Porter's movement.

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

On the 29th, Mr. Lincoln had telegraphed: "I think we shall be able, within three days, to tell you certainly whether any considerable force of the enemy, Jackson or any one else, is moving on Harper's Ferry or vicinity. Take this expected development into your calculation." On the 31st, McClellan said in a dispatch: "A contraband reports that Beauregard arrived in Richmond day before yesterday with troops, and amid great excitement. . . . Roads again frightful. Need more ambulances." At the same date, the President sent the following important information:

A circle whose circumference shall pass through Harper's Ferry, Front Royal and Strasburg, and whose center shall be a little north-east of Winchester, almost certainly has within it this morning the forces of Jackson, Ewell and Edward Johnson; quite certainly they were within it two days ago. Some part of their forces attacked Harper's Ferry at dark last evening. Shields, with McDowell's advance, retook Front Royal at 11 A. M. yesterday, with a dozen of our own prisoners taken there a week ago, one hundred and fifty of the enemy, etc. . Shields at Front Royal reports a rumor of still an additional force of the enemy, supposed to be Anderson's, having entered the Valley of Virginia. This last may or may not be true. Corinth is certainly in the hands of Gen. Halleck.

The Army of the Potomac, as officially reported on the 31st of May, numbered 127,166, of which force 98,008 were pres-

ent for duty. To this was added the force of Gen. Wool, now put under Gen. McClellan's command, numbering 14,007 in the aggregate, 11,514 being "effective." Total, 141,173, with 109,522 present for duty. Gen. Sigel was also ordered to report, with his command, to Gen. McClellan; but the order was subsequently countermanded, and this force sent to Harper's Ferry. McCall's division was ordered to him on the 6th of June, and he received many other regiments from time to time.

An order of the War Department, June 1, extended the Department of Virginia to include that part of the State south of the Rappahannock and east of the railroad from Fredericksburg to Richmond, Petersburg, and Weldon, under command of Maj.-Gen. McClellan. Gen. Wool was assigned to the command of the Middle Department, succeeding Gen. Butler, with directions to report to Gen. McClellan for orders.

Despite the diversion of a portion of his force for operations in the Valley, the Rebel General in command at Richmond now boldly assumed the aggressive against McClellan.

Taking advantage of a sudden rise of the Chickahominy, before the entire completion of the bridges, Johnston attacked our left in heavy force near Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, on the 31st of May, having skillfully made his combinations with a view to cut off the corps of Heintzelman and Keyes. The attack commenced about 1 o'clock in the afternoon. Casey's division, in the advance, was driven backward, after stoutly contesting the field for hours, while Heintzelman's two divisions were brought up in support. The enemy, attempting to force his way between these troops and Bottom's Bridge, was kept in check until about 6 o'clock. Gen. Sumner came up at that hour with Sedgwick's division, followed by Richardson's, having crossed on the imperfect bridge which they had constructed, and appeared suddenly on the left flank of Johnston's force, opening a destructive fire with his batteries, which stopped the enemy's advance. Then, by a gallant bayonet charge, led by Sumner in person, the Rebels were driven back with great slaughter, beyond Fair Oaks Station. What had been

almost a crushing defeat, would have been turned into a brilliant victory, had our remaining troops been brought into action, and might probably have given us possession of Richmond.

This great opportunity escaped the Commanding General. As Prince de Joinville, his friend and volunteer aid during this campaign, informs us: "It was not until 7 o'clock in the evening that the idea of securing all the bridges without delay, and causing the whole army to cross at daybreak to the right bank of the Chickahominy, was entertained. It was now too late. Four hours had been lost, and the opportunity — that moment so fleeting, in war as in other circumstances — had gone."

The river rose rapidly during the night, sweeping away all the bridges. The enemy renewed the attack in the morning, knowing that our left and center were now completely isolated from the remainder of their comrades, the corps of Porter and Franklin. The troops of Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes fought with desperate courage, sustaining themselves against the concentrated strength of the enemy, until nearly noon, when the latter retired, leaving his dead unburied, and many of his wounded on the field. Both sides had suffered severely in the battles of Saturday and Sunday. The Government loss is stated as about 5,000 and the Rebel loss about 8,000.

The situation of the Army of the Potomac was now full of interest—its opportunities clearly to be seen. The whole force which could be sent against it from Richmond had been beaten by one-half of this army. Jackson, with a force estimated at 25,000, was now fighting with Banks, and Fremont and McDowell were endeavoring to close in about him. In relation to reported reinforcements to Johnston, McClellan telegraphed, on the 3d: "I am satisfied that Beauregard is not here." At the same time, he was fully aware that the forces of Beauregard and Bragg had evacuated Corinth on the 30th of May, and were now partly disposable for active service wherever they were most needed. Every day's delay was now an advantage to the enemy. To wait for reinforcements was to wait for his adversary to gather in every scattered regiment, and to hasten

the arrival of Jackson and Beauregard. To pause for pleasant weather and good roads, was to postpone action indefinitely. He was already almost within shelling distance of Richmond. His supplies came with regularity by water to White House, and thence by railroad to his lines. And yet, with almost daily dispatches about rains and bad roads, with continual appeals for more men, which he knew could not be granted to any great extent, and with repeated assurances of what he was just going to do, nearly an entire month wore away, at this critical and most favorable juncture, without result.

On the 3d of June, he says: "The next leap will be the last one." The Government and the country expected it to be taken at once. But on the 5th, comes an argument for more troops. Five new regiments, and McCall's division, from McDowell's command, are promptly granted him. On the 8th, he says: "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward to take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery." On the same day, McDowell informs him: "For the third time I am ordered to join you, and this time I hope to get through." Having thus the long-sought forces of McDowell apparently within his grasp, he improves the occasion to call for more, telegraphing as follows, on the 11th: "I have again information that Beauregard has arrived, and that some of his troops are to follow him." He asks, therefore, that reënforcements may be sent him from Halleck's army. He laments that he is the victim of an "abnormal season," and adds: "I am completely checked by the weather." At the same date (despite the weather) he reports that "McCall's troops have commenced arriving."

On the 12th, he reports: "Another good day. All quiet this morning. I move headquarters to-day across the river." On the 14th: "I hope two days more will make the ground practicable." On the 15th: "Another rain set in about 3 P. M. to-day." On the 18th he thinks reënforcements for Jackson* had gone from Richmond. Mr. Lincoln replies, stating

* The battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic, in which Gen. Fremont failed to arrest the retreat of Stonewall Jackson, had been fought on the 8th and 9th of June.

circumstances by which this opinion is "corroborated," adding "If this is true, it is as good as a re-enforcement to you of an equal force. I could better dispose of things, if I could know about what day you can attack Richmond." McClellan replies, the same day: "A general engagement may take place any hour. . . . We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries."

On the 19th, the President suggests that the reported re-enforcement of Jackson may be a mere ruse. McClellan replies, on the 20th: "I have no doubt that Jackson has been re-enforced from here. There is reason to believe that Gen. R. S. Ripley has recently joined Lee's army,* with a brigade or division from Charleston. Troops have arrived recently from Goldsboro. There is not the slightest reason to suppose the enemy intends evacuating Richmond. He is daily increasing his defenses. . . . I would be glad to have permission to lay before your Excellency, by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country. In the mean time, I would be pleased to learn the disposition, as to numbers and position, of the troops not under my command, in Virginia and elsewhere."

To this singular dispatch, the President sent the following reply:

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862, 6 P. M.

Your dispatch of yesterday, 2 P. M., was received this morning. If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not under your command, in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accuracy, which I can not, I would rather not transmit either by telegraph or letter, because of the chances

*Gen. Robert E. Lee had been assigned to the command of the Rebel forces at Richmond, on the 3d of June, superseding Johnston, who had been wounded at Fair Oaks.

of its reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you can not leave your camp, and I can not well leave here.

A. LINCOLN, President.

Maj.-Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

In his final report, Gen. McClellan makes the following statement: "All the information I could obtain, previous to the 24th of June, regarding the movements of Gen. Jackson, led to the belief that he was at Gordonsville, where he was receiving re-enforcements from Richmond *via* Lynchburg and Staunton; but what his purposes were, did not appear until the date specified," etc. Entertaining this opinion, it may well be asked, in passing, how happened it that he so vehemently urged, again and again, the withdrawal of all troops from before Washington, leaving an entirely inadequate garrison within the city itself, in order to transfer all to the Peninsula? Such, on the one hand, is his confession; such, on the other, was his demand. That Jackson was prepared for any "purpose" that best suited the occasion—that he would have attacked Washington had McDowell's army been withdrawn, as McClellan desired, or that he would have invaded Maryland by way of the Valley, as Lee has since done—can admit of no rational doubt. Both those movements were defeated by the wise forecast of the President, and by his persistence in adhering to the policy so clearly marked out, with the approval of all the leading generals, at the outset of the Peninsular movement. When McClellan admits his inability to discern the intentions of Jackson, more than a month after the latter left Richmond, he at once puts at rest all cavils in regard to the opinions of those who assumed some other purpose possible than that finally developed. But what solution can be given of his own inaction during all this period of Jackson's known absence? And how will he even give a plausible look to his eagerness to withdraw McDowell, and to leave to Jackson an unobstructed route to the National Capital?

But the "purposes" of Jackson, hitherto so uncertain, were discovered on the 24th of June, and thus reported:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
June 24, 1862, 12 P. M. }

A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the enemy. The party states that he left Jackson, Whiting, and Ewell, (fifteen brigades,) at Gordonsville, on the 21st; that they were moving to Frederickshall, and that it was intended to attack my rear on the 28th. I would be glad to learn, at your earliest convenience, the most exact information you have as to the position and movements of Jackson, as well as the sources from which your information is derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have.

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

The reply was as follows :

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1862.

We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force. Gen. King yesterday reported a deserter's statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, forty thousand men. Some reports place ten thousand Rebels under Jackson, at Gordonsville; others, that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened; and Gen. Kelley, that Ewell was advancing to New Creek, where Fremont has his depots. The last telegram from Fremont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray; the people decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject.

A letter transmitted to the department yesterday, purported to be dated at Gordonsville on the 14th instant, stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington and Baltimore, as soon as you attacked Richmond, but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement is now toward Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not

safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

On the 25th, McClellan began to advance his left, preparatory, he says, to a general forward movement. In the evening of the same day, he reported: "The affair is over, and we have gained our point fully, and with but little loss, notwithstanding the strong opposition." An hour and a half earlier, he had telegraphed: "On our right, Porter has silenced the enemy's batteries in his front."

The blow which the wily deserter had announced to be struck by Jackson on the 28th, fell two days earlier. Only an hour after announcing the success of his preliminary movement on the 25th, McClellan reported that he had "information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong reënforcements, in Richmond yesterday." The desponding side of his temper, and an impulse to protect himself from the extreme effects of an apprehended fall, appear in the following paragraph of this dispatch:

I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of re-enforcements, that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility can not be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs.

Secretary Stanton replied:

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1862, 11.20 P. M.

Your telegram of fifteen minutes past 6 has just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the Government to send you any more reënforcements than has been done, have been so distinctly stated to you by the President, that it is needless for me to repeat them.

Every effort has been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. King's division has reached Falmouth; Shield's division and Ricketts' division are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done.

E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McCLELLAN.

The President sent the following dispatch on the same subject :

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN: Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying.

The later one, of 6.15 P. M., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by two hundred thousand, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, and shall omit, no opportunity to send you reënforcements whenever I possibly can.

A. LINCOLN.

P. S. Gen. Pope thinks if you fall back, it would be much better toward York river than toward the James. As Pope now has charge of the Capitol, please confer with him through the telegraph.

A. LINCOLN.

The aggregate number of the Army of the Potomac, on the 20th of June, was 156,838. The campaign had now extended into the season when disease could not fail to be prevalent, in the low, swampy region now occupied by the Government troops. The effective men numbered 115,102.

From the evening of the 26th, when Jackson attacked his right, and threatened his communications by the Pamunkey river, Gen. McClellan states that "every energy of the army was bent" to the end of "an immediate change of base across the Peninsula." The Rebel Gen. D. H. Hill had gone out from Richmond with his command that day, over Meadow Bridge, to form a junction with Jackson, who was approaching by way of Ashland and Hanover Court House. At about 3 o'clock P. M., Hill attacked McCall, at Mechanicsville, and

was finally repulsed, with great loss. Gen. McClellan telegraphed: "Victory to-day complete, and against great odds. I almost begin to think we are invincible." During the night, the baggage of the Fifth Corps (Porter's) was sent across to the west side of the Chickahominy, and preparations were made to start the trains next day, for James river. Orders were at the same time sent to the White House for the removal of all the stores possible from that vicinity, by water, up the James river, to meet the retreating army, and to destroy whatever supplies could not be thus reshipped. These orders were promptly executed. Gen. Stoneman, with his cavalry force, having been cut off, made a successful retreat to the White House.

McCall was to fall back and unite with the rest of Porter's corps, on the east bank of the Chickahominy, to hold the bridges at Gaines' Mill, giving time for the main army to execute its intended movement. This position was to have been maintained until the night of the 27th, when Porter's force was to cross, destroying the bridges. Hill, however, attacked McCall at dawn with great vigor, compelling him to retire further down the stream, leaving the bridge at Mechanicsville to the enemy. A large part of the Rebel force was now on the left bank of the river, and expeditiously concentrated for the destruction of Porter's forces at Gaines' Mill, near the New Bridge. Porter's left at length gave way, under the fierce and overwhelming onset of the enemy, and the center was thrown into confusion, with imminent danger of utter rout. Reënforcements were hurried across from the south bank of the river, and saved the day. Meagher's Irish brigade, fighting with unsurpassed gallantry, and French's brigade, with like heroic conduct, came to the support of Porter's broken divisions, and held the enemy in check until night closed the conflict. This battle was one of the most sanguinary of the campaign, resulting in defeat, but it gained time for starting the trains and troops through White Oak Swamp. It had also drawn out Lee's forces from Richmond, so as to prevent any immediate interference with the retreat from that quarter.

It was not until the 28th, that Lee became fully aware of

the purpose of McClellan to withdraw his army to the James river. The single road by which this movement was to be made was exposed, at different points, to an advance of the enemy from Richmond, by the several roads leading from the city. There was no degree of security until the rear had passed through the Swamp, and on emerging therefrom the danger would be soon renewed. The corps of Sumner and Franklin were stationed at Fair Oaks on Sunday, the 29th, (Heintzelman meanwhile retiring,) and having protected the trains, which were now well on their way, (a large amount of property which could not be transferred having been destroyed,) began to fall back. The enemy, perceiving the movement, promptly attacked the retiring forces, about 2 o'clock P. M., and they made a stand not far from Savage's Station. The Rebel masses, brought up within a short distance of our artillery, now in position, were repulsed with great loss, and their repeated attacks were successfully repelled. During the night, Sumner and Franklin fell back to the White Oak Swamp bridge. On the morning of the 30th, the last of the troops had followed the trains across that bridge. Franklin remained to dispute the passage of the Rebels at this point, while Heintzelman, with the four divisions of Hooker, Sedgwick, Kearney and McCall, took position at Charles City Cross Roads, where several roads leading from Richmond intersect. Jackson's corps crossed the Chickahominy early on Monday morning, following up the retreating army by the Williamsburg road. The forces of Longstreet, A. P. Hill, Magruder and Huger went out the Charles City road with the expectation of intercepting our forces at that point. Jackson had come close upon the position held by Franklin at the White Oak Swamp, a little before noon; but the rear of our army had already crossed and destroyed the bridge. An artillery engagement followed, lasting until night, with severe losses on both sides. Two brigades of Sumner's corps participated in this action. Further pursuit from this direction was not attempted.

Toward night, on the same day, the forces of Longstreet and others (commanded by Gen. A. P. Hill, the former being absent,) attacked the force under Heintzelman, who was aided

by part of Sumner's corps. The enemy was repulsed with great slaughter and thrown into confusion. In vain were fresh troops massed against the well-managed batteries and heavy musketry fire of our forces. After a desperate conflict, in which the fate of the whole Army of the Potomac was at stake, and with all the strength the Rebels could bring upon the field, a decisive victory was gained for the Government. This has been called the battle of Glendale.

The corps of Keyes and Porter had meanwhile moved forward, in advance of the remaining troops, toward James river, near Turkey Bend, to open communication with the gunboats. The rear of the trains had reached Malvern Hill while the action at Glendale was going on. The transports from the White House arrived almost simultaneously. During the night, the corps of Sumner, Heintzelman and Franklin fell back to the vicinity of this point. Here was an elevated open table-land, a mile and a half in length by three-fourths of a mile in breadth, crossed by several intersecting roads. The troops were massed on this hill for a final encounter, most of the artillery being placed in position—including ten siege guns at the very summit. Porter's corps held the left, Heintzelman and Sumner the center, and Keyes the right, the line curving backward nearly to the river. The left flank was protected by the gunboats under command of Com. Rodgers, which took part in the action, and on the right the roads were barricaded.

Thus disposed, after the losses incurred during a wearisome retreat of seventeen miles, fighting by day and marching by night, the Army of the Potomac was compelled to grapple with the collected forces of the enemy. Before 10 o'clock in the morning, Rebel skirmishers, with artillery, appeared all along the left wing. About 2 o'clock a column was seen in front of Heintzelman, beyond the range of his artillery, moving toward the right, but it disappeared without making an attack. An hour later, the divisions of Kearney and Couch, on the left center, were fiercely assailed with artillery and musketry. The fire was returned with such effect as to drive back the assailants in disorder, our forces advancing several hundred yards to a stronger position. This

action occupied about an hour. The enemy renewed the attack on the left about six o'clock, with artillery, advancing his infantry columns to storm the hill. These were swept away by our batteries, and each successive attacking party shared the same fate, until the field was covered with the wounded and dead. Not only artillery fire, but also volleys of musketry and bayonet charges, met the persistent assailants, who advanced, column after column, only to be crushed and scattered. Night ended the terrible struggle—the Stars and Stripes floating in grand triumph over the field made ghastly with the Rebel masses, fallen in the vain attempt to overwhelm a gallant army that six days before had seemed their easy prey.

Instead of improving the advantage gained, to drive into Richmond an enemy whose strength, as now shown by repeated trials, had been greatly overrated, and who was disheartened by continued defeat, the commanding General withdrew his forces from their strong position, retiring to Harrison's Landing. This was effected during the next two days, with no serious attempt at molestation from the enemy. Gen. McClellan states the entire number of his killed, wounded and missing during these seven days, at 15,249.

Thus ended the Peninsular campaign—adding three disastrous months of unmasterly activity to the eight months of dreamy indecision before Washington. It was no fault of the army. It was from no lack of support by the Government. It was due to no combination of untoward events. The positive successes at Williamsburg, at Fair Oaks, at Savage's Station, at Glendale, and at Malvern Hill, show that the Army of the Potomac could win victories, even against great supposed odds in numbers and in position, when courageously led to the fight.

In adopting a route to Richmond by the Lower Chesapeake, against the better judgment of the President, Gen. McClellan had expressed his readiness to stake his reputation, his life, and the cause itself, on the success of his plan. He was furnished all needful means, and every available man, consistently with *his own* opinions as to the necessary security of Washing-

ton, and with the express conditions agreed to by himself in undertaking the work. He sadly failed in his efforts to employ those men and means to the accomplishment of the end desired.

The military record of the campaign has a singular sameness. When occasionally his roads are good, he can not move without reënforcements. When his reënforcements come, he has to wait for better roads. Thus time passes—the month of April, before an army originally one-eighth as large as his own; much of May and June by the sickly Chickahominy, his men not unfit for duty engaged in throwing up intrenchments, to be abandoned on the first attack. Day after day, he is only waiting for something just on the point of being gained, when his final advance and assault are to commence. But perfect readiness never comes; and at last, the enemy, concentrating all his strength, himself attacks, and puts upon its defense, an army that was confidently led forth for aggressive war.

A month wasted at Yorktown, without plausible palliation; tardy pursuit, after the unintended battle, resulting in victory at Williamsburg; unaccountable hesitation and slackness on the Chickahominy; utter neglect to use the known absence of Jackson, or to anticipate the arrival of Beauregard after the evacuation of Corinth; insured an otherwise impossible discomfiture. Never did the result of a campaign more bitterly disappoint public hope. The worst that Mr. Lincoln had foreseen from the adoption of the Peninsular plan had happened, and even a loss of the entire army was now dreaded. Every advantage supposed by Gen. McClellan to be attainable by this route to Richmond had been thrown away. The cause had suffered a vastly greater blow than at Bull Run. The nation was more depressed; the Administration more painfully embarrassed, than by any previous calamity. The worst effects upon the cause, abroad and at home, were to be apprehended from this unfortunate issue of a grand military plan.

CHAPTER VIII.

Campaign of the Army of Virginia.—Withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula.—First Invasion of Maryland.—McClellan Superseded.

GEN. FREMONT, commanding the Mountain Department and Gen. Banks, commanding the Department of the Shenandoah, having failed to coöperate effectively in carrying out the President's order intended to entrap Jackson in his bold operations in the Valley, and the subsequent movements of Gen McDowell, in command of the Department of the Rappahannock, having also been unable to render decisive aid in this work, it became manifest that a reorganization of the forces in question, under one head, had become necessary. Some time before the final catastrophe at Richmond, it had also become apparent that the Army of the Potomac, instead of accomplishing its object, was rather in danger of being itself sacrificed. Meanwhile, the capture of New Madrid, the occupation of Corinth, and the rapid advance of our forces down the Mississippi, taking possession of Fort Pillow on the 5th of June, and of Memphis on the 6th, and passing with little opposition to Vicksburg, (before which our fleet appeared on the 25th,) had not only secured substantial results, but had also awakened a desire for similar leadership in the East.

Few events of the war, thus far, had evinced better generalship than the operations at New Madrid and Island Number Ten, in which Maj.-Gen. John Pope was the hero. Aside from Gen. Grant, still needed with the Army of the Tennessee, no other general, at this time, was more emphatically a rising man in the army. The President accordingly determined to call Gen. Pope to Washington, where he arrived about the 20th of June. After full consultation and deliberation, the President having visited Gen. Scott at West Point on the 24th, it was decided

to consolidate the three departments specified above, and to organize a new campaign. In pursuance of this purpose, the President issued his order, on the 26th of June, creating the Army of Virginia, under the command of Gen. Pope, the forces under Gen. Fremont to constitute the First Army Corps, those of Gen. Banks the Second Corps, and those under Gen. McDowell the Third Corps, each to be commanded by those officers respectively. At the time of this action, the critical condition of McClellan's army seemed to impose the necessity of positive measures for protecting Washington and holding the approach into Maryland and Pennsylvania by the Shenandoah Valley, from the first foreseen, as since demonstrated, to be an important element of the military position.

On the 27th, Gen. Fremont asked to be relieved from his command. This request was granted, and his connection with the army, in any active command, has never since been resumed. Gen. Francis Sigel was soon after put in command of the First Corps of the Army of Virginia in his stead.

Maj.-Gen. Halleck was also called to Washington. It may be safely assumed that the appointment of this officer as General-in-chief of the army was one of the subjects in regard to which the President had anxiously desired the counsel of Gen. Scott, and about which there was a free interchange of views, on the memorable visit of the 24th of June. The appointment of Gen. Halleck as General-in-chief was officially announced on the 11th of July.

On the 28th of June, the Governors of seventeen States united in an address to the President, expressing their belief in the readiness of the people to respond to a call for more troops, and in the popular desire for prompt and vigorous measures to end the rebellion. In response, the following circular was sent to each of the Governors uniting in this suggestion, and the call for three hundred thousand additional troops was at once published :

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
 July 1, 1862. }

GENTLEMEN: Fully concurring in the wisdom of the views expressed to me in so patriotic a manner by you in the com

munication of the 28th day of June, I have decided to call into the service an additional force of three hundred thousand men.

I suggest and recommend that the troops should be chiefly of infantry. The quota of your State would be ——. I trust that they may be enrolled without delay, so as to bring this unnecessary and injurious civil war to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion.

An order fixing the quotas of the respective States will be issued by the War Department to-morrow.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Gen. Pope at once entered on the work of preparation for the far from welcome duties assigned him. On ascertaining the condition of the forces placed at his command, he was painfully conscious of the great disproportion of the means at his disposal to the ends that were desired. In addition to the troops within the intrenchments around Washington, the whole effective force at his disposal was as follows: First Corps, 11,500; Second Corps, (as reported,) 14,500; and Third Corps, 18,400—making in all, 44,400. Gen. Pope states, however, that the Second Corps really numbered but about 8,000, so that the total was barely 38,000. With this force, the new Commanding General had the triple task of defending Washington holding the Shenandoah Valley, and creating a diversion in favor of the army at Harrison's Landing.

At the first intelligence of Jackson's onset upon the Army of the Potomac by way of Hanover Court House, on the 26th, Gen. Pope had earnestly and repeatedly urged the impolicy of a retreat to the James river, still further away from re-enforcements, but advised, instead, that McClellan should make his way northward, where effective support could be rendered him by the remaining troops in Virginia. This policy of concentration may have been impracticable, under the circumstances; and at all events, it was little regarded by McClellan, except upon conditions that would expose to the enemy all the approaches to Washington and the Valley. The necessity of cordial coöperation between the little army left for the defense of these positions, and the remnant of McClellan's force, at Harrison's Landing, was obvious. The utter impossibility of send

ing to the latter point any re-enforcements drawn from the former, hardly needs to be stated, and yet it was for precisely the reason that this was not done, that Gen. McClellan, after his disastrous battle at Gaines' Mill, on the 28th, wrote the following letter—which, but for his deliberate reproduction of it in his final report, might have been charitably dismissed as a mere hasty ebullition—received with a forbearance which, perhaps, such unamiable weakness had long since ceased to deserve :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
SAVAGE'S STATION, June 28, 1862, 12.20 A. M. }

I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order. My regulars were superb; and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I twenty thousand or even ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and *personnel* of the army.

If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small.

I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes; but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large re-enforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have.

In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely

intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow.

I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and can not hold me responsible for the result.

I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not so now, the game is lost.

If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons in Washington.

You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

G. B. McCLELLAN.

Hon. E. M. STANTON.

Further communication with this officer was interrupted until, after his arrival at Harrison's Landing, the following dispatch was sent in reply :

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1862, 3.30 P. M.

It is impossible to re-enforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men, we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out.

A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McCLELLAN.

Obviously, the chief concern in regard to this army was now to preserve it from further loss—there having been, in fact, apprehensions through the country that its entire surrender would be the ultimate result, even after it had reached its present comparatively secure position. Indeed, had the numbers under Lee at all corresponded with McClellan's estimate, this danger was still imminent. The enemy held one bank of the James river, the chief security to our communications being in the fleet of gunboats under Commodore Rodgers.

It was under these circumstances that Gen. Pope, having unsuccessfully appealed to the chief authorities at Washington to relieve him from a command from which so little was to be

hoped, and in which his high military reputation was staked at fearful odds, issued an energetic address to his army, with the vigorous orders so offensive to his adversaries, and proceeded earnestly to the performance of the three-fold duties already indicated, drawing almost the entire army of Lee away from Richmond.

One of Pope's first movements was the sending out of cavalry detachments from Fredericksburg, to cut the Virginia Central railroad at several points. This having been duly accomplished, orders were given to Gen. Banks, on the 14th of July, to send forward all his cavalry, with an infantry support, to occupy Culpepper Court House, and to advance from thence to Gordonsville, destroying the railroad for ten or fifteen miles eastward from that place. The cavalry commander failed to execute the latter part of the order, going only as far as Madison Court House—a failure which cost him his command. Jackson's advance, under Ewell, reached Gordonsville on the 16th. Gen. Pope took the field in person on the 29th, and the main portion of his infantry and artillery was placed in position, by the 7th of August, along the turnpike road from Sperryville to Culpepper. Gen. Buford, who had been assigned to the command of the cavalry in Banks' corps, was posted at Madison Court House with five regiments, his pickets extending along the Rapidan, from Burnett's Ford to the Blue Ridge. Gen. Sigel was directed to send a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery, in support of Buford, to Robertson's river. Gen. Bayard, with four cavalry regiments, was posted near Rapidan Station, his pickets extending eastward along the Rapidan to Raccoon Ford, and westward to meet those of Buford at Burnett's Ford. Cavalry pickets were also stationed along the Rapidan from Raccoon Ford to the confluence of that river with the Rappahannock, while King's division of infantry remained opposite Fredericksburg, substantially completing the line to the Potomac.

On the 8th, the enemy was reported in force in front of both Bayard and Buford, the former slowly falling back toward Culpepper. Crawford's brigade, of Banks' corps, was sent toward Cedar mountain, to support Bayard, and to aid in ascertaining

the numbers and intentions of the enemy. On the 9th, Banks was ordered, with the remainder of his corps, to join the brigade under Crawford—Sigel having failed, for some reason, to arrive from Sperryville, to participate in this movement as intended. Ricketts' division, of McDowell's corps, was posted three miles in the rear of Banks, so as to be available for his support, or to be thrown toward Sperryville, whither Buford was retreating, reporting a heavy Rebel force advancing toward Culpepper from Madison Court House.

During the day, on the 9th, and down to five o'clock, the enemy did not appear before Banks, in any considerable force, which led that officer, contrary to the intentions of the commanding General, who merely desired the enemy at this point to be kept in check, to advance two miles to attack. In reality, he encountered a superior force in a strong position, his troops fighting bravely. The action lasted less than two hours, the Government forces being gradually driven back to their former position, with considerable loss. Ricketts' division now came up to their aid, with Gen. Pope at its head. A brisk artillery fire was soon after commenced, driving back the enemy to his former shelter in the woods.

Sigel having arrived, his corps was now advanced and that of Banks withdrawn toward Culpepper, to be put in condition after its fatigues and losses. King had been telegraphed for at Fredericksburg on the 8th, and arrived on the night of the 11th, which day had been spent by both parties in burying the dead. Pope, now having numbers about equal to those of the enemy, determined to bring on a battle, by falling on his line of communications at daybreak. But, during the night, Jackson retired hurriedly across the Rapidan, toward Gordonsville, leaving behind many of his dead and wounded. Gen. Pope reports a loss of about 1,800 men, in killed, wounded and prisoners.

A cavalry force, under Buford and Bayard, followed the enemy to the Rapidan, capturing many stragglers. Thereupon the cavalry resumed its former position, on the line of the Rapidan, from Raccoon Ford to the Blue Ridge.

On the 14th, Pope had an accession to his strength, by the

arrival of Gen. Reno, with 8,000 men from the forces of Gen. Burnside (Ninth Corps), which had arrived at Falmouth. The army was then advanced, taking a favorable position, with its right, under Sigel, resting on Robertson's river; the center, under McDowell, occupying both flanks of Cedar mountain, and the left, under Reno, taking position near Raccoon Ford, covering the road thence to Stevensburg and Culpepper Court House. The cavalry, meanwhile, continued to operate on the communications of the enemy, who was receiving heavy reënforcements from Richmond. A cavalry expedition sent toward Louisa Court House, on the 16th, captured the Adjutant General of Stuart, and, among other papers, an autograph letter from Gen. Robert E. Lee to the latter, showing the plans of the enemy to mass an overwhelming force in Pope's front, and to fall upon him before he could be reënforced from the Army of the Potomac. Despairing of such assistance in holding his present strong position, Pope made the best dispositions in his power for withdrawing behind the Rappahannock, which movement was executed with great skill and expedition, on the night of the 18th, and during the day of the 19th.

It now becomes necessary to return to the Army of the Potomac, the presence and coöperation of which had become so essential to success at this critical juncture.

During the first days of July, Gen. McClellan had been endeavoring to render his new position as secure as possible. It was early manifest that a withdrawal of his force, to aid in the operations before Washington, did not accord with his individual views. To the last, he was extremely loath to abandon the Peninsula. On the 4th of July, McClellan had said, in a dispatch to the President: "Our communications by the James river are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musketry and command the river, and where it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them out." At the same date, before receiving the dispatch just quoted from, the President, still anxious in regard to the preservation of McClellan's remaining force, and without having definitely determined on the course to be pursued with regard to it, wrote him as follows.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., July 4, 1862. }

I understand your position as stated in your letter, and by Gen. Marcy. To re-enforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac, (about ten thousand men, I suppose), and about ten thousand I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about five thousand from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your only care. Save the army, first, where you are, if you *can*, and, secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion, that with the aid of the gunboats and the re-enforcements mentioned above, you can hold your present position; provided, and so long as you can keep the James river open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James river open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communications cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

P. S.—If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so.

A. L.

McClellan replied, on the 7th: "My position is very strong, and daily becoming more so. If not attacked to-day, I shall laugh at them. I have been anxious about my communications. . . . Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose confidence in this army." At the same date, he wrote a long letter to the President, volunteering a statement of his "general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion." He reminds Mr. Lincoln that "the Rebel army is in the front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications." He "can not but regard" his "condition as critical." The singularity of one sitting down, under such circumstances, to write a political disquisition, as if he were the veriest gentleman of leisure, is more striking than any thing

in the document itself. Two or three paragraphs in this letter (dated July 7, 1862, and published at length in the writer's last official report) will serve to show its quality :

Our cause must never be abandoned ; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State. The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our National trouble. . . .

This rebellion has assumed the character of a war ; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. . . .

Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The National forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

From time to time, Gen. McClellan continued to urge the policy of preparing his army to advance on Richmond from its present position. He called for reënforcements, asking a concentration under his command of "every thing we can possibly spare from less important points, to make sure of crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to be the most important point in rebeldom." The President visited Harri- -' Landing on the 8th of July, and in company with the Com-

manding General, reviewed the Army of the Potomac. For an entire month, scarcely so much as a reconnoissance in force occurred to break the monotony of life in that unhealthy locality. On the 30th, Gen. Halleck suggested that the enemy at Richmond be pressed, to ascertain the strength of his force there. Finally, on the 4th of August, one day after being ordered to prepare for a prompt withdrawal to Acquia Creek, the divisions of Hooker and Sedgwick, by order of Gen. McClellan, advanced and turned Malvern Hill, causing the Rebel force which had occupied that position to retreat toward Richmond. Col. Averill, on the evening of the 5th, returned from a cavalry reconnoissance in the direction of Savage's Station, and McClellan announced: "Our troops have advanced twelve miles in one direction, and seventeen in another, toward Richmond to-day." Meanwhile, he had commenced sending off his sick and disabled soldiers, as directed by Gen. Halleck, on the 30th of July—the order being repeated, with emphasis, on the 2d of August. On the 6th, he was ordered to send, "immediately," a regiment of cavalry and several batteries of artillery to Burnside's command at Acquia Creek. Instead of promptly complying with this order, Gen. McClellan returned a dispatch offering reasons for non-compliance, and promising to "obey the order as soon as circumstances permit." It was partly complied with a day or two later.

From the 3d of August, when he was directed to take "immediate measures" for withdrawing his army from the Peninsula, Gen. McClellan earnestly resisted this order, until, on the 6th, he was definitively informed: "The order will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness." Gen. Halleck, who had not determined on this course, until he had visited Gen. McClellan in camp, respectfully considered the views presented against it, and wrote him at length, assigning the following, among other reasons, for the policy adopted:

You and your officers at our interview estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then, you and others report that they have received, and are receiving, large re-enforcements from the South. Gen. Pope's army,

covering Washington, is only about 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and Gen. Pope, eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect; neither can re-enforce the other in case of such an attack.

If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to re-enforce you, Washington, Maryland and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They can not be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies can be united. * *

But you will reply, why not re-enforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said, at our interview, that you required 30,000 additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have some chance of success with 20,000. But you afterward telegraphed me that you would require 35,000, as the enemy was being largely re-enforced.

If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks.

To keep your army in its present position until it could be so re-enforced, would almost destroy it in that climate.

The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James river; and even after you received the re-enforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond.

It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time—perhaps as much as those at Yorktown.

This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time Gen. Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from

the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula, now advise its abandonment.

This final decision was telegraphed to McClellan on the 6th. Pope's situation on the Rapidan, as already seen, was becoming critical, and yet, on the 9th, Gen. Halleck found occasion to telegraph as follows.

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1862, 12.45 P. M.

I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Gens. Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and move forward to the Potomac.

You must send re-enforcements instantly to Acquia Creek.

Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McCLELLAN.

He received in reply: "There has been no unnecessary delay, as you assert—not an hour's—but every thing has been and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out your orders." On the 10th, a full week after the original order, Gen. Halleck again telegraphed: "The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting Gen. Pope to-day. There must be no further delay in your movements. That which has already occurred was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily explained." The chief excuse for this delay was the want of sufficient transportation. He had not yet disposed of even the sick—a work required to be at once proceeded with, as early as the 30th of July. But even this imperfect explanation is set aside by Gen. Halleck in the following reply, (August 12th): "The Quartermaster General informs me that nearly every available steam vessel in the country is now under your control. . . . Burnside moved nearly 13,000 troops to Acquia Creek in less than two days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. All the vessels in the James river and the Chesapeake Bay were placed at your disposal

and it was supposed that eight or ten thousand of your men could be transported daily. . . . There has been, and is, the most urgent necessity for dispatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington." Gen. McClellan again asseverates, in reply, that he is doing all he can, and actually says, (August 12th), nine days after the order to move: "If Washington is in danger now, this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it; it is in much better position to do so from here than from Acquia."

Two or three days later, in a dispatch dated August 14, 11 P. M., McClellan at length announced: "Movement has commenced by land and water. All sick will be away to-morrow night" — the "movement" referred to being, as he states in his final report, that "of the main army." At noon on the 15th, we find him saying: "Two of my army corps marched last night and this morning *en route* for Yorktown — one *via* Jones' Bridge, and the other *via* Barrett's Ferry, where we have a pontoon bridge. The other corps will be pushed forward as fast as the roads are clear; and I hope before to-morrow morning to have the entire army in motion." In a word, under the most urgent orders to hasten to Washington, at a time of imminent danger, *nearly two weeks* expire before the march is commenced. The remainder of the movement was executed in accordance with this beginning.

On the 21st, eighteen days after the order to move was given, Gen. Halleck sends the following to McClellan, then at Fortress Monroe: "The forces of Burnside and Pope are hard pushed, and require aid as rapidly as you can send it. Come yourself as soon as you can. — By all means, see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition. We have no time here to supply them. Moreover, they may have to fight as soon as they land." McClellan replied: "I have ample supplies of ammunition for infantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. I can supply any deficiency that may exist in Gen. Pope's army." Leaving the corps of Gen. Keyes to occupy Yorktown, and Sumner's corps waiting for transportation, the remainder of the troops having at length embarked, McClellan sailed from Fortress Monroe for Acquia Creek on the evening of August 23, and reported from that

place on the morning of the 24th. On the 27th, he reached Alexandria.

Gen. Pope, having promptly executed his retrograde movement, had his men in a strong position on the Rappahannock line, with the following dispositions on the 20th August: The right, under Sigel, was posted three miles above Rappahannock Station, on the left bank of the river, and connecting closely with McDowell in the center, near that point, and the left keeping open the connection with Fredericksburg, whence reënforcements from the Army of the Potomac were partly to come. Repeated calls were made from Washington for additional forces to cover his right, which could not be further extended without exposing this necessary connection on the left, and which was strongly threatened by the enemy. Ample time had passed, since the order of August 3, for the arrival of the requisite force for this purpose from the Peninsula, but the tardy movement of McClellan had rendered this reënforcement, reasonably expected, as yet impossible. The enemy, now in strong force, confronted Pope from Kelly's Ford, to a point beyond his extreme right. On the 21st and 22d, attempts were made by the Rebels to cross the river at several points, but in every instance they were repulsed. Pope was urged to make every exertion to hold out for two days longer, when it was believed his line would be adequately strengthened. But up to the 25th, the only forces that had arrived in his vicinity, except the detachment under Reno, from Burnside's corps, were 2,500 of the Pennsylvania Reserves, under Gen. Reynolds, which reached Kelly's Ford, and Kearney's division, 4,500 strong, at Warrenton Junction. The evident movements of the enemy to turn his right, caused the Commanding General much uneasiness, but the necessity of maintaining his communication on the left was still imperative. Sigel was instructed to stand firm, allowing the enemy to cross at Sulphur Springs, and move toward Warrenton, when Pope determined to mass his force to the right for the purpose of falling upon the enemy's advance. All of the cavalry, under Buford and Bayard, were pushed to the right of Sigel, toward Fayetteville and Sulphur Springs, to picket the river and to watch the enemy's movements. On the

night of the 22d, a small cavalry force made an attack on our army trains at Catlett's Station, doing no great damage. The right of Pope being still heavily threatened, while a strong force was massed in his front at Rappahannock Station, he formed the bold plan of concentrating his force, recrossing the Rappahannock, and assailing the flank and rear of the opposing army. On the morning of the 23d, his forces were collected for this purpose near Rappahannock Station. The river had meanwhile suddenly risen, and finding that a crossing could not be effected in less than thirty-six hours, the plan was changed. Sigel's corps, supported by those of Banks and Reno, were ordered to Sulphur Springs, to attack any force fallen in with, and to advance to Waterloo Bridge. McDowell, to whose command the reënforcements under Reynolds were attached, was moved directly upon Warrenton, to unite with Sigel, if occasion should require, on the road from thence to Sulphur Springs or Waterloo Bridge.

It was ascertained that, on the afternoon of the 24th, the whole force of the enemy was extended along the river, from Rappahannock Station to Waterloo Bridge, his center being near Sulphur Springs. During the day, a large Rebel force moved rapidly northward toward Rectortown, west of Bull Run Mountains, (which are crossed by the Manassas railroad at Thoroughfare Gap.) This movement clearly evinced a purpose to turn the right of Pope's army by way of White Plains and Thoroughfare Gap. Gen. Pope, feeling bound, as he says, by his instructions to maintain his communication with Fredericksburg, and having assurances that 30,000 men were to be sent forward that day, or the next morning, did not immediately change his position to meet that emergency. The main force of the enemy steadily tending in the same direction as the advance, he determined, on the night of the 25th, to abandon the lower fords of the Rappahannock, and directed McDowell, with his own corps and that of Sigel, to hold Warrenton, while Reno was pushed forward three miles on the Warrenton turnpike, and Fitz John Porter, who had now reported to him from rear Bealton Station, was ordered to join Reno. Heintzelman's corps was left at Warrenton Junction,

with the intention of being sent, at the proper time, to Greenwich, intermediate between Warrenton and Gainesville. It was requested of Gen. Halleck that Franklin's corps should be hastened to Gainesville, and that a strong division of the Plains troops should be posted at Manassas Junction. All the cavalry at that place was ordered to be sent forward to Thoroughfare Gap, for observation. Gen. Kearney was directed to post strong guards all along the railroad in his rear, from Warrenton Junction southward, while Gen. Sturgis was charged with the performance of a like duty from Manassas Junction to Catlett's Station. It was confidently expected by Gen. Pope that these several dispositions would have been completed by the afternoon of the 26th.

Jackson advanced through Thoroughfare Gap, as anticipated, and at 8 o'clock P. M., on the 26th, he had cut the railroad six miles east of Warrenton Junction, near Kettle Run. A sharp action ensued on the 27th between Hooker and Ewell, near Bristow, in which the latter was beaten. No report had been made by the cavalry sent to watch the enemy's movement, and it now became manifest to the commanding General that the re-enforcements so confidently expected on the assurances given, had failed to come to his support. His plans, otherwise likely to have been successful in stopping Jackson's advance, were thus foiled. He determined to throw the forces he had upon the enemy, moving toward Manassas and Gainesville, and getting between Lee's army and Bull Run. His entire force, much of which was greatly exhausted by continual marching or fighting, during the last nine days, now numbered about 54,000. On the morning of the 27th he proceeded to execute the purpose just indicated.

McDowell reached Gainesville during the night of the 27th, as directed, and Kearney and Reno took position at Greenwich, according to orders, communicating with McDowell. This force was thus successfully interposed between the main army of Lee, still west of the Bull Run Mountains, near White Plains, and the forces of Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, now south of the Warrenton turnpike, in the immediate vicinity of Manassas Junction. It was now that Gen. Pope, feeling that Jackson

was completely in his power, ordered Fitz John Porter, with his command of fresh troops, to move at 1 o'clock the next morning to Bristow Station, with a view to complete the work of inclosing and crushing Jackson. This order was defiantly disregarded, as charged by Gen. Pope, and as subsequently proved to the full satisfaction of a court-martial, by whose verdict Porter, for this and other acts during the two or three days ensuing, was ignominiously dismissed from the service. Kearney, having been moved to Bristow Station, was sent thence, followed by Hooker, (whose command, notwithstanding the orders of Gen. Halleck, and the lavish promises of McClellan in reply, was almost entirely destitute of ammunition), in pursuit of Ewell toward Manassas. Porter's corps did not arrive at Bristow until half past 10 o'clock in the morning of the 28th. Meanwhile, Jackson had evacuated Manassas Junction, very early that morning. Sigel's corps, in the advance at Gainesville, had also failed to move on Manassas as expeditiously as was intended, otherwise the retreat of Jackson would have been intercepted before he reached Bull Run. The commanding General reached Manassas Junction, with Reno's corps and Kearney's division, within an hour after Jackson in person had left for Centreville. Hooker, Kearney and Reno were immediately sent forward toward the latter place, and Porter was ordered to bring up his corps. McDowell was also apprised of the state of affairs, and ordered to recall his troops advancing on Manassas, (as directed before Jackson's retreat was begun,) and to move out the road from Gainesville toward Centreville. Near night, Gen. Kearney drove Jackson's rear-guard out of the latter place, occupying it about dark, with his advance a little beyond. McDowell, who had with him Sigel's corps and Reynolds' division, in addition to his own corps, (from which the division of Ricketts had been detached in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap), encountered the advance of Jackson about 6 o'clock in the evening, and a conflict ensued, lasting until dark, when each force held its ground. Contrary to expectation, however, King's division, which had sustained the principal part in this action, withdrew during the night, and Ricketts had been driven back from the Gap, retiring upon Bristow

Station. The party assailing Ricketts was the advance of Longstreet, sent to re-enforce Jackson.

Gen. Sigel, supported by Reynolds, was directed to attack Jackson on the 29th, and Gen. Heintzelman, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, was ordered forward from Centreville to attack the enemy in the rear. Orders were sent to McDowell and Porter to move forward, with their two corps, to Gainesville, with all haste, to participate in the battle. Sigel began the attack at daylight, (on the 29th), a mile or two east of Groveton, where he was soon joined by Hooker and Kearney. Jackson at first attempted to avoid an engagement by falling back, but was compelled to take a stand, having his right a little south of the Warrenton turnpike, and his left near Sudley Springs. His line was covered by an old railroad grade, extending from Gainesville toward Leesburg. The engagement was a severe and protracted one. Porter having entirely failed to bring his men into action as ordered, Jackson, though his forces were badly cut up, was able to hold out until Longstreet, with the advance of Lee's main army, near night came up to his support.

The losses were very heavy on both sides, Gen. Pope estimating his killed and wounded at six or eight thousand. That of the enemy was very much greater.

The battle of the 30th, the enemy being thus re-enforced, was fought under great disadvantages, near the old battleground of Bull Run. The Government troops fought with great bravery, maintaining their position with remarkable firmness amidst heavy losses, though the left was gradually forced back. Pope had boldly attacked, in the morning, to anticipate the arrival of further re-enforcements to the enemy by Thoroughfare Gap. It was not until dark that this sanguinary engagement ceased, when our left had receded nearly three-fourths of a mile, though with unbroken ranks and in good order, the turnpike in the rear, which the enemy had endeavored to occupy, being still well covered. The losses on both sides were very heavy.

Gen. Pope's army was not only exhausted with hard work before the commencement of this day's fight, but was also

becoming destitute of supplies. To an urgent request on the 28th for rations and forage, to be promptly forwarded, he received the following reply on the morning of the 30th :

TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER AT CENTREVILLE: I have been instructed by Gen. McClellan to inform you that he will have all the available wagons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all the cars also, as soon as you will send in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the train.

Respectfully,
W. B. FRANKLIN,
Major-General commanding Sixth Corps.

"Such a letter," says Gen. Pope, "when we were fighting the enemy, and Alexandria was swarming with troops, needs no comment." Neither Sumner's corps nor Franklin's had as yet been advanced to render any aid in a military crisis, which urgently demanded the presence of every available man at the scene of action. Another corps, commanded by McClellan's chief favorite, Fitz John Porter, though close at hand, had been found equally wanting at Groveton, through the deliberate disobedience of its commander, though it took part in the battle of the 30th. Gen. McClellan was, meanwhile, quietly waiting at Alexandria, having been ordered by Gen. Halleck, on the 27th, to "take entire direction of the sending out of the troops from Alexandria;" and having also been told on the same day, that "Franklin's corps should march" to Manassas "as soon as possible." On the previous day, the 26th, Sumner's corps commenced disembarking at Acquia Creek. While thus leisurely waiting, charged with the duty of promptly sending indispensable re-enforcements to Pope, yet neglecting to send even the needed supplies to the troops he already had, McClellan was sending such suggestions to Washington as the following :

I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted : First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope ; Second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the Capital perfectly safe.

To this the President replied :

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862, 4.10 P. M.

Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to-wit.: "to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope," is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. Halleck, aided by your counsels.

A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

After the battle of the 30th, and the opening of free communication for the enemy at Thoroughfare Gap, through which the main army of Lee was now pouring in great numbers, it only remained for Gen. Pope to withdraw his army, as best he could, toward Washington. All the troops were withdrawn to Centreville in good order, where they were rested during the day, on the 31st, receiving supplies and ammunition. Here he was joined by Sumner and Franklin, with an aggregate reinforcement of 19,000 men. On the 1st of September, the enemy was found moving toward Fairfax Court House, endangering Pope's right. Due precautions had been taken, so that when the right was attacked at sunset, the enemy was met by McDowell, Reno, Hooker, and Kearney. A sharp conflict followed, at Chantilly, in the midst of a thunder-storm, terminating soon after dark. The Rebels were handsomely repulsed. Maj.-Gen. Kearney and Brig.-Gen. Stevens were among our killed.

On the 2d, the forces under Gen. Pope were ordered to be withdrawn within the intrenchments around Washington, which movement was executed in good order. Directly after, Gen. Pope was relieved, and appointed to the command of the Department of the Northwest.

Gen. McClellan, on the 1st of September, was orally directed by Gen. Halleck to take command of the defenses of Washington. He immediately entered on the work, his command, however, being still limited to the Army of the Potomac, and no new jurisdiction being assigned to him outside of the fortifications. It was without any formal extension of this authority that he went out to meet the enemy in Maryland, where Lee next assumed a threatening position, having gone out by Leesburg and crossed the Upper Potomac.

Proceeding cautiously, until the purpose of the enemy was definitely developed, the advance of Gen. McClellan's forces, on the 14th of September, came up with and defeated the rear guard of Lee at South Mountain. This was a gallant action, in which Gen. Burnside and his corps took a conspicuous part, and in which Gen. Reno lost his life. On the side of the Government, about 30,000 men were engaged, at various points, including the forces under Gen. Meade. The Commanding General reports his losses as 312 killed, 1,234 wounded, and 22 missing. About 1,500 prisoners were taken from the enemy, whose losses in killed and wounded were estimated to have largely exceeded those of the Government forces.

Meanwhile, Gen. Franklin had been executing a movement on the left, by Crampton's Gap, where he had a sharp engagement. He was directed to relieve Harper's Ferry, where Col. Miles, with a force of nearly 14,000 men, was in imminent danger. Before Franklin came to his aid, though within sound of his guns, Miles (who was soon after killed) had surrendered his position, his munitions of war, and his entire force of infantry and artillery. His cavalry, numbering about 2,000, cut its way out on the night of the 14th, under the command of Col. Davis, capturing, on its route to the Government lines, the train of Longstreet and over one hundred prisoners.

McClellan's forces were soon through the mountain passes, and a prompt engagement with the enemy was expected, with a view to prevent his return across the Potomac, without a crushing defeat. The circumstances now seemed favorable to this result, the forces of McClellan being massed in the immediate vicinity of the Rebel army, which was now contending merely for a secure retreat—in itself a concession of decided inferiority.

On the 15th, the enemy made a stand on the heights beyond Antietam Creek, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg. McClellan, seeing the formidable position thus occupied, deemed it advisable to prepare with great deliberation, for the attack he had intended to make at once. The 15th and most of the 16th were accordingly employed in this preparation, during which time

the enemy also made new dispositions, some artillery firing going on during both days. Meanwhile, Jackson's forces returned from the capture of Harper's Ferry. The corps of Sumner and Hooker (the latter of whom had taken the place of Heintzelman, assigned to duty within the fortifications at Washington) were posted on the right, near Keedysville, on both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike. Franklin's corps and Couch's division were placed in front of Brownsville, in Pleasant Valley. Burnside's corps occupied a position on the left. Heavy artillery was massed in the center, behind which, in the low ground, Porter's corps was held in reserve. The right, center and left, were each, respectively, near three stone bridges across Antietam Creek, the one on the right being about three and a half miles from that on the left.

In the evening of the 16th, Hooker's corps advanced across the stream, by the upper bridge and by a ford near it, with orders to endeavor to turn the enemy's left. After a short engagement, the opposing force was driven back, and Hooker encamped for the night on the ground thus gained. Sumner's corps crossed at the same point, and was followed by the corps of Gen. Mansfield (the Twelfth, consisting of the divisions of Gens. Williams and Green.)

At an early hour on the morning of the 17th, Hooker made an attack on the enemy's left—his whole corps being soon engaged, as well as the remaining troops that had crossed over, on the right. Franklin's corps and other forces were also brought into action. The contest was a severe one, the enemy having evidently moved a heavy force to the support of his left—his right not having been engaged by Burnside, until after the heaviest of this fighting was over. Gen. Mansfield fell mortally wounded. Gen. Hooker was early so severely wounded as to be compelled to leave the field. Gen. Hartsuff, of Hooker's corps, was also badly wounded, as were Gens. Sedgwick and Dana, and many other officers. On both sides, there was heavy slaughter. The enemy was finally driven backward some distance, and our right held the position gained.

Gen. Burnside's advance, on the left, was not commenced until hours after Hooker had brought on the action on the

right. About 8 o'clock in the morning, he was ordered by the Commanding General to carry the bridge before him, and to occupy the heights beyond, advancing along their summit toward Sharpsburg. The bridge was not carried until 1 o'clock, and a halt was again made until 3, the heights being finally carried in a gallant manner. Burnside earnestly asked, but failed to receive reënforcements from the heavy reserve under Porter, which remained inactive through the day. The enemy, as night approached, heavily reënforced his right, compelling Burnside to fall back to a lower range of hills than that he had gained.

On the whole, our forces had gained a substantial advantage, and had inflicted the heaviest damage on the enemy, in killed and wounded.

Instead of renewing the engagement, next morning, as a less prudent general would undoubtedly have done, Gen. McClellan spent the 18th "in collecting the dispersed, giving rest to the fatigued, removing the wounded, burying the dead, and the necessary preparations for a renewal of the battle." During the night of the 18th, Lee's entire army retreated across the Potomac. "As their line was but a short distance from the river," Gen. McClellan says in his final report, "the evacuation presented but little difficulty, and was effected before daylight." His dispatches of the 19th, show that he regarded these matters somewhat differently at the time. In fact, several hours elapsed, before the Commanding General appears to have understood how completely the enemy had eluded his grasp.

In his official dispatch of Sept. 29, Gen. McClellan says, in summing up his estimate of the Rebel losses :

As nearly as can be determined at this time, the number of prisoners taken by our troops in the two battles will, at the lowest estimate, amount to 5,000. The full returns will no doubt show a larger number. Of these about 1,200 are wounded. This gives the Rebel loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, 25,542. It will be observed that this does not include their stragglers, the number of whom is said by citizens here to be large. It may be safely concluded, therefore, that the Rebel army lost at least 30,000 of their best troops during their campaign in Maryland.

In his last report, Gen. McClellan states his own losses during the same period as amounting, in the aggregate, to 15,520.

It was not until the 20th, that Maryland Heights were occupied by the corps of Gen. Williams. On the 22d, Gen. Sumner was advanced to Harper's Ferry. On the 23d, Gen. McClellan regarded the enemy as still remaining in front of him, with "indications of an advance of reënforcements," and accordingly proceeded to act on a defensive policy. On the 27th, he believes "the main body of the enemy is concentrated not far from Martinsburg," and extending "toward our right and beyond it." All efforts to induce a vigorous pursuit of an enemy lately represented as completely routed and panic stricken, proved of no avail.

On the 1st of October, the President visited the army, (the headquarters of which were still on the Maryland side of the Potomac) and passed over the battle fields of South Mountain and Antietam, in company with Gen. McClellan. It is not too much to say that this visit was made, in part, from the extreme anxiety felt by Mr. Lincoln on account of the protracted delay in moving the army, and from a desire to ascertain, by personal observation, how far this inaction was necessary or reasonable. On the President's return, the following dispatch was sent by Gen. Halleck to Gen. McClellan :

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6, 1862.

I am instructed to telegraph you as follows : The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be reënforced with thirty thousand men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than twelve or fifteen thousand can be sent you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river ; also to what point the reënforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on, before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add, that the Secretary of War and the General-in-chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

Under various dilatory pleas, this peremptory order was effectually disregarded. After fifteen days, during which various supplies were asked and furnished, and an appearance of being on the eve of moving was kept up, McClellan sent Gen. Halleck a dispatch, on the 21st, complaining of a want of horses, as an excuse for further delay, and begging "leave to ask whether the President desires" him "to march at once, or to await the reception of the new horses, every possible step having been taken to insure their prompt arrival." The General-in-chief immediately replied: "Your telegram of 12 M. has been submitted to the President. He directs me to say that *he has no change to make in his order of the 6th inst.* . . . The President does not expect impossibilities; but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity." A full investigation of the facts is believed to have justified the following conclusion, stated by Gen. Halleck to the Secretary of War, on the 28th of October: "In my opinion, there has been no such want of supplies in the army under Gen. McClellan as to prevent his compliance with my order to advance against the enemy. Had he moved his army to the south side of the Potomac, he could have received his supplies almost as readily as by remaining inactive on the north side."

During the last days of October and the earlier days of November, the Army of the Potomac was put in motion. After weeks of fine weather had passed unimproved, it is not surprising that "heavy rains delayed the movement considerably in the beginning." The army advanced along the southern base of the Blue Ridge, by Lovettsville, Snicker's Gap, and Rectortown, until the several corps were massed in the vicinity of Warrenton. The main army of Lee at the same time fell back on Gordonsville.

On the night of the 7th, a dispatch from President Lincoln reached Gen. McClellan, at his headquarters near Rectortown, relieving him from the command of the Army of the Potomac. Maj.-Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside was designated as his successor. This transfer of the command was promptly carried into effect, and Gen. McClellan, on the 10th, took his final leave of the army.

CHAPTER IX.

A New Era Inaugurated.—Emancipation.—Message of the President.—Last Session of the Thirty-seventh Congress.

THE elections, prior to the autumn of 1862, had shown large majorities for the Administration. Brilliant successes had been won by its armies in the West, until, in June, the tide of victory paused before Vicksburg. In the East, military inefficiency had culminated on the Peninsula and before Washington. Lee had invaded Maryland, and leisurely retired, unpursued. Political defeat followed military disaster. Ohio and Pennsylvania gave small majorities against the Administration in October. New York, in the next month, followed the example. The lower House of the next Congress was already claimed as secured by the Opposition. Popular discontent and despondency were every-where manifest. Opposition politicians held the President responsible before the people for the non-action of their favorite General, whom they did not cease to lament when removed. Peace Democrats rallied behind banners inscribed, "For a more vigorous prosecution of the war;" yet their representative man was the one who, evading orders of the Administration, and thwarting the President's wishes, had wasted lavish preparations and abundant military forces, during a whole year, in organizing failure.

Long before this disheartening epoch, however, President Lincoln, as seen in previous pages, had earnestly directed his thoughts to the proper mode of dealing with slavery, in its necessary relations to the war. His final speech to the Border State men on compensated emancipation, as we have seen, plainly indicated that, as early as July, his mind was made up to wrest this element of military power from the support of the Rebellion.

In the month of May, 1862, Gen. Hunter, then commanding the Department of the South, issued an unauthorized order, in

which he attempted, by logical deduction from the premise of Secession, to establish the conclusion that, in his military department, all slaves had become manumitted. As a result of this logical exercise, he declared such persons to be "forever free." This order, like the rhapsody on Slavery and Romanism, issued by Gen. Phelps, in his proclamation at Ship Island, might have been suffered to pass without public notice by the Executive, had it not emanated from a commanding general in whose department were two of the States in which slaves were the most numerous, and had it not the appearance of an authentic announcement of a new policy, which Gen. Hunter had lately been sent out to put in operation. The President felt constrained to set aside this order, which he did in the following well-considered proclamation:

WHEREAS, There appears in the public prints what purports to be a proclamation of Major General Hunter, in the words and figures following, to wit:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, }
HILTON HEAD, S. C., May 9, 1862. }

General Orders No. 11.]

The three States of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, comprising the Military Department of the South, having deliberately declared themselves no longer under the protection of the United States of America, and having taken up arms against the said United States, it becomes a military necessity to declare them under martial law. This was accordingly done on the twenty-fifth day of April, 1862. Slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible. The persons in these three States, Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared forever free.

DAVID HUNTER,

Major General Commanding.

Official: ED. W. SMITH, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

AND WHEREAS, The same is producing some excitement and misunderstanding,

Therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, proclaim and declare that the Government of the United States had no knowledge or belief of an intention, on the part of Gen. Hunter, to issue such a proclamation, nor has it yet any authentic information that the document is genuine; and, further, that neither Gen. Hunter nor any other commander, or

person, has been authorized by the Government of the United States to make proclamation declaring the slaves of any State free, and that the supposed proclamation now in question, whether genuine or false, is altogether void, so far as respects such declaration.

I further make known that, whether it be competent for me, as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and whether, at any time, or in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the Government to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I can not feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field. These are totally different questions from those of police regulations in armies and camps.

On the sixth day of March last, by a special message, I recommended to Congress the adoption of a joint resolution to be substantially as follows:

"Resolved, That the United States ought to coöperate with any State which may adopt a gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State in its discretion to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system."

The resolution, in the language above quoted, was adopted by large majorities in both branches of Congress, and now stands an authentic, definite, and solemn proposal of the nation to the States and people most immediately interested in the subject matter. To the people of these States I now earnestly appeal. I do not argue; I beseech you to make the arguments for yourselves. You can not, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partisan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of Heaven, not rending or wrecking any thing. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done by one effort in all past time, as, in the Providence of God, it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this nineteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-sixth.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The policy on which the Government had been acting, in the Slave districts, was substantially that repeated in an Executive order, under date of July 22, 1862 :

That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers, within and from said States, so many persons of African descent as can be advantageously used for military or naval purposes, giving them reasonable wages for their labor.

That, as to both property, and persons of African descent, accounts shall be kept sufficiently accurate and in detail to show quantities and amounts, and from whom both property and such persons shall have come, as a basis upon which compensation can be made in proper cases ; and the several departments of this Government shall attend to and perform their appropriate parts toward the execution of these orders.

In August, Mr. Greeley, of New York, published in his journal, the *Tribune*, an editorial article on this subject, in the form of a letter addressed to the President, severely criticising his action, and complaining, in no very gentle terms, of various matters, wherein the Administration had, in his opinion, fallen short of the just expectations of "twenty millions" of loyal people. The whole letter proceeded from the mistaken assumption that the President had not, all along, reflected as earnestly, and felt as deeply, in regard to the question of emancipation, as any man living. It was written in ignorance of the fact that the President had already fully matured and resolved upon a definite policy in regard to Slavery, and was only awaiting the fitting moment for its announcement.

Mr. Lincoln thought proper to address Mr. Greeley the following letter, in reply to his complaints :

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
August 22, 1862. }

HON. HORACE GREELEY—*Dear Sir* : I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the New York *Tribune*. If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not now and here controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not now and here argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial

tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always supposed to be right.

As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt.

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the National authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time *save* Slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time *destroy* Slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle *is* to save the Union, and is *not* either to save or destroy Slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing *any* slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing *all* the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about Slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do *not* believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do *less* whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do *more* whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of *official* duty, and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed *personal* wish that all men, every-where, could be free.

Yours, A. LINCOLN.

Although the proclamation of Emancipation had been prepared sometime before this letter was written—in fact as early as July—it was not deemed a fitting occasion to announce this great measure, when our army was recoiling from before Richmond, or when our Capital itself was threatened and Maryland invaded. The battle of Antietam, followed by the withdrawal of Lee's army into Virginia, occurred on the 17th day of September. The President, five days later, issued the followi

PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION.

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, and Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United States and the people

whereof in those States in which that relation is, or may be, suspended or disturbed; that it is my purpose upon the next meeting of Congress to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the Slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, the immediate or gradual abolishment of Slavery within their respective limits, and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon the continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the government existing there, will be continued; that on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or any designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, SHALL BE THEN, THENCEFORWARD AND FOREVER, FREE; and the military and naval authority thereof will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for actual freedom; that the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto, at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State and the people thereof have not been in rebellion against the United States.

Your attention is hereby called to an act of Congress entitled, "An act to make an additional article of war," approved March 13, 1862, and which act is in the words and figures following:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That hereafter the following shall be promulgated as an additional article of war for the government of the Army of the United States, and shall be observed and obeyed as such:

"ARTICLE —. All officers or persons of the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due, and any officer who shall be found guilty by

a court-martial of violating this article, shall be dismissed from the service.

"SEC. 2 And be it further enacted, that this act shall take effect from and after its passage."

Also to the ninth and tenth sections of an act entitled, "An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of Rebels, and for other purposes," approved July 17, 1862, and which sections are in the words and figures following :

"SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, that all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion against the Government of the United States, or who shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto, escaping from such persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army; and all slaves captured from such persons or deserted by them, and coming under the control of the Government of the United States, and all slaves of such persons found on (or being within) any place occupied by Rebel forces and afterward occupied by the forces of the United States, shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude and not again held as slaves.

"SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, that no slave escaping into any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, from any of the States, shall be delivered up, or in any way impeded or hindered of his liberty, except for crime, or some offense against the laws, unless the person claiming said fugitive shall first make oath that the person to whom the labor or service of such fugitive is alleged to be due, is his lawful owner, and has not been in arms against the United States in the present rebellion, nor in any way given aid or comfort thereto; and no person engaged in the military or naval service of the United States shall, under any pretense whatever, assume to decide on the validity of the claim of any person to the service or labor of any other person, or surrender up any such person to the claimant, on pain of being dismissed from the service."

And I do hereby enjoin upon, and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey and enforce within their respective spheres of service the act and sections above recited.

And the Executive will, in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall (upon the restoration of the constitutional relation between the United States and their respective States and people, if the relation shall have been suspended or disturbed) be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.

By the President:

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

WM. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

This proclamation, inaugurating a new era in the progress of the war, and constituting a landmark in the nation's history for all time, was received with great satisfaction throughout the loyal States, reassuring the faith and reviving the confidence of those who now saw the only hope of a complete overthrow of the slaveholders' conspiracy, in the utter eradication of its mischievous and immoral cause. This decree flashed a new light across the Atlantic, and gave cheer to the friends of American republicanism abroad, affording them a firm foothold among the nations of the Old World, so many of whose ruling men had manifested a positive affinity for Davis and the inhuman revolt against freedom and civilization which he had inaugurated. From this time onward, that portion of the European population in sympathy with the constitutional government of this nation began steadily to advance, until its power has come to be strongly felt, and its influence controlling. In Europe, the line was now distinctly drawn between the grand principles of universal freedom and the usurpations of slaveholding barbarism; between legitimate authority on the side of liberty, and organized revolt to perpetuate oppression.

On the 1st day of January, the expected proclamation, completing this great work and giving it actual vitality, was promulgated in the following terms:

WHEREAS, On the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to-wit.

That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or any designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against th.

United States, shall be thenceforward and forever free, and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom :

That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States, and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State and the people thereof are not then in rebellion against the United States :

Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for repressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day of the first above-mentioned order, and designate, as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to-wit. : Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia, except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth, and which excepted parts are, for the present, left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued.

And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States are, and henceforward shall be free ; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.

And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense, and I recommend to them, that in all cases, when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.

And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.

And upon this, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
[L. S.] hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh.

By the President:

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

The power exercised by President Lincoln in suspending the writ of habeas corpus, in certain cases, gave some uneasiness to a class of men whose efforts to obstruct the Government in putting down the rebellion had been pursued under the assumption that they would escape punishment on a formal trial, for the treason of which they were morally guilty. The people, however, fully sustained this course of the Executive, in a time of great public peril, and his prompt action therein tended materially to strengthen the Government. His proclamation on this subject, issued on the 24th day of September, 1862, contained the following orders:

That during the existing insurrection, and as a necessary measure for suppressing the same, all Rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to the Rebels against the authority of the United States, shall be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or military commissions.

That the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military

prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court-martial or military commission

In noticing these measures, which have occupied so large a place in the public mind, it is fitting also to mention the order issued by President Lincoln, in response to an appeal made to him by many Christian men, in regard to the better observance of Sunday as a day of rest and religious devotion. "In revolutionary times," this reverence for the day can seldom be maintained in that strictness which is required even by human laws ; but that a great improvement in this respect was practicable, could not be denied. The President's order on this subject, issued on the 16th of November, 1862, is one which deserves a perpetual remembrance. It is here subjoined :

The President, Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, desires and enjoins the orderly observance of the Sabbath, by the officers and men in the military and naval service. The importance, for man and beast, of the prescribed weekly rest, the sacred rights of Christian soldiers and sailors, a becoming deference to the best sentiment of a Christian people, and a due regard for the Divine will, demand that Sunday labor in the army and navy be reduced to the measure of strict necessity.

The discipline and character of the National forces should not suffer, nor the cause they defend be imperiled, by the profanation of the day or name of the Most High. "At this time of public distress," adopting the words of Washington in 1776, "men may find enough to do in the service of God and their country, without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality." The first general order issued by the Father of his Country, after the Declaration of Independence, indicates the spirit in which our institutions were founded and should ever be defended : "The General hopes and trusts that every officer and man will endeavor to live and act as becomes a Christian soldier defending the dearest rights and liberties of his country."

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The Thirty-seventh Congress convened, for its last session, on the first day of December, 1862. The annual message of the President was transmitted to both Houses on that day. In view of the marked events of the preceding season, this document was looked for with unusual interest ; nor was its favor

able reception disproportioned to the public expectation. The material portions of this State paper are as follows:

MR. LINCOLN'S ANNUAL MESSAGE, 1862.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: Since your last annual assembling, another year of health and bountiful harvests has passed. And, while it has not pleased the Almighty to bless us with a return of peace, we can but press on, guided by the best light He gives us, trusting that, in His own good time, and wise way, all will yet be well.

If the condition of our relations with other nations is less gratifying than it has usually been at former periods, it is certainly more satisfactory than a nation so unhappily distracted as we are, might reasonably have apprehended. In the month of June last there were some grounds to expect that the maritime powers which, at the beginning of our domestic difficulties, so unwisely and unnecessarily, as we think, recognized the insurgents as a belligerent, would soon recede from that position, which has proved only less injurious to themselves than to our own country. But the temporary reverses which afterward befell the National arms, and which were exaggerated by our own disloyal citizens abroad, have hitherto delayed that act of simple justice.

The civil war, which has so radically changed, for the moment, the occupations and habits of the American people, has necessarily disturbed the social condition, and affected very deeply the prosperity of the nations with which we have carried on a commerce that has been steadily increasing throughout a period of half a century. It has, at the same time, excited political ambitions and apprehensions which have produced a profound agitation throughout the civilized world. In this unusual agitation we have forbore from taking part in any controversy between foreign States, and between parties or factions in such States. We have attempted no propagandism, and acknowledged no revolution. But we have left to every nation the exclusive conduct and management of its own affairs. Our struggle has been, of course, contemplated by foreign nations with reference less to its own merits, than to its supposed, and often exaggerated, effects and consequences resulting to those nations themselves. Nevertheless, complaint on the part of this Government, even if it were just, would certainly be unwise.

The treaty with Great Britain for the suppression of the slave-trade has been put into operation, with a good prospect

of complete success. It is an occasion of special pleasure to acknowledge that the execution of it, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, has been marked with a jealous respect for the authority of the United States, and the rights of their moral and loyal citizens. . . .

Applications have been made to me by many free Americans of African descent to favor their emigration, with a view to such colonization, as was contemplated in recent acts of Congress. Other parties, at home and abroad—some from interested motives, others upon patriotic considerations, and still others influenced by philanthropic sentiments—have suggested similar measures; while, on the other hand, several of the Spanish-American republics have protested against the sending of such colonies to their respective territories. Under these circumstances, I have declined to move any such colony to any State, without first obtaining the consent of its Government, with an agreement on its part to receive and protect such emigrants in all the rights of freemen; and I have, at the same time, offered to the several States situated within the tropics, or having colonies there, to negotiate with them, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, to favor the voluntary emigration of persons of that class to their respective territories, upon conditions which shall be equal, just and humane. Liberia and Hayti are, as yet, the only countries to which colonists of African descent from here, could go with certainty of being received and adopted as citizens; and I regret to say such persons, contemplating colonization, do not seem so willing to migrate to those countries, as to some others, nor so willing as I think their interest demands. I believe, however, opinion among them in this respect, is improving; and that, ere long, there will be an augmented and considerable migration to both these countries, from the United States. . . .

I have favored the project for connecting the United States with Europe by an Atlantic telegraph, and a similar project to extend the telegraph from San Francisco, to connect by a Pacific telegraph with the line which is being extended across the Russian Empire.

The Territories of the United States, with unimportant exceptions, have remained undisturbed by the civil war; and they are exhibiting such evidence of prosperity as justifies an expectation that some of them will soon be in a condition to be organized as States, and be constitutionally admitted into the Federal Union.

The immense mineral resources of some of those Territories ought to be developed as rapidly as possible. Every step in that direction would have a tendency to improve the revenue:

of the Government, and diminish the burdens of the people. It is worthy of your serious consideration whether some extraordinary measures to promote that end can not be adopted. The means which suggest itself as most likely to be effective, is a scientific exploration of the mineral regions in those Territories, with a view to the publication of its results at home and in foreign countries—results which can not fail to be auspicious.

The condition of the finances will claim your most diligent consideration. The vast expenditures incident to the military and naval operations required for the suppression of the rebellion, have hitherto been met with a promptitude and certainty unusual in similar circumstances; and the public credit has been fully maintained. The continuance of the war, however, and the increased disbursements made necessary by the augmented forces now in the field, demand your best reflections as to the best modes of providing the necessary revenue, without injury to business, and with the least possible burdens upon labor.

The suspension of specie payments by the banks, soon after the commencement of your last session, made large issues of United States notes unavoidable. In no other way could the payment of the troops, and the satisfaction of other just demands, be so economically, or so well provided for. The judicious legislation of Congress, securing the receivability of these notes for loans and internal duties, and making them a legal tender for other debts, has made them an universal currency; and has satisfied, partially, at least, and for the time, the long felt want of an uniform circulating medium, saving thereby to the people immense sums in discounts and exchanges.

A return to specie payments, however, at the earliest period compatible with due regard to all interests concerned, should ever be kept in view. Fluctuations in the value of currency are always injurious, and to reduce these fluctuations to the lowest possible point will always be a leading purpose in wise legislation. Convertibility, prompt and certain convertibility into coin, is generally acknowledged to be the best and the surest safeguard against them; and it is extremely doubtful whether a circulation of United States notes, payable in coin, and sufficiently large for the wants of the people, can be permanently, usefully and safely maintained.

Is there, then, any other mode in which the necessary provision for the public wants can be made, and the great advantages of a safe and uniform currency secured?

I know of none which promises so certain results, and is, at the same time, so unobjectionable, as the organization of banking associations, under a general act of Congress, well guarded

its provisions. To such associations the Government might furnish circulating notes, on the security of the United States bonds deposited in the treasury. These notes, prepared under the supervision of proper officers, being uniform in appearance and security, and convertible always into coin, would at once protect labor against the evils of a vicious currency, and facilitate commerce by cheap and safe exchanges.

A moderate reservation from the interest on the bonds would compensate the United States for the preparation and distribution of the notes, and a general supervision of the system, and would lighten the burden of that part of the public debt employed as securities. The public credit, moreover, would be greatly improved, and the negotiation of new loans greatly facilitated by the steady market demand for Government bonds which the adoption of the proposed system would create.

It is an additional recommendation of the measure of considerable weight, in my judgment, that it would reconcile, as far as possible, all existing interests, by the opportunity offered to existing institutions to reorganize under the act, substituting only the secured uniform national circulation for the local and various circulation, secured and unsecured, now issued by them.

The receipts into the treasury, from all sources, including loans, and balance from the preceding year, for the fiscal year ending on the 30th June, 1862, were \$583,885,247 06, of which sum \$49,056,397 62 were derived from customs; \$1,795,331 73 from the direct tax; from public lands \$152,203 77; from miscellaneous sources, \$931,787 64; from loans in all forms, \$529,692,460 50. The remainder, \$2,257,065 80, was the balance from last year.

The disbursements during the same period were for congressional, executive, and judicial purposes, \$5,939,009 29; for foreign intercourse, \$1,339,710 35; for miscellaneous expenses, including the mints, loans, post office deficiencies, collection of revenue, and other like charges, \$14,129,771 50; for expenses under the Interior Department, \$3,102,985 52; under the War Department, \$394,368,407 36; under the Navy Department, \$42,674,569 69; for interest on public debt, \$13,190,324 45; and for payment of public debt, including reimbursement of temporary loan, and redemptions, \$96,096,922 09; making an aggregate of \$570,841,700 25, and leaving a balance in the treasury on the first day of July, 1862, of \$13,043,546 81.

It should be observed that the sum of \$96,096,922 09, expended for reimbursements and redemption of public debt, being included also in the loans made, may be properly deducted, both from receipts and expenditures, leaving the actual

receipts for the year, \$487,788,324 97; and the expenditures, \$474,744,778 16. . . .

On the 22d day of September last a proclamation was issued by the Executive, a copy of which is herewith submitted.

In accordance with the purpose expressed in the second paragraph of that paper, I now respectfully recall your attention to what may be called "compensated emancipation."

A nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people and its laws. The territory is the only part which is of certain durability. 'One generation passeth away and another generation cometh, but the earth abideth forever.' It is of the first importance to duly consider, and estimate, this ever-enduring part. That portion of the earth's surface which is owned and inhabited by the people of the United States, is well adapted to be the home of one national family; and it is not well adapted for two, or more. Its vast extent, and its variety of climate and productions, are of advantage, in this age, for one people, whatever they might have been in former ages. Steam, telegraphs and intelligence have brought these to be an advantageous combination for one united people.

In the inaugural address I briefly pointed out the total inadequacy of disunion, as a remedy for the differences between the people of the two sections. I did so in language which I can not improve, and which, therefore, I beg to repeat:

"One section of our country believes Slavery is *right*, and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is *wrong*, and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute. The fugitive slave clause of the Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the foreign slave-trade, are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law can ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I think, can not be perfectly cured; and it would be worse in both cases *after* the separation of the sections, than before. The foreign slave-trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived without restriction in one section; while fugitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other.

"Physically speaking, we can not separate. We can not remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence, and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of our country can not do this. They can not but remain face to face; and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it

possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous, or more satisfactory, *after* separation than *before*? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens, than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you can not fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions, as to terms of intercourse, are again upon you."

There is no line, straight or crooked, suitable for a National boundary, upon which to divide. Trace through, from east to west, upon the line between the free and slave country, and we shall find a little more than one-third of its length are rivers, easy to be crossed, and populated, or soon to be populated, thickly, upon both sides; while nearly all its remaining length are merely surveyors' lines, over which people may walk back and forth without any consciousness of their presence. No part of this line can be made any more difficult to pass, by writing it down on paper, or parchment, as a national boundary. The fact of separation, if it comes, gives up, on the part of the seceding section, the fugitive slave clause, along with all other constitutional obligations upon the section seceded from, while I should expect no treaty stipulation would ever be made to take its place.

But there is another difficulty. The great interior region, bounded east by the Alleghanies, north by the British Dominions, west by the Rocky Mountains, and south by the line along which the culture of corn and cotton meets, and which includes part of Virginia, part of Tennessee, all of Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, and the Territories of Dakotah, Nebraska, and part of Colorado, already has above ten millions of people, and will have fifty millions within fifty years, if not prevented by any political folly or mistake. It contains more than one-third of the country owned by the United States—certainly more than one million of square miles. Once half as populous as Massachusetts already is, it would have more than seventy-five millions of people. A glance at the map shows that, territorially speaking, it is the great body of the Republic. The other parts are but marginal borders to it; the magnificent region sloping west from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific, being the deepest, and also the richest, in undeveloped resources. In the production of provisions, grains, grasses, and all which proceed from them, this great interior region is naturally one of the most important in the world. Ascertain from the statistics the small proportion of the region which has, as yet, been brought into cultivation, and also the large and rapidly increas-

ing amount of its products, and we shall be overwhelmed with the magnitude of the prospect presented. And yet this region has no sea-coast, touches no ocean any-where. As part of one nation, its people now find, and may forever find, their way to Europe by New York, to South America and Africa by New Orleans, and to Asia by San Francisco. But separate our common country into two nations, as designed by the present rebellion, and every man of this great interior region is thereby cut off from some one or more of these outlets, not, perhaps, by a physical barrier, but by embarrassing and onerous trade regulations.

And this is true, *wherever* a dividing or boundary line may be fixed. Place it between the now free and slave country, or place it south of Kentucky, or north of Ohio, and still the truth remains, that none south of it can trade to any port or place north of it, and none north of it can trade to any port or place south of it, except upon terms dictated by a government foreign to them. These outlets, east, west, and south, are indispensable to the well-being of the people inhabiting, and to inhabit, this vast interior region. *Which* of the three may be the best, is no proper question. All are better than either; and all, of right, belong to that people, and to their successors forever. True to themselves, they will not ask *where* a line of separation shall be, but will vow, rather, that there shall be no such line. Nor are the marginal regions less interested in these communications to, and through them, to the great outside world. They, too, and each of them, must have access to this Egypt of the West, without paying toll at the crossing of any national boundary.

Our National strife springs not from our permanent part: not from the land we inhabit; not from our National home-stead. There is no possible severing of this, but would multiply, and not mitigate, evils among us. In all its adaptations and aptitudes, it demands union, and abhors separation. In fact, it would, ere long, force reunion, however much of blood and treasure the separation might have cost.

Our strife pertains to ourselves—to the passing generations of men; and it can, without convulsion, be hushed forever with the passing of one generation.

In this view, I recommend the adoption of the following resolution and articles amendatory to the Constitution of the United States:

“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (two-thirds of both Houses concurring,) That the following articles be proposed to the Legislatures (or conventions) of the several States

as amendments to the Constitution of the United States, all or any of which articles, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures (or conventions), to be valid as part or parts of the said Constitution, viz.:

“ARTICLE —. Every State, wherein slavery now exists, which shall abolish the same therein, at any time, or times, before the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand and nine hundred, shall receive compensation from the United States as follows, to-wit:

"The President of the United States shall deliver, to every such State, bonds of the United States, bearing interest at the rate of — per cent. per annum, to an amount equal to the aggregate sum of _____ for each slave shown to have been therein, by the eighth census of the United States, said bonds to be delivered to such State by installments, or in one parcel, at the completion of the abolishment, accordingly as the same shall have been gradual, or at one time, within such State; and interest shall begin to run upon any such bond, only from the proper time of its delivery as aforesaid. Any State, having received bonds as aforesaid, and afterward re-introducing or tolerating slavery therein, shall refund to the United States the bonds so received, or the value thereof, and all interest paid thereon.

“ARTICLE —. All slaves who shall have enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of the war, at any time before the end of the rebellion, shall be forever free; but all owners of such, who shall not have been disloyal, shall be compensated for them, at the same rates as is provided for States adopting abolishment of slavery, but in such way, that no slave shall be twice accounted for.

"ARTICLE —. Congress may appropriate money, and otherwise provide for colonizing free colored persons, with their own consent, at any place or places without the United States.'

I beg indulgence to discuss these proposed articles at some length. Without slavery, the rebellion could never have existed; without slavery, it could not continue.

Among the friends of the Union, there is great diversity of sentiment, and of policy, in regard to slavery, and the African race among us. Some would perpetuate slavery; some would abolish it suddenly, and without compensation; some would abolish it gradually, and with compensation; some would remove the freed people from us, and some would retain them with us; and there are yet other minor diversities. Because of these diversities, we waste much strength in struggles among ourselves. By mutual concession we should harmonize, and act together. This would be compromise; but it would be

compromise among the friends, and not with the enemies of the Union. These articles are intended to embody a plan of such mutual concessions. If the plan shall be adopted, it is assumed that emancipation will follow, at least in several of the States.

As to the first article, the main points are: first, the emancipation; secondly, the length of time for consummating it—thirty-seven years; and, thirdly, the compensation.

The emancipation will be unsatisfactory to the advocates of perpetual slavery; but the length of time should greatly mitigate their dissatisfaction. The time spares both races from the evils of sudden derangement—in fact, from the necessity of any derangement—while most of those whose habitual course of thought will be disturbed by the measure, will have passed away before its consummation. They will never see it. Another class will hail the prospect of emancipation, but will deprecate the length of time. They will feel that it gives too little to the now living slaves. But it really gives them much. It saves them from the vagrant destitution which must largely attend immediate emancipation in localities where their numbers are very great; and it gives the inspiring assurance that their posterity shall be free forever. The plan leaves to each State, choosing to act under it, to abolish slavery now, or at the end of the century, or at any intermediate time, or by degrees, extending over the whole or any part of the period; and it obliges no two States to proceed alike. It also provides for compensation, and, generally, the mode of making it. This, it would seem, must further mitigate the dissatisfaction of those who favor perpetual slavery, and especially of those who are to receive the compensation. Doubtless, some of those who are to pay, and not to receive, will object. Yet the measure is both just and economical. In a certain sense, the liberation of slaves is the destruction of property—property acquired by descent, or by purchase, the same as any other property. It is no less true for having been often said, that the people of the South are not more responsible for the original introduction of this property, than are the people of the North; and when it is remembered how unhesitatingly we all use cotton and sugar, and share the profits of dealing in them, it may not be quite safe to say, that the South has been more responsible than the North for its continuance. If, then, for a common object, this property is to be sacrificed, is it not just that it be done at a common charge?

And if, with less money, or money more easily paid, we can preserve the benefits of the Union by this means, than we can by the war alone, is it not also economical to do it? Let us

consider it then. Let us ascertain the sum we have expended in the war since compensated emancipation was proposed last March, and consider whether, if that measure had been promptly accepted, by even some of the slave States, the same sum would not have done more to close the war, than has been otherwise done. If so, the measure would save money, and, in that view, would be a prudent and economical measure. Certainly it is not so easy to pay *something* as it is to pay *nothing*; but it is easier to pay a *large* sum, than it is to pay a *larger* one. And it is easier to pay any sum *when* we are able, than it is to pay it *before* we are able. The war requires large sums, and requires them at once. The aggregate sum necessary for compensated emancipation, of course, would be large. But it would require no ready cash; nor the bonds even, any faster than the emancipation progresses. This might not, and probably would not, close before the end of the thirty-seven years. At that time we shall probably have a hundred millions of people to share the burden, instead of thirty-one millions, as now. And not only so, but the increase of our population may be expected to continue for a long time after that period, as rapidly as before; because our territory will not have become full. I do not state this inconsiderately. At the same ratio of increase which we have maintained, on an average, from our first National census, in 1790, until that of 1860, we should, in 1900, have a population of 103,208,415. And why may we not continue that ratio far beyond that period? Our abundant room—our broad National homestead—is our ample resource. Were our territory as limited as are the British Isles, very certainly our population could not expand as stated. Instead of receiving the foreign born, as now, we should be compelled to send part of the native born away. But such is not our condition. We have two millions nine hundred and sixty-three thousand square miles. Europe has three millions and eight hundred thousand, with a population averaging seventy-three and one-third persons to the square mile. Why may not our country, at some time, average as many? Is it less fertile? Has it more waste surface, by mountains, rivers, lakes, deserts, or other causes? Is it inferior to Europe in any natural advantage? If, then, we are, at some time, to be as populous as Europe, how soon? As to when this *may* be, we can judge by the past and the present; as to when it *will* be, if ever, depends much on whether we maintain the Union. Several of our States are already above the average of Europe—seventy-three and a third to the square mile. Massachusetts has 157; Rhode Island, 133; Connecticut, 99; New York and New Jersey, each, 80. Also two other great States, Pennsylvania and Ohio,

are not far below, the former having 63 and the latter 59. The States already above the European average, except New York, have increased in as rapid a ratio, since passing that point, as ever before; while no one of them is equal to some other parts of our country, in natural capacity for sustaining a dense population.

Taking the nation in the aggregate, and we find its population and ratio of increase, for the several decennial periods, to be as follows:

1790.....	3,929,827			
1800.....	5,305,937	35.02	per cent.	ratio of increase.
1810.....	7,239,814	36.45	"	"
1820.....	9,638,131	33.13	"	"
1830.....	12,866,020	33.49	"	"
1840.....	17,069,453	32.67	"	"
1850.....	23,191,876	35.87	"	"
1860.....	31,443,790	35.58	"	"

This shows an average decennial increase of 34.60 per cent. in population through the seventy years from our first, to our last census yet taken. It is seen that the ratio of increase, at no one of these seven periods, is either two per cent. below, or two per cent. above, the average, thus showing how inflexible, and, consequently, how reliable, the law of increase, in our case, is. Assuming that it will continue, gives the following results:

1870.....	42,323,341
1880.....	56,967,216
1890.....	76,677,872
1900.....	103,208,415
1910.....	138,918,526
1920.....	186,984,335
1930.....	251,680,914

These figures show that our country *may* be as populous as Europe now is, at some point between 1920 and 1930—say about 1925—our territory, at seventy-three and a third persons to the square mile, being the capacity to contain 217,186,000.

And we *will* reach this, too, if we do not ourselves relinquish the chance, by the folly and evils of disunion, or by long and exhausting war, springing from the only great element of National discord among us. While it can not be foreseen exactly how much one huge example of secession, breeding lesser ones indefinitely, would retard population, civilization, and prosperity, no one can doubt that the extent of it **would** be very great and injurious.

The proposed emancipation would shorten the war, perpetuate peace, insure this increase of population, and proportionately the wealth of the country. With these, we should pay all the emancipation would cost, together with our other debt, easier than we should pay our other debt, without it. If we had allowed our old National debt to run at six per cent. per annum, simple interest, from the end of our Revolutionary struggle until to-day, without paying any thing on either principal or interest, each man of us would owe less upon that debt now, than each man owed upon it then; and this because our increase of men, through the whole period, has been greater than six per cent.; has run faster than the interest upon the debt. Thus, time alone relieves a debtor nation, so long as its population increases faster than unpaid interest accumulates on its debt.

This fact would be no excuse for delaying payment of what is justly due; but it shows the great importance of time in this connection—the great advantage of a policy by which we shall not have to pay until we number a hundred millions, what, by a different policy, we would have to pay now, when we number but thirty-one millions. In a word, it shows that a dollar will be much harder to pay for the war, than will be a dollar for emancipation on the proposed plan. And then the latter will cost no blood, no precious life. It will be a saving of both.

As to the second article, I think it would be impracticable to return to bondage the class of persons therein contemplated. Some of them, doubtless, in the property sense, belong to loyal owners; and hence, provision is made in this article for compensating such.

The third article relates to the future of the freed people. It does not oblige, but merely authorizes, Congress to aid in colonizing such as may consent. This ought not to be regarded as objectionable, on the one hand, or on the other, in so much as it comes to nothing, unless by the mutual consent of the people to be deported, and the American voters, through their representatives in Congress.

I can not make it better known than it already is, that I strongly favor colonization. And yet I wish to say there is an objection urged against free colored persons remaining in the country, which is largely imaginary, if not sometimes malicious.

It is insisted that their presence would injure, and displace white labor and white laborers. If there ever could be a proper time for mere catch arguments, that time surely is not now. In times like the present, men should utter nothing for which they would not willingly be responsible through time and in eternity. Is it true, then, that colored people can displace

any more white labor by being free, than by remaining slaves? If they stay in their old places, they jostle no white laborers; if they leave their old places, they leave them open to white laborers. Logically, there is neither more nor less of it. Emancipation, even without deportation, would probably enhance the wages of white labor, and, very surely, would not reduce them. Thus, the customary amount of labor would still have to be performed; the freed people would surely not do more than their old proportion of it, and very probably, for a time, would do less, leaving an increased part to white laborers, bringing their labor into greater demand, and, consequently, enhancing the wages of it. With deportation, even to a limited extent, enhanced wages to white labor is mathematically certain. Labor is like any other commodity in the market—increase the demand for it, and you increase the price of it. Reduce the supply of black labor, by colonizing the black laborer out of the country, and, by precisely so much, you increase the demand for, and wages of, white labor.

But it is dreaded that the freed people will swarm forth, and cover the whole land? Are they not already in the land? Will liberation make them any more numerous? Equally distributed among the whites of the whole country, and there would be but one colored to seven whites. Could the one, in any way, greatly disturb the seven? There are many communities now, having more than one free colored person to seven whites; and this without any apparent consciousness of evil from it. The District of Columbia, and the States of Maryland and Delaware, are all in this condition. The District has more than one free colored to six whites; and yet, in its frequent petitions to Congress, I believe it has never presented the presence of free colored persons as one of its grievances. But why should emancipation South send the freed people North? People, of any color, seldom run, unless there be something to run from. *Heretofore*, colored people, to some extent, have fled North from bondage; and *now*, perhaps, from both bondage and destitution. But if gradual emancipation and deportation be adopted, they will have neither to flee from. Their old masters will give them wages, at least until new laborers can be procured; and the freed men, in turn, will gladly give their labor for the wages, till new homes can be found for them, in congenial climes, and with people of their own blood and race. This proposition can be trusted on the mutual interests involved. And, in any event, can not the North decide for itself, whether to receive them?

Again, as practice proves more than theory, in any case, has

there been any irruption of colored people northward, because of the abolishment of slavery in this District last spring?

What I have said of the proportion of free colored persons to the whites, in the District, is from the census of 1860, having no reference to persons called contrabands, nor to those made free by the act of Congress abolishing slavery here.

The plan consisting of these articles is recommended, not but that a restoration of the National authority would be accepted without its adoption.

Nor will the war, nor proceedings under the proclamation of September 22, 1862, be stayed because of the *recommendation* of this plan. Its timely *adoption*, I doubt not, would bring restoration, and thereby stay both.

And, notwithstanding this plan, the recommendation that Congress provide by law for compensating any State which may adopt emancipation, before this plan shall have been acted upon, is hereby earnestly renewed. Such would be only an advance part of the plan, and the same arguments apply to both.

This plan is recommended as a means, not in exclusion of, but in addition to, all others for restoring and preserving the National authority throughout the Union. The subject is presented exclusively in its economical aspect. The plan would, I am confident, secure peace more speedily, and maintain it more permanently, than can be done by force alone; while all it would cost, considering amounts, and manner of payment, and times of payment, would be easier paid than will be the additional cost of the war, if we rely solely upon force. It is much—very much—that it would cost no blood at all.

The plan is proposed as permanent constitutional law. It can not become such without the concurrence of, first, two-thirds of Congress, and, afterward, three-fourths of the States. The requisite three-fourths of the States will necessarily include seven of the slave States. Their concurrence, if obtained, will give assurance of their severally adopting emancipation, at no very distant day, upon the new constitutional terms. This assurance would end the struggle now, and save the Union forever.

I do not forget the gravity which should characterize a paper addressed to the Congress of the nation, by the Chief Magistrate of the nation. Nor do I forget that some of you are my seniors; nor that many of you have more experience than I in the conduct of public affairs. Yet I trust that, in view of the great responsibility resting upon me, you will perceive no want of respect to yourselves, in any undue earnestness I may seem to display.

Is it doubted, then, that the plan I propose, if adopted, would shorten the war, and thus lessen its expenditure of money and of blood? Is it doubted that it would restore the National authority and National prosperity, and perpetuate both indefinitely? Is it doubted that we here—Congress and Executive—can secure its adoption? Will not the good people respond to a united and earnest appeal from us? Can we, can they, by any other means, so certainly, or so speedily, assure these vital objects? We can succeed *only* by concert. It is not, "Can *any* of us *imagine* better?" but, "Can we *all* do better?" Object whatsoever is possible, still the question recurs, "Can we do better?" The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disinthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.

Fellow-citizens, *we* can not escape history. We, of this Congress and this Administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass, will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We *say* we are for the Union. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We—even *we here*—hold the power, and bear the responsibility. In *giving* freedom to the *slave*, we *assure* freedom to the *free*—honorable alike in what we give, and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth. Other means may succeed; this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just—a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

DECEMBER 1, 1862.

During the session, the Opposition leaders, elated with their recent successes in the elections, assumed a greater boldness of hostility to the Administration, some of them defiantly avowing their desire that further resistance to armed rebellion should cease. Throughout the country, the mask under which so many Congressional districts had lately been carried, began to be gradually withdrawn.

Among the principal transactions of this session, aside from the necessary appropriations, were: The admission of the new State of West Virginia, by an act approved Dec. 31, 1862; the

organization of the new territory of Arizona, Feb. 24, 1863 the passage of a stringent act to prevent and punish frauds upon the Government, March 2, 1863; the enactment of a law for enrolling and calling out the National forces (sometimes called the "conscription act;") an authorization of the issue of letters of marque and reprisal; the organization of the new territory of Idaho; and the passage of an act to provide for the collection of abandoned property in insurrectionary districts the last four measures having been approved on the 3d of March, 1863, when the session closed.

Soon after the adjournment of Congress, a closely contested election occurred in New Hampshire, in which the Opposition spared no exertion to secure a popular verdict against the Administration. It was soon manifest, however, that a change was taking place in the public mind—a strong reaction from that tone of sentiment which brought political defeat in the preceding autumn. The election had a highly favorable result. Connecticut and Rhode Island, also, in the following month, emphatically indorsed President Lincoln and his policy. The most trying period had passed.

CHAPTER X.

Summary of Military Movements in the West.—Army of the Potomac.—Gen. Hooker Superseded.—Gen. Meade takes Command.—Battle of Gettysburg.

AFTER the occupation of Corinth, the armies, respectively commanded by Gens. Grant and Buell, had separated for different undertakings. Grant was to advance southward, occupying the military positions captured along the banks of the Mississippi, as possession of that river was gradually recovered, and coöperating in the work, as occasion was presented. Buell was to move on Chattanooga and to attempt the relief of East Tennessee, occupying that stronghold and cutting the Rebel communications by that great thoroughfare.

In carrying out this policy, Buell gradually moved his army to the vicinity of Chattanooga, on the north side of the river, but soon found himself in a critical position, on account of the weakness of so long a line of communication with his base of supplies. Bragg, who had now assumed command of the opposing Rebel army, had the two corps of Hardee and Polk at Chattanooga, and that of Kirby Smith at Knoxville—having reached the former place in advance of Buell, after the evacuation of Corinth. Gen. Geo. W. Morgan, with a considerable Government force, had meanwhile occupied Cumberland Gap, which he held for weeks, but was finally flanked by Kirby Smith, and retreated across the country to the Ohio river. This exposed the left of Buell, and Morgan's failure was fatal to the campaign.

While Smith pursued his course toward Lexington, a portion of Bragg's force, on the 21st of August, crossed the Tennessee river, at Harrison, a short distance above Chattanooga, and turned the left of Buell, moving up the Sequatchie, while another detachment moved on McMinnville. A junction of the three Rebel corps was to be effected in the interior of Kentucky.

An advance force of the Rebels appeared before Munfordsville, on the 13th of September. The enemy were repulsed. on

the 14th, by the small force there, under command of Col Wilder, but the place was surrendered on the 17th. Buell meanwhile moved with celerity, and, approaching Louisville, compelled the enemy to turn aside from his movement on that city, to open communication with the remainder of his forces, at Lexington and elsewhere. On the 18th, Bragg issued a proclamation at Glasgow, calling upon the people of Kentucky to rally to his support. On the 4th of October, Buell arrived at Bardstown, on his way to meet the enemy. On the same day, a Rebel "Provisional Governor" of Kentucky was proclaimed at Frankfort, a portion of Bragg's forces having possession of the State Capital.

During the hurrying to and fro of these opposing armies, not a little excitement prevailed at Cincinnati and Louisville, in view of the apparent danger impending. Both cities were almost entirely undefended; and now might be seen the full significance of the memorable Buckner-McClellan compact. The Kentucky heights opposite the city, instead of being held and fortified, were open to scarcely disputed occupancy by the invaders. Works were speedily thrown up before Cincinnati, and Gen. Wallace, who was assigned to the command of this post, soon found a large number of men at his disposal, many thousands of the people of Ohio and Indiana having rallied at the call of the State authorities. The events of this invasion and "siege" will long have a prominent place in local tradition and history.

On the 6th, Gen. Buell's advance reached Springfield, sixty miles from Louisville, between Danville and Bardstown. His army at this time was organized into three corps, respectively commanded by Gens. Gilbert, Crittenden and McCook. Learning that a considerable Rebel force was at Perryville, a few miles distant, on the 7th, Buell formed the plan of surrounding the portion of the enemy there, bringing each of his corps into action. Gen. Crittenden, however, failed to come up in time, and Bragg, learning this fact, determined to fall upon McCook and Gilbert, recalling Hardee's corps to Perryville for that purpose, after he was already on his retreat. On the 8th, the battle was fought, McCook's force suffering heavily before

reenforcements from Gilbert arrived, after 3 o'clock P. M. The conflict continued until dark, the Government forces falling back. Crittenden's corps came up that night, and Bragg retreated without renewing the engagement.

Buell's loss in this engagement, including Brig. Gens. Jackson and Terrill, is stated at 466 killed, 1,463 wounded, and 160 missing—a total of 2,089. The Rebel loss was estimated at about the same.

Bragg succeeded in making his escape with a large amount of spoils, consisting mainly of various supplies, of which his army was greatly in need. He retired by way of Stanford and Mount Vernon, where pursuit ceased, and from whence Buell fell back on the line of Nashville and Louisville. Here he was superseded by Gen. Rosecrans, under the President's order of the 25th of October.

Gen. Grant having sent reënforcements to Buell during this period of marching and countermarching in Kentucky, the enemy began to assume a threatening attitude in front of his line, which extended from Corinth to Tusculum. The second brigade of Gen. Stanley's division fell back from the latter place, which it had held under command of Col. Murphy, to Iuka, on the 10th of September, and the Ohio brigade, holding that place, withdrew, on the 11th, to Corinth, leaving Murphy's command to hold the post. A sudden dash of Rebel cavalry put Murphy's force to rout, and secured a large amount of booty which that officer, completely surprised, neglected to destroy.

Gen. Rosecrans, who had succeeded to the command surrendered by Gen. Pope on going to Virginia, took prompt measures to meet the emergency. The force under Price appears to have been sent forward for the purpose of either coöperating with Bragg, or of drawing away troops from Corinth, to facilitate its capture by Van Dorn. The movement was met by an attempt of Gen. Grant to cut off the retreat of Price, and to force him to surrender his army, numbering, as reported, about 15,000 men. A force of about 5,000 men, under Gen. Ord, (who was accompanied by Gen. Grant in person,) was to move toward Burnsville, to attack in front, while Gen

Rosecrans was to take part of his command by Jacinto to attack the flank of Price's army. The execution of this plan commenced on the 18th of September. Rosecrans, advancing by rapid marches, in a heavy rain, fell in with the Rebel pickets on the following day, seven miles from Iuka, and a skirmish ensued, the force encountered falling back toward that village. The forces of Rosecrans were now concentrated at Barnett's, and after waiting two hours for the expected sound of Ord's cannon, a dispatch from Gen. Grant, on the other side of Iuka, was received, saying that he was waiting for Rosecrans to open on the enemy. The force was then moved up from Barnett's to within two miles of Iuka, where the Rebels were found in strong position on a commanding ridge. A hot engagement immediately commenced, which lasted more than two hours, closing at nightfall.

Gen. Hamilton's division bore the brunt of this conflict, aided by the Eleventh Ohio Battery, which, in half an hour of the thickest of the fight, lost 72 men in killed and wounded. The Fifth Iowa Regiment lost 116 men in killed and wounded, and the Eleventh Missouri, 76. The fiercest contest was over the Ohio battery, twice captured by the Rebels, twice retaken at the point of the bayonet. During the night, Price escaped, retiring to Bay Spring. Grant and Ord had not been able, it appears, to engage the enemy, or to prevent his flight. The road by which he withdrew was one unknown to the commanding General. The loss of Rosecrans was 148 killed, 570 wounded, and 94 missing—a total of 812. He took several hundred prisoners from Price, whose other losses were believed to be greater than those of Rosecrans, including two or three generals killed.

This battle had the effect of preventing Price from rendering any direct aid to Bragg, in his incursion through Kentucky, one apprehended purpose of this movement. The retreating column was pursued for some distance, and its loss in arms and other property was large.

On the 26th of September, Gen. Rosecrans took command at Corinth, Gen. Grant proceeding to Jackson, and Gen. Ord to Bolivar—both on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, north of

Grand Junction. Price, continuing his retreat to Baldwin, Mississippi, moved to Dumas, fifteen miles northwest, and effected a junction with Van Dorn. He was afterward joined by Mansfield Lovell at Pocahontas, Van Dorn having chief command of the concentrated force. Gen. Rosecrans anticipated an attack on Corinth, and prepared accordingly. The position was regarded as a strong one, Gen. Halleck having much improved the defensive works of the place, after its evacuation by Beauregard.

The forces under Van Dorn's command having concentrated at Ripley, crossed the Hatchie river and occupied the railroad north of Corinth, on which they advanced on the 2d of October, cutting off direct communication with Bolivar and Jackson. A force was sent by Gen. Grant, however, under command of McPherson, which seasonably arrived at Corinth by a circuitous route. Of the four divisions of Rosecrans at Corinth, three, under Gens. Hamilton, Davies and McKean, were drawn up in line of battle near the outer intrenchments, while the other division remained in the town as a reserve. Heavy skirmishing was kept up through the day on the 3d. On the morning of the 4th, two dense assaulting columns approached, about 9 o'clock—one on the right, under the lead of Price; the other on the left, under Van Dorn. The movement was intended to be simultaneous, but Price, having a less obstructed route, first forced his way, under the destructive fire of numerous heavy guns, quite within the outer intrenchments. For a moment, the division of Davies fell back, and all seemed lost. Rosecrans in person rallied his men, however, and under the gallant conduct of the Fifty-sixth Illinois Regiment, which delivered an effective fire of musketry and advanced with a resolute charge of bayonets, the enemy was driven back, and scattered with terrible havoc. This brilliant affair was well over, when Van Dorn, approaching in a similar manner, found himself confronted by Hamilton's division—the Ohio brigade, under Col. Fuller, and the Eleventh Missouri Regiment, bearing the brunt of the fight, on the part of the infantry force. The batteries on this side of the town, also, did frightful execution, and Van Dorn's column failed to gain a foothold within

the intrenchments. He was driven back with great slaughter, the guns sweeping away the retreating masses with unsparing fury.

The Rebel force outnumbered that on the Government side, two to one, but from the character of the fight their losses were greatly disproportionate. Those of Van Dorn were 1,423 killed, and, by the usual estimate, 5,692 wounded. He also lost 2,265 prisoners—making a total of 9,380. In small arms, cannon, ammunition, and other property, his loss was also large. Further damage was inflicted by the forces sent out in pursuit. Rosecrans had 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 230 taken prisoners or missing—in all, 2,357. This was one of the most decisive victories of the war.

On the 24th of October, an attempt was made by Breckinridge to recover Baton Rouge, which was occupied by a Government force under Gen. Williams, (who lost his life in the engagement,) but the attempt was defeated, by a decisive victory over the assailants.

The stronghold of Vicksburg had as yet proved an insuperable obstacle to the recovery of full possession of the Mississippi river. It had become manifest that a strong land force was required to coöperate in the reduction of the place. An expedition for this purpose was accordingly organized at Cairo and Memphis, under Gen. W. T. Sherman, to proceed down the Mississippi in transports, and to approach the city in the rear from the Yazoo river. It was also intended that Gen. Grant, commanding the department within which these operations were to be, should advance southward by the Mississippi Central railroad, coming in with his forces by Jackson, Miss., to aid Sherman in this undertaking. Gen. Hovey's division of 7,000 men, was sent by Gen. Curtis from Helena, Ark., now occupied by a Government force, to cut the railroad beyond the Tallahatchie, intercepting the Rebels in their retreat. This having been accomplished, the detachment returned to Arkansas. Its appearance, however, had served to alarm the enemy, leading to an overestimate of the strength of Grant's column. Gen. Pemberton, commanding a Rebel force at Grenada, consequently fell back toward Canton. Grant's advance, under

Hamilton, occupied Holly Springs on the 29th of November. On the 4th of December, Grant established his headquarters at Oxford, and was preparing to advance on Grenada. The withdrawal of Hovey's force, however, becoming known to Van Dorn, he sent out an expedition, which made a rapid advance on Holly Springs, in Grant's rear, defeating the garrison there on the 20th, through the culpable neglect of Col. Murphy, in command of the post, and destroying the Government stores, collected in large quantity at that place. A similar attack at Davis' Mills, further north, was gallantly repulsed by the garrison under command of Col. W. H. Morgan. A body of Rebel cavalry under Forrest, at nearly the same time, made an attack on Jackson, in Tennessee, destroying the railroad for some distance; the town of Humboldt, on the same road, further north, was occupied; Trenton was surrendered by Col. Fry, the officer in command, much property being destroyed; and other points on the road were captured. Though Forrest was soon after utterly routed, these combined disasters, but especially that at Holly Springs, led Gen. Grant to fall back, abandoning the intended movement further southward. As the event proved, this turn of affairs was fortunate, for the subsequent unusual rise in the rivers of that country would have cut off alike his communications and his line of retreat, seriously imperiling his whole force.

Gen. Sherman's expedition took its departure down the river, from Memphis, on the 20th of December, over one hundred transports conveying his troops. In the night of the 24th, having arrived at Milliken's Bend, a detachment under Gen. Morgan L. Smith landed on the west bank of the Mississippi, and destroyed a section of the Vicksburg and Texas railroad, ten miles from the river, returning to the main army. Christmas having been passed at Milliken's Bend, the expedition proceeded up the Yazoo river, and on the morning of the 27th, the troops disembarked, the right at the plantation of the late Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, and the center and left extending along Lake's plantation, to within two or three miles of Haines' Bluff, where a Rebel battery and force prevented a further advance up the river. The line was extended about six miles along the Yazoo.

A gunboat fleet on the Mississippi meanwhile coöperated, assaulting the place from the opposite side, with no material success, and receiving not a little damage.

The face of the country, for the eight or ten miles intervening between this position and the high ground on which the city of Vicksburg stands, is first low and marshy, with lagoons, sandbars and bayous, and then peculiarly rough, deep ravines alternating with precipitous bluffs, mostly wooded, or covered with cane-brake and rank undergrowth. Among these natural defenses there nestled masked batteries and rifle pits, manned by an ample force gathered to meet this expected assault upon the rear of Vicksburg.

On attempting to advance, determined resistance was encountered from the enemy, who was gradually driven back, during eight hours of hard fighting, closing at night. On the 28th, the conflict was early renewed, continuing with varying success, but with little permanent change of position, through the day. On the following morning, a general assault on the Rebel works was every-where repulsed, with heavy loss. The 30th was mostly spent in burying the dead and transferring the wounded to the transports. The undertaking was now abandoned. The forces of Sherman, reëmbarking, returned to Milliken's Bend, and there went into camp, at the beginning of the new year.

Gen. Burnside, on assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, determined on an advance toward Richmond by way of Fredericksburg, instead of executing another plan of advance preferred (without being ordered) by the President and Gen. Halleck. A force occupied Acquia Creek, and commenced repairing the railroad which had been destroyed by the Rebels. pontoons were ordered, to be in readiness for a rapid movement, Burnside being nearer than the enemy to Falmouth, where the crossing was to be made, and no considerable force then occupying Fredericksburg. Chiefly through a mortifying dilatoriness on the part of the proper officer at Washington, in forwarding the pontoons, Lee gained time to move his force and to take the position he desired for meeting the intended advance. The principal battle resulting from this

movement occurred on the 13th of December, when Burnside's forces endeavored to carry the enemy's strong position on Fredericksburg heights, by assault. After a hard-fought contest, through the day, attended by partial successes—Gen. Meade having temporarily carried a portion of the enemy's works—night found the army still unsuccessful, and suffering heavy losses. The position held in town and across the Rappahannock was retained by Burnside during the next two days, but the morning of the 16th found the whole army safely withdrawn to the Falmouth side, without any loss or interruption in this retrograde movement.

The losses in Gen. Sumner's grand division (the Second and Ninth Corps,) on the right, were 473 killed, 4,090 wounded, 748 missing; in Gen. Hooker's grand division (the Third and Fifth Corps,) in the center, 326 killed, 2,468 wounded, 754 missing; and in Gen. Franklin's grand division (the First and Sixth Corps,) on the left, 339 killed, 2,547 wounded, and 576 missing—a total of 12,321.

The army now went into winter quarters, little being done until Gen. Burnside was relieved, and Gen. Joseph Hooker appointed in his place, assuming command of the Army of the Potomac on the 26th of January. At the same time, Gens. Franklin and Sumner were relieved, being presently assigned to other commands.

Gen. Rosecrans arrived at Nashville on the 10th of November, and proceeded to reorganize the Army of the Cumberland, which was increased by new levies and put in excellent condition, and to restore the railroad communication between Louisville and Nashville. The Rebel army, on the other hand, now under command of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, was concentrating at Murfreesboro and vicinity, prepared to contest any advance of the Government forces. Supposing, from the information he had, that Rosecrans would go into winter quarters at Nashville, Johnston detached the cavalry force under Forrest, which was to cut the railroad in West Tennessee, in Grant's rear, and another body of cavalry under Morgan to make a raid into Kentucky, to perform a like service in the rear of Rosecrans. Instead of helplessly calling for reënforce-

ments, Rosecrans improved the opportunity afforded by this weakening of Johnston's army, to strike an effective blow. He began to move on the enemy on the 26th of December McCook, with three divisions, advanced on Triune to attack Hardee, whose corps was believed to be between that place and Eagleville; but it had retreated on McCook's approach, and was pursued until it was found that he had gone to Murfreesboro, where Polk and Kirby Smith's forces were. Thomas and Crittenden also advanced on Nolinsville, Stewart's Creek, and Lavergne. Polk's corps and Wheeler's brigade of cavalry had been stationed at the last-named place, but retired before Crittenden's advance.

On the 28th, being Sunday, the troops, for the most part, rested. Meanwhile, the Rebel purpose of concentrating near Stone River was developed. The enemy's right, under Polk, consisting of the three divisions of Cheatham, Buckner and Breckinridge, rested on the Lebanon pike—the center, under Kirby Smith, extended westward, and the left, commanded by Hardec, rested on the Murfreesboro and Franklin road. On the 29th, the Government forces moved up nearer to the Rebel line, taking position preparatory to assuming the offensive. On the 30th, McCook, on the right, finding his position in danger of being turned by Hardee, advanced his line, under fire from the enemy, to avoid this result. On the 31st, early in the morning, the Rebels suddenly made an attack in heavy force along the entire line of McCook. His forces were driven back with the loss of many prisoners, but the ground was well contested by the division of Davis, especially, and the purpose of turning the right of Rosecrans failed.

The right having thus fallen back, Gen. Rosecrans prepared for an advance of the enemy upon his center and left, by massing his artillery at the anticipated point of assault, and sent forward Negley's division, sustained by that of Rousseau, to support the broken forces of McCook. This movement stopped further pursuit in that quarter. The Rebels were driven back in turn, with the loss of many prisoners. The forces of Negley and Rousseau, acting under orders, retreated on meeting another wave of battle, and the Rebels advanced in dense numbers.

aulting in their supposed victory, until brought within the deadly fire of the newly-placed batteries of Rosecrans, not hitherto discovered. Leaving immense numbers of dead and wounded on the field, the Rebel forces now turned and fled in confusion, not to be rallied again until much later in the day. The right of Rosecrans had been forced backward more than two miles, and his line was now formed anew, the flanks having better protection.

The Rebels renewed the engagement, about 3 o'clock P. M., by an attack on the center and left of our army. A sharp and destructive conflict continued for two hours, with no advantage to the assailants. Gen. Rosecrans, who was personally in the thick of the fight, had shown rare skill and energy in handling his troops, after his right had been doubled back upon his left. A change of front was successfully accomplished under fire, and a seemingly sure defeat turned into a substantial victory.

The two armies confronted each other during the next three days, without becoming actively engaged. On the 4th of January, Johnston was found to have retreated, and Murfreesboro was promptly occupied by our forces. The Government loss, in killed and wounded, was 8,778, and about 2,800 in prisoners. The Rebel loss is computed by Gen. Rosecrans at 14,560.

This summary of military events, in the East and in the West, embraces what is deemed most important down to the eve of the campaigns of 1863, rendered illustrious by the great victories at Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Gettysburg, and Chattanooga. The first two years of the war, with varying successes in detail, had resulted, on the whole, in decided advantages to the Government arms. Commencing their "Confederacy" with seven States, the conspirators had determined, by intrigue and by the force of arms, to wrest the remaining eight slaveholding States the Indian Territory, New Mexico, and Arizona, from their allegiance to the Government, and to add this immense region, with its population, to the side of the Davis usurpation. The vigorous campaign of Gen. Canby, in New Mexico, and the victory at Fort Craig, in 1862, hurled back the invaders in that quarter into Texas, while the grand Rebel defeat at Pea

Ridge, Ark., under Gen. Curtis, in March of the same year, had put an end to all hopes of any Rebel acquisition in the Territories of the United States. The four slave States of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, had been swept into the Secession rebellion at the very outset. All the determined efforts to extend the Rebel boundary beyond these States, had proved abortive. On the contrary, the spring of 1863 found Arkansas substantially reclaimed; New Orleans and a large portion of Louisiana, (including the State capital,) restored to the Government; the Mississippi river reconquered during its entire length, except the comparatively short distance from Vicksburg to Port Hudson, inclusive; the capital of Tennessee, and most of the western and middle parts of the State, occupied by Government garrisons; the western half of Virginia reorganized under a loyal government, and much of Eastern Virginia firmly held; a permanent foothold gained on the coasts of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida; Northern Alabama returning to sentiments of loyalty, under the supporting presence of Government troops; a blockade, under the active operations of our formidable Navy, pressing heavily upon the rebellious States; and the power of slavery materially crippled, under the effects of the Emancipation Proclamation of the President, deranging the productive interests of the rebellion, and adding a new element of increasing strength to our arms.

To save their waning cause, the Rebels were now putting forth every energy to hold their trans-Mississippi communications, the Red river country and Texas being among their most abundant sources of supplies. To this end, it was necessary to keep their strongholds at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. A land force under Gen. Banks (who had succeeded Gen. Butler as commander of the Department of the Gulf,) and the fleet of Admiral Farragut, began the work of reducing the latter post, on the 8th of May. After severe engagements on land and water, during the next two months, the place being closely invested, Port Hudson was unconditionally surrendered on the 3th of July, with its garrison, numbering 6,223. This event, however, was preceded by the fall of Vicksburg, and may be

regarded as partly the result of the brief and brilliant campaign of Gen. Grant, which terminated in the surrender of that more important stronghold, on the 4th of July.

Running transports past the batteries at Vicksburg, and crossing the river near the mouth of the Big Black, on the 30th of April, with about 40,000 men, Gen. Grant occupied Grand Gulf, which had been forced by Admiral Porter to surrender, after a vigorous bombardment; defeated the enemy near Port Gibson, on the 1st of May; moved rapidly northward to interpose his force between the covering army of Johnston and the troops of Pemberton, advancing from Vicksburg; gained decisive victories at Raymond, on the 12th; at Jackson, the State capital, on the 14th; at Baker's Creek, and at Champion Hill, on the 16th, and at Black River Bridge, on the 17th; finally driving the enemy within his works at Vicksburg. The fact that Johnston was in his rear, with the prospect of his being heavily reënforced, led Grant to make two attempts to carry the place by storm, on the 19th and on the 22d, but without success. The siege lasted until the 4th of July, when Pemberton capitulated, and Grant occupied the place, taking over 30,000 prisoners. This great victory opened the Mississippi to the Gulf, cutting off the territory west of that river from its connection with the remainder of the "Confederacy"—a practical loss of nearly one-half of the Rebel territory.

In Eastern Virginia, Hooker fought Lee at Chancellorsville, on the 2d and 3d of May, and was repulsed, with heavy losses on both sides, retiring across the Rappahannock. Among the Rebel losses was that of Stonewall Jackson, mortally wounded. Lee now assumed the offensive, advancing through Maryland into Pennsylvania. Gen. Hooker, moving on an interior line, covered Washington and kept his forces in an attitude to strike the enemy with effect. During these movements, Hooker was superseded, on the 28th of June, by Gen. George G. Meade. The battle of Gettysburg was fought on the 1st, 2d and 3d days of July, in which an important victory was gained over Lee, who retreated in all possible haste over the Potomac, glad to escape with the remnant of his army. He had lost heavily, in killed, wounded and prisoners, the latter numbering 13,621

He left 28,178 small arms on the field. His entire loss & this invasion, including numerous desertions, must have approached, if it did not equal, 40,000 men. Meade's total losses, in killed, wounded and missing, numbered 23,186.

The operations before Charleston and other points, attended with less success than was for a time promised, were not without favorable results.

Another disaster to the Rebel cause, and one of the greatest magnitude, followed the advance of Gen. Rosecrans on Chattanooga, and of Gen. Burnside upon Knoxville, in the latter part of August. With no very severe fighting, Burnside occupied Knoxville on the 1st of September, and Cumberland Gap on the 9th. Rosecrans, after the unfavorable battle of Chickamauga, took possession of Chattanooga, on the 21st of September. East Tennessee was thus completely in our possession, and a line of communication of the greatest importance to the enemy was finally severed. On the 19th of October, Gen. Grant, by the President's order, assumed command of the united armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio. The subsequent victories of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, on the 24th and 25th of November, and the decisive defeat of Longstreet in his bold attempt to recover Knoxville, made this great acquisition entirely secure. The way was thus prepared for assuming the offensive, by an advance into the heart of Georgia.

The rebellion seemed now to have been brought to the verge of final overthrow.

CHAPTER XI.

The Popular Voice in 1863.—First Session of the Thirty-eighth Congress.—Amnesty Proclamation.—Message.—Orders, Letters and Addresses.—Popular Sentiment in 1864.—Appointment of Lieutenant General Grant.—Opening of the Military Campaigns of 1864.—Conclusion.

THE great popular reaction in favor of the Administration of Mr. Lincoln, indicated by the spring elections, was fully apparent in the verdict of every loyal State in the autumn of 1863. In Ohio, the so-called Democratic organization, which had prevailed in that State by a small majority in October, 1862, put forward, as its candidate for Governor, a notorious Peace Democrat named Vallandigham, whose action, while a member of the previous Congress, had been in strict conformity with his avowed motto: "Not a man or a dollar for the war." To such an extent was his support of the rebellion carried, by haranguing his followers, and all who would hear him, against the Government and the measures it had adopted in the prosecution of the war, that he had been arrested by Gen. Burnside, then in command of the Department including Ohio, tried for his treasonable practices, convicted, and ordered to be sent through the lines of our army to his friends at the South. The proceedings under which he was thus condemned, were fully reviewed before the United States District Court at Cincinnati, on a motion for a writ of *habeas corpus*, and sustained by the decision of Judge Leavitt. It may be added that this action was further confirmed, several months later, on a hearing before the Supreme Court of the United States. Hon. John Brough, the Administration candidate, was chosen Governor of Ohio, after a protracted and earnest canvass, by more than 100,000 majority over Vallandigham.

In Pennsylvania, the Republican candidate for Governor, Hon. Andrew G. Curtin, was reelected by a large majority over

Judge Woodward, another Peace Democrat. In New York, where the most violent opposition was made to "conscription," resulting in a barbarous riot in New York city, the Administration ticket for sundry State officers had a very large majority over the candidates of the Seymour and Wood Democracy. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the Opposition, and the fact that hundreds of thousands of soldiers had been lately called into the field, every other loyal State, except New Jersey, (in which there were Administration gains,) gave similarly decided majorities for the supporters of Mr. Lincoln.

During the earlier, as well as the later, elections of this year, a prominent issue before the people was the course of the Administration in regard to Emancipation. Both at home and abroad, this policy had proved an element of great strength in shaping public opinion favorably to Mr. Lincoln. It identified his Administration, from the day this great step was taken, with not only a most effective means for suppressing the rebellion, but also with a measure in accordance with the high behests of justice, and the clearest interests of civilization and humanity. At the beginning of the year, the President received a gratifying testimonial of sympathy and confidence from the workingmen of Manchester, in England, and of their warm appreciation, especially, of his action in issuing the Proclamation of Emancipation. To this address, Mr. Lincoln sent the following reply:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, }
WASHINGTON, January 19, 1863. }

TO THE WORKINGMEN OF MANCHESTER: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the address and resolutions which you sent me on the eve of the new year.

When I came, on the 4th of March, 1861, through a free and constitutional election, to preside in the Government of the United States, the country was found at the verge of civil war. Whatever might have been the cause, or whosoever the fault, one duty, paramount to all others, was before me, namely, to maintain and preserve at once the Constitution and the integrity of the Federal Republic. A conscientious purpose to perform this duty is the key to all the measures of administration which have been, and to all which will hereafter be pursued. Under our frame of government and my official oath, I could

not depart from this purpose if I would. It is not always in the power of governments to enlarge or restrict the scope of moral results which follow the policies that they may deem it necessary, for the public safety, from time to time to adopt.

I have understood well that the duty of self-preservation rests solely with the American people. But I have, at the same time, been aware that the favor or disfavor of foreign nations might have a material influence in enlarging and prolonging the struggle with disloyal men in which the country is engaged. A fair examination of history has seemed to authorize a belief that the past action and influences of the United States were generally regarded as having been beneficial toward mankind. I have, therefore, reckoned upon the forbearance of nations. Circumstances—to some of which you kindly allude—induced me especially to expect that, if justice and good faith should be practiced by the United States, they would encounter no hostile influence on the part of Great Britain. It is now a pleasant duty to acknowledge the demonstration you have given of your desire that a spirit of peace and amity toward this country may prevail in the councils of your Queen, who is respected and esteemed in your own country only more than she is by the kindred nation which has its home on this side of the Atlantic.

I know, and deeply deplore, the sufferings which the workmen at Manchester, and in all Europe, are called to endure in this crisis. It has been often and studiously represented that the attempt to overthrow this Government, which was built upon the foundation of human rights, and to substitute for it one which should rest exclusively on the basis of human slavery, was likely to obtain the favor of Europe. Through the action of our disloyal citizens, the workingmen of Europe have been subjected to severe trial, for the purpose of forcing their sanction to that attempt. Under these circumstances, I can not but regard your decisive utterances upon the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism, which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country. It is indeed an energetic and reinspiring assurance of the inherent power of truth, and of the ultimate and universal triumph of justice, humanity, and freedom. I do not doubt that the sentiments you have expressed will be sustained by your great nation; and, on the other hand, I have no hesitation in assuring you that they will excite admiration, esteem, and the most reciprocal feelings of friendship among the American people. I hail this interchange of sentiment, therefore, as an augury that, whatever else may happen, whatever misfortune may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship which now exist between

the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Later in the season, Mr. Lincoln was invited to revisit his home in Springfield, on the occasion of a mass meeting of the people of Illinois, who were unconditionally for the Union, to be held at that place. The letter addressed by him, in reply, to the chairman of the Committee of Invitation, an esteemed personal friend, was published at the time, and received with satisfaction by the loyal people of the country. The subject of Emancipation is again treated therein, after discussing the possible terms of peace, and the issue brought directly home to the minds of the people, with pointed force and sunlike clearness. The letter is in these words:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
August 26, 1863. }

MY DEAR SIR: Your letter inviting me to attend a mass meeting of unconditional Union men, to be held at the capital of Illinois on the 3d day of September, has been received. It would be very agreeable to me thus to meet my old friends at my own home; but I can not just now be absent from this city so long as a visit there would require.

The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devotion to the Union; and I am sure that my old political friends will thank me for tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other noble men whom no partisan malice or partisan hope can make false to the nation's life. There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say: You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways: First, to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is to give up the Union. I am against this. If you are, you should say so, plainly. If you are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise.

I do not believe that any compromise embracing the maintenance of the Union is now possible. All that I learn leads to a directly opposite belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military—its army. That army dominates all the country and all the people within its range. Any offer of any terms made by any man or men within that range in opposition to that

army, is simply nothing for the present, because such man or men have no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise, if one were made with them. To illustrate: Suppose refugees from the South and peace men of the North get together in convention, and frame and proclaim a compromise embracing the restoration of the Union. In what way can that compromise be used to keep Gen. Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? Gen. Meade's army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania, and I think can ultimately drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise to which the controllers of Gen. Lee's army are not agreed, can at all affect that army. In an effort at such compromise we would waste time, which the enemy would improve to our disadvantage, and that would be all. A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those who control the Rebel army, or with the people, first liberated from the domination of that army by the success of our army. Now, allow me to assure you that no word or intimation from the Rebel army, or from any of the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has ever come to my knowledge or belief. All charges and intimations to the contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kept secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself to be the servant of the people, according to the bond of service, the United States Constitution; and that, as such, I am responsible to them.

But, to be plain. You are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself upon that subject. I certainly wish that all men could be free, while you, I suppose, do not. Yet I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure which is not consistent with even your view, provided you are for the Union. I suggested compensated emancipation, to which you replied that you wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I have not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from greater taxation, to save the Union exclusively by other means.

You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and perhaps would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think that the Constitution invests its Commander-in-chief with the law of war in the time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that the slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us or hurts the enemy? Armies, the world over, destroy

enemies' property when they can not use it; and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the massacre of vanquished foes and non-combatants, male and female. But the proclamation, as law, is valid or is not valid. If it is not valid, it needs no retraction. If it is valid, it can not be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to think that its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better after the retraction than before the issue? There was more than a year and a half of trial to suppress the rebellion before the proclamation was issued, the last one hundred days of which passed under an explicit notice, that it was coming unless averted by those in revolt returning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us since the issue of the proclamation as before. I know as fully as one can know the opinions of others, that some of the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our most important victories, believe the emancipation policy and the aid of colored troops constitute the heaviest blows yet dealt to the rebellion, and that at least one of those important successes could not have been achieved when it was but for the aid of black soldiers. Among the commanders holding these views are some who have never had any affinity with what is called abolitionism, or with "republican party politics," but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit their opinions as being entitled to some weight against the objections often urged that emancipation and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good faith.

You say that you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem to be willing to fight for you—but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union. I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you to declare that you will not fight to free negroes. I thought that, in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do any thing for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the

strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the promise, being made, must be kept.

The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great North-west for it. Nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a hand. On the spot their part of the history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great National one, and let none be banned who bore an honorable part in it; and, while those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that any thing has been more bravely and better done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro, Gettysburg, and on many fields of less note. Nor must Uncle Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At all the waters' margins they have been present: not only on the deep sea, the broad bay and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou; and wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all. For the great Republic—for the principles by which it lives and keeps alive—for man's vast future—thanks to all. Peace does not appear so far distant as it did. I hope it will come soon, and come to stay: and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future time. It will then have been proved that among freemen there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And then there will be some black men who can remember that, with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well poised bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this great consummation; while I fear that there will be some white men unable to forget that, with malignant heart and deceitful speech, they have striven to hinder it.

Still, let us not be over-sanguine of a speedy final triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let us diligently apply the means, never doubting that a just God, in His own good time, will give us the rightful result.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

JAMES C. CONKLING, Esq.

Mr. Lincoln, whose gratitude to the gallant soldiers who have rallied at the call of their country, and whose proud satisfaction in their heroic conduct on so many battle-fields, have been constantly manifested, was unwilling to decline the invitation to be present on the solemn occasion of consecrating

a National Cemetery at Gettysburg, for the fallen in the sanguinary conflicts at that place, in July, 1863. No truer or tenderer sympathy than his, for the brave dead and for their surviving friends, ever had place in any human breast. The elaborate eloquence of our most accomplished orator, Edward Everett, and the presence of an innumerable multitude of people, added a solemn grandeur to the ceremonies of the day. But no fitter or more touching words were spoken than these of Mr. Lincoln :

ADDRESS AT GETTYSBURG, NOV. 19, 1863.

Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We are met to dedicate a portion of it as the final resting-place of those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate, we can not consecrate, we can not hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that they have thus far so nobly carried on. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to the cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that the dead shall not have died in vain—that the nation shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom, and that the Government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

The concluding elections for the Thirty-eighth Congress bitterly disappointed the expectations previously entertained by the Opposition. They were so favorable to the Administration as to insure it a decided majority in the House of Representatives—a result which had not happened for many years in the choice of the second Congress during any Presidential term.

On the assembling of the Thirty-eighth Congress, on the 7th

day of December, 1863, the Hon. Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, (the Administration candidate,) was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives, on the first ballot, receiving one hundred and one votes, against eighty-one for all others—a majority of twenty. The Opposition votes were scattered upon half a dozen different candidates. The Hon. Edward McPherson, of Pennsylvania, was chosen Clerk of the House, by a vote of one hundred and two to sixty-nine for Emerson Etheridge, whom the Republicans had chosen to that position in the previous House, and who had since gone over to the Democratic side. A still more striking indication of the present tone of National sentiment was perhaps to be found in the fact that the Rev. William Henry Channing, whose extreme views on the great questions of the day are well known, was elected Chaplain of the House, the principal Opposition vote being cast for Bishop Hopkins, of Vermont, a noted apologist for slavery.

After the decisive advantages gained by our arms, the rebellion being substantially at an end in the States of Louisiana, Tennessee and Arkansas, and movements for their reorganization under loyal local governments already under consideration by the people of those States, some indication of the President's policy for restoring order and law, in the territory reconquered from armed Rebels, was naturally expected by the people. Mr. Lincoln, as the meeting of Congress approached, had given his earnest attention to this difficult subject—now become one of the highest practical moment. By an act approved July 17, 1862, Congress had provided :

That the President is hereby authorized, at any time hereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may have participated in the existing rebellion in any State or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions, and at such time, and on such conditions, as he may deem expedient for the public welfare.

In the judgment of Mr. Lincoln, the fitting time had now come for exercising this power. Among the "conditions" which he was authorized to prescribe, very clearly, good faith and consistency required him to include an effective one for carrying out his policy of Emancipation. This and other con-

siderations also made it indispensable that he should indicate — without inflexibly prescribing, as he did not—an acceptable mode of reorganizing loyal State Governments. The result of his deliberations was set forth simultaneously with the publication of his annual message, in the celebrated paper following :

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS, In and by the Constitution of the United States it is provided that the President “shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment;” and whereas, a rebellion now exists whereby the loyal State Governments of several States have for a long time been subverted, and many persons have committed and are now guilty of treason against the United States; and whereas, with reference to said rebellion and treason, laws have been enacted by Congress declaring forfeitures and confiscation of property and liberation of slaves, all upon terms and conditions therein stated; and also declaring that the President was thereby authorized at any time thereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may have participated in the existing rebellion, in any State or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such times and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare: and whereas, the Congressional declaration for limited and conditional pardon accords with well-established judicial exposition of the pardoning power; and whereas, with reference to said rebellion, the President of the United States has issued several proclamations, with provisions in regard to the liberation of slaves; and whereas, it is now desired by some persons heretofore engaged in said rebellion, to resume their allegiance to the United States, and to reinaugurate loyal State Governments within and for their respective States; therefore,

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known to all persons who have, directly or by implication, participated in the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted, that a full pardon is hereby granted to them and each of them, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves, and in property cases where rights of third parties shall have intervened, and upon the condition that every such person shall take and subscribe an oath, and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath inviolate; and which oath shall be registered for permanent preservation, and shall be of the tenor and effect following, to-wit:

“I, — — —, do solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty

God, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the Union of the States thereunder; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by Congress, or by decision of the Supreme Court; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all proclamations of the President made during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as not modified or declared void by decision of the Supreme Court. So help me God."

The persons excepted from the benefits of the foregoing provisions are all who are, or shall have been, civil or diplomatic officers or agents of the so-called Confederate Government; all who have left judicial stations under the United States to aid the rebellion; all who are, or shall have been, military or naval officers of the said so-called Confederate Government, above the rank of colonel in the army, or of lieutenant in the navy; all who left seats in the United States Congress to aid the rebellion; all who resigned commissions in the Army or Navy of the United States, and afterward aided the rebellion; and all who have engaged in any way in treating colored persons, or white persons in charge of such, otherwise than lawfully as prisoners of war, and which persons may have been found in the United States service as soldiers, seamen, or in any other capacity.

And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known, that whenever, in any of the States of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina, a number of persons, not less than one-tenth in number of the votes cast in such State at the Presidential election of the year of our Lord 1860, each having taken the oath aforesaid, and not having since violated it, and being a qualified voter by the election law of the State existing immediately before the so-called act of secession, and excluding all others, shall re-establish a State Government which shall be republican, and in nowise contravening said oath, such shall be recognized as the true Government of the State, and the State shall receive thereunder the benefits of the constitutional provision which declares that "the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or the Executive, (when the Legislature can not be convened,) against domestic violence."

And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that

any provision which may be adopted by such State Government in relation to the freed people of such State, which shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class, will not be objected to by the National Executive. And it is suggested as not improper, that, in constructing a loyal State Government in any State, the name of the State, the boundary, the subdivisions, the Constitution, and the general code of laws, as before the rebellion, be maintained, subject only to the modifications made necessary by the conditions hereinbefore stated, and such others, if any, not contravening said conditions, and which may be deemed expedient by those framing the new State Government.

To avoid misunderstanding, it may be proper to say that this proclamation, so far as it relates to State Governments, has no reference to States wherein loyal State Governments have all the while been maintained. And for the same reason, it may be proper to further say that whether members sent to Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats constitutionally rests exclusively with the respective Houses, and not to any extent with the Executive. And still further, that this proclamation is intended to present the people of the States wherein the National authority has been suspended, and loyal State Governments have been subverted, a mode in and by which the National authority and loyal State Governments may be re-established within said States, or in any of them; and, while the mode presented is the best the Executive can suggest, with his present impressions, it must not be understood that no other possible mode would be acceptable.

Given under my hand at the city of Washington,
 [L. s.] the 8th day of December, A. D. 1863, and of the
 Independence of the United States of America the
 eighty-eighth. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Mr. Lincoln's Annual Message was sent in to Congress on the 9th day of December. This document — omitting only portions of less abiding interest—is as follows:

MR. LINCOLN'S ANNUAL MESSAGE.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: Another year of health and sufficiently abundant harvests, has passed. For these, and especially for the improved condition of our National affairs our renewed and profoundest gratitude to God is due.

We remain in peace and friendship with foreign powers.

The efforts of disloyal citizens of the United States to involve us in foreign wars, to aid an inexcusable insurrection, have been unavailing. Her Britannic Majesty's Government, as was justly expected, have exercised their authority to prevent the departure of new hostile expeditions from British ports. The Emperor of France has, by a like proceeding, promptly vindicated the neutrality which he proclaimed at the beginning of the contest. Questions of great intricacy and importance have arisen, out of the blockade and other belligerent operations, between the Government and several of the maritime powers, but they have been discussed, and, as far as was possible, accommodated in a spirit of frankness, justice, and mutual good will. It is especially gratifying that our prize courts, by the impartiality of their adjudications, have commanded the respect and confidence of maritime powers.

The supplemental treaty between the United States and Great Britain for the suppression of the African slave-trade, made on the 17th day of February last, has been duly ratified, and carried into execution. It is believed that, so far as American ports and American citizens are concerned, that inhuman and odious traffic has been brought to an end. . . .

Incidents occurring in the progress of our civil war have forced upon my attention the uncertain state of international questions touching the rights of foreigners in this country and of United States citizens abroad. In regard to some Governments, these rights are at least partially defined by treaties. In no instance, however, is it expressly stipulated that, in the event of civil war, a foreigner residing in this country, within the lines of the insurgents, is to be exempted from the rule which classes him as a belligerent, in whose behalf the Government of his country can not expect any privileges or immunities distinct from that character. I regret to say, however that such claims have been put forward, and, in some instances in behalf of foreigners who have lived in the United States the greater part of their lives.

There is reason to believe that many persons born in foreign countries, who have declared their intention to become citizens, or who have been fully naturalized, have evaded the military duty required of them by denying the fact, and thereby throwing upon the Government the burden of proof. It has been found difficult or impracticable to obtain this proof, from the want of guides to the proper sources of information. These might be supplied by requiring clerks of courts, where declarations of intention may be made or naturalizations effected, to send, periodically, lists of the names of the persons naturalized,

or declaring their intention to become citizens, to the Secretary of the Interior, in whose Department those names might be arranged and printed for general information.

There is also reason to believe that foreigners frequently become citizens of the United States for the sole purpose of evading duties imposed by the laws of their native countries, to which, on becoming naturalized here, they at once repair, and, though never returning to the United States, they still claim the interposition of this Government as citizens. Many alterations and great prejudices have heretofore arisen out of this abuse. It is, therefore, submitted to your serious consideration. It might be advisable to fix a limit, beyond which no citizen of the United States residing abroad may claim the interposition of his Government.

The right of suffrage has often been assumed and exercised by aliens, under pretenses of naturalization, which they have disavowed when drafted into the military service. I submit the expediency of such an amendment of the law as will make the fact of voting an estoppel against any plea of exemption from military service, or other civil obligation, on the ground of alienage.

The condition of the several organized Territories is generally satisfactory, although Indian disturbances in New Mexico have not been entirely suppressed. The mineral resources of Colorado, Nevada, Idaho, New Mexico, and Arizona are proving far richer than has been heretofore understood. I lay before you a communication on this subject from the Governor of New Mexico. I again submit to your consideration the expediency of establishing a system for the encouragement of immigration. Although this source of National wealth and strength is again flowing with greater freedom than for several years before the insurrection occurred, there is still a great deficiency of laborers in every field of industry, especially in agriculture and in our mines, as well of iron and coal as of the precious metals. While the demand for labor is thus increased here, tens of thousands of persons, destitute of remunerative occupation, are thronging our foreign consulates, and offering to emigrate to the United States if essential, but very cheap, assistance can be afforded them. It is easy to see that, under the sharp discipline of civil war, the nation is beginning a new life. This noble effort demands the aid, and ought to receive the attention and support, of the Government.

Injuries, unforeseen by the Government and unintended, may, in some cases, have been inflicted on the subjects or citizens of foreign countries, both at sea and on land, by persons in the service of the United States. As this Government expects

redress from other Powers when similar injuries are inflicted by persons in their service upon citizens of the United States, we must be prepared to do justice to foreigners. If the existing judicial tribunals are inadequate to this purpose, a special court may be authorized, with power to hear and decide such claims of the character referred to as may have arisen under treaties and the public law. Conventions for adjusting the claims by joint commission have been proposed to some Governments, but no definite answer to the proposition has yet been received from any.

In the course of the session, I shall probably have occasion to request you to provide indemnification to claimants where decrees of restitution have been rendered and damages awarded by admiralty courts, and in other cases, where this Government may be acknowledged to be liable in principle, and where the amount of that liability has been ascertained by an informal arbitration.

The proper officers of the Treasury have deemed themselves required, by the law of the United States upon the subject, to demand a tax upon the incomes of foreign consuls in this country. While such demand may not, in strictness, be in derogation of public law, or perhaps of any existing treaty between the United States and a foreign country, the expediency of so far modifying the act as to exempt from tax the income of such consuls as are not citizens of the United States, derived from the emoluments of their office, or from property not situated in the United States, is submitted to your serious consideration. I make this suggestion upon the ground that a comity which ought to be reciprocated exempts our consuls, in all other countries, from taxation to the extent thus indicated. The United States, I think, ought not to be exceptionally illiberal to international trade and commerce.

The operations of the Treasury during the last year have been successfully conducted. The enactment by Congress of a National Banking Law has proved a valuable support of the public credit; and the general legislation in relation to loans has fully answered the expectations of its favorers. Some amendments may be required to perfect existing laws; but no change in their principles or general scope is believed to be needed.

Since these measures have been in operation, all demands on the Treasury, including the pay of the Army and Navy, have been promptly met and fully satisfied. No considerable body of troops, it is believed, were ever more amply provided, and more liberally and punctually paid; and it may be added that

by no people were the burdens incident to a great war ever more cheerfully borne.

The receipts during the year from all sources, including loans and the balance in the Treasury at its commencement, were \$901,125,674 86, and the aggregate disbursements, \$895,796,630 65, leaving a balance on the 1st of July, 1863, of \$5,329,044 21. Of the receipts there were derived from customs \$69,059,642 40; from internal revenue, \$37,640,787 95; from direct tax, \$1,485,103 61; from lands, \$167,617 17; from miscellaneous sources, \$3,046,615 35; and from loans, \$776,622,361 57; making the aggregate, \$901,125,674 86. Of the disbursements, there were, for the civil service, \$23,253,922 08; for pensions and Indians, \$4,216,520 79, for interest on public debt, \$24,729,846 51; for the War Department, \$599,298,600 83; for the Navy Department \$63,211,105 27; for payment of funded and temporary debt \$181,086,635 07; making the aggregate, \$895,796,630 65; and leaving the balance of \$5,329,044 21. But the payment of funded and temporary debt, having been made from moneys borrowed during the year, must be regarded as merely nominal payments, and the moneys borrowed to make them as merely nominal receipts; and their amount, \$181,086,635 07, should therefore be deducted both from receipts and disbursements. This being done, there remain, as actual receipts, \$720,039,039 79; and the actual disbursements, \$714,709,995 58, leaving the balance as already stated.

The actual receipts and disbursements for the first quarter, and the estimated receipts and disbursements for the remaining three quarters, of the current fiscal year 1864, will be shown in detail by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, to which I invite your attention. It is sufficient to say here that it is not believed that actual results will exhibit a state of the finances less favorable to the country than the estimates of that officer heretofore submitted; while it is confidently expected that at the close of the year both disbursements and debt will be found very considerably less than has been anticipated.

The report of the Secretary of War is a document of great interest. It consists of—

1. The military operations of the year, detailed in the report of the General-in-Chief.
2. The organization of colored persons into the war service.
3. The exchange of prisoners, fully set forth in the letter of General Hitchcock.
4. The operations under the act for enrolling and calling ou

the National forces, detailed in the report of the Provost Marshal General.

5. The organization of the invalid corps ; and

6. The operation of the several departments of the Quartermaster General, Commissary General, Paymaster General, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, and Surgeon General.

It has appeared impossible to make a valuable summary of this report, except such as would be too extended for this place, and hence I content myself by asking your careful attention to the report itself.

The duties devolving on the naval branch of the service during the year, and throughout the whole of this unhappy contest, have been discharged with fidelity and eminent success. The extensive blockade has been constantly increasing in efficiency, and the Navy has expanded ; yet on so long a line it has so far been impossible to entirely suppress illicit trade. From returns received at the Navy Department, it appears that more than one thousand vessels have been captured since the blockade was instituted, and that the value of prizes already sent in for adjudication, amounts to over thirteen million dollars.

The naval force of the United States consists, at this time, of five hundred and eighty-eight vessels, completed and in the course of completion, and of these seventy-five are iron-clad or armored steamers. The events of the war give an increased interest and importance to the Navy, which will probably extend beyond the war itself.

The armored vessels in our Navy, completed and in service, or which are under contract and approaching completion, are believed to exceed in number those of any other Power. But while these may be relied upon for harbor defense and coast service, others, of greater strength and capacity, will be necessary for cruising purposes, and to maintain our rightful position on the ocean.

The change that has taken place in naval vessels and naval warfare since the introduction of steam as a motive power for ships-of-war, demands either a corresponding change in some of our existing navy-yards, or the establishment of new ones, for the construction and necessary repair of modern naval vessels. No inconsiderable embarrassment, delay, and public injury have been experienced from the want of such Governmental establishments. The necessity of such a navy-yard, so furnished, at some suitable place upon the Atlantic seaboard, has, on repeated occasions, been brought to the attention of Congress by the Navy Department, and is again presented in the report of the Secretary which accompanies this communication.

I think it my duty to invite your special attention to this subject, and also to that of establishing a yard and depot for naval purposes upon one of the Western rivers. A naval force has been created on those interior waters, and under many disadvantages, within little more than two years, exceeding in numbers the whole naval force of the country at the commencement of the present Administration. Satisfactory and important as have been the performances of the heroic men of the Navy at this interesting period, they are scarcely more wonderful than the success of our mechanics and artisans in the production of war vessels, which has created a new form of naval power.

Our country has advantages superior to any other nation in our resources of iron and timber, with inexhaustible quantities of fuel in the immediate vicinity of both, and all available and in close proximity to navigable waters. Without the advantage of public works, the resources of the nation have been developed, and its power displayed, in the construction of a navy of such magnitude, which has, at the very period of its creation, rendered signal service to the Union.

The increase of the number of seamen in the public service, from seven thousand five hundred men in the spring of 1861, to about thirty-four thousand at the present time, has been accomplished without special legislation or extraordinary bounties to promote that increase. It has been found, however, that the operation of the draft, with the high bounties paid for army recruits, is beginning to affect injuriously the naval service, and will, if not corrected, be likely to impair its efficiency, by detaching seamen from their proper vocation and inducing them to enter the army. I therefore respectfully suggest that Congress might aid both the army and naval services by a definite provision on this subject, which would at the same time be equitable to the communities more especially interested.

I commend to your consideration the suggestions of the Secretary of the Navy in regard to the policy of fostering and training seamen, and also the education of officers and engineers for the naval service. The Naval Academy is rendering signal service in preparing midshipmen for the highly responsible duties which in after-life they will be required to perform. In order that the country should not be deprived of the proper quota of educated officers for which legal provision has been made at the Naval School, the vacancies caused by the neglect or omission to make nominations from the States in insurrection have been filled by the Secretary of the Navy. The school is now more full and complete than at any former

period, and in every respect entitled to the favorable consideration of Congress.

During the past fiscal year the financial condition of the Post Office Department has been one of increasing prosperity, and I am gratified in being able to state that the actual postal revenue has nearly equaled the entire expenditures; the latter amounting to \$11,314,206 84, and the former to \$11,163,789 59, leaving a deficiency of but \$150,417 25. In 1860, the year immediately preceding the rebellion, the deficiency amounted to \$5,656,705 49, the postal receipts of that year being \$2,645,722 19 less than those of 1863. The decrease since 1860 in the annual amount of transportation has been only about 25 per cent., but the annual expenditure on account of the same has been reduced 35 per cent. It is manifest, therefore, that the Post Office Department may become self-sustaining in a few years, even with the restoration of the whole service.

The quantity of land disposed of during the last and the first quarter of the present fiscal years was 3,841,549 acres, of which 161,911 acres were sold for cash, 1,456,514 acres were taken up under the homestead law, and the residue disposed of under laws granting lands for military bounties, for railroad and other purposes. It also appears that the sale of the public lands is largely on the increase.

It has long been a cherished opinion of some of our wisest statesmen that the people of the United States had a higher and more enduring interest in the early settlement and substantial cultivation of the public lands than in the amount of direct revenue to be derived from the sale of them. This opinion has had a controlling influence in shaping legislation upon the subject of our National domain. I may cite, as evidence of this, the liberal measures adopted in reference to actual settlers; the grants to the States of the overflowed lands within their limits, in order to their being reclaimed and rendered fit for cultivation; the grants to railway companies of alternate sections of land upon the contemplated lines of their roads, which, when completed, will so largely multiply the facilities for reaching our distant possessions. This policy has received its most signal and beneficent illustration in the recent enactment granting homesteads to actual settlers. Since the 1st day of January last, the before-mentioned quantity of 1,456,514 acres of land have been taken up under its provisions. This fact and the amount of sales furnish gratifying evidence of increasing settlement upon the public lands, notwithstanding the great struggle in which the energies of the Nation have been en-

gaged, and which has required so large a withdrawal of our citizens from their accustomed pursuits.

The measures provided at your last session for the removal of certain Indian tribes, have been carried into effect. Sundry treaties have been negotiated which will, in due time, be submitted for the constitutional action of the Senate. They contain stipulations for extinguishing the possessory rights of the Indians to large and valuable tracts of lands. It is hoped that the effect of these treaties will result in the establishment of permanent friendly relations with such of these tribes as have been brought into frequent and bloody collision with our outlying settlements and emigrants. Sound policy and our imperative duty to these wards of the Government demand our anxious and constant attention to their material well-being, to their progress in the arts of civilization, and above all, to that moral training which, under the blessing of Divine Providence, will confer upon them the elevated and sanctifying influences, the hopes and consolations of the Christian faith.

When Congress assembled a year ago, the war had already lasted nearly twenty months; and there had been many conflicts on both land and sea, with varying results. The rebellion had been pressed back into reduced limits; yet the tone of public feeling and opinion, at home and abroad, was not satisfactory. With other signs, the popular elections, then just past, indicated uneasiness among ourselves, while, amid much that was cold and menacing, the kindest words coming from Europe were uttered in accents of pity that we were too blind to surrender a hopeless cause. Our commerce was suffering greatly by a few armed vessels built upon and furnished from foreign shores; and we were threatened with such additions from the same quarter as would sweep our trade from the sea and raise our blockade. We had failed to elicit from European Governments any thing hopeful upon this subject. The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued in September, was running its assigned period to the beginning of the new year. A month later the final proclamation came, including the announcement that colored men of suitable condition would be received into the war service. The policy of emancipation, and of employing black soldiers, gave to the future a new aspect, about which hope and fear and doubt contended in uncertain conflict. According to our political system, as a matter of civil administration, the General Government had no lawful power to effect emancipation in any State; and for a long time it had been hoped that the rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it as a military measure. It was all the while deemed possible that the necessity for it might come, and that

if it should, the crisis of the contest would then be presented. It came, and as was anticipated, it was followed by dark and doubtful days. Eleven months having now passed, we are permitted to take another review. The Rebel borders are pressed still further back, and by the complete opening of the Mississippi the country dominated by the rebellion is divided into distinct parts, with no practical communication between them. Tennessee and Arkansas have been substantially cleared of insurgent control, and influential citizens in each, owners of slaves and advocates of slavery at the beginning of the rebellion, now declare openly for emancipation in their respective States. Of those States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, Maryland and Missouri, neither of which, three years ago, would tolerate any restraint upon the extension of slavery into new Territories, only dispute now as to the best mode of removing it within their own limits.

Of those who were slaves at the beginning of the rebellion, full one hundred thousand are now in the United States military service, about one-half of which number actually bear arms in the ranks; thus giving the double advantage of taking so much labor from the insurgent cause, and supplying the places which otherwise must be filled with so many white men. So far as tested, it is difficult to say they are not as good soldiers as any. No servile insurrection, or tendency to violence or cruelty, has marked the measures of emancipation and arming the blacks. These measures have been much discussed in foreign countries, and contemporary with such discussion the tone of public sentiment there is much improved. At home the same measures have been fully discussed, supported, criticised, and denounced, and the annual elections following are highly encouraging to those whose official duty it is to bear the country through this great trial. Thus we have the new reckoning. The crisis which threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past.

Looking now to the present and future, and with reference to a resumption of the National authority within the States wherein that authority has been suspended, I have thought fit to issue a proclamation, a copy of which is herewith transmitted. On examination of this proclamation it will appear, as is believed, that nothing is attempted beyond what is amply justified by the Constitution. True, the form of an oath is given, but no man is coerced to take it. The man is only promised a pardon in case he voluntarily takes the oath. The Constitution authorizes the Executive to grant or withhold the pardon at his own absolute discretion; and this includes the

power to grant on terms, as is fully established by judicial and other authorities.

It is also proffered that if, in any of the States named, a State Government shall be, in the mode prescribed, set up, such Government shall be recognized and guaranteed by the United States, and that under it the State shall, on the constitutional conditions, be protected against invasion and domestic violence. The constitutional obligation of the United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and to protect the State, in the cases stated, is explicit and full. But why tender the benefits of this provision only to a State Government set up in this particular way? This section of the Constitution contemplates a case wherein the element within a State favorable to republican government, in the Union, may be too feeble for an opposite and hostile element external to or even within the State; and such are precisely the cases with which we are now dealing.

An attempt to guarantee and protect a revived State Government, constructed in whole, or in preponderating part, from the very element against whose hostility and violence it is to be protected, is simply absurd. There must be a test by which to separate the opposing element, so as to build only from the sound; and that test is a sufficiently liberal one, which accepts as sound whoever will make a sworn recantation of his former unsoundness.

But if it be proper to require, as a test, of admission to the political body, an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, and to the Union under it, why also to the laws and proclamations in regard to slavery? Those laws and proclamations were enacted and put forth for the purpose of aiding in the suppression of the rebellion. To give them their fullest effect, there had to be a pledge for their maintenance. In my judgment they have aided, and will further aid, the cause for which they were intended. To now abandon them would be not only to relinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith. I may add at this point that, while I remain in my present position, I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation; nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress. For these and other reasons, it is thought best that support of these measures shall be included in the oath; and it is believed the Executive may lawfully claim it in return for pardon and restoration of forfeited rights, which he has clear constitutional power to withhold altogether, or grant upon the terms which he shall deem wisest for the public interest. It

should be observed, also, that this part of the oath is subject to the modifying and abrogating power of legislation and supreme judicial decision.

The proposed acquiescence of the National Executive in any reasonable temporary State arrangement for the freed people, is made with the view of possibly modifying the confusion and destitution which must, at best, attend all classes by a total revolution of labor throughout whole States. It is hoped that the already deeply afflicted people in those States may be somewhat more ready to give up the cause of their affliction, if, to this extent, this vital matter be left to themselves; while no power of the National Executive to prevent an abuse, is abridged by the proposition.

The suggestion in the proclamation as to maintaining the political framework of the States on what is called reconstruction, is made in the hope that it may do good without danger of harm. It will save labor, and avoid great confusion.

But why any proclamation now upon this subject? This question is beset with the conflicting views that the step might be delayed too long or be taken too soon. In some States the elements for resumption seem ready for action, but remain inactive, apparently for want of a rallying point—a plan of action. Why shall A adopt the plan of B, rather than B that of A? And if A and B should agree, how can they know but that the General Government here will reject their plan? By the proclamation a plan is presented which may be accepted by them as a rallying point, and which they are assured in advance will not be rejected here. This may bring them to act sooner than they otherwise would.

The objection to a premature presentation of a plan by the National Executive consists in the danger of committals on points which could be more safely left to further developments. Care has been taken to so shape the document as to avoid embarrassments from this source. Saying that, on certain terms, certain classes will be pardoned, with rights restored, it is not said that other classes or other terms will never be included. Saying that reconstruction will be accepted, if presented in a specified way, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way.

The movements, by State action, for emancipation in several of the States, not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, are matters of profound gratulation. And while I do not repeat in detail what I have heretofore so earnestly urged upon this subject, my general views and feelings remain unchanged; and I trust that Congress will omit no fair opportunity of aiding these important steps to a great consummation.

In the midst of other cares, however important, we must not lose sight of the fact that the war power is still our main reliance. To that power alone can we look, yet for a time, to give confidence to the people in the contested regions that the insurgent power will not again overrun them. Until that confidence shall be established, little can be done any-where for what is called reconstruction. Hence our chiefest care must still be directed to the Army and Navy, who have thus far borne their harder part so nobly and well. And it may be esteemed fortunate that in giving the greatest efficiency to these indispensable arms, we do also honorably recognize the gallant men, from commander to sentinel, who compose them, and to whom, more than to others, the world must stand indebted for the home of freedom disenthralled, regenerated, enlarged, and perpetuated.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

DECEMBER 8, 1863.

During its first session, the President found in this Congress the ready coöperation he needed in all measures for the prosecution of the war. A system of direct taxation, affording a firm basis for all Government securities, and insuring against financial disaster, was carefully matured and passed. The enactments required to carry out the policy of the distinguished Secretary of the Treasury, and to sustain his earnest efforts, hitherto successful, to meet all the pressing demands upon the National exchequer, received the necessary attention. A controlling desire to further the energetic exertions of the Government in preparing for the grand struggle with rebellion in its last desperate campaign, as hoped, was so manifested in the action of both Houses as to inspire the country with confidence in a speedy and favorable issue of the war.

The improved temper of the House of Representatives, as compared even with that of the preceding one, was seen in its severe and indignant censure of the Secessionist, Harris, of Maryland, (whose expulsion was voted by a decided majority of the members, failing of the requisite two-thirds only by the recusancy of Democrats professedly loyal,) and of his sympathizing coadjutor, Alexander Long, of Ohio, both declared "unworthy members" of that body. It will be borne in mind that Vallandigham, of whom Long was but a docile disciple, habitually belched his treasonable sentiments in the previous

House without official rebuke ; and that traitors, like Burnett, of Kentucky, and Reid, of Missouri, retained their seats therein through the extra session, going directly after into the Rebel military or civil service. Toleration to treason in utterance was now no longer a virtue.

On the first day of the session, Mr. Washburne, of Illinois, offered a joint resolution, reviving the rank of Lieutenant General in the army. This resolution was adopted by both Houses in the last days of February, and was approved by the President. All eyes were now turned upon Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, the hero of so many victories, who was seen to be, if not the most earnest and the most unselfish, at least the most successful, commander in a war, in which so many officers had won a high place in popular regard, as the fit person to receive this chief honor, with its immense responsibilities. The President immediately nominated Gen. Grant as Lieutenant General, and he was unanimously confirmed, on the 2d day of March, by the Senate. Having been called to Washington without delay, he received his commission with a rare modesty, and at once proceeded to organize a grand campaign, embracing the armies of the East and the West in a combined effort for their closing work.

In intrusting this great power to Lieut.-Gen. Grant, the direction of military affairs was limited by no hampering conditions. The entire forces of the country, with such subordinates and such preparations as he chose to ask, were freely placed at his disposal.

The Lieutenant General had not only heartily supported the Administration in its endeavors to put down, by vigorous attacks, a wantonly wicked insurrection, but he had emphatically expressed, in his correspondence, his personal approval of the President's policy of emancipation and of enrolling colored soldiers in the armies of the Government.

Earlier movements in Florida and in Louisiana, already undertaken, afforded no very auspicious opening to the campaigning season ; Fort Pillow on the Mississippi and Plymouth in North Carolina were captured by the Rebels, followed by massacres unparalleled in barbarism by the acts of any profes-

sedly civilized people since the darkest ages; but the grand armies of Eastern Tennessee and in Virginia, heavily increased in strength by new levies and by the withdrawal of troops from positions in which their action could not be effective in executing the intended advance upon the great central points of the rebellion, were put in condition for striking the last mortal blows upon a tottering conspiracy, too long suffered to gather hope from the delay of retribution on its crimes.

The following speech, delivered by Mr. Lincoln on the 18th of April, 1864, at a fair held in Baltimore for the benefit of the United States Sanitary Commission, is particularly suggestive, in regard to the date, place, and occasion of its delivery. On his way to Washington, in February, 1861, he passed through the city of Baltimore *incognito*, to escape from a plot of assassination, of which he had been forewarned. On the 19th of April, in the same year, the blood of loyal soldiers, on marching to protect the National Capital, had flowed in the streets of that city. He now stood before an immense throng in the same city, on the anniversary eve of the assault upon those soldiers, at the fair in aid of an organization for the benefit of Union soldiers every-where. He spoke, too, of slavery, and was loudly cheered when he referred to the practically accomplished annihilation of that institution in Maryland. He even took this opportunity—the first public occasion presented—to announce his determined purpose of enforcing retaliation (long before enjoined on the army by special orders) for the crime, then just perpetrated, of massacreing the colored garrison of Fort Pillow, refusing quarter.

The report of this speech, as it appeared in the Baltimore journals at the time, is here given :

After the cheering had ended, and after, with great exertions, order had been secured—every body being anxious to see the President—he said, substantially :

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN : Calling it to mind that we are in Baltimore, we can not fail to note that the world moves. [Applause.] Looking upon the many people I see assembled here to serve as they best may the soldiers of the Union, it occurs to me that three years ago those soldiers could not pass through Baltimore. I would say, blessings upon the men who have

wrought these changes, and the ladies who have assisted them. [Applause.] This change which has taken place in Baltimore, is part only of a far wider change that is taking place all over the country.

When the war commenced, three years ago, no one expected that it would last this long, and no one supposed that the institution of slavery would be materially affected by it. But here we are. The war is not yet ended, and slavery has been very materially affected or interfered with. [Loud applause.] So true is it that man proposes and God disposes.

The world is in want of a good definition of the word liberty. We all declare ourselves to be for liberty, but we do not all mean the same thing. Some mean that a man can do as he pleases with himself and his property. With others, it means that some men can do as they please with other men and other men's labor. Each of these things are called liberty, although they are entirely different. To give an illustration: A shepherd drives the wolf from the throat of his sheep when attacked by him, and the sheep, of course, thanks the shepherd for the preservation of his life; but the wolf denounces him as despoiling the sheep of his liberty—especially if it be a black sheep. [Applause.]

This same difference of opinion prevails among some of the people of the North. But the people of Maryland have recently been doing something to properly define the meaning of the word, and I thank them from the bottom of my heart for what they have done and are doing. [Applause.]

It is not very becoming for a President to make a speech at great length, but there is a painful rumor afloat in the country, in reference to which a few words shall be said. It is reported that there has been a wanton massacre of some hundreds of colored soldiers at Fort Pillow, Tennessee, during a recent engagement there, and it is fit to explain some facts in relation to the affair. It is said by some persons that the Government is not, in this matter, doing its duty. At the commencement of the war, it was doubtful whether black men would be used as soldiers or not. The matter was examined into very carefully, and after mature deliberation, the whole matter resting as it were with himself, he, in his judgment, decided that they should. [Applause.]

He was responsible for the act to the American people, to a Christian nation, to the future historian, and, above all, to his God, to whom he would have, one day, to render an account of his stewardship. He would now say that in his opinion the black soldier should have the same protection as the white soldier, and he would have it. [Applause.] It was an error to

say that the Government was not acting in the matter. The Government has no direct evidence to confirm the reports in existence relative to this massacre, but he himself believed the facts in relation to it to be as stated. When the Government does know the facts from official sources, and they prove to substantiate the reports, retribution will be surely given [Applause.]

A month earlier, Mr. Lincoln had made the following happy response to a call of the assembled multitude at a fair, for similar objects, held in Washington :

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I appear, to say but a word. This extraordinary war in which we are engaged falls heavily upon all classes of people, but the most heavily upon the soldier. For it has been said, all that a man hath will he give for his life; and, while all contribute of their substance, the soldier puts his life at stake, and often yields it up in his country's cause. The highest merit, then, is due to the soldier.

In this extraordinary war, extraordinary developments have manifested themselves, such as have not been seen in former wars; and among these manifestations nothing has been more remarkable than these fairs for the relief of suffering soldiers and their families. And the chief agents in these fairs are the women of America. I am not accustomed to the use of the language of eulogy; I have never studied the art of paying compliments to women; but I must say that, if all that has been said by orators and poets, since the creation of the world, in praise of women, were applied to the women of America, it would not do them justice for their conduct during this war. I will close by saying, God bless the women of America [Great applause.]

The spring elections of 1864, in New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island, showed still more decidedly than those of the previous year, that the Administration had become strong in the confidence and affection of the people. That this gratifying result had a direct relation to Mr. Lincoln in person, is seen in the fact that the Administration party in each of those States, had committed itself, without dissent, in favor of his reelection, making this a distinct issue of the canvass. In twelve other States, nearly at the same time, the popular voice, as declared through State Conventions or Legislatures demanded, with like unanimity and enthusiasm, that Mr. Lin

coln should continue in the Presidency for another term. A similar current of opinion was seen to exist in every other loyal State. Since the celebrated "era of good feeling," in the days of President Monroe, this manifestation of popular sentiment has had no parallel. Abroad, too, no less than at home, the true friends of our Government have almost universally looked upon the reelection of Mr. Lincoln, under the present circumstances of the country, as the manifest interest and duty of the American people.

The policy of Mr. Lincoln's Administration has been fully set forth in his own words. No dissembling, no insincerity, gives the least false tinge to any of his public papers or addresses. This outspoken, frank, confiding way of his, has given him a hold upon the popular heart, and upon the love of all true men, such as few statesmen have ever had. "Honesty" is the word which has been commonly used in speaking of this trait—coupled with a sterling integrity that excludes all selfish and sinister ends; yet it is something more, as the Golden Rule has a wider scope than simple justice. He not only really believes in the right and the true as infinitely preferable to the wrong and the false, both in means and in end, but he is also sure that the people have the same pure faith, and will judge him with that degree of candor which he uses in unfolding to them his purposes and his thoughts. The spirit of that Diplomacy which conceals, and feigns, and doubles, and deceives, never for a moment darkened his mind.

Of necessity, the questions relating to slavery and the African element of our population, have occupied the foremost ground during all this great struggle, in which Mr. Lincoln has been called to lead the organized action of the nation. His whole policy on this general subject, and a concise history of his action and of the processes of his mind thereon, are set forth, with admirable frankness and precision, in the following letter to a gentleman in Kentucky:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, April 4, 1864. }

A. G. HODGES, Esq., Frankfort, Ky.—*My Dear Sir:* You ask me to put in writing the substance of what I verbally said,

the other day, in your presence, to Gov. Bramlette and Senator Dixon. It was about as follows :

I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I can not remember when I did not so think and feel. And yet, I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath I took, that I would, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it my view, that I might take an oath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too, that, in ordinary civil administration, this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary, abstract judgment, on the moral question of slavery. I had publicly declared this many times, and in many ways. And I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery.

I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that Government—that Nation—of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the Nation, and yet preserve the Constitution?

By general law, life and limb must be protected ; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life ; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I feel that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through the preservation of the Nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that to the best of my ability I had even tried to preserve the Constitution, if to save slavery or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of Government, Country and Constitution, all together. When early in the war, Gen. Fremont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think it an indispensable necessity. When a little later, Gen. Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, Gen. Hunter attempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come.

When, in March, and May, and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the Border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposi-

tion, and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter. In choosing it, I hoped for greater gain than loss; but of this I was not entirely confident. More than a year of trial now shows no loss by it, in our foreign relations; none in our home popular sentiment: none in our white military force—no loss by it anyhow or any-where. On the contrary, it shows a gain of quite a hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, seamen, and laborers. These are palpable facts, about which, as facts, there can be no caviling. We have the men, and we could not have had them without the measure.

And now let any Union man who complains of the measure, test himself, by writing down in one line that he is for subduing the rebellion by force of arms, and in the next that he is for taking these 130,000 men from the Union side, and placing them where they would be, but for the measure he condemns. If he can not face his cause so stated, it is only because he can not face the truth.

I add a word, which was not in the verbal conversation. In telling this tale, I attempt no compliment to my own sagacity. I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years' struggle, the Nation's condition is not what either party or any man devised or expected. God alone can claim it. Whither it is tending, seems plain. If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and wills also that we of the North, as well as you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new cause to attest and revere the justice and goodness of God.

Yours, truly,

A. LINCOLN.

When Mr. Lincoln's determination to employ negro soldiers first became publicly known, it encountered "conservative" opposition in the loyal States. To many, even, who hoped success from this movement, it was a doubtful experiment. The results shown in the foregoing letter, leave this no longer an open question. Prejudice has given way before demonstrated fact, until soldiers in the field and citizens at home now welcome the aid of this immense power, wrested from the enemy and added to the loyal armies.

The arch conspirator at Richmond had the sagacity to see that serious consequences were involved in this policy. Resorting to the methods so long potent with the men of his class, and

seemingly forgetful, for the moment, that they were not still equally available, he fulminated a threatening edict, designed to arrest this work by intimidation. It was plainly indicated that neither black soldiers nor their white officers need claim any of the immunities recognized under the laws of war. This was emphatically met by the President, in the only possible way by orders for retaliation, issued to our armies.

General Order, No. 100, under date of April 24, 1863, promulgating general instructions for the government of our armies, "previously approved by the President," contain the following directions, specially enjoining the protection of colored troops:

The law of nations knows of no distinction of color, and if an enemy of the United States should enslave and sell any captured persons of their army, it would be a case for the severest retaliation, if not redressed upon complaint. The United States can not retaliate by enslavement; therefore, death must be the retaliation for this crime against the law of nations.

All troops of the enemy known or discovered to give no quarter in general, or to any portion of the army, receive none.

Mr. Lincoln made these instructions more explicit and direct, in the following order issued by himself as Commander-in-Chief, and communicated to the entire Army, referring to this subject alone:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, }
WASHINGTON, July 30, 1863. }

It is the duty of every Government to give protection to its citizens, of whatever class, color or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of Nations, and the usages and customs of war, as carried on by civilized powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person, on account of his color, and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism, and a crime against the civilization of the age.

The Government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers; and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any one because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession.

It is therefore ordered, that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a Rebel soldier shall be executed; and for every one enslaved by the enemy or

sold into slavery, a Rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works, and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

How completely the Administration has been able, under the often critical and complicated situations resulting from an extended blockade of our coast, from a premature concession of belligerent rights to armed Rebels by leading powers of Europe, from the constant and crafty efforts of Secession emissaries to secure a recognition of the so-called Confederacy by those powers, and from all the incidents of an unprecedented civil war, necessarily affecting our foreign relations in various ways, to maintain peace with other nations, can not be lost sight of in the excitement of military events at home. The value of this successful pacific policy—which has been attended by an increase rather than a diminution of respect abroad—can not be too highly estimated.

Not less conspicuous is the success which has attended the financial policy of the Government. This is, indeed, a marvel which would have hardly been credited in advance as possible, with the prospect of a war lengthened out beyond the period of three years, and calling into the service a million and a half of men, with all the attendant expenditures. To-day, however, Government securities are firm; no one doubts the full payment of every dollar of the public indebtedness; every new loan is speedily taken; and no adjusted claim has long to await liquidation.

The operations of the Army and Navy, related in only the merest summary of the more prominent events, and necessarily excluding more than an allusion to much that would have required volumes to detail at large, have engrossed a great portion of the preceding pages. Could exact justice be done in such a narrative, as affecting both these branches of the service, it would clearly appear that neither has been wanting in efficient executive management, or in its proper share of the great work already accomplished. On these two strong arms of war, now so organized by the President as to secure universal confidence, must mainly depend the future issues of the great conflict.

J. B. R.

